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
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
OF
A N N A M B H A T T A ,

WITH A
HINDÍ PARAPHRASE AND ENGLISH VERSION.

PRINTED, FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE, BY ORDER OF
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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE design of this Hindí paraphrase is to facilitate the reading of the popular Sanskrit compendium of the Nyáya Philosophy in the Hindí department of the College, and to call attention to some of the points in which the progress of science has led to changes of opinion since the time when Annam Bhaṭṭa wrote. These ends the version may at present subserve; but, in subsequent efforts in the same line, it is to be hoped that our pandits will gradually find the Hindí language becoming a more tractable instrument. At present it is in their hands emphatically a *lingua volgare*.

The English version has had the advantage of being revised, and in part constructed, by Mr. F. Edward Hall.

J. R. B.

Benares College, 8th Sept. 1851.



T R A N S L A T I O N
O F T H E H I N D Í V E R S I O N O F
A N D
C O M M E N T
O N T H E T A R K A - S A N G R A H A .

This translation, into the Hindí language, of the compendious treatise, the *Tarka-Sangraha*, on the *Vaiśeshika śástra*, composed by the sacred teacher *Kañáda*, is made for this purpose, that people who know Sanskrit even a little, may understand this book with ease.

Translation.

Having placed in my heart the Lord of the world, [that is to say, having meditated on God,] and having saluted my preceptor, I compose this treatise, named the Compendium of Logical results for the pleasant comprehension of the uninstructed.

Remarks.

According to the opinion of the illustrious teacher *Kaṇḍa*, the categories are seven. That is to say, there is not in the world any thing such that the name of it cannot be expressed by that of one or other of these categories. As—what is a Man?—we may say that he is a Substance:—and a Stone, which is a very different thing from a Man, is nevertheless a Substance. Redness, and Length, although they are different, are nevertheless both called Qualities. And, just so, whatever is understood by each several name, is amongst those seven categories.

Translation.

Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Difference, Co-inherence, and Non-existence,—these are the seven Categories.

Remark.

The definition of each category amongst these seven categories will be written down further on, for this reason, that synonymous terms for them do not exist in the *Hindī*.

Translation.

Amongst those [that is to say, amongst the Categories], Substances [that is to say, the abodes of Qualities] are nine—Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Place, Soul, and Mind.

Remarks.

Those learned in the science of Chemistry, dwelling in Eu-

rope, say that Water [which the Indian learned men say is an un-mixed substance] is formed of two airs; and, of these, the one air is the principal constituent of the air adapted for our breathing. The proof of this will be found detailed in chemical treatises.

Now, after this, Quality [that is to say, the character of a thing—as the character of Earth is Weight, and Colour, &c.] is spoken of. This is of twenty-four kinds.

Translation.

Colour, Savour, Odour, Tangibility, Number, Dimension, Severalty, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Weight, Fluidity, Viscidity, Sound, Understanding, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit and Demerit, Faculty.

Remark.

Of these Qualities severally the definition will be written down further on. We now write down of how many kinds Action is.

Translation.

To throw upwards, to throw downwards, to contract, to expand, to go:—these are called the five Actions.

Genus [that is to say, a common nature, as the nature common to jars, the nature common to webs, &c.] is of two kinds—higher and lower.

Remark.

The definition of these will be found further on.

Translation.

Differences, which reside in eternal substances, are endless. >

Remarks.

By "eternal substances" are understood Mind, Soul, Time, Atoms, &c. They call "Atom" that from which, according to the opinion of the followers of the *Nyāya*, the production of Earth, Water, &c., takes place.

Translation.

Co-inherence is one only.

Non-existence [that is to say, the fact of not existing] is of four kinds—antecedent non-existence, destruction, absolute non-existence, and mutual non-existence.

Remark.

After stating the divisions of the several categories, we now write down the definitions of the several Substances.

Translation.

They call "Earth" that in which there is the quality Odour. It is of two kinds, eternal and un-eternal. In its atomic character it is eternal; and when some product arises out of those atoms, then that is called un-eternal.

This [that is to say,—Earth in the character of a product] is of three kinds, through these differences—body, organ of sense, mass. The body is that of us men. The organ is the apprehender of odour, called the Smell, which resides in the fore-part of the nose. And the masses [that is to say, what have parts,] are clods, stones, &c.

What appears cold on touching it, that they call Water.

And that (namely, water) is of two kinds—eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal; and when a product is produced by those atoms, then that is called un-eternal. In the form of products, water is of three kinds, through the difference of body, sense, and mass. The body exists in the world of Varuṇa; and the sense is the percipient of savour, which they call the Taste. It resides in the fore-part of the tongue. And the masses are rivers, seas, and the like.

That of which the sensation by touch is warm, they call Light. This is of two kinds, eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal, and in the form of products it is un-eternal. This light in the form of products is of three kinds, through these differences—body, sense, and mass. The body exists in the solar realm—this is a familiar assertion. The sense, the percipient of colour, which they call the Sight, resides in the fore-part of the pupil of the eye. And the masses are of four kinds, through these differences—produced in earth, produced in the sky, produced in the stomach, and produced in mines. Produced in earth, it is fire, &c. Produced in the sky, it is lightning and the like, the fuel of which is water. And that is resident in the stomach which is the cause of the digestion of things eaten. That light is produced in mines which, such as gold and the like, is found in mines.

Remarks.

But on this matter the learned inhabiting Europe say that the alvine heat is the effect of the digestion of things eaten, but not the cause. The explanation of this point is written fully in their books of chemical science.

In the *Nyāya Śāstra* they say of the sense of Sight that it is light; and when, having gone out from the pupil of the eye, it

comes in contact with the object, then there is to the Soul the cognizance of colour. And in the *Bhāshā-parichchheda* it is written that the Sight apprehends colour through its conjunction with light and with perceptible colour. But modern enquirers into the laws of vision say that we have the perception of colour from the coming of light into the eye, and not by the proceeding of colour from the eye to the object. As people strike a ball against a wall, and it comes back by reason of its elasticity, just so the light, having come from the sun or the like, having come in contact with a coloured object, goes into the eye. Then there is to the Soul the cognizance of colour. And Europeans believe that elasticity exists in Air, &c.; as it is written in the *Bhāshā-parichchheda* that "Some people believe that elasticity exists in all the four elements."

Translation.

That which has not colour, and has tangibility, they call Air. It is of two kinds—eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal; and in the form of products it is un-eternal. Air in the form of products is of three kinds—through the differences of body, sense, and mass. The body is in the aerial world. The sense is the Touch, the apprehender of tangibility, existing throughout the whole body. Its mass is that which is the cause of the shaking of trees and the like.

Remarks.

In these days people generally believe that air is a colourless substance; but others say that its colour is blue—and the proof of this shall be written where an account is given of the Qualities.

Translation.

Air circulating within the body is called *prāna*. Although it is but one, yet, from the difference of its accidents, it is called breath, flatulence, cerebral pulsation, general pulsation, and digestion.

They call that Ether in which there resides the quality of sound. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.

The cause of the employment of 'Past,' 'Present,' and 'Future,' they call Time. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal.

The cause of the employment of 'East,' 'West,' &c., they call Space. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal.

The substratum of Knowledge (that is,—that in which knowledge resides)—they call Soul. It is of two kinds—the animal soul, and the Supreme soul. The Supreme soul is God, the Omniscient. He is One only, and devoid of joy or sorrow. And the animal soul is distributed to each body. It is all-pervading and eternal.

The sense which is the cause of the perception of pleasure and pain, &c., they call the Mind. And it is innumerable—for this reason that it remains with each Soul. It is in the form of an atom, and is eternal.

Remark.

In the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* it is said that the mind is all-pervading; but the *Naiyāyikas* object, to this opinion, that if we admit the mind to be all-pervading, then it would at one time take cognizance of the objects of all the senses, and such cannot be the case.

Translation.

That quality which is apprehended only by the sense of Sight,

they call Colour. And this quality is of seven kinds—through these differences, white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown, and variegated. This quality resides in earth, water, and light. In earth, colour of all the seven kinds resides; and in water, white colour not lustrous resides; and lustrous white colour resides in light.

Remark.

According to modern European philosophers, all colour resides only in light, which we can exhibit, separated, by means of a prism—(a three-cornered stick of glass).

Translation.

The quality which is known through the sense of Taste, they call Savour. And it (namely, the quality of Savour) is of six kinds, through the differences of Sweet, Sour, Saline, Bitter, Astringent, and Pungent. This quality resides in earth and water. In earth there is savour of the six kinds; and in water there is only the sweet savour.

Remark.

Modern European philosophers say that in pure water there is no savour; and sweetness is found only in sugar and such things.

Translation.

The quality which is apprehended by the sense of Smell, they call Odour. It is of two kinds, fragrance and stench. This quality resides in earth alone.

They call that quality Tangibility which they perceive only by the organ of Touch. This quality is of three kinds, through the distinctions of cold, warm, and temperate, [that is to say, neither cold nor warm]. This quality resides in earth, water, light, and air. Coldness to the touch resides in water, warmth to the touch in light, and temperateness in earth and air.

The four of which Colour is the first, [that is to say, Colour, Savour, Odour, and Tangibility] may be produced in Earth [that is to say, in earthy things,] by maturation [that is to say, by the special conjunction of Heat], and they are then transient. In others [that is to say, in Water, Light, and Air,] Colour and the like are not produced by the conjunction of Heat. They are here eternal or transient. When they reside in eternal things they are eternal, and when they reside in things not eternal, they are said to be transient.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of Unity, and the like, Number. This, [that is to say, Number,] resides in the nine Substances; and, reckoning from Unity, it is as far as a "*láksh* of *lákhs* of *karors*." Unity is both eternal and un-eternal. It is eternal in an eternal thing, and un-eternal in an un-eternal thing:—but Duality, and the like, is everywhere un-eternal.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of Bulk, Measure. This quality resides in the nine Substances; and it, [that is to say, Measure,] is of four kinds—through the distinctions of small, great, long, and short.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of [things as] numerically distinct, Severalty. This quality resides in all the Substances.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of [things as] conjoined, Conjunction. This quality also resides in all the Substances.

They call the quality which annihilates Conjunction, Disjunction ; and this resides in all the Substances.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of [things as] Far and Near, Remoteness and Proximity. These qualities reside in earth, water, light, air, and mind. They are of two kinds—made by Space and made by Time. There is Remoteness made by space in that thing which remains in a distant place, and Proximity made by space in that thing which remains in a place near. In the person who is the elder, there is Remoteness made by time; and in the person who is the younger, there is Proximity made by time. [Distance and Proximity are determined by relation.]

They call the quality which is the non-intimate cause of incipient falling, Weight. This quality resides in earth and in water.

The quality which is the non-intimate cause of incipient trickling, [that is to say, oozing or melting or flowing,] is called Fluidity. It affects earth, light, and water. This quality is of two kinds—natural, [that is to say, established by its own nature,] and adscititious, [that is to say, produced by some cause]. Natural Fluidity resides in water. And adscititious Fluidity resides in earth and light. In earthy substances, butter and the like, Fluidity is produced by the conjunction of fire.

They call the quality which is the cause why particles and the like become a heap, Viscidity. This quality resides in water alone.

They call the quality which is apprehended by the organ of hearing, Sound. This quality resides only in the Ether. It is of two kinds—inarticulate and articulate. Inarticulate sound is produced by the instrumentality of a drum or the like. Sound which is in the shape of the Sanskrit, [the Hindí,] or any other language, is called articulate, [that is to say, in the form of syllables].

Knowledge, which is the cause of every conception, [that can

be put in words] they call Understanding. It is of two kinds, Remembrance and Notion.

The knowledge which is produced only by its own antecedence [i. e. by itself as its own antecedent], they call Remembrance :—and knowledge which is different from that is called Notion. This, [that is to say, Notion,] is of two kinds—right and wrong.

Of whatever description any thing is, when our idea of that thing is of that same description, it is called a right notion :—as, in the case of Silver, the idea of its being Silver. This is called *pramā* [that is to say, commensurate with its object.] The supposing a thing to be as the thing is not—such a notion is called a wrong notion :—as, in the case of a [pearly] Shell, the notion of its being Silver.

Right notion is of four kinds, according to the division of Perceptions, Inferences, Conclusions from similarity, and authoritative Assertions understood. And the efficient causes of these, [that is to say, their peculiar causes,] also are of four kinds—according to the division of Perception, Inference, Recognition of similarity, and authoritative Assertion.

Whatever thing, through its operating, is the cause, not common to all effects, of some given effect, that is the instrumental cause thereof.

That which is invariably antecedent to some product, and is not otherwise constituted—[i. e., is not by any thing else,—except the result in question,—constituted a cause]—is the cause [of that product].

That which annuls its own antecedent non-existence is called an Effect.

Cause is of three kinds, according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That in which an effect inti-

mately relative to it takes its rise, is an intimate cause [of that effect], as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own colour, &c. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause which is associated in one and the same object [as a necessarily immanent cause] with such effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the colour of the threads that of the colour of the cloth. The cause which is distinct from both of these is the instrumental cause, as the weaver's brush, the loom, &c., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that only is called an instrumental cause which is not a universally concurrent cause or condition [of all effects, as God, time, place, &c., are].

The cause of the knowledge [called] sensation is an organ of sense; knowledge produced by the conjunction of an organ of sense and its object, is sensation. It is of two kinds, where it does not pay regard to an alternative, and where it does. The knowledge which does not pay regard to an alternative is that which involves no specification, as in the simple cognition that 'this is something that exists.' The knowledge which contemplates an alternative is that which includes a specification, as 'This is *Dittha*,' 'This is a *Bráhmana*,' 'this is black.'

The relative proximity of a sense and its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds, (1.) conjunction, (2.) intimate union with that which is in conjunction, (3.) intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, (4.) intimate union, (5.) intimate union with that which is intimately united, and (6.) the connection which arises from the relation between that which qualifies and the thing qualified. For example, when a jar is perceived by the eye, there is [between the sense and the object] the proximity of conjunction. In the perception of the colour of the jar, there is the proximity of intimate union with that which is in conjunction, because the colour is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunction with the sense

of vision. In the perception of the fact that colour generically is present, there is the proximity of intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, because the generic property of being a colour is intimately united with the particular colour which is intimately united with the jar which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of sound by the organ of hearing, there is the proximity of intimate union, because the organ of hearing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of the ear, and sound is a quality of ether, and there is intimate union between a quality and that of which it is the quality. In the perception of the nature of sound [in a given sound of which we are cognizant] the proximity is that of intimate union with what is intimately united, because the nature of sound is intimately united with sound which is intimately united with the organ of hearing. In the perception of non-existence, the proximity is dependent on the relation between a distinctive quality and that which is so distinguished, because when the ground is [perceived to be] possessed of the nonexistence of a jar, the nonexistence of a jar distinguishes the ground which is in conjunction with the organ of vision.

Knowledge produced by these six kinds of proximity is perception. Its instrumental cause is sense. Thus it is settled that an organ of sense is what gives us the knowledge called sensation.

So much for the chapter on Sense.

The instrument [in the production] of an inference is a generalized fact. An inference is the knowledge that arises from deduction. Deduction is the ascertaining that the subject possesses that character which is invariably attended [by what we then predicate of it]. For example, the knowledge that 'this hill is characterised by smoke, which is always attended by fire,' is a deductive application of a general principle; the knowledge

produced from which, viz. that 'the hill is fiery,' is an inference. Invariable attendedness is the fact of being constantly accompanied,—as in the example 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire [by which it is invariably attended].' By 'the subject's possessing a character, &c.' we mean that in a mountain or the like there is present that [e. g., smoke] which is invariably attended [e. g., by fire].

A general principle is of two kinds, in so far as it may be useful for one's self, and for another. That which is employed for one's self is the cause of a private conclusion in one's own mind. For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having assumed that the concomitancy is invariable, having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendance of fire where there is smoke. Then the knowledge arises that 'this mountain is characterised by smoke, which is invariably attended by fire.' This is called *linga-parámarśa*, which means the consideration of a sign. Thence is produced the knowledge that the 'mountain is fiery,' which is the conclusion (*anumiti*). This is the process of inference for one's self.

But, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition for the instruction of another, then is the process one of inference for the sake of another. For example, (1.) The mountain is fiery; (2.) because it smokes; (3.) whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth; (4.) and this does so; (5.) therefore it is fiery as aforesaid. In consequence of the token here rendered, the other also admits that there is fire.

The five members of this syllogism are severally named: (1.) the proposition, (2.) the reason, (3.) the example, (4.) the application, and (5.) the conclusion. 'The mountain is fiery' is the

proposition ; 'because of its being smoky' is the reason ; 'whatever is smoky, &c.' is the example ; 'and so this mountain is' is the application ; 'therefore the mountain is fiery' is the conclusion.

The cause of an inference (*anumiti*) whether for one's self or for another, is simply the consideration of a sign ; therefore the *anumāna* [which was previously stated to be the cause of an inference] is just this consideration of a sign.

A sign or token (*linga*) is of three sorts, (1.) that which may betoken by its presence or by its absence (*anwaya-vyatireki*) ; (2.) that which betokens only by its presence (*kevalānwayi*) ; and (3.) that which betokens only by its absence (*kevalavyatireki*). The first is that token which is possessed of pervading inherence (*vyāpti*) both in respect of its association [with the thing which it betokens], and its absence [when the thing it betokens is absent], as, for example, *smokiness* when *fire* is to be proved. When it is said, 'where there is smoke there is fire, as on a culinary hearth,' we have a case of concomitant presence. When it is said, 'where fire is not, there smoke also is not, as in a great deep lake,' we have a case of concomitant absence. The second is that token which has no negative instance, as when it is said, 'the jar is nameable because it is cognizable, as cloth is,' there is no instance of nameableness or of cognizableness being present where the other is absent, because everything [that we can be conversant about] is both cognizable and nameable. The third is that token in regard to which we can reason only from its invariable absence. For example, [we might argue as follows] :—

- (1.) Earth is different from these [other elements] :
- (2.) Because it is odorous :
- (3.) Nothing that is not different from these [other elements] is odorous—as water, [for example, is not odorous] :

(4.) But this [earth] is not inodorous :—

(5.) Therefore it is different from the other elements :—

but if [in the third member of the argument] we had argued [affirmatively] that ‘ what possesses odour is different from the other elements,’ we should have had no example to cite in confirmation, seeing that of earth alone can that property be asserted.

That whose possession of what is to be established is doubtful is called the subject (*paksha*) ; as the mountain, when the fact of its smoking is assigned as the reason [for inferring the presence of fire]. That which certainly possesses the property in question is called an instance on the same side (*sapaksha*) ; as the culinary hearth, in the same example. That which is certainly devoid of the property in question is called an instance on the opposite side (*vipaksha*) ; as the great deep lake, in the same example.

The five that merely present the appearance of a reason (*hetu-wábhása*), are (1.) that which goes astray, (2.) that which would prove the contradictory, (3.) that where there is an equally strong argument on the other side, (4.) the unreal, and (5.) the futile.

The alleged reason which goes astray (*svyabhichára*), is that which has not just the one conclusion. It is of three kinds—(1.) What would prove too much (*sádhárana*) ; (2.) what belongs to none besides the individual (*asádhárana*) ; and (3.) the non-exclusive (*anupasanhári*). The fallacy falls under the first head, when that which is alleged as the proof may be present whilst that which is to be proved is absent :—as for instance, if one should say, ‘ The mountain is fiery, because it is an object of right knowledge,’ [the reason assigned would be liable to this objection] because the being an object that may be rightly known is predicable also of a lake, which is characterised by the absence of fire.

That [pretended token] which belongs neither to any similar instance nor to any one dissimilar, is one devoid of community (*asádhárana*). As, when one says 'Sound is eternal, for it has the nature of sound.' Now the nature of sound belongs to sound alone, and to nothing else, whether eternal or uneternal.

The pretended argument, which can bring an example neither in support nor in opposition, is non-exclusive (*anupasanhárti*). For example—should one say, 'Every thing is uneternal, because it is cognizable'—there would be no example to cite, because 'every thing' (leaving nothing over) is the subject of the conclusion.

A reason proving the reverse (*viruddha*), is that which invariably attends the absence of what is to be proved. For example—suppose one should say, 'sound is eternal because it is created.' [We should reject his argument at once, because the fact of having been created implies non-eternity—the negation of being eternal.]

A counterbalanced reason (*satpratipaksha*) is that along with which there exists another reason, which [equally well] establishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible, as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be),' (it might be argued, with equal force on the other side, that) 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is.'

An unreal reason is threefold—(1) where there is not established the existence of any such locality as that where the property is alleged to reside (*ásrayásiddha*); (2) where the nature alleged does not really reside in the subject (*swarúpásiddha*); and (3)

where the alleged invariableness of concomitancy is not real (*vyápyatwásiddha*).

(As an example of) the fallacy of non-existent locality, (suppose that one argues), 'The sky-lotus is fragrant, because the nature of a lotus resides in it, as in the lotuses of the lake'—here the sky-lotus is (alleged as) the locality (of the nature of a lotus), and in fact it (the sky lotus) does not exist.

As (an example of) an argument where the nature does not really exist in the subject, (suppose one were to argue), 'Sound is a quality, because it is visible'—here (every one would perceive at once, that) visibility does not reside in sound, for sound is recognised by the hearing (not by vision).

A reason, when there is an indispensable condition, is faulty as regards comprehensiveness. Such an indispensable condition (*upádhi*) is what always attends the property to be established, but does not always attend what is brought forward in proof.

Invariable attendance on the property to be established (*sádhya-vyápakatwa*) consists in the not being the counterentity (*apratiyogitwa*) of the absolute non-existence (*atyantábháva*) which has the same location as (*samánádhikarāna*) that which is to be proved. Non-invariable attendance on what is brought forward in proof (*sáadhanávyápakatwa*) consists in the being the counterentity (*pratiyogitwa*) of the non-existence which has what is brought forward in proof.

(Suppose it to be argued that), 'The mountain must smoke, because it is fiery'—in this case the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition. For 'wherever there is smoke,

there is the conjunction of wet fuel'—so that we have here invariable attendance on what is to be proved (*sádhavyápakatá*). But it is not true that 'wherever there is fire, there there is conjunction of wet fuel'—for there is no conjunction of wet fuel in the case of an (ignited) iron ball—so we have here non-invariable attendance on the proof (*sáadhanávyápakatá*). As there is thus its invariable attendance on what is to be proved, the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition for the sufficiency of the reason alleged. As it would require this additional condition (in order to prove that smoke must be present), fieriness (in the argument before us) is faulty as regards comprehensiveness.

An argument is futile (*bádhita*) when the reverse of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof. For example (it may be argued that), 'Fire is cold, because it is a substance.' There coldness is to be proved; and its opposite, warmth, is apprehended by the very sense of touch. Hence the argument is futile.

Thus has Inference been expounded.

Comparison or the recognition of likeness, (*upamána*) is the cause of an inference from similarity (*upamiti*). Such an inference consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named. Its instrument is the knowledge of a likeness. The recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance is the operation of that instrument. For example—a person not knowing what is meant by the word *gavaya* (*Bos gavaeus*), having heard from some inhabitant of the forest that a *gavaya* is like a cow, goes to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow.

Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind), that 'this is what is meant by the word *gavaya*.'

Thus has comparison been expounded.

A word (or right assertion) is the speech of one worthy (of confidence). One worthy, is a speaker of the truth. A speech (or sentence) is a collection of significant sounds; as, for example, 'Bring the cow.' A significant sound (*pada*) is that which is possessed of power (to convey a meaning). The power (of a word) is the appointment, in the shape of God's will, that such and such an import should be recognizable from such and such a significant sound.

The cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence is the interdependence, compatibility, and juxtaposition (of the words).

Interdependence (*ákámkshá*) means the inability in a word to indicate the intended sense in the absence of another word. Compatibility (*yogyatá*) consists in (a word's) not rendering futile the sense (of the sentence). Juxtaposition (*sannidhi*) consists in the enunciation of the words without a (long) pause between each.

A collection of words devoid of interdependence, &c. is no valid sentence—for example 'cow, horse, man, elephant,' gives no information, the words not looking out for one another.

The expression 'He should irrigate with fire' is no cause of right knowledge, for there is no compatibility (between fire and irrigation).

The words 'Bring—the—cow'—not pronounced close together but with an interval of some three hours between each, are not a cause of correct knowledge, from the absence of (the requisite closeness of) juxtaposition.

Speech is of two kinds, temporal or profane (*laukika*) and sacred (*vaidika*). The former, being uttered by God, is all-authoritative: but the latter, only if uttered by one who deserves confidence, is authoritative; any other is not so.

The knowledge of the meaning of speech is verbally communicated knowledge; its instrumental cause is language.

Thus has been explained what constitutes correct knowledge.

Incorrect knowledge is of three sorts, according to the division of doubt, mistake, and [such opinion as is open to] *reductio ad absurdum*.

The recognition, in one [and the same] thing possessing a certain nature, of several heterogeneous natures as characterising it, is doubt (*sansaya*). For example 'a post, or a man.'

Apprehending falsely is mistake (*viparyaya*). For example in the case of mother o'pearl, the idea that this is silver.

Reductio ad absurdum (*tarka*) consists in establishing the pervader [here supposed to be denied] through the allegation of the pervaded [here supposed to be granted]. For example, 'If there were not fire [which you deny], then there would not be smoke [which you admit there is].'

Memory also is of two kinds, correct and incorrect. Correct memory is that which arises from correct knowledge. Incorrect memory is that which arises from incorrect knowledge.

What all perceive to be agreeable, is pleasure (*sukha*); what appears disagreeable, is pain (*du'kha*).

Desire (*ichchhá*) means wishing. Aversion (*dvesha*) means disliking. Effort (*prayatna*) means action.

Virtue, or merit, (*dharma*) arises from the performance of what is enjoined: but vice, or demerit (*adharmma*) from the performance of what is forbidden.

The eight qualities,—Intellect and the rest,—are distinctive of Soul alone.

Intellect, desire, and effort, are of two kinds, eternal and transient; eternal in God, transient in mortals.

Quality selfreproductive (*śanskára*) is of three kinds, momentum, imagination, and elasticity. Momentum (*vega*) resides in the four beginning with Earth, and in Mind. Imagination (*bhāvaná*), the cause of memory, and arising from notion, resides only in the Soul. Elasticity (*sthitisthápaka*) is that which restores to its former position what had been altered. It resides in mats and the like formed of the earthy element.

So much for the Qualities.

Action consists in motion.

Casting upward (*utkshepana*) is the cause of conjunction with a higher place. Casting downward (*apakshepana*) is the cause of

contact with a lower place. Contraction (*ákunchana*) is the cause of conjunction with what is near the body. Dilatation (*prasáranā*) is the cause of conjunction with what is distant. Going (*gamaṇa*) is the name of every other variety. Action resides only in the four beginning with Earth, and in Mind.

Community, or Genus, (*sámānya*) is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, residing in Substance, Quality, and Action. It is of two kinds, higher and lower. The highest degree of community [or the *summum genus*] is existence. A lower genus is such a one as Substantiality [the common nature of what are called Substances].

Differences (*viśeṣha*) residing in eternal substances, are excluders [of each from community of nature with the others].

Intimate relation (*samavāya*) is constant connection. It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, difference and eternal substances.

Antecedent non-existence (*prágabhāva*) is without beginning, and has an end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its production. Destruction (*pradhwanśa*) has a beginning, and no end. [Such is the non-existence] of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) is that the counterentity whereof is considered independently of the three times [past, present, and future.] For example—[such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked that] there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual non-existence, or difference, (*anyonyābhāva*) is that the counterentity whereof is considered with reference to the relation of identity. For exam-

ple [such difference is referred to when it is remarked that] a jar is not a web of cloth.

Since everything is properly included under the categories that have been now stated, it is established that there are only seven categories.

This Compendium of Logical Results was composed by the learned *Annam Bhaṭṭa*, in order to perfect the acquaintance of students with the opinions of *Kanāda* and of the *Nyāya*.


Thus is the *Tarka-sangraha* completed.

THE
TAR KA - SANGRAHA,
WITH A
TRANSLATION AND NOTES
IN
HINDI AND ENGLISH.

Printed for the use of the Benares College by order of
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॥ तर्कसंग्रह ॥

श्री सच्चिदानन्दमूर्तये परमेश्वराय नमः ॥

श्रीमत्कणाद आचार्य्य कृत वैशेषिक शास्त्र में संचिप्त ग्रन्थ तर्क संग्रह का अनुवाद हिन्दी भाषा में श्री काशीस्थ पाठशालाध्यक्ष श्री डाक्टर बेलपट्टेन साहेब की आज्ञा से किया जाता है एतदर्थ कि जो लोग संस्कृत थोड़ासा भी जानते हैं इस ग्रन्थ को समझता से समझें ।

॥ मूल ॥

निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् ।
बालानां सुखबोधाय क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

॥ अनुवाद ॥

हृदय में जगत् के ईश्वर को रखके [अर्थात् ईश्वर का ध्यान करके] और गुरु की वन्दना करके सुखपूर्वक बालकों के समझने के लिए तर्कसंग्रह नामक ग्रन्थ में बनाता हूँ ।

॥ तर्क संग्रह ॥

॥ टीका ॥

श्री कणाद आचार्य के मत के अनुसार पदार्थ सात हैं अर्थात् संसार में कोई ऐसी वस्तु नहीं है कि जिस का नाम किसी न किसी पदार्थ में से न कहा जा सके। जैसा मनुष्य क्या है तो कहेंगे कि द्रव्य है और पाषाण जो कि मनुष्य से अति भिन्न वस्तु है तो भी द्रव्य है। रक्त और दीर्घत्व यद्यपि भिन्न होते हैं तथापि दोनों गुण कहलाते हैं। और ऐसे ही जो कुछ कि प्रत्येक पद से ज्ञात होता है सो इन्हीं सातों पदार्थों में से होता है।

॥ मूल ॥

द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावास्त्वप्त पदार्थाः

॥ अनुवाद ॥

द्रव्य गुण क्रिया जाति विशेष समवाय और अभाव सात पदार्थ ये हैं।

॥ टीका ॥

इन् सातों पदार्थों में प्रत्येक पदार्थ का लक्षण आगे लिखा जायगा इन् कारण कि इन् का अनुवादक शब्द हिन्दी भाषा में नहीं है।

। मूल ।

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यग्नेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

उन् में [अर्थात् पदार्थों में] द्रव्य [अर्थात् गुण का आश्रय] नव हैं ॥ पृथिवी जल तेज वायु आकाश काल दिशा आत्मा और मन।

॥ टोका ॥

यूरपदेशनिवासी रसायनविद्या के पण्डित कहते हैं कि जल [जिस् को भारतवर्षीय पण्डित कहते हैं कि अमिश्रित द्रव्य है] दो वायु से बना है और उन् में से एक वायु हमारे साससम्बन्धी वायु का मुख्य अंश है और इस् का प्रमाण उन् के रसायन शास्त्र में विस्तारपूर्वक मिलेगा ॥ अब इस् के आगे गुण [अर्थात् वस्तु का धर्म जैसे पृथिवी का धर्म गुरुत्व और रूप इत्यादि] कहा जाता है सो चौबीस प्रकार का है ।

॥ मूल ॥

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणप्रथक्संयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्व
गुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्काराश्चतुर्विंशति गुणाः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

रूप रस गन्ध स्पर्श संख्या नाप भिन्नता संयोग विभाग परत्व सन्नि
कटता भार द्रवत्व स्नेह शब्द बुद्धि सुख दुःख इच्छा द्वेष चेष्टा धर्म
अधर्म संस्कार ।

॥ टीका ॥

इन् प्रत्येक गुणों के लक्षण आगे लिखे जायेंगे ।

॥ तर्क संग्रह ॥

॥ टीका ॥

कर्म्म के प्रकार का है सो अब लिखते हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्चैव कर्म्माणि ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

ऊपर फेंकना नीचे गिराना सिकोड़ना फैलाना चलना । ये पांच कर्म्म कहलाते हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

परमपरञ्चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

सामान्य [अर्थात् जाति जैसे घटत्व और पटत्व इत्यादि] दो प्रकार का है पर और अपर ।

॥ टीका ॥

इन् के लक्षण आगे मिलेंगे ।

॥ मूल ॥

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

विशेष जो कि नित्य द्रव्य में रहते हैं अनंत हैं ।

॥ तर्क संग्रह ॥

७

॥ टीका ॥

नित्य द्रव्य से मन आत्मा काल परमाण्वादिक बूझे जाते हैं। परमाणु उस् को कहते हैं कि जिस् से नैयायिकों के मतानुसार पृथिवी जल इत्यादि की उत्पत्ति होती है।

॥ मूल ॥

समवायस्त्वेक एव ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

समवाय एक ही है ।

॥ मूल ॥

अभावश्चतुर्विधः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्चेति ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

अभाव [अर्थात् अविद्यमानता] चार प्रकार का है प्रागभाव प्रध्वंसाभाव अत्यन्ताभाव और अन्योन्याभाव ।

॥ टीका ॥

प्रत्येक पदार्थ के भेद कथन के अनन्तर अब प्रत्येक द्रव्यों का उल्लेख लिखते हैं ।

॥ तर्क संग्रह ॥

॥ मूल ॥

गन्धवती पृथिवी सा द्विविधा नित्याऽनित्याचेति नित्या परमाणु
रूपा अनित्या कार्यरूपा ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

गन्धगुण जिस् में हो उसे पृथिवी कहते हैं। सो दो प्रकार की है
नित्य और अनित्य। परमाणुरूप नित्य है और जब कि इन पर-
माणुओं से कुछ कार्य उत्पन्न होता है तब वह अनित्य कहलाती है।

॥ मूल ॥

सा पुनस्त्रिविधा शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् शरीरमस्त्रदादीनाम्
इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणम् नासाद्यवर्ति विषयो मृत्पाषाणादिः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

वह [अर्थात् कार्यरूप पृथिवी] तीन प्रकार की है शरीर इन्द्री
विषय इन भेदों से। शरीर हम लोगों की। इन्द्री गन्ध ग्रहण करने
वाली घ्राण नामक जो नासिका के अग्रभाग में रहती है। और
विषय [अर्थात् अवयवी] मृत्तिका पाषाण इत्यादि हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

श्रीतस्वर्शवत्य आपः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जो स्पर्श करने में ठंडा ज्ञात होता है उसे जल कहते हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

ताश्च द्विविधा नित्या अनित्याश्च नित्याः परमाणुरूपा अनित्याः
कार्यरूपाः । पुनस्त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं
वरुणलोके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वाद्यवर्णि । विषयः
सरित्समुद्रादिः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

और वह [अर्थात् जल] दो प्रकार का है नित्य और अनित्य
परमाणुरूप नित्य है और जब कि इन परमाणुओं से कार्य उत्पन्न
होता है तब वह अनित्य कहलाता है । वह कार्यरूप जल तीन
प्रकार का है शरीर इन्द्री विषय इन भेदों से । शरीर वरुणलोक
में होती है और इन्द्रों रस को बूझनेवाली जिस् को रसन कहते हैं
जिह्वा के अग्रभाग में रहती है । और विषय नदी समुद्र इत्यादि हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

उष्णस्पर्शवन्नेजः तद्द्विविधम् नित्यमनित्यं च नित्यं परमाणुरूपम्
नित्यं कार्यरूपम् । पुनस्त्रिविधम् शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं
मादित्यलोके प्रसिद्धम् इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराद्यवर्णि
विषयस्तुर्विधो भौमदिव्यौदर्याकरजभेदात् । भौमं वज्रादिकम् ।
अबिन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । भुक्तस्य परिणामहेतुरौदर्यम् । आक-
रजं सुवर्णादि ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जिस् का स्पर्श उष्ण हो उसको तेज कहते हैं। सो दो प्रकार का है नित्य और अनित्य परमाणुरूप नित्य है और कार्यरूप अनित्य यह कार्यरूप तेज तीन प्रकार का है शरीर इन्द्री विषय इन् भेदों से शरीर सूर्यलोक में होता है यह बात प्रसिद्ध है। इन्द्री रूप ग्रहणकरनेवाली जिस् को चक्षु कहते हैं नेत्र की पुतली के अग्रभाग में रहती है। और विषय चार प्रकार का है भूमि में उत्पन्न आकाश में उत्पन्न उदर में उत्पन्न और आकर में उत्पन्न इन् भेदों से। भूमि में उत्पन्न अग्न्यादि। आकाश में उत्पन्न विजुलौआदि जिस् का इन्धन जल है। और उदर में रहनेवाला बुद्बुद् है जो भुक्त वस्तु के परिणाम का हेतु है। आकर में उत्पन्न तेज वह है जो खान में पाया जाता है जैसे सोना इत्यादि।

॥ टीका ॥

परन्तु इस् बात पर यूरोपदेश निवासी पण्डित लोग कहते हैं कि औदर्य तेज भुक्त वस्तु के परिणाम का कार्य है परन्तु कारण नहीं है। इस् बात का विवरण विस्तारपूर्वक उन के रसायन शास्त्र के ग्रंथों में लिखित है। न्याय शास्त्र में चक्षु इन्द्री को कहते हैं कि तेज है और जब कि नेत्र की पुतली में से निकलकर विषय पर लगता है तब आत्मा को रूप का ज्ञान होता है। और भाषापरिच्छेद

में लिखा है कि आलोक और उद्भूत रूप के सम्बन्ध से चक्षु रूप का ग्रहण करता है परन्तु सम्प्रतिकालिक दर्शनानुशासनज्ञाता लोग कहते हैं कि हम लोगों को रूप का ज्ञान तेज के आने से नेत्र में होता है और न कि चक्षु में से तेज के जाने से विषय पर। जैसे गेंद को दीवार पर मारते हैं और वह स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कार के कारण से फिर आता है वैसे ही आलोक सूर्यादि से आके रूप विशिष्टपदार्थ पर लग के चक्षु में जाता है तब आत्मा को रूप का ज्ञान होता है। और इसी स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कार को यूरपदेशीय वायु आदि में मानते हैं जैसे भाषापरिच्छेद में लिखा है कि कई एक लोग स्थितिस्थापकसंस्कार को चारों भूतों में मानते हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

रूपरहितस्पर्शवाग्वायुः। स द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यश्च नित्यःपरमाणुरूपोऽनित्यः कार्यरूपः। पुनस्त्रिविधः शरीरेंद्रियविषयभेदात् शरीरं वायुलोके इन्द्रियं स्पर्शघ्राहकं त्वक् सर्वशरीरवर्त्मविषयो वृक्षादिकम्पनहेतुः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जिस का रूप नहीं है और स्पर्श होता है उसे वायु कहते हैं। वह

दो प्रकार का है नित्य और अनित्य। परमाणुरूप नित्य है और कार्यरूप अनित्य और कार्यरूप वायु तीन प्रकार का है शरीर इन्द्री विषय इन् भेदों से। शरीर वायुलोक में होती है। इन्द्री स्पर्शग्रहणकरनेवाली त्वचा है जो सर्वशरीरवर्ती है। और विषय वह है जो वृक्षादि के कम्पन का हेतु है।

॥ टीका ॥

इन् दिनों में बङ्गला लोग समझते हैं कि वायु रूपरहित द्रव्य है परन्तु दूसरे लोग कहते हैं कि उसका रूप नीला है। और प्रमाण इसका वहाँ लिखा जायगा जहाँ कि गुणों का विवरण किया जायगा।

॥ मूल ॥

शरीरान्तःसंचारी वायुःप्राणः सचैकोऽप्युपाधिभेदात्प्राणापाना
दिसंज्ञां लभते ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

देह के भीतर संचारकरनेवाला वायु प्राण कहलाता है यद्यपि वह एक है तथापि उपाधिभेद से प्राण अपान उदान ब्यान समान कहलाता है।

॥ तर्कसंग्रह ॥

१३

॥ मूल ॥

शब्दगुणमाकाशं तच्चैकं विभु नित्यञ्च ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

शब्द गुण जिस् में है उसको आकाश कहते हैं वह एक है व्यापक है और नित्य है ।

॥ मूल ॥

अतीतादि व्यवहारहेतुः कालः सच्चैको विभूर्नित्यञ्च ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

व्यतीत वर्तमान भविष्य व्यवहार के हेतु को काल कहते हैं वह एक है व्यापक है और नित्य है ।

॥ मूल ॥

शास्त्रादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक् साच्चैका नित्या विभूश्च ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

पूर्व पश्चिम इत्यादि व्यवहार के हेतु को दिशा कहते हैं । वह एक है व्यापक है और नित्य है ।

॥ मूल ॥

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा स द्विविधो जीवात्मा परमात्मा च । तत्रेश्वरः
सर्वज्ञः परमात्मा एक एव । जीवात्मा प्रति शरीरं भिन्नो
विभुर्नित्यश्च ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

ज्ञान का अधिकरण [अर्थात् ज्ञान जिस् में रहता है] उस को
आत्मा कहते हैं । वह दो प्रकार का है जीवात्मा और परमात्मा ।
परमात्मा ईश्वर है सर्वज्ञ है एकही है और सुख दुःखादि से रहित
है । और जीवात्मा प्रति शरीर भिन्न २ है व्यापक है और नित्य है ।

॥ मूल ॥

सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियक्षनः तच्च प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वादनन्तं
परमाणुरूपं नित्यश्च ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जो इन्द्री सुख दुःख इत्यादि के अनुभव करने में हेतु है उस को
मन कहते हैं । और वह अनगिनत है इस कारण कि प्रत्येक आत्मा
के संग रहता है । परमाणुरूप है और नित्य है ।

॥ टीका ॥

मौनांसाशास्त्र में मन को व्यापक कहा है परन्तु नैयायिक लोग इस बात का खण्डन करते हैं कि जो मन को व्यापक मानेंगे तो वह एक काल में सब इन्द्रियों के विषय का भोग करेगा और ऐसा नहीं हो सक्ता।

॥ मूल ॥

चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुणो रूपम् । तच्च शुक्लनीलपीतरक्तहरितकपिश
चित्रभेदात्मविधम् । पृथिवोजलतेजोवृत्ति । तत्र पृथिव्यां
सप्तविधम् । अभास्वरं शुक्लं जले । भास्वरं शुक्लञ्च तेजसि ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

रूप उद्गुण को कहते हैं जो केवल चक्षु इन्द्री से गृहीत होता है और यह गुण सात प्रकार का है शुक्ल नील पीत रक्त हरित कपिश चित्र इन् भेदों से। यह गुण पृथिवी जल तेज में होता है। पृथिवी में सातों प्रकार का रूप रहता है और जल में अभास्वर शुक्ल रूप रहता है और भास्वर शुक्ल रूप तेज में होता है।

॥ टीका ॥

यूरपदेशनिवासी नवीन शास्त्रज्ञों के अनुसार सब रूप केवल प्रकाश में रहता है जिस को त्रिकोणकाचदण्ड से भिन्न दिखला सक्ते हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

रसनद्याह्यो गुणो रसः। सचमधुरामुलवणकटुकषायतिक्तभेदात्
षड्विधः। पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः। पृथिव्यां षड्विधःजले मधुर एव।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जो गुण रसन इन्द्री से ज्ञात होता है सो रस कहलाता है। चौर
बुह [अर्थात् रस गुण] छ प्रकार का है मधुर मोठा आम आमिला
लवण नेन कटु कडुआ कषाय कसेला तिक्त तीता इन भेदों से।
यह गुण पृथिवी और जल में रहता है। पृथिवी में छ प्रकार
का रस होता है और जल में केवल मधुर रस होता है।

॥ टीका ॥

यूरपदेशीय नवीन विद्यावान् कथन करते हैं कि खच्छ जल में
खाद नहीं होता और मधुरता केवल चीनी आदि वस्तुओं में पाई
जाती है।

॥ मूल ॥

घ्राणद्याह्यो गुणो गन्धः स द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च पृथिवी
मात्रवृत्तिः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

घ्राण इन्द्री से जो गुण गृह्यत होता है सो गन्ध कहलाता है। सो
दो प्रकार का है सुरभि [अर्थात् सुगन्ध] और असुरभि [अर्थात्
दुर्गन्ध]। यह गुण पृथिवी मात्र में रहता है।

॥ मूल ॥

त्वग्द्रियमात्रघातो गुणः स्पर्शः। स च त्रिविधः शीतोष्णानुष्णा
शीतभेदात्। पृथिव्यग्नेजोवायुवृत्तिः। तत्र शीतो जले। उष्ण
स्तेजसि। अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

केवल त्वचा इन्दी से जिस गुण को ज्ञात करने हैं उसे स्पर्श कहते हैं। यह गुण तीन प्रकार का है शीत उष्ण और अनुष्णाशीत [अर्थात् न शीत और न उष्ण] इन् भेदों से। यह गुण पृथिवी जल तेज वायु में रहता है। शीत स्पर्श जल में रहता है उष्ण स्पर्श तेज में और अनुष्णाशीत पृथिवी और वायु में।

॥ मूल ॥

रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च। अन्यत्रापाकजं नित्य
मनित्यं च। नित्यगतं नित्यम्। अनित्यगतमनित्यम्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

रूपादि चारो [अर्थात् रूप रस गंध स्पर्श] पृथिवी में [अर्थात् पार्थिवपदार्थों में] पाकसे [अर्थात् तेज के विशेष संयोग से] उत्पन्न होते हैं और अनित्य हैं। दूसरों में [अर्थात् जल तेज वायु में]

रूपादि तेज के संयोग से जनित नहीं होते हैं नित्य भी हैं और अनित्य भी हैं नित्य पदार्थों में जब वर्तमान हैं तब नित्य हैं और जब कि अनित्य वस्तु में रहते हैं तब अनित्य कहे जाते हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

एकत्वादिव्यवहारासाधारणहेतुसंख्या ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

एकत्व आदि व्यवहार के विशेष हेतु को संख्या कहते हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

सा नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः। एकत्वादिपराङ्गपर्यन्ता। एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च नित्यगतं नित्यम् अनित्यगतमनित्यम्। द्वित्वादिकंतु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

बुद्ध [अर्थात् संख्या] नवो द्रव्यो में रहती है और एकत्व से लेके पराङ्ग पर्यन्त है। एकत्व नित्य भी है और अनित्य भी है नित्य पदार्थ में नित्य है और अनित्य पदार्थ में अनित्य परंतु द्वित्व आदि सर्वत्र अनित्य ही है ।

॥ मूल ॥

मानव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं परिमाणं नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः । तच्चतुर्विधम् अणु महत् दीर्घं ह्रस्वंचेति ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

मान व्यवहार के विशेष कारण को परिमाण कहते हैं यह गुण नवो द्रव्य में रहता है और वह [अर्थात् परिमाण] चार प्रकार का है अणु महत् दीर्घ और ह्रस्व इन भेदों से ।

॥ मूल ॥

पृथग्व्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं पृथक्त्वं सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

पृथक् व्यवहार के मुख्य कारण को पृथक्त्व कहते हैं । यह गुण सब द्रव्यों में रहता है ।

॥ मूल ॥

संयुक्तव्यवहारासाधारणो हेतुः संयोगः सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ।

संयुक्तव्यवहार के विशेष हेतु को संयोग कहते हैं। यह गुण भी सब द्रव्यों में रहता है।

संयोगनाशकोगुणो विभागः सर्वद्रव्यवर्तिनः ।

संयोग के नाश करनेवाले गुण को विभाग कहते हैं और यह सब द्रव्यों में रहता है।

परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे परत्वापरत्वे। एथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवर्तिनी ते द्विविधे दिक्कृते कालकृतेच। दूरस्थे दिक्कृतं परत्वं समीपस्थे दिक्कृतमपरत्वम्। ज्येष्ठे कालकृतम् परत्वम् कनिष्ठे कालकृतमपरत्वम् ।

पर और अपर व्यवहार के असाधारण कारण को परत्व और

अपरत्व कहते हैं ये गुण पृथिवी जल तेज वायु और मन में रहते हैं। ये दो प्रकार के हैं दिक्कृत और काल कृत। दूर देश में जो वस्तु रहता है उसमें दिक्कृत परत्व है और समीप देश में जो वस्तु रहता है उसमें दिक्कृत अपरत्व है। ज्येष्ठ पुरुष में कालकृत परत्व होता है और कनिष्ठ पुरुष में कालकृत अपरत्व होता है परत्व और अपरत्व अपेक्षा से निर्णीत होते हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वं पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

प्रथम पतन में जो गुण असमवायि कारण होता है उसे गुरुत्व कहते हैं। यह गुण पृथिवी और जल में रहता है।

॥ मूल ॥

आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वं पृथिव्यग्नेजोवृत्तिः। तद् द्विविधम् सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकंच। सांसिद्धिकं जले। नैमित्तिकं पृथिवीर्तेजसोः। पृथिव्यां घृतादौ अग्निसंयोगजन्यं द्रवत्वम्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

आद्यस्यन्दनमें [अर्थात् चूना वा टिघलना वा बहना] जो गुण

असमवायि कारण है सो द्रवत्व कहलाता है। यह गुण दो प्रकार का है। सांसिद्धिक [अर्थात् स्वभाव से सिद्ध] नैमित्तिक [अर्थात् निमित्त से उत्पन्न] सांसिद्धिक द्रवत्व जल में रहता है। और नैमित्तिक द्रवत्व पृथिवी और तेज में रहता है। घृत आदि पार्थिव पदार्थों में अग्नि के संयोग से द्रवत्व उत्पन्न होता है।

॥ मूल ॥

चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुर्गुणः स्नेहो जलमात्रवृत्तिः ।

॥ अनवाद ॥

चूर्ण आदि के पिण्ड होने में जो गुण हेतु होता है उसे स्नेह कहते हैं यह गुण केवल जल में रहता है।

॥ मूल ॥

आत्रयाद्यो गुणः शब्दः आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः । स द्विविधः ध्वन्यात्मको वर्णात्मकश्चेति । ध्वन्यात्मको भेर्यादौ । वर्णात्मकः संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ।

॥ अनवाद ॥

आत्र इन्द्री से जो गुण गृहीत होता है उसे शब्द कहते हैं यह गुण केवल आकाश में रहता है। सो दो प्रकार का है ध्वन्यात्मक और

वर्णात्मक ध्वन्यात्मक शब्द भेदों आदि अवच्छेद से उत्पन्न होता है। संस्कृत हिन्दी भाषादि स्वरूप जो शब्द से वर्णात्मक [अर्थात् अक्षर स्वरूप] कहलाता है।

॥ मूल ॥

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्ज्ञानं बुद्धिः। सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

सब व्यवहार का हेतु जो ज्ञान उसे बुद्धि कहते हैं वह दो प्रकार की है स्मृति और अनुभव।

॥ मूल ॥

संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः। तद्भिन्नमनुभवः। स द्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्च।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जो ज्ञान केवल संस्कार से उत्पन्न होता है उसे स्मृति कहते हैं। और उच्चो भिन्न जो ज्ञान से अनुभव कहलाता है। वह [अर्थात् अनुभव] दो प्रकार का है यथार्थ और अयथार्थ।

॥ मूल ॥

तद्भूति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः यथा रजते इदं रजतमिति।

ज्ञानम । सैव प्रमेत्युच्यते । तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो
ऽयथार्थः । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जो वस्तु जिस प्रकार की है उस वस्तु का उसी प्रकार से ज्ञान
होनायथार्थ अनुभव कहलाता है । जैसे रजत में रजतत्व ज्ञान
है । जो पदार्थ जैसा नहीं है उस पदार्थ को वैसा बूझना यह
ज्ञान अयथार्थ अनुभव कहलाता है । जैसे शुक्ति में रजत का
होना ।

॥ मूल ॥

यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात् । तत्क
रणमपि चतुर्विधम् प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

यथार्थ अनुभव चार प्रकार का है । प्रत्यक्ष अनुमिति उपमिति
शाब्द इन भेदों से । और इन के कारण [अर्थात् असाधारण
कारण] भी चतुर्विध है । प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान उपमान शब्द इन
भेदों से ।

॥ मूल ॥

व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं कारणम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जो पदार्थ स्वकार्य द्वारा जिस कार्य का विशेष कारण है वह उस का कारण है ।

॥ मूल ॥

अनन्यथासिद्धकार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जो कार्योत्पत्ति के पूर्व नियत स्थिति करता ऊँचा कार्य में आवश्यक है वह कारण है ।

॥ मूल ॥

कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

प्रागभाव के प्रतियोगी को कार्य कहते हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

कारणं त्रिविधम् समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तवः पटस्य पटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः । कार्येण कारणेन वा सदैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति कारणमसमवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य तन्तुरूपं पट

रूपस्य । तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणम् । यथा तुरीवेमा
दिकं पटस्य । तदेतन्निविधकारणमध्ये यदसाधारणं कारणं
तदेव कारणम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

कारण तीन प्रकार का है समवायि असमवायि निमित्त इन भेदों
से । जिस से और जिस कार्य से समवाय सम्बन्ध है वह उस कार्य का
समवायि कारण है । जैसे बस्त्र का समवायि कारण तन्तु है और
पट स्वगत रूपादि का समवायि कारण है । जो कारण अपने कार्य
से वा उस के कारणान्तर से समानाधिकरण है । वह असमवायि
कारण कहलाता है जैसे तन्तु संयोग पट का असमवायि कारण है ।
और जैसे तन्तु रूप पटगत रूप का इन दोनों कारणों से भिन्न जो
कारण सो निमित्त कारण कहलाता है जैसे तुरी वेमादिक पट का
निमित्त कारण है इन तीन प्रकार के कारण के मध्य में जो विशेष
कारण है उसे कारण कहते हैं ।

। मूल ॥

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । व्याप्ति
विशिष्ट पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः । यथा वक्त्रिव्याप्यधूमवानयं
पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः । तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वक्त्रिमानितिज्ञानं
अनुमितिः । यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः ।
व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

अनुमान उसे कहते हैं जो कि अनुमिति का कारण है। कारण [अर्थात् उस का असाधारण कारण] अनुमिति उस ज्ञान को कहते हैं जो कि परामर्श से उत्पन्न होता है। व्याप्ति विशिष्ट जो हेतु उस का जो पक्ष वृत्तित्व ज्ञान से परामर्श कहलाता है जैसे वक्रि से व्याप्य अर्थात् नियत सहचरित जो धूम तिस से युक्त यह पर्वत है इस ज्ञान को परामर्श कहते हैं। परामर्श से उत्पन्न जो ज्ञान कि पर्वत वक्रिमान् है अनुमिति कहलाता है। जहां जहां धूम है वहां अग्नि है इस साहचर्य नियम को व्याप्ति कहते हैं। नियत सहचरित पदार्थ को जो पर्वतादि में वर्तमानता से पक्ष धर्मता कहलाती है।

॥ मूल ॥

अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थञ्च । स्वार्थं स्वानुमितिहेतुः ।
तथाहि । स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति महान्
सादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गत्वा तद्गतेचाग्नौ सन्दिहानः
पर्वते धूमं पश्यन् व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति । तदनन्तरं
वक्रिव्याप्यधूमवान् अयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । अयमेव लिङ्ग
परामर्श इत्युच्यते । तस्मात्पर्वतो वक्रिमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिस्तत्प
द्यते । तदेतत्स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

अनुमान दो प्रकार का है स्वार्थ और परार्थ। अपने अनुमिति के हेतु को स्वार्थ अनुमान कहते हैं जैसे कोई पुरुष बार बार के

दर्शन से जहाँ धूम है वहाँ अग्नि भी है इस व्याप्ति को महानस आदि में ग्रहण करके पर्वत के समीप गया तब उस को सन्देह हुआ कि यहाँ अग्नि है कि नहीं और देखा कि पर्वत में धूम है तब व्याप्ति स्वरण किया कि जहाँ धूम वहाँ अग्नि इस के अनन्तर उस पुरुष को ज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है कि वह व्याप्य धूमवान् यह पर्वत है। और इसी ज्ञान को लिङ्ग परामर्श कहते हैं। तो इस ज्ञान से पर्वत में अग्नि है यह अनुमिति उत्पन्न होती है। इसी को स्वार्थानुमान कहते हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

यत्तु ख्यं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं प्रति बोधयितुं पञ्चावयववाक्यं
प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थानुमानम्। यथा। पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमवत्वात्।
यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः। तथा चायम्। तस्मा
त्तथेति अनेन प्रतिपादितालिङ्गात्परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जहाँ पञ्चावयव वाक्य का प्रयोग कोई पुरुष आप धूम से अग्नि की अनुमिति करके दूसरे पुरुष के समझाने के लिये करता है उस स्थल में परार्थानुमान होता है जैसे पर्वत वह्निमान् है इस लिये कि धूमवान् है क्योंकि जो जो धूमवान् है सो वह्निमान् है जैसे महानस तैसा यह है। इस कारण पर्वत अग्निमान् इस पञ्चावयव वाक्य से प्रतिपादित जो हेतु तिस हेतु से दूसरा भी अग्नि को जान सकता है।

॥ मूल ॥

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि पञ्चावयवाः । पर्वतोवह्नि
मानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यो यो धूमवानित्यु
दाहरणम् । तथाचायमित्युपनयः । तस्मान्मथेति निगमनम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ।

प्रतिज्ञा हेतु उदाहरण उपनय और निगमन ये पांच अवयव कह
लाते हैं । पर्वत वह्निमान् है यह प्रतिज्ञा है । धूम से यह हेतु है । जो
जो धूमवान् है सो वह्निमान् यह उदाहरण है । और वैसे यह
है । यह उपनय है । इस से यह वैसे है । यह निगमन है ।

॥ मूल ॥

स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमित्योच्छिष्टपरामर्श एव कारणम् तस्मा
च्छिष्टपरामर्शोऽनुमानम्

॥ अनुवाद ॥

स्वार्थ अनुमिति और परार्थ अनुमिति का लिंग परामर्श ही
कारण है इस कारण से लिंग परामर्श अनुमान कहलाता है ।

॥ मूल ॥

लिङ्गं त्रिविधम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलान्वयि केवलव्यतिरेकि
चेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि यथा वह्नौ
साध्ये धूमवत्त्वम् । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः ।
यत्र वह्निर्वास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाहृद इति व्यतिरेक

व्याप्तिः । अन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि । यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् पटवत् । अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयोर्द्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिर्नास्ति सर्वस्य प्रमेयत्वादभिधेयत्वाच्च । व्यतिरेकमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि । यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वात् । यदि तरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् यथा जलम् । नचेयं तथा । तस्मात्स तथेति । अत्र यद्गन्धवत्तदितरभिन्नमित्यन्वयदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवी मात्रस्य पक्षत्वात् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

लिंग [हेतु] तीन प्रकार का है अन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलान्वयि और केवल व्यतिरेकि । जिस हेतु में अन्वयव्याप्ति और व्यतिरेक व्याप्ति दोनों रहती हैं उस हेतु को अन्वयव्यतिरेकि कहते हैं जैसे बर्फ़ के अनुमान में धूम । जहाँ धूम वहाँ अग्नि रहती है जैसे महा-नस में । इस को अन्वय व्याप्ति कहते हैं । जहाँ बर्फ़ नहीं वहाँ धूम नहीं जैसे महाहृद् में । इस को व्यतिरेक व्याप्ति कहते हैं । जिस में केवल अन्वय व्याप्ति रहती है उस को केवलान्वयि कहते हैं जैसे घट अभिधेय है इस लिये कि प्रमेय है [अर्थात् ज्ञान का विषय] जैसे पट इस न्याय में प्रमेयत्व और अभिधेयत्व । इन दोनों की व्यतिरेक व्याप्ति नहीं होती है क्योंकि सब वस्तु प्रमेय है और अभिधेय है । जिस हेतु में केवल व्यतिरेक व्याप्ति रहती है सो केवल-व्यतिरेकि कहलाता है जैसे पृथिवी दूसरे द्रव्यों से भिन्न है इस लिये कि गन्धवती है । जो इतर से [अर्थात् पृथिवी भिन्न द्रव्य से भिन्न नहीं

है सो गन्धवान् नहीं है जैसे जल] और यह [अर्थात् पृथिवी] बेसी नहीं है [अर्थात् गन्धवती है इस हेतु से बेसी नहीं है अर्थात् इतर से भिन्न है] इस स्थल में जो गन्धवान् है सो इतर से [अर्थात् जलादि से भिन्न है]। यह अन्यथ इष्टान्त नहीं है क्योंकि पृथिवी मास पर साध्य का संदेह है]।

॥ मूल ॥

सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान् पक्षः। यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ पर्वतः। निश्चित साध्यवान् सपक्षः। यथा तत्रैव महानसः। निश्चितसाध्याभाव वान् विपक्षः। यथा तत्रैव महाद्द्रुदः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जिस पदार्थ पर साध्य का संदेह रहता है उसे पक्ष कहते हैं। जैसे इस स्थल में धूम हेतु है वहाँ पर्वत पक्ष है क्योंकि अग्नि का संदेह है। जिस पर साध्य का निश्चय रहता है सो सपक्ष कहलाता है जैसे उसी स्थल में महानस। जिस में साध्य के अभाव का निश्चय है उसे विपक्ष कहते हैं जैसे उसी स्थल में महाद्द्रुद।

॥ मूल ॥

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धबाधिताः पक्षहेत्वाभासाः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

सव्यभिचार विरुद्ध सत्प्रतिपक्ष असिद्ध और बाधित ये पांच हेत्वा-
भास कहलाते हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः। स त्रिविधः साधारणासाधारणानुपसंहारिभेदात्। तत्र साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिः साधारणोऽनैकान्तिकः। यथा पर्वतो वङ्गिमान् प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य वङ्गभाववति ह्रदे विद्यमानत्वात्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

सव्यभिचार और अनैकान्तिक ये दोनो शब्द पर्याय हैं। सव्यभिचार [अर्थात् जिस दोष के जानने से व्याप्तिज्ञान नहीं होता वह व्यभिचार है। इस दोष के साथ जो हेतु से सव्यभिचार कहलाता है]। तीन प्रकार का है साधारण असाधारण अनुपसंहारी। इन भेदों से इन तीनों में साध्य के अभाव के अधिकरण में जो हेतु रहता है सो साधारण सव्यभिचार कहलाता है जैसे पर्वत वङ्गिमान् है क्योंकि प्रमेय है [अर्थात् ज्ञान का विषय है। इस स्थल में प्रमेयत्व हेतु साधारण सव्यभिचार है क्योंकि ह्रद में प्रमेयत्व रहता है परन्तु वङ्ग का अभाव है।

॥ मूल ॥

सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तौऽसाधारणः। यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तं शब्दमात्रवृत्तिः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जो हेतु किसी सपक्ष और विपक्ष में नहीं रहता सो असाधारण सव्यभिचार कहलाता है जैसे शब्द नित्य है क्योंकि वहाँ शब्दत्व है। इस

शब्द में शब्दत्वहेतु असाधारण सव्यभिचार कहलाता है क्योंकि वह न किसी नित्य में रहता है और न किसी अनित्य पदार्थ में रहता है केवल शब्द में रहता है।

॥ मूल ॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितोऽनुपसंहारी यथा सर्वमनित्यम् प्रमे-
यत्वादिति अब सर्वस्यापि पक्षत्वात् दृष्टान्तो नास्ति।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जिस हेतु में अन्वयदृष्टान्त और व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्त नहीं मिलता वह अनुपसंहारी सव्यभिचार कहलाता है जैसे सब अनित्य है क्योंकि प्रमेय है इस न्याय में सब जगत पक्ष है इस लिये दृष्टान्त नहीं मिलता।

॥ मूल ॥

साध्याभावव्याप्यो हेतुर्विरुद्धः। यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वा-
दिति। कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

विरुद्धहेतु उस को कहते हैं जिस में साध्य के अभाव की व्याप्ति रहती है जैसे शब्द नित्य है क्योंकि कार्य्य है इस न्याय में कृतकत्व [अर्थात् कार्य्यत्व] हेतु नित्यत्वके अभाव की व्याप्ति रखता है। इस लिये विरुद्ध है।

॥ मूल ॥

साध्याभावसाधकं हेतुन्तरं यस्य स सत्प्रतिपक्षः। यथा शब्दो नित्यः
प्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववदिति शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्य्यत्वात् घटवदिति।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जिस हेतु के प्रयोग में साध्य के अभाव की सिद्धि करनेवाला दूसरा हेतु उपस्थित हो सो सत्प्रतिपक्ष कहलाता है। जैसे शब्द नित्य है क्योंकि श्रवण इंद्रि से जाना जाता है। शब्दत्व के सदृश। इस स्थल में श्रावणत्व हेतु नित्यत्व का साधक है जैसे शब्दत्व में और इस के विरुद्ध हेतु यहां उपस्थित होता है कि शब्द अनित्य है क्योंकि कार्य है जैसे घट इस स्थान में सत्प्रतिपक्षस्वरूप हेत्वाभास है।

॥ मूल ॥

असिद्धस्त्रिविधः आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

असिद्ध तीन प्रकार का है आश्रयासिद्ध स्वरूपासिद्ध और व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध।

॥ मूल ॥

आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभि अरविन्दत्वात् सरोजार विन्दवत् अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः सच नास्त्येव ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

आश्रयासिद्ध। अर्थात् जिस का पक्ष असत्य है। जैसे किसी ने कहा कि आकाश में उत्पन्न कमल सुगन्धयुक्त है क्योंकि कमल है सरोज कमल के सदृश इस स्थल में गगनारविन्द जिस को पक्ष ठहराते हैं सो असत्य है। तो अरविन्दत्वहेतु आश्रयासिद्ध है।

॥ मूल ॥

स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो गुणस्याक्षुषत्वात् अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे
नास्ति शब्दस्य आवणत्वात्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

स्वरूपासिद्ध [अर्थात् जिस हेतु को पक्ष पर अयोम्यता है उसे
शब्द गुण है क्योंकि चक्षु इंद्रि से ज्ञात होता है। इस न्याय में चाक्षु-
षत्वहेतु से शब्द में गुणत्व का अनुमान नहीं होता है क्योंकि शब्द
अत्र से ज्ञात होता है तो यह हेतु स्वरूपासिद्ध कहलाता है।

॥ मूल ॥

सोपाधिकोहेतुर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः। साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्या-
पक उपाधिः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

उपाधि विशिष्ट जो हेतु सो व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध कहलाता है जो पदार्थ
साध्य का व्यापक हो और साधन का अव्यापक हो उसे उपाधि
कहते हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापकत्वम्।
साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

साध्य के अधिकरण में रहनेवाला जो अत्यन्ताभाव तिस की प्रति-
योगिता जिस पदार्थ में न रहे सो साध्य व्यापक होता है। साधन

[अर्थात् हेतु] के अधिकरण में रहनेवाला जो अत्यन्ताभाव तिस की प्रतियोगिता जिस में रहे सो साधनाव्यापक कहलाता है।

॥ मूल ॥

पर्वतो धूमवान् वङ्गित्वादित्यत्र आर्द्रन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः तथा-
हि यत्र धूमस्तत्रार्द्रन्धन संयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता। यत्र वङ्गि-
स्तत्रार्द्रन्धनसंयोगोनास्ति अयोगोलके आर्द्रन्धन संयोगाभावा-
दिति साधनाव्यापकता। एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वेसति साधनाव्या-
पकत्वादार्द्रन्धन संयोग उपाधिः सोपाधिकत्वाद् वङ्गित्वं व्याप्यत्वा-
सिद्धम्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

पर्वत धूमवान है क्योंकि वहाँ वङ्गि है इस स्थान में आर्द्रन्धन का संयोग उपाधि है इस प्रकार से कि जहाँ धूम रहता है वहाँ आर्द्रन्धन का संयोग भी रहता है इस लिये वह साध्य व्यापक है और जहाँ वङ्गि है वहाँ आर्द्रन्धन का संयोग नहीं है जैसे अयोगोलक में वङ्गि है परन्तु आर्द्रन्धन के संयोग का अभाव है इस लिये यह साधन का अव्यापक है। इस प्रकार से आर्द्रन्धनसंयोग साध्य का व्यापक है और साधन का अव्यापक है इस लिये उपाधि है उपाधि योग से वङ्गिहेतु व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध है।

॥ मूल ॥

यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधितः यथा वङ्गिर-
नुष्णी द्रव्यत्वादिति। अनानुष्णत्वं साध्यम् तदभाव उष्णत्वं

स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते इति बाधितत्वम् । व्याख्यातमनुमान-
प्रकरणम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जिस हेतु के साध्य का अभाव दूसरे प्रमाण से पक्ष में निश्चित है सो बाधित है जैसे वक्त्र अनुष्ण है क्योंकि द्रव्य है इस स्थान में उष्णत्व का अभाव साध्य है उस का अभाव अर्थात् उष्ण स्पर्श स्पर्शन प्रत्य-
क्षात्मक जो दूसरा प्रमाण है उससे ज्ञात होता है इस लिये द्रव्यत्व हेतु बाधित है । अनुमान का व्याख्यान हो चुका ।

॥ मूल ॥

उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्ध ज्ञानमुपमितिः
तत्करणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तरव्या-
पारः तथाहि गवयशब्दवाच्यमजानन् कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषा-
ङ्गासदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् गौसदृश-
पिण्डं पश्यति तदनन्तरं असौ गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरुत्प-
द्यते । व्याख्यातमुपमानम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

उपमिति के कारण को उपमान कहते हैं । संज्ञा और संज्ञी के सम्बन्धज्ञान को उपमिति कहते हैं—सादृश्य ज्ञान उपमिति का कारण है । उपदिष्ट जो वाक्य तिसके अर्थ का जो स्मरण उस को व्यापार कहते हैं इस का उदाहरण—कि कोई पुरुष जो गवय शब्द के वाच्य को नहीं जानता और किसी आरण्यक पुरुष से सुना कि गौ के सदृश गवय होता है यह सुन कर वन में जा कर वाक्यार्थ स्मरण करता

ऊआ गो सदृश पिण्ड देखा इस के अनन्तर यह गवय शब्द वाच्य है यह ज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है। उपमान का व्याख्यान हो चुका।

॥ मूल ॥

आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः। आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता वाक्यं पदसमूहः यथा गामानयेति। शक्तं पदम्। अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इति ईश्वरेच्छा संकेतः शक्तिः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

आप्त पुरुष के वाक्य को शब्द कहते हैं। यथार्थ कथन करने वाले को आप्त कहते हैं। पदों के समूह को वाक्य कहते हैं और शक्ति जिस में रहे उस को पद कहते हैं इस पद से यह अर्थ बूझने योग्य है इस ईश्वरेच्छारूपी संकेत को शक्ति कहते हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

आकांक्षा योग्यता सन्निधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

आकांक्षा योग्यता और सन्निधि वाक्य के अर्थ ज्ञान में हेतु हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकांक्षा अर्था-
बाधो योग्यता। पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणं सन्निधिः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

एक पद में दूसरे पद के न होने के कारण से बाध उत्पन्न करने में जो असामर्थ्य उस को आकांक्षा कहते हैं। अर्थ के अबाध को

योग्यता कहते हैं। पदों का अविलंब से उच्चारण सन्निधि कह-
लाता है।

॥ मूल ॥

आकांक्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् यथा गौरन्धः पुरुषो हस्ती-
ति न प्रमाणमाकांक्षाविरहात् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

आकांक्षा आदि से रहित वाक्य प्रमाण नहीं होता जैसे गौ
घोडा पुरुष हस्ती यह वाक्य प्रमाण नहीं। क्योंकि यहां आकांक्षा
का विरह है। अर्थात् इन पदों का अर्थ बूझने के लिये दूसरे
पद की अपेक्षा नहीं।

॥ मूल ॥

अग्निनासिञ्चेदिति न प्रमाणम् योग्यता विरहात् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

आग से सींचना चाहिए यह वाक्य प्रमाण नहीं है क्योंकि यहां
योग्यता का विरह है। अर्थात् सेचन योग्यत्व अग्नि में नहीं है।

॥ मूल ॥

प्रहरेप्रहरे असहोच्चारितानि गामानयेत्यादि पदानि न प्रमा-
णम् सान्निध्याभावात् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

प्रहर प्रहर के अन्तर पर असहोच्चारित जो गौ ले आओ ये पद
प्रमाण नहीं इस लिये कि सान्निध्य का अभाव है।

॥ मूल ॥

वाक्यं द्विविधं लौकिकं वैदिकञ्च वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वात्पर्यमेव
प्रमाणम् लौकिकं, आप्तोक्तं प्रमाणं अन्यदप्रमाणम्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

वाक्य दो प्रकार का है वैदिक और लौकिक वैदिक वाक्य सब
प्रमाण है क्योंकि ईश्वर ने उन को कहा है लौकिक वाक्य वे प्रमाण
हैं जिन को आप्त ने कहा है और सब दूसरे वाक्य अप्रमाण हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानं तत्करणं शब्दः इति यथार्थानुभवे
निरूपितः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

वाक्य के अर्थ का जो ज्ञान से शाब्दज्ञान कहलाता है अर्थात्
शब्दजनित ज्ञान इस ज्ञान का कारण शब्द होता है। यथार्थानुभव
निरूपण समाप्त हुआ अब आगे अर्थार्थानुभव का निरूपण किया
जाता है।

॥ मूल ॥

अर्थार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्यय तर्कभेदात्।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

अर्थार्थानुभव तीन प्रकार का है संशय विपर्यय तर्क इन भेदों से

॥ मूल ॥

एकस्मिन्मूर्खिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः
यथा स्थापुर्वा परुषोवेति।

॥ तर्क संशय ॥

४९

॥ अनुवाद ॥

एक धर्म में विरुद्धानेकधर्मवैशिष्ट्यविषयक जो ज्ञान वह संशय है। जैसा स्थाणु है वा पुरुष है यह ज्ञान।

॥ मूल ॥

मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः। यथा श्रुक्ताविद् रजतमिति।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

मिथ्या ज्ञान विपर्यय है। जैसा श्रुक्ति में वह रजत है।

॥ मूल ॥

व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः। यथा यदि बन्धिर्नस्यात् तर्हि धूमोपि नस्यादिति।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

व्याप्य के आरोप से व्यापक का जो आरोप वह तर्क है। जैसा जो बन्धि न रहे तो धूम भी नहीं रहेगा।

॥ मूल ॥

स्मृतिरपि द्विधा यथार्थाऽयथार्थाश्च। प्रमाजन्या यथार्था अप्रमा जन्या अयथार्था।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

स्मृति भी दो प्रकार की है यथार्थ और अयथार्थ। प्रमा से उत्पन्न यथार्थ है और अप्रमा से उत्पन्न अयथार्थ है।

॥ मूल ॥

सर्वेषामनुकूलवेदनीयं सुखं। प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं दुःखम्।

॥ तर्क संग्रह ॥

॥ अनुवाद ॥

सभी को अनुकूलता से जिस का अनुभव होता है वह सुख है ।
और जिस का प्रतिकूलता से अनुभव होता है वह दुःख है ।

॥ मूल ॥

इच्छा कामः क्रोधोद्वेषः । कृतिः प्रयत्नः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

इच्छा काम है । क्रोध द्वेष है । कृति प्रयत्न है ।

॥ मूल ॥

विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्तु धर्मः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

विहित कर्म से उत्पन्न धर्म है । और निषिद्ध कर्म से उत्पन्न
अधर्म है ।

॥ मूल ॥

बुद्ध्यादयोऽष्टावात्मनात्रविशेष गुणाः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

बुद्धिआदि आठ केवल आत्मा के विशेष गुण हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्नाद्विविधा नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्या इन्द्ररस्य-
अनित्या जीवस्य ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

बुद्धि इच्छा और प्रयत्न ये दो प्रकार के हैं। नित्य और अनित्य।
नित्य ईश्वर के हैं और अनित्य जीव के हैं।

॥ मूल ॥

संस्कारस्त्रिविधो वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति। वेगः प्रथि-
व्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः। अनुभवजन्यास्मृतिहेतुर्भावना। आत्म-
मात्रवृत्तिः। अन्यथाकृतस्य पुनस्तादवस्थापादकः स्थिति
स्थापकः। कटादिप्रथिवी वृत्तिः। इति गुणाः।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

संस्कार तीन प्रकार का है वेग भावना और स्थितिस्थापक। वेग
प्रथिवी आदि चार और मन इन पाँचों में रहता है। अनुभव
जन्य और स्मृति का हेतु भावना है वह केवल आत्मा में रहता है।
अन्यथाकृत को फिर उसी अवस्था में ले आनेहारा स्थितिस्थापक है
यह केवल कटादि जो प्रथिवी उस में रहता है ॥ गुणों का कथन
हो चुका ॥

॥ मूल ॥

चलनात्मकं कर्म।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

चलनात्मक कर्म है।

॥ मूल ॥

अद्देशसंयोगहेतुकत्वेपणम्। अधोदेशसंयोगहेतुरपक्षेपणम्।

शरीरस्य सन्निकृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्चनम् । विप्रकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्र-
सारणम् । अन्यद्वर्षं गमनम् । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोमात्रं वृत्तिः ॥

॥ अनुवाद ॥

अर्धदेश के संयोग का हेतु उत्क्षेपण है । अधोदेश के संयोग का हेतु अपक्षेपण है । शरीर के सन्निकृष्ट के संयोग का हेतु आकुञ्चन है । विप्रकृष्ट के संयोग का हेतु प्रसारण है और सब गमन है । पृथिवी आदि चार और मन इन पाँचों में रहता है ।

॥ मूल ॥

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यम् द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मवृत्तिः । तत् द्विविधम्
परापरभेदात् । परं सत्ता । अपरं जातिर्द्रव्यत्वादिः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

नित्य एक और अनेक पदार्थों में अनुगत जो है सो सामान्य है । द्रव्य गुण और कर्म इन तीनों में रहता है । वह दो प्रकार का है पर और अपर इन भेदों से । सत्ता पर है और द्रव्यत्वादि जाति अपर है ।

॥ मूल ॥

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो व्यावर्त्तका विशेषाः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

नित्य द्रव्य में रहते ऊँचे जो व्यावर्त्तक हैं वह विशेष हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

नित्यसम्बन्धः समवायः । अयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्ये एक-

मपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । अवयवावयविनौ गुण-
गुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्मौ जातिव्यक्तौ विशेषनित्यद्रव्येचेति ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

नित्य सम्बन्ध समवाय है वह अयुत सिद्ध पदार्थों में रहता है
जिन पदार्थों में एक दूसरे पर आश्रित रहता है वे अयुत सिद्ध हैं ।
अवयव और अवयवी गुण और गुणी क्रिया और क्रियावान् जाति
और व्यक्ती विशेष और नित्य द्रव्य इतने अयुतसिद्ध पदार्थ हैं ।

॥ मूल ॥

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य । सादिरनन्तः
प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रति-
योगिकोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्य-
सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकोऽन्योन्याभावः । यथा घटः पटो न
भवतीति ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

जिस का आदि अर्थात् उत्पत्ति नहीं है और अंत है वह प्राग
भाव है । यह कार्य के उत्पत्ति के पहिले रहता है । जिस का
आदि है और अंत नहीं वह प्रध्वंस है । यह कार्य के उत्पत्ति के
अनंतर रहता है । तीनों काल में जो सम्बन्ध उस का प्रतियोगी
असम्बन्धताभाव है । जैसा भूतल पर घट नहीं है । तादात्म्य सम्बन्ध
का प्रतियोगी अन्योन्याभाव है जैसा घट जो है सो पट नहीं है ।

॥ मूल ॥

सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वेवान्तर्भावान्तरैव पदार्था
इति सिद्धम् ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

यथा योग्य रूप से कहे जाए पदार्थों में सब पदार्थों का अंतर्भाव
होता है इस लिये सात ही पदार्थ हैं यह सिद्ध भया ।

॥ मूल ॥

कणादन्यायमतयोर्बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।
असंभट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

॥ अनुवाद ॥

कणाद और न्याय इन के मतों में बालकों को व्युत्पत्ति होने के
लिये विद्वान् जो असं भट्ट उस ने तर्कसंग्रह की रचना की है ।

॥ मूल ॥

इति तर्कसंग्रहः समाप्तः ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

इस प्रकार से तर्कसंग्रह संपूर्ण भया ।

[जो अग्रिम वाक्य विस्तरण से लुप्त हुए थे सो २६ वें पृष्ठ में १५
वीं पंक्ती के अनन्तर स्थापन करना]

॥ मूल ॥

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षं । इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं ।
तत् द्विविधं निर्बिकल्पकं सबिकल्पकञ्च तत्र निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं

निर्विकल्पकं । यथा इदं किञ्चित् सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सविकल्पकं
यथा हित्वायं ब्राह्मणायं श्लामोयमिति ।

॥ अनुवाद ॥

उस में प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान का कारण प्रत्यक्ष है इन्द्रिय और अर्थ के
सन्निकर्ष से जो ज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है उसे प्रत्यक्ष कहते हैं वह दो
प्रकार का है एक निर्विकल्पक और दूसरा सविकल्पक इन में निष्प्र-
कारक ज्ञान निर्विकल्पक है जैसा यह कुछ है और सप्रकारक ज्ञान
सविकल्पक है जैसा यह हित्य है यह ब्राह्मण है यह श्लाम है ।

॥ मूल ॥

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः षड्विधःसंयोगसंयुक्तसमवाय
संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायसमवायसमवेतसमवायविशेषणविशेष्यभावा-
इति । चक्षुषा घट प्रत्यक्ष जनने संयोगः सन्निकर्षः । घटरूप-
प्रत्यक्ष जनने संयुक्तसमवायः सन्निकर्षः चक्षुः संयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य
समवायात् । रूपत्व सामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्त समवेतसमवायः सन्नि-
कर्षः चक्षुः संयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात् ।
श्रोत्रेण शब्दसाक्षात्कारे समवायः सन्निकर्षः कर्णविवरवृत्त्याका-
शस्य श्रोत्रत्वात् शब्दस्थाकाशगुणत्वात् गुणगुणिनोश्च समवा-
यात् । शब्दत्व साक्षात्कारे समवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः श्रोत्रसमवेते
शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् । अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्य भावः
सन्निकर्षः घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुः संयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य
विशेषणत्वात् । एवं सन्निकर्षषट्कजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं तत्करण-
मिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमितिसिद्धम् ।

प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान का हेतु इन्द्रिय और अर्थ का सन्निकर्ष छह प्रकार का है संयोग संयुक्तसमवाय संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय समवाय समवेत समवाय विशेषणविशेष्यभाव इन भेदों से। चक्षु से घट का प्रत्यक्ष उत्पन्न होने में संयोग सन्निकर्ष है। घट रूप के प्रत्यक्ष होने में संयुक्तसमवाय सन्निकर्ष है क्योंकि चक्षुः संयुक्त घट में रूप का समवाय है। रूपत्व सामान्य के प्रत्यक्ष होने में संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय सन्निकर्ष है जिस लिये कि चक्षुः संयुक्त घट में रूप समवेत है उस में रूपत्व का समवाय है। ओत्र से शब्द के प्रत्यक्ष होने में समवाय सन्निकर्ष है क्योंकि कर्णविवरटर्पि जो आकाश वही ओत्र है और आकाश का शब्द गुण है और गुण और गुणी का समवाय है। शब्दत्व के प्रत्यक्ष होने में समवेतसमवाय सन्निकर्ष है जिस लिये कि ओत्र समवेत जो शब्द उस में शब्दत्व का समवाय है। अभाव के प्रत्यक्ष होने में विशेषणविशेष्यभाव सन्निकर्ष है जैसा जहां भूतल पर घट का अभाव है वहां चक्षुः संयुक्त भूतल में घट के अभावकों विशेषणत्व है। एवं छह प्रकार के सन्निकर्ष से उत्पन्न ऊँचा ज्ञान प्रत्यक्ष है उस का कारण इन्द्रिय है इस लिये इन्द्रिय प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण है यह सिद्ध भया।

LECTURES
 ON THE
 NYA'YA PHILOSOPHY,
 EMBRACING THE TEXT
 OF THE
 TARKA SANGRAHA.

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PREFACE
TO THE
FIRST EDITION.

THESE lectures were delivered to the senior class of pupils in the English Department of the Benares College, with the view of introducing them to the philosophical terminology current among their learned fellow-countrymen, the pandits. The easiest, if not the only, way to obtain a thorough acquaintance with the force of the terms belonging to a philosophical system, is to study the system itself. The circumstances under which the lectures were delivered will account for their familiar tone, and for the introduction of various remarks which would have been superfluous if the work had been addressed to the learned of Europe.

J. R. B.

Benares College, 1848.

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THIS edition has been carefully revised, and, in great part, rewritten. The most important alterations,—and, it is hoped, improvements,—are in the section on Inference, where the Inductive and Deductive divisions of the subject have been more clearly made out. The text of this edition has been carefully collated by my coadjutor, Mr. F. Edward Hall, who has also suggested occasional improvements in the rendering, prepared the list of Questions for Examination, and furnished the following observations on the text-book and its several commentaries.

J. R. B.

*Benares College, }
13th Nov. 1852. }*

If tradition may be credited, Annam Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Tarka-sangraha*, flourished about two hundred years ago. He belonged to the Tailanga race, and is said to have been, by sect, a S'aiva. As an author, he is most widely known by his *Tarka-sangraha*, and by his commentary on it, the *Tarka-dīpikā*. In addition to these works, he also composed notes on Kaiyyaṭa's commentary on the *Mahābhāshya*. These, as well as the scholia of others of Kaiyyaṭa's annotators, having been superseded by the more recent elucidations of Nāges'a Bhaṭṭa, are now seldom to be met with.

The *Tarka-sangraha*, considering its conciseness, as also its secular and rudimentary character, has been the subject of unusually copious and varied illustration. The subjoined catalogue of commentaries which it has elicited, is as complete as I have at present the means of making it.

I The *Tarka-dīpikā*, by the author of the text. This, the most difficult of the commentaries on the *Tarka-sangraha*, is also the only one among them that has been disseminated through the medium of the press. It was lithographed, with the text, by Munshī Budha Siṅha, at Bénares, in 1850. The volume consists of 53 pages, running transversely, and contains 500 s'lokas, the commentary contributing about 350 of them.

The *Tarka-dīpikā*, by reason of its abstruseness, is familiarly called, with allusion to the great logical commentary the *Gādādhari*, the *Bāla-gādādhari*, or "lesser *Gādādhari*."

This commentary has been elucidated by

1. The *Hanumadīya*, by Hanumadāchārya, a follower of the Vaishṇava school of Madhwa Achārya. This writer was a native of Karnāṭa, but

spent the greater portion of his life in the service of the Rájá of Nágpur, at his capital. He is said to have died about a hundred years ago. The *Hanumadya* contains nearly 6000 s'lokas.

2. The *Nílakanthí*, by Nílakantha S'ástrí, of Ballári in Tailanga. The writer died at Benares about 30 years ago. The *Nílakanthí* contains not far from 1250 s'lokas.

The *Nílakanthí* has been interpreted in
a. The *Rámabhadrí*, by Rámabhadra Bhaṭṭa, a Tailanga. This work I have had no opportunity of inspecting, nor am I informed of its extent.

3. The *Tarka-dípiká* has also been annotated by the author of the *Nirukti*, No. III., in which allusion is made to it. In point of seniority, No. 3 precedes No. 2.

4. Mukunda Bhaṭṭa Gádegila, the author of No. V., is also said to have written a commentary on the *Tarka-dípiká*. One of my pandits professes to have seen the work, but has not been able to produce it.

II. The *Nyáya-bodhiní*, by Govardhana Mis'ra, a Gauḍa, the author of the *Tarka-bháshá-prakás'a*. The *Nyáya-bodhiní* is the simplest of all the commentaries on the *Tarka-sangraha*, and has considerable currency. It contains about 400 s'lokas.

III. The *Nirukti*, by Paṭṭábhírāma S'ástrí, a Tailanga of Chola. This, one of the easiest of the commentaries on the *Tarka-sangraha*, is reported to have been written for the instruction of the author's daughter. Paṭṭábhírāma is

supposed to have died about 75 years ago. The *Nirukti* contains nearly 600 ślokas.

IV. The *Siddhānta-chandrodaya*, by Kriṣṇa Dhūrjaṭī Dīkṣhita. It purports to have been composed for the use of Rājā Siṅha, son of Rājā Gada Siṅha of Ujjayanī. This work is reputed the most difficult, after the *Tarka-dīpikā*, of the various commentaries on the *Tarka-sangraha*. It contains about 1300 ślokas.

V. The *Tarka-sangraha-chandrikā*, by Mukunda Bhaṭṭa Gāḍegīla, a Mahārāshṭra. It contains about 1200 ślokas.

VI. The *Pada-kṛitya*, by Chandraja Siṅha, a Gauḍa Kṣatriya. This work is read, to some extent, in the Gangetic provinces. It contains about 1000 ślokas.

VII. The *Tarka-sangrahopannyāsa*, by Meru Śāstrī, a Mahārāshṭra saṅnyāsī of great local repute, still living at Benares. This work is much esteemed, though the author has not attached his name to it. It contains about 500 ślokas.

These works have been arranged, as far as was practicable, in chronological order. This point, however, is scarcely determinable by any internal evidence afforded by the works themselves, or by any other treatises on the Nyāya which I have consulted. In arriving at my conclusions, I have, accordingly, been obliged to rely principally on living tradition, under confirmation or correction of the dates of transcription noted in the oldest procurable MSS. of each work. These commentaries being in prose, in order to convey a definite idea of their extent, I have employed, for facility, the native method of estimating the size of similar works. This method consists in computing the number of couplets to which they would correspond, if reduced to the measure of the Anuṣṭubh metre.

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

- 1.—What and how many are the Categories, according to the Nyáya? § 2.
- 2.—What and how many are they, according to Aristotle? § 2.
- 3.—What is meant by the term Category or Predicament? § 2.
- 4.—What is the etymological meaning of the corresponding Sanskrit term? § 2.
- 5.—What and how many substances does the Nyáya recognise? § 3.
- 6.—Mention the chemical view of the composition of water. § 3.
- 7.—How does this view accord with that of the Nyáya? § 3.
- 8.—What two opinions are entertained, by European physicists, regarding the nature of Light? § 3.
- 9.—Does either of these opinions accord with that of the Nyáya? § 3.
- 10.—Why are Time and Space classed among Substances? § 3.
- 11.—How many are the Qualities, and what are they? § 4.
- 12.—What and how many varieties of Action are laid down in the Nyáya? § 5.
- 13.—What objection has been brought against the Nyáya division of action? § 5.

- 14.—How is Community divided ? § 6.
 15.—To what do these divisions correspond, in our phraseology ? § 6.
 16.—What are Ultimate Differences ? § 7.
 17.—Where are they held to reside ? § 7.
 18.—Give an example of Co-inherence. § 8.
 19.—How many kinds of Non-existence are enumerated ? Their names ? § 9.

CHAPTER II.

- 20.—How is Earth defined ? § 10.
 21.—Of how many kinds is it said to be ? 11.
 22.—In what character is it eternal, and in what character is it uneternal ? § 11.
 23.—Are the facts of Chemistry such as to render advisable the identification of the odorous with the earthy ? § 11.
 24.—What is meant by saying that Earth is uneternal in the form of aggregates ? § 11.
 25.—What says Empedocles on the subject of the common nature of the senses and the elements ? § 11.
 26.—Similarly, according to the Nyáya, what is the nature of the senses, severally ? § 11.
 27.—What is the Naiyáyika definition of Water ? § 12.
 28.—What does the Nyáya justly assert regarding levity ? § 12.
 29.—As the Naiyáyika view of levity is correct, do the holders of it also agree with the moderns in regard to the nature of cold ? § 12.
 30.—Define Light, according to the Nyáya ? § 14.
 31.—How is Light in the form of masses divided ? § 14.

32.—In what is each supposed to be resident or produced ? § 14.

33.—Does our theory of light and heat agree with that of the Nyáya ? § 14.

34.—How do our views on the subject of vision differ from those of the Nyáya ? § 14.

35.—Compare the Naiyáyika doctrine of intestinal heat with Liebig's theory of digestion. § 14.

36.—Why, in the Nyáya, is Gold held to be of the nature of light ? § 14.

37.—How is it viewed in the Mímánsá philosophy ? § 14.

38.—And how by European Chemists ? § 14.

39.—Give the definition of Air, according to the Nyáya. § 15.

40.—What are the two European views of Air, as to its possessing colour ? § 15.

41.—What reason is there for supposing that it has colour ? § 15.

42.—What is meant by *prána* ? § 16.

43.—As it is held to be of but one kind, how comes it to be spoken of as if it were of several kinds ? § 16.

44.—What does Prof. Wilson remark in regard to the vital airs ? § 16.

45.—Define the Ether of the Nyáya, and state its attributes. § 17.

46.—For what purpose is the Ether assumed, by the Naiyáyikas, as a fifth element ? § 17.

47.—Compare, or contrast, the Nyáya theory of the senses and their operation, with the ancient European theory of sensible forms. § 17.

48.—Define Time, and state its attributes. § 18.

49.—Define Place, and state its attributes. 19.

- 50.—How is Soul defined and divided ? § 20.
- 51.—State the definition and description of Mind. 21.
- 52.—What objection do the Naiyáyikas bring against the Mímánsá view of Mind ? § 21.
- 53.—What analogy do the Naiyáyikas adduce in illustration of their opinion that the Mind can attend to only one object at a time ? § 21.
- 54.—How is the phenomenon, instanced in this analogy, accounted for, in modern philosophy ? § 21.

CHAPTER III.

- 55.—How does the Nyáyá define Colour ? § 22.
- 56.—How many varieties are there said to be of Colour, and where are they held to reside ? § 22.
- 57.—How many and what varieties of Colour are held to reside in each of its substrata ? § 22.
- 58.—According to Sir Isaac Newton, to what are the varieties of Colour owing ? § 22.
- 59.—Define Savour, according to the Nyáyá. § 23.
- 60.—Of how many kinds is it said to be, and what are they ? § 23.
- 61.—In what substances is it held to reside ? § 23.
- 62.—How many kinds of Savour are there held to be in Earth, and how many in Water ? § 23.
- 63.—What is the European view of the savour of pure water ? § 23.
- 64.—Define and divide Odour, according to the text-book. § 24.
- 65.—Where is it said to reside ? § 24.
- 66.—State the Nyáyá definition of Tangibility. § 25.

67.—What are its kinds, and where are they held to reside ? § 25.

68.—Give the Naiyáyika definition of Number. § 27.

69.—Of what may Number be predicated ? § 28.

70.—State the nature of Unity ; and of Multiplicity. § 28.

71.—How is the transientness of uneternal Unity manifested ? § 28.

72.—And how the universal transientness of Duality &c. ? § 28.

73.—On what is Disjunction dependent ? § 32.

74.—Define Weight, and state where it is held to reside. § 34.

75.—What modern experiments militate against the Nyáyya, in this connection ? § 34.

76.—According to the Nyáyya, is levity a positive quality ? § 34.

77.—What is the correct employment of the terms *light* and *heavy* ? § 34.

78.—Define Fluidity, state to what substances it is held to appertain, and divide it. § 35.

79.—Where does each kind reside ? § 35.

80.—Explain in what respects modern science is opposed to the Nyáyya, respecting the nature of Fluidity. § 35.

81.—To what notion has the allusion, in the text, to liquified light, reference ? § 35.

82.—Define Viscidity, and state its locus. § 36.

83.—Hence, of what nature are oil &c., agreeably to the Nyáyya ? § 36.

84.—How does this view apply to the case of mercury ? § 36.

85.—Define Sound, and state where it is held to reside. § 37.

86.—How does this stand in regard to the European theory? § 37.

87.—Define Knowledge, and state its divisions, according to the Nyáya. § 38.

88.—Define Remembrance and Notion, and state the divisions of the latter. § 39.

89.—Give examples of each division. § 40.

90.—What is the technical Sanskrit name of Right Notion? § 40.

91.—How many kinds of Right Notion are there, and what are they? § 41.

92.—Of how many kinds are their instrumental causes, and what are they? § 41.

93.—How far is the philosophical nomenclature, here employed in Sanskrit, free from ambiguity? § 41.

94.—What does the Sánkhya say of the Naiyáyika conclusion from Similarity? § 41.

95.—Give the substance of the illustrations adduced in point. § 41.

96.—Define an Instrumental Cause. § 42.

97.—Define a Cause generally. § 43.

98.—Define an Effect. § 44.

99.—Show how this virtually corresponds with Mr. Mill's language. § 44.

100.—How many kinds of Cause are reckoned, and what are their names? § 45.

101.—Define and exemplify each. § 45.

102.—How far does this view of causes agree with that of the followers of Aristotle? § 45.

- 103.—How, in modern philosophy, has the application of the word *cause* been narrowed ? § 45.
- 104.—What is understood by a Physical Cause ? § 45.
- 105.—And what by an Efficient Cause ? § 45.
- 106.—Define Perception. § 46.
- 107.—What is a Logical Individual ? § 46.
- 108.—What does Mr. Moberly remark on this ? § 46.
- 109.—Explain the terms *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. § 46.
- 110.—What is an Induction ? § 48.
- 111.—What is an Inference ? § 48.
- 112.—What is syllogizing ? § 48.
- 113.—Give examples. § 48.
- 114.—Explain and exemplify the application of the terms *vyápti* and *paksha-dharmatá*. § 48.
- 115.—Define the “subject’s *possession*.” § 48.
- 116.—Whence comes, perhaps, the formal difference between the phraseology of European logic and that of Indian, that the Hindús, in private reasoning, combine the major and minor premises in a single expression ? § 48.
- 117.—Give, at full length, an example of inferring for oneself, and then of proving to another. §§ 49, 50.
- 118.—What underserved censures have been passed on the five-membered argumentative exposition ? § 51.
- 119.—How has Ritter misunderstood the five-membered exposition ? § 51.
- 120.—Explain how an induction is equivalent to the “Consideration of a Sign.” § 52.
- 121.—How many kinds of Sign are there, and what are they ? § 53.
- 122.—Illustrate the three in order. § 53.
- 123.—What is the Subject, in an argument ? § 54.

- 124.—What is an "Instance on the same side" ? § 54.
- 125.—What is an "Instance on the opposite side" ? § 54.
- 126.—To what terms, employed by Bacon, do these expressions correspond ? § 54.
- 127.—What are the various Simblances of a reason ? § 55.
- 128.—Define and divide the Fallacy called *savyabhichára*. § 56.
- 129.—Define and exemplify the "Simblances of a reason" called *sádhárana*, *asádhárana*, and *unupusáhhári*. §§ 56, 57, 58.
- 130.—Define and exemplify a *viruddha-hetu*. § 59.
- 131.—Define and exemplify a 'Counterbalanced' reason. § 60.
- 132.—State the three-fold division of an 'Unreal' reason. § 61.
- 133.—Exemplify the 'Unreal' reason called *ás'rayásiddha*. § 62.
- 134.—Exemplify the 'Unreal' reason termed *staurúpasiddha*. 63.
- 135.—Define the 'Unreal' reason called *vyápyatwásiddha*. § 64.
- 136.—Define the logical term *upádhí*. § 64.
- 137.—Illustrate the expressions *sádhya-vyápakatá* and *sádhantí-vyápakatá*. § 65.
- 138.—Define and exemplify a 'Futile' reason. § 67.
- 139.—Define *upamána*. § 68.
- 140.—Give an example of it. § 68.
- 141.—Define a "Trustworthy Assertion". § 69.
- 142.—Who is "One Worthy" ? § 69.
- 143.—What is a Speech or Sentence ? § 69.
- 144.—What is a "Grammatically inflected word" ? § 69.

- 145.—In what is its Power here said to consist ? § 69.
- 146.—What are the causes in the absence of which no sense can be gathered from a Sentence ? § 70.
- 147.—Define the 'Expectancy' of a word. § 71.
- 148.—Define the 'Compatibility' of a word. § 71.
- 149.—Define the 'Juxta-position' of words. § 71.
- 150.—Exemplify the absence of these several requisites. § § 72, 73, 74.
- 151.—What is the literal meaning of *ákánkshá* ? § 72.
- 152.—Define *s'ábdajnána*. § 76.
- 153.—What are the divisions of "Incorrect Notion" ? § 77.
- 154.—Define Doubt. § 78.
- 155.—Define Mistake. § 79.
- 156.—Define and exemplify *reductio ad absurdum*. § 80.
- 157.—What is the connection and difference between the three kinds of "Wrong Notion" just defined ? § 80.
- 158.—Define Memory. § 81.
- 159.—How are Pleasure and Pain defined ? § 82.
- 160.—Define Desire, Aversion, and Effort. § 83.
- 161.—What definition is given of Merit and Demerit ? § 84.
- 162.—Which of the qualities belong to soul alone ? § 85.
- 163.—What qualities are called self-reproductive ? § 87.

CHAPTER IV.

- 164.—Define and divide Action. § 88.

CHAPTER V.

- 165.—Define Genus. § 89.

166.—To what terms, used by us in regard to Community, do the words *para* and *apara* correspond ? § 89.

CHAPTER VI.

167.—What are called Differences ? § 90.

CHAPTER VII.

168.—Define “Co-inherence.” § 91.

CHAPTER VIII.

169.—How many and what are the varieties of Non-existence ? § 92.


170.—Exemplify each. § 92.

171.—To what circumstance does the Vais'eshika school owe its name ? § 94.

172.—Who was the founder of the Vais'eshika school, and who of the Naiyáyika ? § 94.

EMENDATIONS.

PAGE.	LINE.	
3	17	For <i>dig</i> read <i>dis</i> '.
4	13,14	For <i>Priority</i> and <i>Posteriority</i> read <i>Remoteness</i> and <i>Proximity</i>
14	22	Include ' <i>Present</i> ,' and ' <i>Future</i> ,' in brackets.
"	27	For <i>Space</i> read <i>Place</i> .
26	16	Delete the brackets enclosing <i>pramá</i> .
37	7	After <i>inherence in</i> add <i>what inheres</i> <i>in</i> .



LECTURES
ON THE
NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.

THE compendium of the Nyaya system of philosophy, entitled the *Tarka Sangraha*, which we purpose here to translate and comment upon, has the following exordium :—

निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् ।

बालानां सुखबोधाय क्रियते तर्कसङ्ग्रहः ॥

1. “ Having placed in my heart the Lord of the World, [that is to say, having meditated on God,] and having saluted my preceptor, I compose [this treatise, named] the Compendium of Logical Results, for the pleasant comprehension of the uninstructed.”

a. The author then proceeds to enumerate the categories, or most general heads, under one or other of which every Name current in the world is capable of being classed. These, in accordance with the system of *Kāṇḍa*, followed by the author of the *Tarka Sangraha*, are enumerated in the next extract.

CHAP. I.—THE CATEGORIES.

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावास्त्व

पदार्थाः ।

2. "Substance (*dravya*), Quality (*guṇa*), Action (*karma*), Genus (*sāmānya*), Difference (*viśeṣa*), Co-inherence (*samavāya*), and Non-existence (*abhāva*);—these are the seven Categories (*padārtha*)."

a. The word Category is derived from a Greek word, corresponding to the Latin *predicamentum*, and signifying "what can be said or predicated" respecting the several things included under the term. For example, the Colour, Savour, and Odour of an apple are qualities. We predicate or assert that Colour comes under the category or predicament of Quality; and so of the others. But we cannot, correctly speaking, predicate any thing of Quality itself, except that it is one of the most general or comprehensive of Names. From its etymology it would seem that the word *padārtha* is equivalent to *padasya artha*, "the meaning of a word;" and the meaning of every common term must be com-

prised under one or other of the Categories that constitute a correct division of Names.

b. Different schools of philosophy have adopted different sets of categories. Those of Aristotle, which correspond more nearly than any others with those of the Nyáya, are "substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, condition, possession, action, and passion."

c. Our text-book now proceeds to enumerate the sub-divisions of the Categories:—

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदि-
गात्ममनांसि नवैव ।

3. "Amongst those [that is to say, amongst the Categories,] Substances [that is to say, the abodes of Qualities,] are nine: Earth (*prithivi*), Water (*ap*), Light (*tejas*), Air (*váyu*), Ether (*ákáśa*), Time (*ká-la*) Place (*dig*), Soul (*átman*), and Mind (*ma-nas*)."

a. Modern Chemistry has resolved Water into two gases, one of which is a constituent also of the compound air that we breathe. Earth is a very vague term, on which we shall have to remark further on. Philosophers are still divided in opinion as to whether Light is an imponderable substance, or the effect of undulation. The term Ether seems to be frequently employed in a sense scarcely differing from that of space in three dimensions. The specific quality assigned to it in the Nyáya system will be considered further on. [See § 17.] Time and Space are

here classed as *substances*, because the word substance is employed to signify that to which *qualities* can be attributed. How Soul and Mind come to be viewed as different substances, will appear in the sequel. [See §§ 20 and 21.]

b. The Qualities are next enumerated :—

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोग-
विभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुः-
खेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्काराश्चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणाः ।

4. "Colour (*rūpa*), Savour (*rasa*), Odour (*gan-
dha*), Tangibility (*sparśa*), Number (*sankhyá*), Di-
mension (*parimāna*), Severalty (*prithaktwa*), Con-
junction (*sanyoga*), Disjunction (*vibhāga*), Priority
(*paratwa*), Posteriority (*aparatwa*), Weight (*guru-
twa*), Fluidity (*dravatwa*), Viscidity (*sneha*), Sound,
(*śabda*), Understanding (*buddhi*), Pleasure (*sukha*),
Pain (*du'kha*), Desire (*ichchhā*), Aversion (*dvesha*),
[Will or] Effort (*prayatna*), Merit (*dharma*),
Demerit (*adharna*), and the Self-reproductive
(*sanskāra*) ;—these are the twenty four qualities."

a. These will be severally considered in the se-
quel [—§ 22]. The varieties of action are next
enumerated :—

उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्च
कर्माणि ।

5 “Throwing upwards (*utkshepaṇa*), Throwing downwards (*apakshepaṇa*), Contraction (*ākunchana*), Expansion (*prasāraṇa*), and Going (*gamana*);—these are the five actions.”

a. The last of these, viz., *gamana*, or “motion in general,” includes all the varieties of motion not previously enumerated, and might very well include also these four results of the exertion of force.

परमपरं चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ।

6. “Genus (*sāmānya*) [that is to say, a common nature, as the nature common to jars, the nature common to webs, &c.,] is of two kinds, higher (*para*) and lower (*apara*).”

a. These correspond to *genus* and *species*, as will be shown further on. [See chap. VII.]

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव ।

7. “Differences (*viśeṣha*), which reside in eternal substances, [such as mind, soul, time, place, and those atoms of which the *Nyāya* philosophers consider earth, water, &c., to be composed,] are endless.”

समवायस्त्वेक एव ।

8. “But Co-inherence (*samavāya*) is one only.”

a. Such is the relation between a web and the threads of which it is formed, the relation between a body and the parts of which it is made up.

अभावश्चतुर्विधः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्य-

साभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्चेति ।

9. "Non-existence (*abhāva*) [that is to say, the fact of not existing,] is of four kinds, antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhdva*), destruction (*pradhwan-sdbhdva*), absolute non-existence (*atyantābhhdva*), and mutual non-existence [or difference] (*anyonyābhhdva*)."

a. Having thus subdivided the categories, the writer of our text-book proceeds to consider each of the subdivisions in detail.

CHAP. II.—THE SUBSTANCES.

तच्च गन्धवती पृथिवी । सा द्विविधा नित्यानित्या
श्चेति । नित्या परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या
कार्यरूपा ।

10. "Earth is that in which there is the quality Odour. It is of two kinds, eternal and uneternal. In its atomic character it is eternal ; and when in the shape of some product [which has arisen out of those atoms, then] it is [said to be] un-eternal."

a. In order to come to a right understanding with the supporters of the view here laid down, it is necessary, in the first place, to enquire whether the first proposition is intended as a definition, or as a dogma. If as a definition of the sense in which the *Nyāya* philosopher intends to employ the term "earth," then it must be conceded that, as the propounder of

any theory has a right to define his terms as he pleases, provided he keeps strictly to his definition throughout the argument, and does not attempt to apply, in any different sense of the terms, the conclusions thus obtained, the *Nyāya* philosopher is, on this understanding, fully entitled to call every thing earth that smells, and nothing earth that does not smell. The question then remaining will be, whether the division of objects into odorous and inodorous is of any service in rendering our acquired knowledge more distinct, or in facilitating the acquirement of fresh knowledge. Let us see how the case stands. Ammoniacal gas, composed of the two simple and inodorous gases, Hydrogen and Nitrogen, is powerfully odorous. Will it facilitate, or obstruct, our acquaintance with the character and the relations of this substance, if we separate it from the class of airs, and associate it with stones or flowers? History must answer this question—the history of the progress of chemical discovery under the elemental theory and that of inductive analysis.

b. If, on the other hand, the proposition that “Earth is distinguished by the quality of smell,” is intended, not as a definition of the sense in which the term “Earth” is to be employed throughout the argument, but as an assertion that there actually is one real and distinct principle which is the constituent equally of every thing that is odorous;—then the philosophy of modern Europe demurs to the proposition. It is not self-evidently true. If it be true, therefore, it must be shown to be so, by the adduc-

tion of evidence. This is not furnished by our text-book.

c. The transitoriness of earth in the form of aggregates signifies the want of permanence in the forms, such as jars, &c., which it may assume. The jar, when crushed to powder, is no longer a jar; but the earth of which it was composed still remains.

d. Our text-book proceeds to subdivide the products of earth as follows:—

पुनस्त्रिविधा शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमस्सदादीनाम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणं नासाग्रवर्ति । विषयो मृत्पाषाणादिः ।

11. "This [that is to say, Earth in the character of a product,] is of three kinds, through these differences; body (*śarīra*), organ of sense (*indriya*), and mass (*vishaya*). The body is that of us men. The organ is the apprehender of odour, [called] the Smell (*ghrāṇa*), which resides in the fore-part of the nose. And the masses are clods, stones &c."

a. The notion that the senses and the elements partake of a common nature, appears also to have been that of Empedocles, who (as quoted and translated by Prof. Wilson, in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, p. 122,) says:

'By the earthy element we perceive earth; by the watery, water; the air of heaven by the aerial element; and devouring fire by the element of fire.' [See, further, § 17, b.] ♦

The senses are regarded as being each of the same nature with that constituent of the external world which each severally takes cognizance of. There are five senses, and these take notice of five distinct kinds of qualities, to furnish substrata for which the five Elements are postulated.

शीतस्पर्शवत्य आपः ।

12. "That which appears cold on touching it, they call Water."

a. In the sequel our text-book offers the just observation that levity is not an entity, but is only the absence of gravity. Modern philosophers hold that *cold* is, in like manner, the absence, or, rather, a low degree, of heat. Water, hotter, or colder than the body, or of the same temperature with the body, feels hot, or cold, or of medium temperature, just as iron or air feels, according to the greater or less amount of heat, as compared with the body, that it contains at the time.

ताः द्विविधा नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्याः
परमाणुरूपाः । अनित्याः कार्यरूपाः । पुन-
स्त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं बह-
व्यलीके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वाग्रवर्ति ।
विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिः ।

13. "And that [namely, water,] is of two kinds—

eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal; and when a product is produced by those atoms, then that is called un-eternal. [In the form of products,] again, it is of three kinds, through the difference of body, sense, and mass. The body [that is formed of water] exists in the world of Varuṇa [the god of the waters]; and the sense is the percipient of savour, [which is called] the Taste,—residing in the fore-part of the tongue. The masses are rivers, seas, and the like.”

उष्णस्य श्वत्तेजः । तद्विविधं नित्यमनित्यं च ।
 नित्यं परमाणुरूपमनित्यं कार्यरूपम् । पुनस्त्रिविधं
 शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमादित्यलोके ।
 इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति ।
 विषयश्चतुर्विधः भौमदिव्यौदर्याकरजभेदात् । भौमं
 वह्न्यादिकम् । अबिन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । भुक्तस्य
 परिणामहेतुरौदर्यम् । आकरजं सुवर्णादि ।

14. “That of which the sensation by touch is warm, they call Light. This is of two kinds, eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal, and in the form of products it is un-eternal. This [light in the form of products,] again, is of three kinds, through the difference of body, sense, and mass. The body exists in the solar realm. The sense, the percipient of colour, [which is called] the Sight

(*chakshush*), resides in the fore-part of the pupil of the eye. The masses are of four kinds, through these differences—residing in earth (*bhauma*), residing in the sky (*divya*), resident in the stomach (*audarya*), and produced in mines (*akaraja*). Residing in earth, it is fire, &c. Residing in the sky, it is lightning and the like, the fuel of which is water. That is resident in the stomach which is the cause of the digestion of things eaten. That [light] which is produced in mines is gold and the like.”

a. The *Nyaya* regards light and heat as one and the same substance. Modern research has discovered striking analogies, not only between light and heat, but also between these and electricity and magnetism; but whether they are radically the same, or different, has not yet been determined by investigation. In the *Nyaya*, the organ of sight is said to be a ray of light proceeding from the pupil of the eye towards the object viewed. Modern optical science pronounces that we see by means of rays coming to, not proceeding from the eye.

b. The doctrine of intestinal heat seems like an anticipation of Liebig's theory of digestion; but it reverses the order of cause and effect. The animal heat *arises* from the digestion of the food; the body acting, as Liebig tells us, “as a furnace which we supply with fuel.”

c. Gold is supposed, by the *Naiidyikas*, to consist of light, and not to be earthy, like the other metals; because the strongest heat of a furnace is insufficient to calcine it, or turn it into an earthy-looking oxide.

d. In the *Mimāṃsā*, gold is reckoned a distinct substance, as it is by European chemists.

रूपरहितस्पर्शवान्वायुः । स द्विविधो नित्यो-
ऽनित्यश्च । नित्यः परमाणुरूपोऽनित्यः कार्यरूपः ।
पुनस्त्रिविधः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं
वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं त्वक् सर्वशरीर-
वर्ति । विषयो वृक्षादिकम्पनहेतुः ।

15. "That which has not colour, and has tangibility, they call Air. It is of two kinds—eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal ; and in the form of products it is un-eternal. This, again, [in the form of products,] is of three kinds, through the differences of body, sense, and mass. The [aerial] body is in the aerial world, The sense is the Touch (*twach*), the apprehender of tangibility, existing throughout the whole body. Its mass is that which is the cause of the shaking of trees and the like."

a. Air is, by many people, in the present day, regarded as colourless ; but, if the colour of a body be that coloured ray which it reflects, then air should be considered to be blue, for it reflects the blue rays. The colour of a small quantity of air is not perceptible ; but when we look at a distant mountain, the colour of the large mass of intervening air causes the mountain to appear blue.

शरीरान्तः सञ्चारी वायुः प्राणः सचैकोऽप्युपा-
धिभेदात्प्राणायानादिसम्भवं लभते ।

16. "Air circulating within the body is called *prāṇa*. Although it is but one, yet, from the difference of its accidents, it takes the name of breath, flatulence, &c."

a. On this opinion Professor Wilson (p. 104 of his edition of the *Sāmkhya Kārikā*), remarks: "The vital airs are, in fact, the vital functions of breathing, circulation, and digestion. That these functions, resulting from organization, should be supposed to partake of the nature of aerial humours, originates very possibly from some misapprehension of the phenomena of breathing, flatulence, and arterial pulsation."

शब्दगुणकमाकाशं तच्चैकं विभु नित्यं च ।

17. "They call that Ether in which there resides the quality of sound. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal."

a. This element is inferred; in order to account for sound, and to provide each of the senses with a separate element. As pure air and water are devoid of odour, it seems to have been decided, by the *Naiyāyikas*, that odour is the distinctive evidence of earth. The perception of savour being dependent on the presence of moisture in the mouth, it was decided that the sense of taste must be aqueous in its nature. The relation between light and vision was obvious. The air, again, having been appropri-

ated to the sense of touch, which pervades the body just as the air usually envelops it, there remained nothing for it, if the uniformity of the system was to be kept up, but to postulate a fifth elementary substance to account for hearing; and this received the name of Ether.

6. The Nyaya theory of the senses and their operation, is in some respects the converse of the theory of ideas, or the older European theory of sensible forms. In that theory, outward bodies were supposed to send refined copies of themselves to the mind through the senses. Here, on the other hand, the mind is viewed as despatching a sense towards its object, in a material state resembling that of the object itself. Thus, luminous bodies are represented as being discerned by means of a ray of light, which proceeds from the eye, and which constitutes the sense of sight.

अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः स चैको विभुर्नित्यश्च ।

18. "The cause of the employment of 'Past,' 'Present,' and 'Future,' they call Time. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal."

प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक् सा चैका विभ्वी नित्या च ।

19. "The cause of the employment of 'Eastern' &c., they call Space. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal."

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । स द्विविधो जीवात्मा पर-
मात्मा चेति । तत्रेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः परमात्मा एक एव ।
जीवः प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नो विमुर्नित्यश्च ।

20. "The substratum of Knowledge [that is, that in which knowledge resides,]—they call Soul (*átman*). It is of two kinds, the animal soul and the Supreme soul. Of these two, the Supreme soul is God, the Omniscient. He is One only. And the animal [soul] is distributed to each body. It is all-pervading and eternal."

a. The reason assigned for saying that the human soul is all-pervading, is this, that whithersoever the body goes, there the soul too is present.

सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः । तच्च प्रत्या-
त्मनियतत्वादनन्तं परमाणुरूपं नित्यं च ।

21. "The organ which is the cause of the perception of pleasure &c., they call the Mind (*manas*). And it is innumerable, for this reason, that one remains with each Soul. It is in the form of an atom, and is eternal."

a. The *Naiyáyikas* argue that the mind is minutely small, as an atom, because, if it were infinite, as the *Mimánsú* maintains, it might be united with everything at once, and all sensations might be con-

temporaneous. Various cognitions, the *Naiḍyikas* contend, do not arise at one time to the same soul. "They only seem to do so when passing rapidly, though successively ; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, seems a ring of fire."—The phenomenon here instanced is accounted for, in modern philosophy, by the statement that the retina retains impressions for a short time after the exciting cause has been removed. Analogously, the ear apprehends one continuous sound when the succession of sounds is very rapid, as when a slip of wood is successively struck by the teeth of a rapidly revolving wheel.

b. Having finished his account of substance, our author proceeds to treat of quality.

CHAP. III.—THE QUALITIES.

चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुणो रूपम् । तच्च शुक्लनील-
पीतरक्तहरितकपिशचिचभेदात्सप्तविधम् । पृथिवी-
जलतेजोवृत्ति । तच्च पृथिव्यां सप्तविधम् । अभा-
स्वरं शुक्लं जले । शुक्लं भास्वरं तेजसि ।

22. "That quality which is apprehended only by the sense of Sight, is Colour. And this [quality] is of seven kinds, through these differences, white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown, and variegated. This [quality] resides in earth, water, and light. In earth it is of all the seven kinds; in water it is white and not lustrous; in light it is white and lustrous."

a. The researches of Sir Isaac Newton lead to the conclusion that colour belongs to light only, and that a ray of white light contains all the primary colours, which can be separated by a prism of glass. An object appears of the colour of the ray which it reflects; and the different power, in different bodies, to absorb one portion of a white ray and to reflect the coloured residue of the ray, gives rise to the variety of colours visible in nature.

रसनग्राह्यो गुणो रसः । स च मधुराम्लखर-
कटुकषायतिक्तभेदात् षड्विधः । पृथिवीजलदृष्टिः ।
पृथिव्यां षड्विधः जले तु मधुर एव ।

23. "The quality which is apprehended through the sense of Taste, is Savour. And it (namely, the quality of Savour,) is of six kinds, through the differences of Sweet, Sour, Saline, Bitter, Astringent, and Pungent. It resides in earth and water. In earth it is of the six kinds; but in water there is only the sweet savour."

a. It would be more in accordance with the usage of modern language, to say that pure water is devoid of savour, although moisture is indispensable to the perception of the savour residing in other substances. The term sweet more properly suggests the taste of sugar and the like.

प्राणग्राह्यो गुणो गन्धः । स च द्विविधः सुर-

भिरसुरभिश्च । पृथिवीमाचरतिः ।

24. "The quality which is apprehended by the sense of Smell, is Odour. And it is of two kinds, fragrance and stench. It resides in earth alone."

a. On the opinion that odour is peculiar to earth we have already remarked. [See § 10, a, b.] The division into fragrance and stench is not so much a division of odours as they are in themselves, but rather as they affect individuals agreeably or otherwise. The odour of musk is fragrance to one man, and stench in the nostrils of another.

त्वर्गिन्द्रियमाचराद्यो गुणः स्पर्शः । स च त्रिविधः
शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदात् । पृथिव्यस्तेजोवायुदृत्तिः ।
तत्र शीतं जले । उष्णस्तेजसि । अनुष्णाशीतः
पृथिवीवायोः ।

25. "The quality which is perceived only by the organ of Touch is Tangibility. And this is of three kinds, through the distinctions of cold, warm, and temperate, [that is to say, neither cold nor warm]. This quality resides in earth, water, light, and air. Coldness to the touch resides in water, warmth to the touch in light, and temperateness in earth and air."

a The feeling here described is that of temperature only ; and it is perhaps of that only that the organ gives us information without the coöperation

of our muscular frame, which, by creating or offering resistance, conduces to the sensation of hardness, roughness, and the like.

रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च ।
अन्यथापाकजम् । नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं
नित्यम् । अनित्यगतमनित्यम् ।

26. "The four of which Colour is the first, [that is to say, Colour, Savour, Odour, and Tangibility,] may be produced in Earth, [that is to say, in earthy things,] by maturation, [that is to say, by the special conjunction of Heat,] and they are then transient. In others, [that is to say, in Water, Light, and Air,] Colour and the like are not owing to the conjunction of Heat. They are [in Water &c.,] eternal, or transient. When they reside in eternal things [as Atoms,] they are eternal, and when they reside in things not eternal [viz. products,] they are transient.

एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः सङ्ख्या ।

27. "The cause of the employment of the terms Unity &c., is Number."

नवद्वयव्यवहारः । एकत्वादिपरार्द्धपर्यन्ता ।
एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् । अनि-
त्यगतमनित्यम् । द्वित्वादिकां तु सर्वथानित्यमेव ।

28. "This, [that is to say, Number,] resides

in the nine Substances ; and, beginning with Unity, it extends to the utmost limit of numeration (*pardrd-dha*). Unity is both eternal and un-eternal. It is eternal in an eternal thing, and un-eternal in an un-eternal thing :—but Duality and the like is everywhere un-eternal.”

The word here rendered “the utmost limit of numeration,” is “one hundred thousand billions.” The transientness of un-eternal unity is seen in the breaking of a jar, which then ceases to be “one jar.” The universal transientness of duality &c., implies the possibility that two or more things—such as drops of water—may run into *one*, and so the duality may perish.

मानव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं परिमाणम् । नव-
द्रव्यवृत्तिः । तच्चतुर्विधं अणु महद् दीर्घं रूखं चेति ।

29. “The peculiar cause of the employment of the term Bulk, is Measure. This quality resides in the nine Substances. It [that is to say, Measure,] is of four kinds—through the distinctions of small, great, long, and short.”

पृथग्व्यवहारासाधारणकारणं पृथक्त्वम् । सर्व-
द्रव्यवृत्तिः ।

30. “The peculiar cause of the employment of the term numerically distinct, is Severalty. This quality resides in all the Substances.”

संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ।

31. "The cause of the employment of the term 'conjoined,' is Conjunction. This quality resides in all the Substances."

संयोगनाशको गुणो विभागः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ।

32. "The quality which annihilates Conjunction is Disjunction. This resides in all the Substances."

a. Disjunction, it is to be remarked, occurs only when conjunction has preceded.

परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणो परत्वापरत्वे ।
 पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिनी । ते द्विविधे दिक्कृते
 कालकृते च । दूरस्थे दिक्कृतं परत्वं समीपस्थे
 दिक्कृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ठे कालकृतं परत्वं कनिष्ठे
 कालकृतमपरत्वम् ।

33. "The peculiar causes of the employment of the two terms Far and Near, are Remoteness and Proximity. These qualities reside in the four beginning with earth, and in mind. They are of two kinds—made by Space and made by Time. There is Remoteness made by space in that thing which remains in a distant place, and Proximity made by space in that thing which remains in a place near. In the person who is the elder there is Remoteness made by time;

and in the person who is the younger there is Proximity made by time."

a. Reckoning either backwards or forwards from the point, in space or time, occupied, or supposed, by the speaker, that one of two things which is nearest he calls *apara*, and that which is further off he calls *para*.

आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वम् । पृथिवी-
जलवृत्ति ।

34. "The non-intimate cause of incipient falling, is Weight. This quality resides in earth and in water."

a. Gravity is here spoken of as being confined to earth and water. If Gautama or Aristotle had lived to witness the experiments of Torricelli and Pascal, they would have changed their opinions respecting the supposed absence of gravity in the atmosphere. Gold was the heaviest substance known to the ancients, who were not acquainted with Platinum; yet, according to the *Nyāya* view that gold is solidified light, it ought to have no gravity. This difficulty is met by saying that some earth is combined with light in the process of solidification (— which reminds us of the opinion of Paracelsus, that Gold is Mercury with its pores saturated with light—); but the puzzle remains, how, with only a portion of gravitating matter, gold should be heavier than every other substance with which the *Naiydyikas* were acquainted.

b. A noticeable decision of the *Naiydyikas* was this, that levity is not a distinct quality, but the negation of gravity. Light and heavy are, in truth, relative terms. Stone is light in comparison with iron, but heavy in comparison with wood. The lightness here consists, not in the absolute negation of gravity, but in the absence of so much as would have made the two equally heavy.

c. Gravity is spoken of as the cause of *incipient* falling,—the continued descent being attributed exclusively to momentum. Thus the accelerated motion of falling bodies appears to have escaped the observation of the *Naiyáyikas*.

आद्यस्यन्द्नासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वम् । पृथिव्य-
 स्तेजोर्दत्त । तद् द्विविधं सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं च ।
 सांसिद्धिकं जले । नैमित्तिकं पृथिवीतेजसोः ।
 पृथिव्यां घृतादौ अग्निसंयोगजन्यं द्रवत्वम् ।

35. " The non-intimate cause of incipient trickling, [that is to say, oozing, or melting, or flowing,] is Fluidity. It belongs to earth, light, and water. This quality is of two kinds—natural and adscititious [that is to say, produced by some cause]. Natural Fluidity resides in water. Adscititious Fluidity belongs to earth and light. In earthy substances, butter and the like, Fluidity is produced by the conjunction of fire."

a. Modern discovery tends to establish the opinion that what *Kandda* regarded as the adscititious cause of fluidity, is in reality the indispensable cause of it. In the opinion of the *Naiydyikas*, "fluidity essentially exists in hail and ice; but is obstructed by an impediment." This impediment is no other than the abstraction of heat, which also solidifies molten lead after it has been removed from the fire. The three states of solid, liquid, and aëriform, most probably belong equally to every substance—or, at least to every un-compounded substance; for heat separates many compounds. Every one who has studied the works of modern chemists will admit the probability of this view.

b. The rendering of Light fluid by means of fire, alluded to in the text, has reference to the notion that gold is solidified light. [See § 34, a.]

चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुर्गुणः स्नेहो जलमाच-
दतिः ।

36. "The quality which is the cause why particles and the like become a heap, is Viscidity. This quality resides in water alone."

Hence the *Naiydyikas* hold that oil &c., are viscid only in consequence of their containing water. Oil contains the elements of water, but mercury does not—yet the particles of mercury collect into heaps just as those of oil or water do. The pheno-

menon, in each of these cases, falls under what is termed, in modern science, the attraction of cohesion.

श्रीचन्द्रो गुणः शब्दः । आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः ।
स द्विविधः ध्वन्यात्मको वर्णात्मकश्चेति । ध्वन्या-
त्मको भेर्यादौ । वर्णात्मकः संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ।

37. "Sound is the quality which is apprehended by the organ of hearing (*śrotra*). It resides only in the Ether. It is of two kinds, inarticulate and articulate. In a drum or the like it is inarticulate. In the shape of the Sanskrit, or any other language, it is articulate."

a. On the question of the medium of sound we have already offered some remarks. [See § 17, a.]

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्बुद्धिर्ज्ञानम् । सा द्विविधा स्मृ-
तिरनुभवश्चेति ।

38. "Knowledge, which is the cause of every application [of names to things], is Understanding (*buddhi*). It is of two kinds, Remembrance and Notion."

संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । तद्भिन्नं ज्ञान-
मनुभवः । स द्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्च ।

39. "The knowledge which is produced only by

its own antecedence [i. e., by itself as its own antecedent,] is Remembrance (*smṛiti*):—and knowledge which is different from that is called Notion (*anubhava*). This [that is to say, Notion,] is of two kinds—right and wrong.”

a. The nature of memory will be considered when we come to the consideration of the qualities which are self-reproducing. [See § 87.]

तद्वति तत्प्रकारकानुभवो यथार्थः । यथा रजते
इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । सैव प्रमेत्युच्यते ।
तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकानुभवोऽयथार्थः । यथा
शुक्लाविदं रजतमित्यादि ज्ञानम् ।

40. “Of whatever description anything is, a notion of that same description is a right notion:—as, in the case of Silver, the idea of its being Silver. This is called (*pramā*) [that is to say, commensurate with its object]. The supposing a thing to be as the thing is not—such a notion is called a wrong notion:—as, in the case of a [pearly] Shell, the notion of its being Silver.”

यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्द-
भेदात् । तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोप-
मानशब्दभेदात् ।

41. “Right notion is of four kinds, according to

the division of Perceptions (*pratyaksha*), Inferences (*anumiti*), Conclusions from similarity (*upamiti*), and authoritative Assertions understood (*śabda*). And the instrumental causes of these also are of four kinds—according to the division of Perception (*pratyaksha*), Inductive generalizations (*anumāna*), Recognition of similarity (*upamāna*), and authoritative Assertion (*śabda*).”

a. The merit of the Sanskrit philosophical nomenclature is observable in this passage, where we find the instrument in the production of knowledge, in three cases out of the four, distinguished by a name different from that which denotes the result of its employment, yet etymologically related to it. The term for Perception labours under the same defect as the English word; the act and the result being denoted by the same ambiguous term. The Conclusion from similarity is included, and properly, in our opinion, by the followers of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, under authoritative Assertion. When a man, to take the familiar illustration instanced by the *Naiyāyikas*, is told that a *gayāl* (*bos gavaeus*) is like a cow, and so recognises the *gayāl*, when he meets with it, by its resemblance to a cow, his knowledge is based on the affirmation of the person who stated the resemblance to him. In a strict classification, founded on a complete analysis, affirmation would not appear as a specifically distinct ground of knowledge or belief, for it is itself indebted to inference for all its efficacy. We believe testi-

mony only where we have inferred that it is trustworthy. Every one is not aware of having made an inference in such a case, because it is not every one that is capable of noting and analysing the operations of his own mind, even were it to occur to him to attempt it. A young Arab believes the *Qurán* on the testimony of his father, because he has observed, during his own infancy, that his father is a much better informed person than himself; and he has always found it safer to take his father's word on any point than to decide, in opposition to it, on the strength of his own experience. He therefore infers that his father's word is to be trusted in regard to the *Qurán* also; and he infers that what he finds written in it is true, because this follows of course from the belief that his father had given a true account of the matter. Now, if, forgetting, or not perceiving, the real foundation of his belief, the young Arab grows up under the habitual impression that the *Qurán* is in itself an authority standing in need of no process of inference, from matters extrinsic or intrinsic, for its establishment, then he must needs remain a Muhammadan to the end of his days, though no one but a Muhammadan will think that his notion is a right one.

व्यापारवदसाधारणकारणं करणम् ।

42. "A cause with an operation, not one of those causes common to all effects, is called an instrumental cause (*karana*)."

अवन्यथासिद्धकार्यनियतपूर्वदृष्टिः कारणम् ।

43. "That which is invariably antecedent to some product, and is not otherwise constituted—[i. e., is not by any thing else,—except the result in question,—constituted a cause],—is the cause (*kāraṇa*) [of that product]."

कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ।

44. "That which annuls its own antecedent non-existence is called an Effect (*kārya*)."

a. This is in accordance with Mill's proposition (Logie, Vol. I. p. 395,) that "It is a universal truth that every fact, which has a beginning, has a cause."

कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्त-
भेदात् । यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायि
कारणं यथा तन्तवः पटस्य पटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः ।
कार्येण कारणेन वा सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति
कारणसमसमवायिकारणं यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य
तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य । तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्त-
कारणं यथा त्वरीवेमादिकं पटस्य । तदेतत्त्रि-
विधकारणमध्ये यद्साधारणं कारणं तदेव कारणम् ।

45. "Cause is of three kinds, according to the distinction of substantial (*samavāyī*), non-substantial (*asamavāyī*), and instrumental (*nimitta*). That in

which an effect intimately relative to it takes its rise, is a substantial cause [of that effect], as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own colour, &c. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause which is associated in one and the same object [as a necessarily immanent cause,] with such effect or cause, is the non-substantial. Thus, the conjunction of the threads is the non-substantial cause of the cloth, and the colour of the threads that of the colour of the cloth. The cause which is distinct from both of these is the instrumental cause, as the weaver's brush, the loom, &c., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that only is called an instrumental cause which is not a universally concurrent cause [or condition of all effects, as God, time, place, &c., are]."

a. Let us compare this view of causes with the view taken by the followers of Aristotle. In the opinion of these speculators, four things were entitled to the name of cause; and these were severally termed the *material*, the *efficient*, the *formal*, and the *final*. That out of which any thing is made, as the marble out of which a statue is made, they termed its material cause. This corresponds to the *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, or substantial cause, of the text. It is the ground of the possibility of a thing's coming into existence. The efficient cause was that in which resides the moving power requisite in order to render the possible existence actual; as the sculptor. According to the *Nyāya*, the sculptor would be classed, along with his

chisels, as one among the several *nimitta-kāraṇa*, or instrumental causes. The final cause of a thing, according to the Aristotelian view, is that very thing in its completeness; as the statue when made. In modern language, (founded on this view,) the final cause is synonymous with the purpose to which any object is supposed to contribute: thus the promotion of vegetation may be regarded as the final cause of rain. This corresponds to what the *Naiydyikas* term *prayojana*, motive or purpose. The formal cause is that which must supervene to the matter, in order to give the thing its precise individual existence as that thing and no other; as the shape which the sculptor communicates to the marble. This corresponds to the *asamavdyi-kāraṇa*, or non-substantial cause, of the text, in so far as it is concerned about the relative distribution of the parts of which the aggregate is made up.

b. The word "form", it may be here noticed, is employed in a peculiar sense by Bacon, to denote that in virtue of which a given quality resides in a given thing; as transparency in glass. "The [Baconian] form, then, (*vide* Preliminary Dissert., Enc. Brit., p. 459,) differs in nothing from the cause; only we apply the word *cause* where it is an event or change that is the effect. When the effect or result is a permanent quality, we speak of the form or essence."

c. In modern philosophy, the employment of the word cause has been much simplified. We now speak of the marble as the material of the statue, not as its material cause. The term "final cause" is

still current, but in the somewhat relaxed sense that we have already stated. The arguments for the existence of a Deity, drawn from the observation of nature, have reference to final causes. Harvey was led to the discovery of the circulation of the blood, by enquiring into the final cause of, or purpose to be subserved by, the valves in the blood-vessels.

d. The scientific employment of the word cause, in modern philosophy, has respect to the familiar truth, (as stated by Mill,—Logic, Vol. 1. p. 397,) “that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it.” Of two facts so related, that which precedes is termed the cause of the other. To prevent misconception, it is frequently termed the *physical* cause; the word physical serving to signify that we are speaking merely of the invariable relation of succession observed in nature between the two facts, and not of any efficiency in the antecedent for the production of the consequent. That efficiency we cannot well conceive to consist in anything else than the fact that the relations observed in nature are such as the Author of Nature has thought fit to establish among his works. The efficiency of a cause consists in its being God's will that it should be efficient. This, in our opinion, is what is conveyed by the Arabic expression *musabbib-ul-asbab*, usually rendered “The causer of causes;” but which, to our mind, rather expresses, “Who maketh

causes to be efficiently such," or "Who bestoweth on something that in virtue of which it becomes a cause."

e. Let us see how the chain of cause and effect, in regard to the production of cloth, looks when we resolve the variously named causes of the *Nydyā* into the language of invariable antecedence and succession. In such a sequence we do not enumerate the matter of the cloth, because, as the matter is the ground of the possible existence of the thing, the existence of the cloth, about which we are speaking, implies the existence of the matter. When we speak of an effect, we speak of an event, not a substance; and the event, of which we have to trace the chain of antecedents, is the appearance of a certain amount of matter in the form of cloth. The event which invariably precedes, and is invariably followed by, the appearance of cloth, is the suitable conjunction of threads. This, then, is the cause why cloth has made its appearance. That conjunction itself was immediately preceded by the operation of the loom upon the threads properly disposed. This operation, which always precedes the conjunction, and which, in regard to threads suitably disposed, is invariably followed by it, is the cause of the conjunction. The operation of the loom was consequent on the muscular exertions of the weaver, which invariably precede each movement of the loom. Again, the exertions of the weaver were consequent upon his desire

to possess cloth, and this desire itself was consequent upon other considerations, which we need not at present enquire further into. Thus we find that the different kinds of causes enumerated by Aristotle and the *Naiyāyikas*, may be resolved into similar sequences, in either of which the links differ among themselves only in respect of the distance of each link in the chain from the ultimate effect dependent upon it.

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । इन्द्रियार्थ-
सन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्विविधं नि-
र्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं च । तत्र निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं
निर्विकल्पकम् । यथा इदं किञ्चित् । सप्रकारकं
ज्ञानं सविकल्पकम् । यथा डिद्योऽयम् । ब्राह्म-
णोऽयम् । श्वामोऽयमिति ।

46. "The cause of the knowledge [called] a perception is sensation. Sensation is the knowledge produced by the conjunction of an organ of sense and its object. It [a perception,] is of two kinds, where it does not pay regard to an alternative, and where it does. The knowledge which does not pay regard to an alternative, is that which involves no specification, as in the simple cognition that 'This is something [we know not what].' The knowledge which contem-

plates an alternative is that which includes a specification, as 'This is *Dittha*,' 'This is a *Bráhmaṇa*,' 'This is *black*.' "

a. The subject of the proposition 'This is something,' is what is technically termed a Logical Individual. In regard to the term 'individual,' Mr. Moberly remarks (—Logic, p. 11—): "The accurate etymological sense of the word Individuum is plainly That which has no qualities that we know of—*quod nihil habet dividui*—but is an object of sensation known to us only by its occupying a certain space at a given time. In this sense, however, it would be absurd to talk of an individual man or horse. If we know that a thing is a man or a horse, we know some of its qualities, and therefore it is no longer an individual to us." The term *nirvikalpaka* is applied not only to the knowledge of a thing 'which has no qualities that we know of,' but also to the knowledge of a generic character abstracted from that to which it might belong,—such as the generic nature of a water-jar (*ghatatwa*). Such knowledge, according to the Nyáya, does not belong to ordinary mortals, all whose knowledge is *sa-vikalpaka*. The vision of abstract entities (or Platonic ideas,) is reserved for the adepts of the *Yoga*.

b. The opinion that sensation is produced by the conjunction of the object and the sense, is borne out by modern enquiry, which, in some quarters, tends to go still further, and to regard with approval

what Sir W. Hamilton terms the shrewd observation of Democritus, that "all the senses are only modifications of touch." [Reid's collected works, p. 104.]

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः षड्विधः संयोग-
संयुक्तसमवायसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायसमवायसमवे-
तसमवायविशेषणविशेष्यभावा इति । चक्षुषा घट-
प्रत्यक्षजनने संयोगसन्निकर्षः । घटरूपप्रत्यक्षजनने
संयुक्तसमवायसन्निकर्षः चक्षुस्संयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य
समवायात् । रूपत्वसामान्वप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवे-
तसमवायसन्निकर्षः चक्षुस्संयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं
तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात् । श्रोत्रेण शब्दसा-
क्षात्कारे समवायसन्निकर्षः कर्णविवरटत्याका-
शस्य श्रोत्रत्वात् शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात् गुणगुणि-
नोश्च समवायात् । शब्दत्वसाक्षात्कारे समवेतसम-
वायसन्निकर्षः श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य सम-
वायात् । अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावसन्नि-
कर्षः घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुस्संयुक्ते भूतले
घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात् । एवं सन्निकर्षषट्कजन्यं

ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्कारणमिन्द्रियं तस्मादिन्द्रियं
प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ।

॥ इति प्रत्यक्षखण्डः ॥

47. "The mutual proximity of a sense and its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds, (1) conjunction, (2) intimate union with that which is in conjunction, (3) inherence in that which is in conjunction, (4) inherence, (5) inherence in that which inheres, and (6) the relation between a distinctive circumstance and that which is thereby distinguished. For example, when a jar is perceived by the eye, there is [between the sense and the object,] the proximity of conjunction. In the perception of the colour of the jar, there is proximity through inherence in that which is in conjunction, because the colour inheres in the jar, which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of the genus—the fact that this is a colour, there is the proximity of inherence in what inheres in that which is in conjunction, because the fact of being a colour inheres in the particular colour which inheres in the jar which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of sound by the organ of hearing, the proximity is that of inherence, because the organ of hearing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of the ear, and sound is a quality of ether, and

a quality inheres in that of which it is the quality. In the perception that it is a sound [in the case of any given sound of which we are cognizant,] the proximity is that of inherence in what inheres, because the fact of being a sound inheres in the sound which inheres in the organ of hearing. In the perception of non-existence, the proximity is through the relation between a distinctive circumstance and that which is thereby distinguished, because, in the case when [we perceive] 'The ground is possessed of the non-existence of a jar,' the [perceived] non-existence of a jar distinguishes the ground which is in conjunction with the organ of vision.

"Knowledge produced by these six kinds of proximity is perception. Its instrument is sense. Therefore we hold that an organ of sense is what gives us the right knowledge called Perception.

"So much for the chapter on Perception."

a. Instead of saying that we perceive the jar immediately, and its colour as inherent in it, modern philosophers hold that the eye takes cognizance of nothing but the colour, which is due to the reflected rays coming to the eye from the object; and from the sensation of a coloured form we infer that there is a jar, just as the sparrows inferred that there was a bunch of grapes in the picture of the Greek artist. Our interpretation of a sign may be right or wrong, but

all that is conveyed to the mind by vision is this sign—viz., the sensation of colour. Again, we do not now say that the sense of vision takes cognizance of the generic quality of colour as residing in any particular colour; for we hold that the term colour, generically, is nothing else than a contrivance of language for the purpose, partly, of economizing words, and, more particularly, of furnishing general propositions, without which we could not reason.

b. The hypothesis of ether in the ear has been rendered unnecessary by the observation, that the vibrations of the ear, occasioned by a sounding body, are communicated to the tympanum, or drum of the ear, which communicates with the auditory nerve, an offshoot of the brain, beyond which we can trace the phenomenon no further; the way in which the matter of the nerves communicates with the immaterial principle of consciousness being one of the mysteries which remain with the Creator.

c. We now come to the important sub-section of

INFERENCE.

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञान-
मनुमितिः । व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मज्ञानं परा-
मर्शः । यथा बह्विव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं

परामर्शः । तज्जन्मं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञान-
मनुमितिः । यच्च यच्च धूमस्तथाग्निरिति साहचर्य-
नियमो व्याप्तिः । व्याप्यस्य पर्वताद्विदितित्वं पक्ष-
धर्मता ।

48. "An induction (*anumdna*) is the instrument of an inference (*anumiti*). An inference is knowledge that results from syllogizing (*pardmars'a*). Syllogizing is the taking cognizance that the subject (*paksha*) possesses what is constantly accompanied [by something which is thus seen to belong to the subject]. For example,—the taking cognizance that 'This hill has smoke—which is constantly accompanied [at the point where it originates,] by fire'—is [an instance of] syllogizing [—i.e., of apprehending, in connection, an induction and an observation]. The knowledge resulting therefrom, viz., that 'The hill has fire [somewhere about it],' is an inference. 'The being constantly accompanied' (*vyāpti*) is such an invariableness of association as this—that wherever there is smoke there is fire. By the 'subject's *possession*' [of something that is constantly accompanied], we mean the fact that there *exists*—in a mountain, for instance—that which is constantly accompanied, [by something else]."

a. In order that we may be enabled to trace the

analogy which, disguised by differences arising from diversity in the point of view or in the form of expression adopted, must yet necessarily exist between any two processes of reasoning neither of which is unsound,—let us examine the terms in the foregoing passage, which we have rendered, as nearly as we could, by equivalents borrowed from the logic of Europe.

b. The first formal difference that requires to be noticed is the fact, that whilst the European logic employs a phraseology founded on classification, the *Nyāya* goes to work with the terms on which the classification is based. The former infers that kings are mortal because they belong to the class of men. The latter arrives at the same inference by means of the consideration that mortality is present wherever there is the human nature, and the human nature wherever there is that of a king.

c. In the logical datum 'This hill has smoke, which is constantly accompanied by fire,' there are wrapt up, in one, the major premiss, "wherever there is smoke there is fire," and the minor premiss, "this hill is smoking." The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable parts of a single statement appears to be this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind that the premises compel the inference. When they are stated separately, they are no other than the premises of an Aristotelian syllogism.

d. The term which we have rendered "the being constantly accompanied," viz., *vyápti*, means, literally, "pervadedness." In regard to the import of a proposition which the logic of Europe calls a Universal Affirmative, such as "All men are mortal," the *Naiya-yika* would say that there is pervadedness (*vyápti*) of humanity by mortality;—and he would state the proposition thus: "Where there is humanity there is mortality." In a universal affirmative the predicate or major term connotes the "pervader" (*vyá-paka*) or constant accompanier of that, connoted by the subject or minor term, which is "pervaded" (*vyápya*) or constantly accompanied by it.

अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च । स्वार्थं स्वानु-
 भितिहेतुः । तर्थाह स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यच्च
 यच्च धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति महानसादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा
 पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्गते चाग्नी सन्दिहानः पर्वते
 धूमं पश्यन् व्याप्तिं स्मरति यच्च धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ।
 तदनन्तरं वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञान-
 मुत्पद्यते । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्श इत्युच्यते ।
 तस्मात् पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुभितिदत्प-
 द्यते । तदेतत् स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

49. "An induction is of two kinds, [inasmuch as it may be employed] for oneself, and for another. That which is for oneself is the cause of a private conclusion [in one's own mind]. For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having gathered the invariable attendedness [of smoke by fire], having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, viz., 'where there is smoke there is fire.' Thereupon the knowledge arises that 'this mountain has smoke, which is constantly accompanied by fire.' This is called the 'pondering of a sign' (*linga-parāmarśa*). Thence results the knowledge that 'the mountain is fiery,' which is the conclusion (*anumiti*). This is the process of inference for oneself."

यत् तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमायं परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं
 पञ्चात्रयववाच्यं प्रयुज्ये तत् परार्थानुमानम् । यथा
 पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूमवच्चात् । यो यो धूमवान्
 स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात्
 तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादिताह्निज्ञात् परोऽप्यग्निं
 प्रतिपद्यते ।

50. * But, after having, for oneself, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition, with a view to the information of another, then is the process one of inference for the sake of another. For example: (1) The mountain has fire in it; (2) because it has smoke; (3) whatever has smoke has fire, as a culinary hearth; (4) and so this has; (5) therefore it is as aforesaid. By this [exposition], in consequence of the sign [or token] here rendered, the other also admits that there is fire."

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि पञ्चास-
 रवाः । पर्वतो वह्निमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवद्वा-
 दिति हेतुः । यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमानित्युदा-
 हरणम् । तथा चायमित्युपनयः । तस्मात् तथेति
 निगमनम् ॥

51. "The five members [of this exposition are severally named]: (1) the proposition (*pratijñā*), (2) the reason (*hetu*), (3) the example (*udāharaṇa*), (4) the application (*upanaya*), and (5) the conclusion (*niḡamaṇa*). 'The mountain is fiery' is the proposition; 'because of its being smoky' is the reason; 'whatever is smoky is fiery' is [the general proposition or principle founded on] the example [of culinary

hearths and the like]; 'and so this [mountain] is the [syllogistic] application; 'therefore it [the mountain,] is fiery' is the conclusion.'

a. The five-membered argumentative exposition has been the object, sometimes of undeserved censure, and sometimes of commendation equally undeserved. When it is commended, at the expense of the Aristotelian syllogism, on the allegation (see a quotation in Sir G. C. Haughton's *Prodromus*, p. 215.) "that it exhibits a more natural mode of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits of the syllogism, and that its conclusion is as convincing as that of the syllogism," the commendation is based simply on a misconception of the syllogism thus disparaged. On the other hand, when it is censured as "a rude form of the syllogism," the censure is misapplied, because what corresponds to the syllogism is the two-membered expression, which, we have already seen, [§ 48, c.] comprises neither more nor less than the syllogism does; whereas the form now under consideration is proposed as the most convenient for communicating our convictions to others. Being a matter of exposition, it is therefore a question of Rhetoric whether the form be, or be not, the most convenient in which to arrange our proposition, our proofs, and our illustrations. The five-membered expression, so far as its arrangement is concerned, is a summary of *Konjida's* views in

regard to Rhetoric, "an offshoot from Logic," (see Whately's Elements of Rhetoric, page 6,) and to which, after "the *ascertainment* of the truth by investigation," belongs "the *establishment* of it to the satisfaction of *another*." Disregarding what is called rhetorical artifice, which, in his system, would have been out of place, as it would have been out of place in Euclid's Elements of Geometry, *Kaṇāda* directs his rhetorician to commence, as Euclid does, by stating the proposition to be proved. The reason is next to be alleged, and then instances are to be cited in order to show that the reason is sufficient to establish the fact in regard to all cases of a certain given character. The auditor is then to be reminded that there is no dispute that the case in question is of the given character, and the oration winds up with the reintroduction of the original proposition, in the new character of an established conclusion, just as Euclid's argument winds up by reintroducing the triumphant proposition with a flourish of trumpets in the shape of a "Quod erat demonstrandum."

b. Thus, rhetorically considered, the five-membered expression is a very suitable framework for a straight-forward argumentative speech, making no appeal to the passions, and not hesitating to table, without exordium, the proposition which it proceeds to establish.

c. Logically considered, the five-membered expres-

sion is a combination of the Inductive with the Deductive syllogism. The instances which led the speaker to an inductive generalization are cited [in the shape of some one or other example, followed by a suggestive “&c.,”] for the satisfaction of the auditor, in the third division of the rhetorical address—from which circumstance it has happened that those who suppose the intended function of the model oration and of the Aristotelic syllogism to be identical, have come, either to regard the oration as an illogical monstrosity, or else to fancy that it is a great improvement upon the syllogism. The former misconception is that of those who, like Ritter, (“History of Ancient Philosophy,” Vol. 4. p. 365,) were familiarly conversant with the logic of the schools. The other misconception was to be looked for in the case of those whose notions of the logic of the schools were derived from Locke’s Essay and Campbell’s Rhetoric.

d. Thus it is quite unfair to say, with Ritter, (“History of Philosophy,” Vol. IV. p. 365,) that two of the five members of *Kaṇāda’s* argument “are manifestly superfluous, while, by the introduction of an example in the third, the universality of the conclusion is vitiated:”—for, as we have shown, the citation of the example is designed, as a matter of rhetorical convenience, to bring to the recollection of the hearer examples in regard to which all parties are unanimous, and which are such as should

constrain him to admit the universality of the principle from which the conclusion follows.

स्वार्थानुमित्तिपरार्थानुमित्योर्लिङ्गपरामर्श एव
करणं तस्मात्लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् ।

52. "The instrument [in the making] of an inference (*anumiti*), whether for oneself, or for another, is simply the consideration of a 'sign' (*linga*); therefore an induction (*anumana*) [which was previously stated to be the instrument of an inference,] is [just] this consideration of a sign."

a. We have next, then, to enquire what several kinds of signs there are.

लिङ्गं त्रिविधमन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलान्वयि के-
वलव्यतिरेकि चेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्या-
प्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि यथा वह्नौ साध्ये धूमवत्त्वम् ।
यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः ।
यत्र वह्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महा-
द् इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । अन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं
केवलान्वयि यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् प-
टवत् । अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयोर्व्यतिरेकव्या-
प्तिर्नास्ति सर्वस्य प्रमेयत्वाद्भिधेयत्वाच्च । व्यति-

रेकमापथ्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि यथा पृथिवी-
 तरेभ्यो भिद्यते । गन्धवत्त्वात् । यदितरेभ्यो न
 भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवद्यथा जलम् । न चैयं तथा ।
 तस्मान्न तथेति । अथ यद्गन्धवत् तदितरभिन्नमि-
 त्यन्वयदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवीमापस्य पक्षत्वात् ।

53. "A Sign [or characteristic token] (*linga*) is of three sorts ; (1) that which is [a token in virtue of its being constantly] accompanied [by what it betokens], and absent [when what it would betoken is absent] (*anwayavyatireki*) ; (2) that which is [a token in virtue of its being constantly] accompanied only [and never absent through the absence of what it should betoken—the thing betokened being in this case one everywhere present—] (*kevaldnwayi*) ; and (3) that which is [a token in virtue of its being invariably] absent only [in the case of everything that could be cited in addition to the subject of the proposition itself] (*kevalavyatireki*). [To illustrate these three in order,]—that which is accompanied and absent (*anwayavyatireki*) is that which is pervaded by [—or, in other words, of which there is invariably predicable —] accompaniment (*anwaya*) [on the part of what it betokens], and absence (*vyatireka*) [on its own part, when what it might betoken is absent], as the possession of smoke when fire is what is to be established. [For example,] 'Where there is smoke there is fire, as on

the culinary hearth, [where the fire is supposed never to be extinguished:]—here there is ‘pervadedness by attendance’ (*anvayavyāpti*) [—i. e., it is predicable of the token, smoke, that it is attended by fire which it betokens]. ‘Where fire is not, there smoke is not, as in a great lake, [where it is taken for granted that fire cannot be:]’—here there is ‘pervadedness by absence’ (*vyatirekavyāpti*)—[i. e., it is predicable of smoke, as a token, that it will be absent where what it would have betokened is absent]. [In the second place,] that [sign] which is accompanied only (*kevalānwayi*) is that which is ‘pervaded by [—or, in other words, of which there is invariably predicable—] accompaniment only’ [on the part of what it betokens]. For example, ‘A jar is namable because it is cognizable, as a web is:—here there is no [case of] ‘pervadedness by absence,’ in cognizability and namableness, because *everything* [that we can be conversant about,] is both cognizable and namable. [Thirdly, and lastly,] that [sign] which is absent only (*kevalavyatireki*) is that which is ‘pervaded by [—or, in other words, of which there is invariably predicable—] absence only,’ [on its part, in the case of whatever could be cited, as an example, in addition to the subject of the proposition itself]. For example :

(1) ‘Earth is different from these others [of the elements] :

(2) Because it is odorous :—

- (3) What is *not* different from these others is not odorous,—as water, [for example, is inodorous] :—
- (4) But this [earth] is not so [—i. e., is not inodorous] :—
- (5) Therefore it is not such [as the other elements, but different from these others].'

Here [we are obliged to employ, in the 3d member, a universal negative, because] there is no analogous example [to cite in confirmation,] in the case of [the universal affirmative] 'What possesses odour is different from the others,' seeing that Earth alone can be the subject [of a proposition in which *odour*—see § 11—is affirmatively predicated].

सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान् पक्षो यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ
पर्वतः । निश्चितसाध्यवान् सपक्षो यथा तत्रैव
महानसः । निश्चितसाध्याभाववान् विपक्षो यथा
तत्रैव महाद्गदः ।

54. "That, whose possession of what is to be established is doubted, is called the subject (*paksha*); as the mountain, when the fact of its smoking is [assigned as] the reason [for inferring the presence of fire]. That which certainly possesses the property in question is called an instance on the same side (*sapaksha*); as the culinary hearth, in the same example. That which is certainly devoid of the pro-

perty in question, is called an instance on the opposite side (*vipaksha*); as the great lake, in the same example."

a. The *sapaksha* corresponds to Bacon's *instantiæ convenientes* "quæ in eadem natura conveniunt, per materias licet dissimilimas." The *vipaksha* corresponds to the *instantiæ* "quæ natura data privantur." *Novum Organum*, Lib. 2, Aph. XI and XII.

b. We now come to the sub-section of

FALLACIES.

संध्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्यतिपक्षासिद्धबाधिताः पञ्च
हेत्वाभासाः ।

55. "The five that present the semblance of a reason (*hetvūbhāsa*) are : (1) that which goes astray, (2) the reverse [of what it ought to be], (3) that which is counterbalanced, (4) the unreal, and (5) the futile."

संध्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स त्रिविधः साधार-
णासाधारणानुपसंहारिभेदात् । तत्र साध्या-
भाववृत्तिः साधारणोऽनैकान्तिको यथा पर्वतो

वद्विमान् प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य वद्व्यभाववति
इदं विद्यमानत्वात् ।

56. "That [alleged reason] which goes astray (*sayyabhichāra*), is that which has not just the one [requisite] conclusion. It is of three kinds; (1) What is common [to others in such a way that it would prove too much] (*sādhāraṇa*); (2) what is common to none [besides the individual, and therefore proves nothing] (*asādhāraṇa*); and (3) the non-exclusive (*anupasañhāri*). Among these, that [alleged reason among the three] having not just the one [requisite] conclusion, is [unduly] 'common', which is present in that in which there is the *absence* of what is to be proved. For example, 'The mountain is fiery, because it [the mountain,] is cognizable': [—here the reason would be liable to this objection] because cognizability belongs [equally] to a lake, which has *no* fire in it."

सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तोऽसाधारणो यथा शब्दो
नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति । शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्ये-
भ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तं शब्दमाचरति ।

57. "That [pretended reason] which is excluded [alike] from all instances, whether similar or dissimilar, is one common to none [besides the individual].

(*asādhāraṇa*). As, 'Sound is eternal, for it has the nature of sound.' Now the nature of sound resides in sound alone, and is excluded from all else, whether eternal or uneternal."

अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितोऽनुपसंहारी यथा
सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्वस्यापि
पक्षत्वादृष्टान्तो नास्ति ।

58. "That [pretended argument] which is destitute of an example whether of association or of dissociation [between itself and anything else,] is non-exclusive (*anupasaṅhāri*). For example, 'Every thing is uneternal, because it is capable of proof;— here there is *no* example [to cite—of *any* sort—] because 'every thing' [leaving nothing over,] is the subject."

साध्याभावव्याप्यो हेतुर्विरुद्धो यथा शब्दो
नित्यः कृतकत्वादिति । कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभा-
वेनानित्यत्वेन ध्याप्तम् ।

59. "A reason the reverse [of what it ought to be] (*viruddha*), is that which is constantly accompanied by the absence of what is to be proved. For example—, 'Sound is eternal because it is created,'—[we should reject this argument at once,] because the fact

of having been created implies non-eternity—the negation of being eternal.”

a. Whether sound be something created or uncreated is a disputed point among Indian philosophers; [—see the *Mīmāṃsā Aphorisms*, B. I., ch. 1, Aph. 6—23,]—the grammarians, of course, taking the side in the dispute which tends most to exalt the object-matter of their own science. Mr. Babbage assigns to sound an eternity of a different kind from that contemplated by the Hindú sages, for he argues, that the undulations, on which sound depends, being once produced, can never be absolutely annihilated; though, through excessive diffusion, the force becomes so diminished that our dull organs are not affected by it. Were it not for this, we might still hear the echos of Cicero's eloquence haunting the Roman forum.

साध्याभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं यस्य स सत्प्रतिपक्षो
यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववदिति ।
शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वाद्दृष्टवदिति ।

60. “A counterbalanced reason (*satpratipakṣha*) is that : long with which there exists another reason, which establishes [equally well] the *non*-existence of what is to be proved. For example ‘Sound is eternal, because it is audible, as the nature of sound is [by both parties admitted to be],’ [it still might be

argued, with equal force on the other side, that] 'Sound is *non*-eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is.' "

असिद्धस्त्रिविध आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपासिद्धो व्या-
प्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति ।

61. "An unreal reason is threefold: (1) that the [alleged] locality of which is unreal (*ásrayásiddha*); (2) that where the nature [alleged as belonging to the subject] is not a fact (*swarúpásiddha*); and (3) that where the being constantly accompanied [—though alleged—] is not a fact (*vyúpyatwásiddha*)."

आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्रर-
विन्दत्यात् सरोजारविन्दवत् । अथ गगनारवि-
न्दमाश्रयः स च नास्त्येव ।

62. "[As an example of] that the [pretended] locality of which is unreal [suppose that one argues]; 'The sky-lotus is fragrant, because the nature of a lotus resides in it, as in the lotuses of the lake'—here the sky-lotus is [alleged as] the locality [of the nature of a lotus], and in fact it [the sky-lotus,] does not exist *at all*."

Mr. Mill, (Logic, vol. I, p. 200), treating of the

nature of Definition, has the following remarks, which noticeably illustrate the case in hand.

He says :—

“Let this, for instance, be our definition ; A dragon is a serpent breathing flame. This proposition, considered only as a definition, is indisputably correct. A dragon *is* a serpent breathing flame : the word *means* that. The tacit assumption, indeed, (if there were any such understood assertion,) of the existence of an object with properties corresponding to the definition, would, in the present instance, be false. Out of this definition we may carve the premises of the following syllogism :—

‘ A dragon is a thing which breathes flame.

But a dragon is a serpent :

From which the conclusion is,

Therefore some serpent or serpents breathe flame :—

“An unexceptionable syllogism, in the first mode of the third figure, in which both premises are true, and yet the conclusion false ; which every logician knows to be an absurdity. The conclusion being false, and the syllogism correct, the premises cannot be true. But the premises, considered as parts of a definition, are true : there is no possibility of controverting them. Therefore, the premises considered as parts of a definition, cannot be the real ones. The real premises must be :

'A dragon is a *really existing* thing which breathes flame :—

'A dragon is a really existing serpent :

'Which implied premises being false, the falsity of the conclusion presents no absurdity'."

स्वरूपासिद्धौ यथा शब्दो गुणश्चाक्षुषत्वात् ।

अथ चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे नास्ति शब्दस्य आबन्धत्वात् ।

63. "As [an example of] an argument where the nature does not really exist in the subject, [suppose one were to argue,] 'Sound is a quality, because it is visible': here [every one would perceive, at once, that] visibility does not reside in sound, for sound is recognised by the hearing [not by vision]."

सोपाधिको हेतुर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । साध्यव्यापकत्वे

सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः ।

64. "The reason, when there is some [indispensable] 'condition,' is not really 'constantly accompanied.' [See § 48, *d.*] A 'condition' (*upādhi*) is that which, whilst constantly accompanying what is to be established, is *not* the constant accompanier of the argument [tendered in proof]."

d. What follows is intended to elucidate the terms of this definition.

साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं सा-
ध्यव्यापकत्वम् । साधनबन्धिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियो-
गित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम् ।

65. "To be the constant accompanier of what is to be established (*sādhya-vyāpakatwa*) consists in the not being the counter-entity (*apratiyogitwa*) of any absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) having the same subject of inhesion (*samānādhikarana*) as that which is to be established. To be not the constant accompanier of the argument (*sādhana-vyāpakatwa*) consists in the being the counter-entity (*pratiyogitwa*) of some absolute non-existence [not impossibly] resident in that which possesses the [character tendered as an] argument."

a. The *Naiydyikas* glory in this bewildering style of elucidation. In the present instance the question was this: "In what consists such a constant accompanying as that of wet fuel in respect of the production of smoke?" In order that the answer might be sufficiently adorned with obscurity, the term Non-existence, the great ally in the mystification of language, is called into council; and it is determined that, so far as concerns the production of smoke, we may assume the non-existence of everything that is *not* required for its production. For example, jars are not indispensable, nor elephants, nor astro-

nomical calculations, nor an indefinite number of other things, the non-existence of all of which is quite compatible with the production of smoke. The counter-entity (*pratiyogi*) in regard to any particular non-existence being the thing itself, and the counter-entities of all the non-existences compatible with the production of smoke being all those things that are *not* indispensable for its production, it follows that the characteristic of the indispensable is its being something different from all these, or, as our author expresses it, its *not* being the counter-entity to any of these non-existences. Such, in the case of smoke, is the part performed by wet fuel, which is not the counter-entity to the non-existence of jars, &c., but is the counter-entity to the non-existence of wet fuel itself, a non-existence which he holds is *not* compatible with the production of smoke.

b. The second definition, as will be readily seen, is the opposite of this. He proceeds to exemplify the case:

पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वादित्यत्र आर्द्रन्धन-
संयोग उपाधिः । तथाहि यत्र धूमस्तत्रार्द्रन्धन-
संयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता । यत्र वह्निस्तत्रार्द्र-
न्धनसंयोगो नास्ति अयोगोलके आर्द्रन्धनसंयोगा-
भावादिति साधनाव्यापकता । एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे

सति साधनास्थापकत्वादाद्र्धनसंयोग उपाधिः ।
 सोपाधिकत्वाद्द्विमच्चं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धम् ।

66. “[Suppose it to be argued that,] ‘The mountain is smoky, because it is fiery’: in this case the contact of wet fuel is a ‘condition.’ To explain:— ‘wherever there is smoke, there there is the conjunction of wet fuel’: [this we assume to be not disputed,—and] thus there is a constant accompanying of [or attendance upon,] what is to be established (*sādhavyāpakatā*). But where there is fire, there is not [necessarily] the conjunction of wet fuel; for there is no conjunction of wet fuel in the case of an [ignited] iron ball, so that there is not a constant accompanying of [or attendance upon,] the proof (*sādhavyāpakatā*). Thus, the conjunction of wet fuel is a ‘condition,’ since it is something [see § 64,] ‘which, whilst constantly accompanying what is to be established, is *not* the constant accompanier of the argument [tendered in proof].’ Fieriness is ‘not really constantly accompanied’ [by smoke], because there is a ‘condition’ attached.”

a. An argument proposed in the form, “The mountain is fiery; therefore it must smoke,” is called an Enthymeme, because, only one of the premises being expressed, the other is regarded as remaining in the mind (*en thymo*) of the reasoner. In the case of a fallacy propounded as an Enthymeme,

[see Whately's Logic, Book 3, § 1,] it is impossible to tell whether the fallacy is in the form, or in the matter. For example, the suppressed premiss, in the present case, may be either, "Some things when ignited are smoky," or, "All things when ignited are smoky." On the former alternative, the fallacy is the formal one of undistributed middle; on the other alternative, the major premiss is false, as proved in the text by the instance of the ignited iron ball. The *Nyāya*, which takes no notice of formal fallacies, assumes that the suppressed premiss is in the form in which, if its truth were conceded, it would really establish the point in question: for example—

"Whatever is ignited smokes;

"The hill is ignited;

"Therefore it smokes."

The instance of the ignited iron ball enables us merely to deny the major premiss of this syllogism. It is not unfrequently useful, however, to know not merely that something is wrong, but to know how far it is wrong, or what amount of correction would make it right. With this view the case may be regarded as falling under the head of the procedure "a dicto *secundum quid* ad dictum simpliciter," that is to say, "from an assertion *with a qualifying condition*, to the same assertion without the qualification." Thus, if we concede to the *Naiyāyika* his

theory of smoke, we may say with him that "Whatever is ignited, provided there is the conjunction of wet fuel, smokes"; from which, however, we cannot go on to infer that the hill, being *simply ignited*, smokes. There the reason (fieriness,) is "secundum quid" (*sopādhika*) in the major premiss, and the fallacy consists in the dropping of the "quid" (*upādhi*) in the minor.

यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स
बाधितः यथा वह्निरनुष्णो द्रव्यत्वादिति । अचा-
नुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षेण
गृह्यते इति बाधितत्वम् ।

॥ व्याख्यातमनुमानम् ॥

67. "An argument is futile (*badhita*) when the absence of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof. For example, [it may be argued that,] 'Fire is cold, because it is a substance.' Here coldness is sought to be established; and its absence, viz., warmth, is apprehended by the sense of touch; [and the direct apprehensions of Sense are of greater authority than any inference which contradicts them]. Hence the argument is futile."
"Thus has Inference been expounded."

a. Our text-book now proceeds to treat of

COMPARISON.

उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसञ्ज्ञ-
ज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्करणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । अति-
देशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तरव्यापारः । तथाहि ग-
वयशब्दवाच्यमज्ञानं कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषाङ्गी-
सदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन्
गोसदृशपिण्डं पश्यति तदनन्तरमसौ गवयशब्दवा-
च्य इत्युपमितिर्त्पद्यते ।

॥ व्याख्यातमुपमानम् ॥

68. "The knowledge of a similarity (*upamāna*) is the instrument [in the production] of an inference from similarity (*upamiti*). This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named. Its instrument is the knowledge of a likeness. The operation involved [in the employment of this instrument for the attainment of knowledge,] is the recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance. For example; a person, not knowing what is meant by the word

gavaya: (*bos. gavaeus*), having heard from some inhabitant of the forest as follows : "A *gavaya* is like a cow,"—having gone to the forest, remembering the purport of what he has been told, sees a body like that of a cow. Thereupon this inference from similarity arises [in his mind], that 'this is what is meant by the word *gavaya*.'"

"Thus has the knowledge of a similarity been expounded."

a. Our text-book now proceeds to treat of

TESTIMONY.

आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता । वाक्यं
पदसमूहो यथा गामानयेति । शक्तं पदम् ।
अस्मात् पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इति ईश्वरेच्छा
सङ्घेतः शक्तिः ।

69. "A word [or right assertion] is the speech of one worthy [of confidence]. But one worthy is a speaker of the truth. A speech [or sentence] is a collection of grammatically inflected terms ; as, for example, 'Bring the cow.' A grammatically inflected term (*pada*) is that which is possessed of power [to convey a meaning]. Such power consists

in its being the will—the appointment—of the Lord, that 'Such and such a meaning is to be understood from such and such a grammatically inflected term.'

आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता सन्नधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञान-

हेतुः ।

70. "The cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence [without which a sentence would else be unintelligible,] is expectancy, compatibility, and juxtaposition."

a. These three requisities are explained as follows:—

पदस्य पदान्तरस्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्द्वयानुभाव-
 क्त्वात्प्रमाणात् । अर्थावाधौ योग्यता । पदानाम-
 विलम्बेनोच्चारणं सन्नधिः ।

71. "Expectancy (*dkāṅkshā*) means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning, this being occasioned by the absence of another word [which, when it comes as expected, will complete the construction and the sense]. Compatibility (*yogyatā*) consists in [a word's] not having a meaning incompatible [with that of other words in the sentence]. Juxtaposition (*sannidhi*) consists in the enuncia-

tion of the words without a [long] pause [between them].”

a. Examples of deficiency in each of these respects here follow :—

आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणं यथा गौरश्वः

पुरुषो हस्तीति न प्रमाणमाकाङ्खाविरहात् ।

72. “A collection of words devoid of expectancy &c., is no instrument of right knowledge; for example, ‘Cow, horse, man, elephant,’ gives no information, from the absence of expectancy; [the words having no reference one to another, and not looking out for one another].”

a. The word *ākāṅkṣhā*, the import of which here is interdependence, literally means ‘desiring, or looking for.’ In the sentence “*Devadatto grāman gachchhāti*,” “Devadatta goes to the village;” the first word is in the nominative case, a form which, as it belongs to an agent, looks out for another word denoting action. The word denoting action, the third in the sentence, looks for some object of the action. This it finds in the second word, which, being in the objective case, was looking out for the verb. Each word, in such a sentence, finds every other kind of word which it looks out for. This, however, is not sufficient to ensure a sentence’s being faultless, as our text-book goes on to show.

अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न प्रमाणं योग्यतावि-
रहात् ।

73. "The expression 'He should irrigate with fire' is no instrument of right knowledge, by reason of the absence of compatibility [between fire and irrigation]."

प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चारितानि गामानयेत्यादि-
पदानि न प्रमाणं सान्निध्याभावात् ।

74. The words, for example, 'Bring—the—cow', not pronounced close together, but with an interval of some three hours between each, constitute no instrument of right knowledge, from the absence of [the requisite closeness of] juxtaposition."

वाक्यं द्विविधं वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिक-
मीश्वरोक्तत्वात् सर्वमेव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं त्वा-
प्तोक्तं प्रमाणम् । अन्यदप्रमाणम् ।

75. "Speech is of two kinds, sacred (*vaidika*) and secular (*laukika*). The sacred, being uttered by the Lord, is all authoritative; but the secular, if uttered by one who deserves confidence, is authoritative: other than this is not authoritative."

z. Who "deserves confidence" is a question which our text-book does not enter upon.

वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानं तत्करणं शब्दः । इति
यथार्थानुभवो निरूपितः ।

76. "The knowledge of the meaning of a speech is verbal knowledge; its instrument is speech.

"Thus has been explained what constitutes correct knowledge."

अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्ययतर्कभे-
दात् ।

77. "Incorrect knowledge is of three sorts, according to the division of doubt, mistake, and [such opinion as is liable to] *reductio ad absurdum*."

एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्याव-
गाहिज्ञानं संशयो यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ।

78. "In regard to one thing possessing a certain nature, 'Thought, plunging itself into specialization by various opposite natures, is Doubt (*sañśaya*). For example, 'a post, or a man.'"

a. The object is supposed to be seen from a dis-

tance, or when there is little light; and, whilst we have not made up our mind that it is *not* a post, or that it is *not* a man, we continue to associate both natures with it, and this constitutes doubt. Thought is mere thought when one is thinking of nothing in particular. When we take cognizance of any particular thing, Thought is regarded as becoming a special thought by immersing itself in the thing, and receiving *information* by taking the form of it. All the forms, or natures, that really belong to the thing, may co-operate harmoniously in producing information;—e. g., the nature of a substance, and of an animal, &c., in the case of a man. But the natures of a man and of a post cannot co-operate in the same case of information. They conflict, and in this conflict consists the state of Doubt.

मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययो यथा गुप्ताविद्ं स्वत-
मिति ।

79. "Apprehending falsely is mistake (*viparyaya*). For example, in the case of mother-o'-pearl,—that this is silver."

व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्को यथा यदि
वह्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति ।

80. "*Reductio ad absurdum* (*tarka*) is a self-willed

notion in regard to the constant accompanier, [which notion it is absurdly attempted to justify] by a self-willed notion in regard to what is constantly accompanied thereby. For example, [in dealing with an illogical person who denies that there is fire in the hill, we may have to urge upon him the consideration that,] ‘If there were not fire, there would not be smoke’; [whereupon the illogical person, so long as he persists in the form of error under consideration, will seek to deny the smoke, in spite of the testimony of his senses, rather than admit the fire which constantly accompanies it].”

a. Thus the term *tarka*, (usually rendered, as here, *reductio ad absurdum*.) when employed to designate, not the confutation, but one of the three forms, of error, denotes the state, of mind which is liable to be thus shown to involve an absurdity.

b. On the three kinds of wrong notion it may be remarked that the first, viz., doubt, ceases when one of the conflicting natures excludes the rest; the result, however, may still be a wrong notion of the second kind, or a mistake; for our doubt ceases when we become sure that a given object is a man, though in reality it be a post. Mistake ceases when, by more careful examination, or by other means, an apprehension of the real nature of the thing displaces the erroneous apprehension. The third kind of error is that where no further examination is required, the want of logical perspicacity being all that pre-

vents the individual from perceiving that the opinion which he entertains is inconsistent with admitted facts.

स्मृतिरपि द्विधा यथार्थायथार्था च । प्रमाजन्या
यथार्था । अप्रमाजन्यायथार्था ।

81. "Memory also [like knowledge in general,] is of two kinds, correct and incorrect. Correct memory is that which arises from correct knowledge. Incorrect memory is that which arises from incorrect knowledge."

a. Our text-book, of which a considerable portion has been occupied with the quality of Intellect, now goes on, to the remaining qualities, pleasure, pain, &c.

सर्वेषामनुकूलवेदनीयं सुखम् । प्रतिकूलवेद-
नीयं दुःखम् ।

82. "What all perceive to be agreeable, is pleasure (*sukha*); what appears disagreeable, is pain (*du'kha*)."

इच्छा कामः । क्रोधो द्वेषः । कृतिः प्रयत्नः ।

83. "By desire (*ichchhd*) we mean wishing; by aversion (*dvesha*), disliking; by effort (*prayatna*), action."

विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः । निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्व-
धर्मः ।

84. "Merit (*dharma*) is what results from enjoined acts; but demerit (*adharmā*), what results from forbidden acts."

बुद्ध्यादयो ऽष्टावात्ममात्रविशेषगुणाः ।

85. "The eight [qualities], beginning with understanding, (§ 4,) are distinctive qualities of Soul alone."

बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना द्विविधा नित्या अनित्याश्च ।
नित्या ईश्वरस्य । अनित्या जीवस्य ।

86. "Understanding, desire, and effort, are of two kinds, eternal and transient; eternal in the 'Lord,' transient in mortals."

संस्कारस्त्रिविधो वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापक-
श्चेति । वेगः पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः । अ-
नुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतुर्भावनात्ममात्रवृत्तिः ।
अन्यथाकृतस्य पुनस्तादवस्थापादकः स्थितिस्था-
पकः कटादिपृथिवीवृत्तिः । इति गुणाः ।

87. "A quality self-reproductive (*saṅskāra*) is of three kinds, [inasmuch as it may appear in the shape of either] momentum, imagination, or elasticity. Momentum (*vega*) resides in the four beginning with Earth, (see § 3,) and in Mind. Imagination (*bhāvanā*), resulting from notion, and the cause of memory, resides only in the Soul. Elasticity (*sthitisthdpaka*) is that which restores to its former position what had been altered. It resides in [cane-woven] mats and the like which are formed of the earthy element.

"So much for the Qualities."

a. Thus a *saṅskāra* is that which, acting as a cause, reproduces itself as an effect.

b. We now come to the third category, that of Action.

CHAP. IV.—ACTION.

चलनात्मकं कर्म ।

"Action consists in motion."

उद्देशसंयोगहेतुत्वेपयाम् । अधोदेशसंयोग-
हेतुरपक्षेपयाम् । शरीरस्य सन्निकृष्टसंयोगहेतुरा-

कुञ्चनम् । विप्रकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्रसारणम् । अन्यत्
सर्वं गमनम् । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोमाच-
रति ।

88. "Casting upward (*utkshepana*) is the cause of conjunction with a higher place. Casting downward (*apakshepana*) is the cause of contact with a lower place. Contraction (*dkunchana*) is the cause of the body's conjunction with [only] what is near. Dilatation (*prasadraṇa*) is the cause of conjunction with what is distant. Going (*gamana*) is [the name of] every other [variety]. Action resides only in the four beginning with Earth, (§ 3,) and in Mind."

a. We now come to the fourth Category, that of Community.

CHAP. V.—COMMUNITY.

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यं द्रव्यगुणकर्मर-
ति । तद्विधं परापरभेदात् । परं सत्ता ।
अपरं जातिर्द्रव्यत्वादिः ।

89. "Community (*sāmānya*) is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, residing in Substance, Quality, and Action. It is of two kinds, higher and

lower. The highest [degree of community, or the *summum genus*,] is existence. The lower genus—called *jāti*—is such a one as Substantiality—[the common nature of what are called Substances].”

a. Of two natures, the one of which constantly accompanies the other, but not *vice versa*, the more extensive is called *para* with respect to the other, just as is the case in our employment of the terms *genus* and *species*.

b. Next we have the fifth Category, that of Difference.

CHAP. VI.—DIFFERENCE.

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो व्यावर्त्तका विशेषाः ।

90. “Differences (*vis'asha*), residing in eternal substances, are excluders [of each from absolute identity with the others].”

a. By eternal substances are meant mind, [soul], time, place, ether; and the atoms of earth, water, light, and air. Two atoms of the same element, being supposed every way homogeneous with one another, differ only in being two different atoms. It is this ultimate, and not further explicable, difference, that is here technically called *vis'asha*.

b. We next come to the sixth Category, that of Intimate Relation.

CHAP. VII.—INTIMATE RELATION.

नित्यसम्बन्धः समवायः । अयुतसिद्धयत्तिः ।
 धयोर्द्वयोर्मध्ये एकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते ताव-
 युतसिद्धौ । अवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रिया-
 क्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति ।

91. "Intimate relation [or co-inherence] (*sama-
 taya*) is constant connection. It exists in things
 which cannot exist separately. Two things which
 cannot exist separately are those of which two the one
 exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are,
 parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities
 and the thing qualified, action and agent, species
 and individual, difference and eternal substances ;
 [§ 90, a]."

a. The seventh and last of the Categories is Non-
 existence.

CHAP. VIII.—NON-EXISTENCE.

b. The varieties of non-existence are described as
 follows :

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्य-
 स्य । सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्य-
 स्य । चैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिको ऽत्यन्ता-
 भावो यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्य-
 सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिको ऽन्योन्याभावो यथा
 घटः पटो न भवतीति ।

92. "Antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) is without beginning, and has an end. [Such is the non-existence] of an effect previously to its production. Destruction (*pradhvaṅsa*) has a beginning, and no end. [Such is the non-existence which may occur in the case] of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) is that the counter-entity whereof is [viewed] in relation to all the three times [past, present, and future]. For example, [such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked that] 'there is not a jar on the ground.' Mutual non-existence [or difference,] (*anyonyābhāva*) is that the counter-entity whereof is regarded under the relation of identity. For example, [such difference is referred to when it is remarked that] 'a jar is not a web of cloth.' "

a. The first two cases of non-existence are simple enough—for it is clear that the jar did not exist until

its antecedent non-existence was put an end to by its being formed out of the clay ; and that it ceased to exist when, by a blow, it was reduced to fragments out of which a *new* jar might perhaps be made, but never again *the* jar. The next two cases of non-existence are sought to be defined by opposing them to their contraries. A jar, for example, is *not* on some particular spot of ground. Let the jar be brought and placed there ;—it will follow that the jar is *absent* from some *other* spot of ground ;—so that *this* kind of non-existence has reference to *all* times. Again, a web is distinguished by being identical with a web, and a jar with a jar : therefore the condition of what is the contrary to this, is given as the definition of the difference between two things that differ.

b. In conclusion, our text-book observes :—

सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात्
सप्तैव पदार्था इति सिद्धम् ।

93. "Since everything is properly included under the categories that have been now stated, it is established that there are only seven categories."

a. Other philosophers regard Power, Resemblance, &c., as separate categories. [See *Siddhanta Muktdvali*, § II. c.]

b. Our text-book concludes with the following couplet :—

कणादन्यायमतयोर्बालव्यत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।

अन्नभट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसङ्ग्रहः ॥

94. "This Compendium of Logical Results was composed by the learned *Annam Bhatta*, in order to perfect the acquaintance of youths with the opinions of *Kaṇāda* and of the *Nyāya*."

a. The *Nyāya* is more strictly the name belonging to the body of opinions promulgated by *Gautama*; the school of *Kaṇāda* receiving the distinctive name of *Vaiśeṣika*, from their reckoning as a category the 'Difference' (*viśeṣa*), which *Gautama* does not recognise as a category. [See Ch. VI.]

॥ इति श्रीतर्कसङ्ग्रहः समाप्तः ॥

"Thus is the *Tarka Sangraha* completed."



A
SYNOPSIS OF SCIENCE;

FROM

THE STAND-POINT

OF

THE NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY.

HINDI AND ENGLISH.

VOL. I.


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THIS work being a simplified version of the Synopsis in Sanskrit, printed for the use of the Benares Sanskrit College, the reasons for taking the framework of the exposition from the Nyáya Philosophy may be learned from the Advertisement to the Sanskrit version.

Since this First Book of the projected Synopsis is not the portion of it which the juvenile learner is likely first to take much interest in, it may be proper to suggest to the teacher what portions should be first taught, and what portions had better remain untaught until the learner is better qualified to appreciate them.

The First Aphorism, as containing a general enunciation of the topics to be investigated in the sequel, should be committed to memory. The Second Aphorism may be passed over. The Third Aphorism may be explained orally, the controversial matter in the commentary being passed over in the first instance. Aphorisms nine to fourteen may then be studied; after which the learner, if a mere beginner, had better pass on to Book II, before reading any more of Book I, to which he may revert from time to time when occasion arises for indicating the position which any new particular topic holds in the general scheme. The teacher, of course, ought to be conversant with the whole; and it may be hoped that this vernacular exposition may have some interest for readers who are familiar with the name of Gautama, but whose avocations preclude their making acquaintance through the Sanskrit with his philosophical arrangement.

*Benares College, }
8th Sept. 1852. }*

J. R. B.



ENGLISH VERSION OF A SYNOPSIS OF SCIENCE IN HINDÍ.

GLORY TO GOD THE MOST HIGH !

BOOK I.

SECTION I;—INTRODUCTORY.

a. HE alone can make a jar who knows the way to make a jar, and he alone can arrive in Kásí without a guide who knows the road to Kásí. Thus *knowledge* assists us in the attainment of what is desired; and if knowledge be of assistance to us in the attainment of ordinary objects, then certainly it should be of assistance to us in the attainment of the Chief End of Man.

b. Although *error* also is [in Sanskrit and Hindí] spoken of as a species of *knowledge* (*jnán**), yet what we here refer to is real knowledge (*tattwa-jnán*), i.e. true knowledge (*satya-jnán*).

c. Now we shall mention, in an Aphorism (*sútr*), those things a correct knowledge of which may assist us in the attainment of the Chief End of Man.

SECTION II.

ENUMERATION OF THE TOPICS.

Aphorism I.

Evidence (*pramán*), object of right notion (*pramey*), doubt

* The word *jnán* answers to *notion* or *credence*, which may be right or wrong.

(*sāṅgāy*), motive (*prayojan*), example (*driṣṭānt*), tenet (*sādhānt*), member (*avayav*), confutation (*tark*), ascertainment (*nirṇay*), disquisition (*vād*), controversy (*jalp*), cavil (*vitandā*), semblance of a reason (*hetwābhās*), fraud (*chhal*), futility (*jāti*), and what indicates worthlessness (*nigraha-sthān*),—in regard to these things we shall investigate the truth, because the knowledge of truth* is of assistance in the attainment of the Chief End of Man.

a. Now if you ask who is 'the person competent' (*adhikārī*) to read this book, &c., then hearken. The person competent is he who is desirous of knowledge and free from envy; 'evidence,' &c., which we shall discuss, are its province (*viśy*); the relation (*sambandh*) between those topics and this book is that of the expounded and the expositor; and the motive (*prayojan*), i.e. the fruit of the perusal of this book, is such knowledge of the truth as may be obtained from it.

b. Now, in a second aphorism, we shall declare the order in which the knowledge of the truth may subserve the attainment of the Chief End of Man.

Aphorism II.

True knowledge is subservient to the attainment of the Chief End of Man, because, in respect of whatever thing there is true knowledge, false knowledge in regard to that thing is destroyed. Again, such evil inclinations as have their origin in any false knowledge, do not cease without the removal of the false knowledge. Again, such improper conduct as has its rise in evil inclinations, does not cease without the removal of the evil inclinations. Again, whatever misery takes its rise in improper conduct, will not cease without the cessation of that improper conduct.

a. Thus it will be perceived how true knowledge may conduce to the removal of such misery as has its rise in false knowledge;

† Of 'what is what' (*tattva*).

and the attainment of the Chief End of Man is incompatible with the continuance of misery. We do not say that all misery will be removed, and the Chief End of Man be attained, merely by a knowledge of the truth; but we say this, that a knowledge of the truth may conduce to the removal of such misery as flows from *false* knowledge.

a. Now we shall describe severally the things that were enunciated in the first aphorism. The first of these is 'evidence' (*pramán*).

SECTION III.

THE INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE.

Aphorism III.

Evidence is of two kinds, 'sense' (*pratyaksh*), and 'the discrimination of a sign' (*anumán* or *linga-parámarś**).

a. 'Evidence' (*pramán*) is the instrument [in the production] of a 'right notion' (*pramá*), and a right notion is synonymous with 'true knowledge' (*satya-jnán*).

b. Now we shall describe 'sense.'

Aphorism IV.

The evidence-called 'sense' (*pratyaksh*) is the instrument† [in the production] of that correct knowledge which arises from the conjunction of a sense-organ with its object.

* That these two expressions are convertible, the *Tarka-sangraha* declares as follows—' *tasmálinga-parámarśo 'numánam'*—i.e. "therefore *anumán* is the discrimination of a sign."

† The term *pratyaksh* is ambiguous, standing both for a particular kind of evidence—viz. *immediate* evidence, e.g. sense,—and for the *knowledge* due to that evidence, e.g. perception. It is with the former of these two meanings that it ought to be employed in the aphorism; and, when so employed, that

a. The five senses are notorious. The 'object' (*arth*) of a sense is [what is also called] its 'province' (*vishay*). For example, *colour* is the object of the sense called 'sight,' which resides in the eye.

b. Now we shall describe 'the discrimination of a sign.'

Aphorism V.

Well, 'the discrimination of a sign' (*anumān*), which is dependent on [the employment of] the senses, is of three kinds, (1) 'having [as the sign observed by sense] an *antecedent*' (*pūrvāvat*), or (2) 'having [as the sign] a *consequent*' (*śeṣa-vat*), or else (3) consisting in 'the perception of [—as the sign—] a *homogeneousness*' (*sāmānyato-drisht*).

a. If we see smoke, then we can infer that there is fire; but if there were no sense-perception, how could we infer any thing? For this reason 'the discrimination of a sign' is spoken of as 'dependent on the [employment of the] senses.'

b. The 'discrimination of a sign' is spoken of as 'having [as the sign] an *antecedent*', in that instance where, having, by the evidence of sense, recognised something that is a *cause*, we expect its effect. For example,—the collecting of clouds is the cause of rain; so, having observed the clouds to be collecting, we expect that rain will fall. Such is that 'discrimination of a sign' which is spoken of as 'having an *antecedent* [as the sign]'

c. The discrimination of a sign' is spoken of as 'having [as the sign] a *consequent*', in that instance where, having, by the evidence of sense, recognised something that is an *effect*, we feel

it is synonymous with 'sense' i.e. the senses, is stated in the *Tarka-saṅgraha* as follows—'*tat-karaṇam indriyam tasmād indriyam pratyakṣa-pramāṇam*'—i.e. "the instrument of this [viz. of perception] is a sense-organ, therefore a sense-organ is what is meant by that instrument of right knowledge which is called *pratyakṣ*."

certain of its *cause*. For example,—having observed the fulness of the river, and the rapidity of the current, we feel certain that rain has fallen.

d. The ‘discrimination of a sign’ is spoken of as consisting in ‘the perception of *homogeneousness* [as the sign],’ when, for example some one, having somewhere seen a mango-tree blossoming, feels certain that other mango-trees also in other places are now blossoming, because they are of the same kind [—or are *homogeneous* with the one he sees].

e. Now you must know that, in the *Nyāya śāstr* of Gautam, two other kinds of evidence are reckoned,—viz. ‘the recognition of likeness’ (*upamān*), and ‘testimony’ (*śabd*). And these really *are* evidence; but *Kaṇād* says that these are included under the ‘discrimination of signs,’ and this is our opinion also; therefore we did not mention them specially in the third aphorism. We shall now describe them,—and first of ‘the recognition of likeness.’

Aphorism VI.

That [evidence] which determines what is to be determined, through likeness to some well known thing, is what we call ‘recognition of likeness’ (*upamān*).

a. Suppose, for example, that there is some one who knows very well what a *cow* is. He hears, from some dweller in the forest, that what is called a *gayāl*, is like a cow. After this, having gone to the forest, he sees an animal like a cow. Then he concludes that “this is a *gayāl*.”

b. Now we shall describe the evidence called ‘testimony’ (*śabd*).

Aphorism VII.

Testimony [—such as constitutes *real* evidence—] is the declaration of one worthy [to be believed].

- a. One worthy [to be believed] is he who speaks the truth.
 b. Now we have to divide 'testimony.'

Aphorism VIII.

Testimony is of two kinds, 'that which refers to the seen' (*drishṭārth*), and 'that which refers to the unseen' (*adrishṭārth*).

a. Whatever thing may be under discussion, if that thing exists in this world, so that it can be subjected to examination, then any assertion in regard to it is spoken of as 'testimony referring to the seen'. If the thing under discussion does *not* exist in this world, so that it cannot be subjected to examination, then any assertion in regard to it is spoken of as 'testimony referring to the unseen.'

Here ends the topic of 'Evidence.'

Now we shall mention the 'demonstrables' (*pramey*) which are capable of being established by evidence.

SECTION IV.

THINGS RESPECTING WHICH CORRECT KNOWLEDGE IS DESIRABLE.

Aphorism IX.

Soul (*ātmā*), body (*śarīr*), sense-organ (*indriy*), sense-object (*arth*), understanding (*buddhi*), mind (*man*), activity (*pravṛtti*), inclination, &c., (*rāgādi*), mundane life (*sānsārik jīvan*), fruit (*phal*), misery, &c., (*du'khādi*), the chief end of man (*parama-purushārth*),—these are what are called the 'demonstrables.'

- a. Now we shall mention the characteristics of soul.

Aphorism X.

Desire (*ichchhā*), aversion (*dvesh*), effort (*prayatn*), joy (*sukh*), grief (*du'kh*), knowledge (*jnān*),—all these are characteristics of soul.

d. That is to say,—these exist in no other thing except soul.

δ. Now we shall mention the characteristics of the body.

Aphorism XI.

The body is the site of action, of the sense-organs, and of the joy and grief [of the soul lodged in it].

a. 'Action' (*cheshtá*) is that kind of movement which results from effort. The sense-organs are the Sight, &c. The body is called the site of joy and grief, because the soul, experiencing joy and grief, is lodged in the body.

b. Now we shall describe the sense-organs.

Aphorism XII.

The smell (*ghrân*), the taste (*rasan*), the sight (*chakshush*), the touch (*twak*), the hearing (*śrotr*),—these are the sense-organs which apprehend the qualities of material things.

a. Material things (*bhautik dravya*) are trees, stones, &c. Those things of which material things are made up, are called Elements (*bhút*). In the opinion of the ancients there are five elements, but in the opinion of the moderns there are more than fifty elements.

b. Now we shall mention what are the elements of which material things are made up.

Aphorism XIII.

The elements are Gold,* &c.

a. In the opinion of the ancients the elements are five, viz. Earth, Water, Light, [—implying Heat—], Air, and Ether

* Gold is here selected as an example of an element, because it so happens that the Naiyáyikas do not dispute its being elementary, believing it to be solidified Light. See the *Tarká Sangraha*, § 14.

(*ákás*). In modern usage that alone is called an element which is not made up of more things than one. For example, Gold is called an element, because the parts of gold are not known to be anything else than gold. But *milk* is not called an element, because milk consists of water, butter, &c.

b. Now we shall mention what are the 'objects' (*arth* or *vishay*) of the senses.

Aphorism XIV.

Odour (*gandh*), Savour (*ras*), Colour (*rúp*), Touch (*spars*), and Sound (*śabd*), the qualities of material things, are what are called the objects of the senses.

a. The sense of smell* (*ghrán*) is the apprehender of the quality Odour; and so the taste (*rasan*) of Savour, the sight (*chakshush*) of Colour, the touch (*twak*) of Touch, and the hearing (*śrotr*) of Sound.

b. Now we have to speak of 'Understanding.'

Aphorism XV.

Understanding (*buddhi*), and apprehension (*upalabdhi*), and knowledge (*jnán*),—these three are employed in the same sense.

a. Now we have to speak of 'Mind.'

Aphorism XVI.

The characteristic of Mind (*man*) is this, that there does not arise more than one cognition at once [in one and the same Soul].

* In the Sanskrit, smell, as a sense, is distinguished from the smell of flowers, and the taste, as a sense, from the taste of fruits, &c., with a precision of language the absence of which is a defect in the English. In translating from English this requires to be borne in mind.

a. That is to say,—whatever is the cause of there not arising several thoughts simultaneously in one and the same Soul, that thing we call the mind.*

b. Now we shall define 'Activity.'

Aphorism XVII.

Activity (*pravritti*) is that in which originates apprehension [—see Aph. XV—], and the actions [or voluntary functions] of the body.

a. Activity (or energy, or the engaging in any operation,) is also what originates the [function of] voice (*vák*), because this is included in the *body* [—so that we see no sufficient reason for enumerating it separately in the aphorism as Gautama does].

b. Now we shall define [the Passions] 'Desire, &c.'

* The English reader who is accustomed to hear the words Soul and Mind (—*anima* and *mens*— $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\varphi\rho\eta$ —) employed interchangeably, must not carry this laxness of phraseology into any Indian dialect, if he desires to be understood, and if he desires to avoid such misconceptions as that of Ritter, who makes the *Naiyáyika* call the Soul an *atom*,—whereas he calls the Soul *infinite* and the *Mind* an atom,—or that of Cousin, who makes out the *Sánkhya* to be a materialist, as if he derived *Soul* from Nature, whereas he only derives the Soul's *organs*—external and internal—from something other than Soul. In the *Hindú* systems, the Soul is the *Self*, and the Mind is the organ or faculty which, standing between the Self and the deliverances of sense, prevents those deliverances from crowding in pell-mell; just as a minister stands between the monarch and the thousand simultaneous claims upon his attention, and hands up for his consideration one thing at a time. We offer here no opinion on this theory of the *Hindús*:—we put the reader on his guard in respect of an established phraseology, the misconception of which has so egregiously misled Ritter and Cousin; and we remit to another section of this work the enquiry whether or not this established phraseology can be so interpreted and employed as to convey nothing hypothetical—nothing that is not positively ascertained.

Aphorism XVIII.

The characteristic of Desire (*rág*), and the rest is this—that they actuate.

a. To be the cause of Activity (*pravritti*) is what is meant by 'actuating' (*pravarttaná*). Whatever object is *desired*, an effort is made for its attainment. For whatever object there is *aversion* (*dvesh*), an effort is made to avoid it.

b. Now we shall define mundane life.

Aphorism XIX.

Mundane life is the union of the soul with such bodies as we have here.

a. Now we shall define the Fruit [of actions].

Aphorism XX.

Whatever joy or grief is obtained through Activity, that is called the fruit (*phal*).

a. Activity is of two kinds—proper and improper. The fruit of proper activity is joy. The fruit of improper activity is sorrow.

b. Now we have to define Sorrow.

Aphorism XXI.

Sorrow (*du'kkh*) is that whose characteristic is pain (*bádhaná*).

a. Of the word *bádhaná* ('obstruction,' 'annoyance,') the meaning here is pain (*piḍá*).

b. Now we have to say something of the Chief End of Man.

Aphorism XXII.

The Chief End of Man is that endless joy which may accrue to the soul from the grace of the Supreme Lord.

a. In this world joy is mingled with sorrow, but [—although

Gautama holds that all joy is but sorrow under another name,— we believe that] the joy which, in the next world, the Supreme Lord will give to his servants, will be without admixture of sorrow, and that it will never end.

b. Here concludes the section of the 'Demonstrables.'

SECTION V.

COMPLETING THE TOPIC OF THE PRE-REQUISITES OF REASONING.

c. Now we shall describe Doubt.

Aphorism XXIII.

Doubt is what occurs where there is the perception of a sameness, and the non-perception of a difference, and the remembrance of a difference.

a. For example, at the time of the twilight some one sees a thing which, in dimension, is like a man and also like a post. The beholder remembers that between a man and a post there are indeed differences, but so long as he does not recognise any such difference, so long does this doubt remain in his mind, viz., — is this a post or is it a man ?

b. Now we shall define a Motive.

Aphorism XXIV.

That thing is called a motive (*prayojan*) for the attainment [or avoidance] of which one makes an effort.

a. Now we have to define an Example.

Aphorism XXV.

That thing is [qualified to serve as] an example (*driṣṭānt*) in regard to which the multitude and the philosopher entertain the same opinions,

a. Here 'the multitude' stands for the learners, and the 'philosopher' for the teachers. Thus an Example is that which is not the object of any difference of opinion. For example, that there is [as a matter of course] fire on the culinary hearth, and that there is [as a matter of course] no fire in a great pond,—if both teacher and taught agree in this [—as a fact that is never for a moment to be questioned—] then each of these is an example [or instance,—the culinary hearth being an instance of what unquestionably has fire, and the great pond an instance of what has the *absence* of fire].

Here ends the topic of the pre-requisites of reasoning.

SECTION VI.

OF TENETS.

b. Now we have to define a Tenet.

Aphorism XXVI.

A tenet (*siddhānti*) is that the certainty of which is held in some system.

a. For example,—in the Mīmāṃsā system Sound is said to be eternal, and in the Nyāya system Sound is said to be un-eternal;—thus the eternity of sound is a Tenet of the Mīmāṃsā system, because the eternity of sound is held in that system although it is not admitted in the Nyāya system.

b. Now we shall divide Tenets.

Aphorism XXVII.

Tenets are of four kinds, (1) common to all the systems, (2) peculiar to a system, (3) hypothetical, and (4) implied.

a. Now we shall state the character of a tenet common to all the systems.

Aphorism XXVIII.

That tenet is said to be common to all the systems (*sarvatāntr siddhānt*) which is accepted in some system and is not opposed to any system.

a. For example,—it is laid down in the Nyāya that it is by the organ of smell that the quality called ‘Odour’ is apprehended, and this statement is not in opposition to any system.

b. Now we shall state the character of a tenet peculiar to a system.

Aphorism XXIX.

That tenet is said to be peculiar to a system (*pratītantr siddhānt*) which is accepted in some system or other, but in other systems is *not* accepted.

a. For example,—that the sun stands still, and that the earth moves round him, is accepted in the modern system [of European Astronomy], but is not accepted in the ancient system.

b. Now we have to define a hypothetical tenet.

Aphorism XXX.

That, by the establishment of which some other point is established [—which otherwise would not be established—], is what is called a hypothetical tenet (*adhikaraṇ siddhānt*).

a. For example,—the fact of the world’s being a *production* is a hypothetical [and necessarily assumed] tenet, by means of which another point,—viz., the omniscience of the Lord, is established. If the world were not a production, then why should we regard [—as we cannot help regarding—] some one as being the *Omniscient* Maker of it, [—seeing that what is *not* a production has not a maker at all]?

b. Now we shall state the character of a tenet that is implied.

Aphorism XXXI.

That matter is called an implied tenet (*abhyupagama siddhánt*, which has not been stated in an aphorism, while it is agreed that such [—though not expressly declared—] *was* the opinion of the author of the aphorisms [of any particular system].

a. For example,—Gautama has not, in his aphorisms, declared that the Mind (*man*) is an *organ* (*indriya*); but it is clear that in Gautama's opinion the mind *is* an organ.

b. Here ends the topic of the 'Tenets' which take their place in argumentation.

SECTION VII.

OF ARGUMENTATION.

c. Now we shall divide and describe the 'Members' [of an argumentative exposition].

Aphorism XXXII.

The members (*avayav*) are (1) the Proposition, (2) the Reason, (3) the Example, (4) the Application, and (5) the Conclusion.

a. Now we have to define the Proposition.

Aphorism XXXIII.

What is called the Proposition (*pratijná*) is the announcement of what is to be established.

a. For example,—“This mountain is fiery,”—this is a proposition.* Here what is to be established is *fire* [—as present in the mountain].

* In European logic each member of the syllogism is called a proposition but the name *pratijná*—it must be remembered—belongs only to the proposi-

b. Now we have to define and divide the Reason.

Aphorism XXXIV.

The Reason (*hetu*) is that which is instrumental in establishing what is to be established;—[and this force it derives] either from the Example's connection with given characters (*sādharmya*), or from the Example's disconnection as regards certain given characters (*vaidharmya*).

a. The general definition of a Reason is 'that which is instrumental in establishing what is to be established.' A Reason is of two kinds, (1) because there belongs to the Example a concomitance of characters [which have been ascertained to stand in the relation of token and betokened], or (2) because there belongs to the Example a concomitant absence of characters [the absence of one of which has been ascertained to involve the absence of the other]. The 'concomitance of characters' (*sādharmya*) it technically termed 'connection' (*anwaya*). The 'concomitans absence of characters' (*vaidharmya*) is termed 'exclusion' (*vyatirek*).*

b. If fire is what is to be established [as existing] in the hill, then the smoke which is visible [rising, in an unbroken line, from the hill,] can serve as the Reason [for inferring that there is

tion to be proved. The *pratijñā*, or 'announcement of what is to be established,' is the proposition which, when established, reappears under the name of the Conclusion. When treating of a regularly constructed argument, what serves to render the English term 'proposition' is *avayav*—i.e. 'member of the five-membered exposition' (*pañchāvayavi*). To a proposition, regarded simply as a predication, no exclusive name is appropriated in Sanskrit.

* Essentially this division serves the same purpose as the division of arguments into those with an affirmative major premiss and those with a negative major premiss. So the Hindoo's shawl and wrapper serve essentially the same purpose as the Englishman's coat, waistcoat, breeches, and gaiters;—that is to say, each set of garments serves as a covering, though every article in each set has not its precise counterpart in the other set. The assertion that 'The

fire—though we do not see it—in the hill; as we shall explain further on].

c. It must be understood that the 'Member' [of the argumentative exposition], in which the Reason is exhibited, is also [by synecdoche] called the Reason,—[so that either 'Smoke,' or 'Because there is Smoke,' may be spoken of as the Reason].

d. Now we shall define the Example.

Aphorism XXXV.

What is called the Example is that instance which makes us recognise a character, in the shape of what is to be established, through another character [—viz. the Reason assigned—which the instance reminds us of] invariably accompanied by what is to be established.

a. This is the Example where there is the concomitant presence [of the token and what it betokens]. The Example where there is exclusion [of both] will be described afterwards.

b. If fire is to be established [i.e. proved to exist] in the hill, by smoke as the Reason, then the culinary hearth may be the Example. Let us explain this. A man, having seen an unbroken line of smoke which commences from the culinary hearth, having then gone near, sees that there is fire there. Often afterwards having seen that where an unbroken line of smoke commences, there is fire, that man settles this in his mind, that

hill is fiery' may be established by means of a negative as well as an affirmative major premise. When employing the negative premise the Hindú logician throws his argument into the hypothetical form,—'if there were not fire there would not be smoke.' This, categorically and with connotative terms, amounts to 'Nothing smoking is fireless,'—from which it follows that the smoking hill is not fireless, or, in other words, that it is fiery. This and other kindred points we may treat of more fully in our version of the *Amardna-khaṇḍa* of the *Chintāmaṇi*.

“Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the [case of the] culinary hearth.” That which is the constant accompanier, as fire is the constant accompanier of smoke, is called the ‘pervader’ (*vyápak**). That which is constantly accompanied, as the smoke, is called the ‘pervaded’ (*vyápyat†*). The habit of the ‘pervaded’ [as *being* constantly accompanied by that which constantly accompanies it] is called ‘pervadedness’ (*vyápti*). The method of ascertaining ‘pervadedness’ will be explained diffusively hereafter in the section on ‘Induction’ (*vyáptigrahopáy*).

e. Now we shall define an Example where there is exclusion [of the token and consequently of the betokened].

*Aphorism XXXVI. **

An Example where there is exclusion (*vyatirekí udáharan*) is the reverse‡ of that Example (*anwayí udáharan*) where there is the concomitant presence [of a token and what it betokens].

a. That is to say,—an Example where there is exclusion is that

* This answers to the connotation of the major-term in the European view of logic. Take the example—‘Wherever there is smoke there is fire.’ This, if we operate with terms connotative of smoke and fire instead of terms denotative thereof, assumes the form ‘Whatever is smoking is fiery.’ There ‘fiery’ is the major term,—that *connoted* by which is the thing *denoted* by the word ‘fire.’ The fact that the terminology of logic has been constructed in Europe with an eye to operating with expressions connotative of what the Hindú terminology has an eye to operating with expressions denotative of, is a fact the import of which has been strangely overlooked. Where it is overlooked, all attempts at the ‘comparative anatomy’ of the two terminologies are wildgoose-chases.

† This answers to the connotation of the middle term:—see the preceding note.

‡ Or negative converse. Every Universal Affirmative (see Whately B. II. ch. 2. § 4.) may “be fairly converted in this way..... e.g. ‘Every poet is a man of genius; therefore He who is not a man of genius is not a poet; or, None but a man of genius can be a poet.’”

which shows that, where there is the absence of what is to be established, there is the absence of what would serve to establish it. For instance, a great pond. In a great pond there is not fire, and smoke [—which would betoken fire—] rises not therefrom. So, 'where fire is not, there smoke is not,—as in a great pond.'

b. The 'member' [of an argumentative exposition] in which the Example is exhibited, is [by synecdoche] also called the Example.

Aphorism XXXVII.

c. Now we have to define the Application.

The application (*vyāpāra*) is the statement of the Subject with reference to the Example [—as conforming to it or *not* conforming to it].

a. What we call the Subject (*pakṣha**) is that in respect of which that which is to be established is asserted. For example, —'The hill is fiery',—in this proposition the hill is the Subject, because the fire, which is 'the thing to be established' (*sādhyā*), is asserted to be in the hill. When the Example is one where there is concomitant presence [of the token and what it betokens], there the form of the Application is as follows,—'And so is this [—e.g., this hill.]' When the Example is one where there is exclusion [of the betokened and therefore of the token], there the form of the Application is as follows,—'And this [—e.g., this hill] is *not* so.'

b. The 'member' [of an argumentative exposition] in which the Subject is laid down, or compared, or mentioned, with reference to the Example, is also [as well as the process itself] called the Application.

† By *pakṣha* is meant the subject in respect of which something is to be proved, or to be disproved; not the subject of a predication in general. See, ante, the note on p. 14.

c. Now we have to define the Conclusion.

Aphorism XXXVIII.

What we call the Conclusion (*nigaman*) is the re-statement of the Proposition because of the mention of the Reason, [—i.e. the re-statement preceded by a ‘*therefore*’].

a. That is to say,—what was at first asserted, has been established by the mention of the Reason; and that ‘Member’ [of the five-membered argumentative exposition] in which the Proposition is stated again in the shape of something established, is called the Conclusion. For Example,—‘Therefore the hill is fiery.’

b. Here concludes the topic of the form of argumentative exposition.

SECTION VIII.

CONCLUDING THE TOPIC OF DEMONSTRATION.

c. Now we have to define Confutation [of objections].

Aphorism XXXIX.

What is called confutation (*tarka*) is arguing, for the purpose of coming at the truth, by means of justifying the Reason [against doubts entertained respecting its cogency].

a. By *justifying* the Reason (*hetu*) we mean repelling the suspicion that it is *erratic*. Erraticalness (*vyabhichár*) in a Reason [alleged in proof of this or that], is the fact of its not being constantly accompanied [by this or that]. For example,—[suppose we argue] “Whatever is fiery must smoke;—this thing is fiery;—therefore it must smoke”;—here fire is [alleged as] the Reason,—and it is not a sufficient reason, because fire is present in an ignited iron ball, where smoke is *not*. Thus in this [pretended] Reason there is the fault of ‘erraticalness’,—that is to say, [the fire wan-

ders away by itself, so that] the smoke, which is to be proved, is *not* the constant accompanier of the fire which is [assigned as] the Reason. Now when there is a suspicion, in regard to any *proper* Reason, that it has the fault of 'erraticness', then the argument which is employed for the removal of the suspicion is called its Confutation (*tarka*). For example,—in regard to smoke as a Reason [for inferring fire], if there be a suspicion that it is 'erratic', then we confute the suspicion as follows,—“If the thing were not fiery*, it would not smoke.”

b. Now we have to define Ascertainment.

Aphorism XL.

The determination of a matter after having been in doubt, or the knowledge resulting from the establishment of one view of the question and the disproof of the other, view, is what is called Ascertainment (*nirṇay*).

a. That is to say,—what is called Ascertainment is the removal of doubt, by the establishment of one's own opinion and the overthrow of the opposite opinion.

b. Here ends the section of the latter division of argumentation.

SECTION IX.

OF CONTROVERSY.

c. Now, after Confutation, perhaps the doubt of some honest enquirer has not departed, and assurance has not been arrived at.

* In order to arrive at the truth, the reasoner who wishes to remove the doubt regarding the validity of the proffered Reason, makes use of *what is not true*. He supposes, for the sake of argument, that the mountain is *not* fiery, and proceeds thence to the *reductio ad absurdum*—that it does not smoke, which it

It is then proper to make an 'Amicable discussion' (*vád*). This Amicable discussion we shall now define.

Aphorism XLI.

Amicable discussion is this, that two men, who do not differ in opinion regarding principles,* having taken opposite views of a question, argue for and against their respective opinions, according to the method of the five-numbered exposition, with proofs and confutations.

a. Those who are not honest enquirers, will wrangle from the desire of victory. We shall define 'Wrangling' (*jalp* or *jalpaná*)

Aphorism XLII.

When Fraud, and Futility, and Ignoratio elenchi, are employed for the purpose of proving or disproving, the discourse is called Wrangling.

a. What is meant by 'Fraud', 'Futility', and 'Ignoratio elenchi', we will state hereafter.

b. He who, not being an honest enquirer, is moreover not capable even of wrangling, will make use of Cavils. Therefore we shall now tell what is Cavilling (*vitandá*).

Aphorism XLIII.

What is called Cavilling, is speaking, for the sake of victory without supporting the opposite view [to that advanced by the other speaker].

is actually seen to do. It is a hypothetical falsehood that thus serves as a stepping-stone to the truth; and, the hypothesis being a false one, it is classed with Doubt and Mistake, as one of the three forms of Wrong Notion.

* Under this head falls the whole province of Formal Logic, in which there is no dispute regarding the premises, but simply regarding the consequence or inconsequence of the proposed conclusion.

a. The 'opposite view' (*pratipaksh*) is another 'view' (*paksh*) Whoever wishes to oppose the view [taken by the first speaker] must undertake the opposite view. The discourse of the man who assails a view of a case, while he makes no effort to establish its contradictory, is what is called Cavilling.

b. Here ends the section of Controversy.

SECTION X.

OF FALLACIES, OR WHAT ONLY LOOK LIKE REASONS, BY MEANS OF WHICH A MAN MAY DECEIVE HIMSELF OR OTHERS.

c. Now, wranglers, &c., when good reasons in support of their opinions are not available, make use of the *semblances* of reasons. By mistake even an honest enquirer may make use of the semblance of a reason [—imagining it to be a solid reason]. Now we shall define and divide the 'Semblance of a reason' (*hetwábhás*).

Aphorism XLIV.

What are called the 'Semblances of a reason' are (1) the 'Erratic', (2) the 'Reverse', (3) the 'Counterbalanced', (4) that which is 'In the same case with what is to be established', and (5) the 'Mistimed'.

a. A 'Semblance of a reason' is a *bad* reason,—what *seems* like a reason, but is in reality no reason.

b. Now we shall define the 'Erratic' (*sa-vyabhichár*) semblance of a reason.

Aphorism XLV.

The 'Erratic' semblance of a reason is that which is found in more than the one connection.

a. To be 'found in more than the one connection,' means this,—not to be the constant accompanier of one single thing

that is to be established, nor the constant accompanier of its absence, but to be the possible accompanier of *both*. For example,—‘The mountain must be smoky because it is fiery,’—here the reason [alleged] does not prove smoke, because it [—viz. fire]—is met with also in an ignited iron ball where there is the absence of smoke.

b. ‘Straying’ means going where it is not proper to go. Now it is not proper that the reason should go there where what is to be established by it is *not*. That bad reason which does so is the ‘erratic’ semblance of a reason.

c. Now we shall define the ‘contradictory’ semblance of a reason.

Aphorism XLVI.

That is called the ‘contradictory’ semblance of a reason which establishes the *absence* of what is to be established.

a. For example,—‘This thing is fiery, because it is a great body of water.’ Now, ‘to be a great body of water’ is not a reason for fire but a reason for the *absence* of fire.

b. Now the definition of that semblance of a reason which is ‘Counterbalanced,’ [—i. e. leaves the matter the same as before].

Aphorism XLVII.

That one is said to leave the matter the same as before, from the employment of which there does not result certainty, but there arises the reflection “Is what is to be established really established by this reason, or is the *absence* of what is to be established established by a reason of equal force?”

a. For example,—‘Sound is eternal, because it is the nature of sound to be eternal.’ Having heard this argument, the reflection may arise that Sound is *not* eternal, because it is *made*; and that which is *made* did not exist from eternity.

b. Now the definition of that semblance of a reason which is in the same case with what is to be established.

Aphorism XLVIII.

As what is to be established requires to be established, if in like manner the reason is one that needs to be established, then that bad reason is said to be 'in the same case with what is to be established.'

a. That reason which needs to be established is said to be 'unproven' (*asiddh*). For example,—'There is fragrance in the flowers of the sky, because they are flowers.' Now it is not proven that what are called 'the flowers of the sky' are really flowers.

b. Now the definition of the 'Mistimed' semblance of a reason.

Aphorism XLIX.

That reason which is employed when the time is passed [when it might have gained a hearing], is called the 'Mistimed' semblance of a reason.

a. For example,—it has been ascertained, by the evidence of sense, that fire is hot; so if any one shall say 'Fire is not hot, because it is made,' then such a reason will not be listened to, because, when the heat of fire has been ascertained by [sense] the strongest of all evidence, then the time is gone by for listening to such an argument.

b. Here ends the section on 'the semblances of a reason.'

SECTION XI.

THE TRICKS OF THE DISINGENUOUS.

c. It has been already remarked that an honest enquirer may, by mistake, make use of 'the semblance of a reason.' Now we

have to describe the 'Tricks' that are employed only by the dishonest.

Aphorism L.

A 'Trick' is the opposing the assertion of an asserter by means of assuming another meaning [than that which the objector well knows was intended].

a. Now we have to divide 'Tricks.'

Aphorism LI.

Tricks are of three kinds, (1) the trick in respect of a term (*vák-chhal*), (2) the trick in respect of genus (*sámánya-chhal*), and (3) the trick in respect of metaphor (*upachára-chhal*).

a. Now the definition of the 'trick in respect of a term.'

Aphorism LII.

When the asserter makes use of some word which has more than one meaning, then to assume a meaning opposed to what he intended is what is called a 'trick in respect of a term.'

a. For example,—in Sanskrit the word *gau* has two meanings, a 'cow,' and an 'elephant;' so if any one shall say, 'A cow (*gau*) has horns,' then the disingenuous will ask—'What! do you say that an *elephant* has horns?'

Aphorism LIII.

When an asserter makes an assertion respecting something with which it is consistent, then to assume that the assertion is made respecting something with which it is *not* consistent, because [forsooth] there is a generic relation [between the two individuals], is called a 'trick in respect of genus.'

b. Now we have to define the 'trick in respect of metaphor.'

Aphorism LIV.

When any word is employed literally, or on the other hand metaphorically, then, to assume that it was employed the other way, is called a 'trick in respect of metaphor.'

a. The literal (*váchya*) employment is this, that the word 'scaffold' be employed just in the sense of scaffold. The metaphorical (*lákshanik*) employment is this, that the word 'scaffold' be employed in the sense of the watchman seated upon the scaffold. So if any asserter, employing the term metaphorically, shall say 'The scaffolds are shouting;' then the disingenuous person will say, 'What! can a scaffold, which is a senseless thing, *shout*?'

b. Now we have to consider a doubt on the subject of the 'Tricks.'

Aphorism LV.

Perhaps some one will say that a 'trick in respect of metaphor' is just a 'trick in respect of a term,' because there is no difference.

a. That is to say,—perhaps some one will say that 'Tricks' are not of three kinds but only of two kinds.

b. We now clear up this;—i.e. we remove this doubt.

Aphorism LVI.

It is not so, because there *is* a difference between them.

a. That is to say,—a 'trick in respect of a term,' and a 'trick in respect of a metaphor,' are really different, although they are somewhat similar.

b. In order to refute the other opinion, we remark further as follows.

Aphorism LVII.

If where there is any likeness, there you will not allow a difference, then 'Tricks' will be of only *one* sort.

a. If you say that 'Tricks,' which are of three kinds, are only of two kinds because of some resemblance [between two of the three], then they will not be even of two kinds but only of *one* kind.

b. Here ends the section on 'Tricks.'

 SECTION XII.

OF FUTILITY AND OF HOPELESS STUPIDITY.

c. Now we have to define 'Futility.'

Aphorism LVIII.

That objection which is made without regard to constancy of association, is called a Futility.

a. For example,—if some one says, 'This man is not fit to march, because he has a fever;'; then the disingenuous may say, 'He *is* fit to march because he is a warrior.' Now fitness for marching is not the constant accompanier of the fact of being a warrior. He who says, 'He is a warrior, and is therefore fit to march,' has no respect to constancy of association; and his speech is unmeaning and self-destructive,—that is to say the speech itself displays its own faultiness.

b. Now we have to define 'Reasons for putting down.'

Aphorism LIX.

[Stupidly and pertinaciously] misunderstanding, and not understanding,—these are 'Reasons for putting down.'

a. In the word *nigraha-sthān* [—which we have rendered ‘Reasons for putting down,’—], the word *nigraha* means ‘chastising,’ and the word *sthān* means ‘an informer’ [of the necessity of chastising or putting down some one whom it is useless to argue with]; thus the word *nigraha-sthān* means ‘the informer of some one’s unfitness.’ What informs us of a man’s unfitness are his ‘misunderstanding’ and ‘not understanding.’ ‘Misunderstanding’ is this, that the man makes a practice of always understanding the reverse of the matter in hand—[the proposition in question]. ‘Not understanding’ is this, that the man positively cannot understand the question. With such a man it is fruitless to argue.

b. Perhaps people might suppose that there are no varieties of ‘Futility’ and of ‘Reasons for putting down,’—therefore we declare that there are such.

Aphorism LX.

There are several varieties of ‘Futility’ and of ‘Reasons for putting down,’ for they are numerous,

a. These shall not be described at present, because there are other matters, the student’s desire to become acquainted with which forbids at present the further consideration of this point.

END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

॥ श्री परमेश्वर की जय ॥

जो जानता है कि घट किस रीत से उत्पन्न होता है सो ही घट को बना सकता है और जो जानता है कि काशी का मार्ग कौन है सो ही किसी मार्गदर्शक के बिना काशी में पहुंच सकता है । इस रीत से जो कुछ इष्ट है उसकी प्राप्ति में ज्ञान उपकारक है और यदि ऐसे साधारण विषयों की प्राप्ति में ज्ञान उपकारक है तो परमपुरुषार्थ नामक वस्तु के प्राप्ति में भी ज्ञान अत्यन्त उपकारक है । यद्यपि भ्रम भी एक ज्ञान है तौ भी यहाँ तत्त्वज्ञान अर्थात् सत्यज्ञान अभिप्रेत है ॥

अब जिन विषयों का तत्त्वज्ञान परमपुरुषार्थ का उपकारी हो सकता है उन विषयों का कथन इस सूच में करते हैं ॥

प्रमाण प्रमेय संशय प्रयोजन दृष्टान्त
सिद्धान्त अवयव तर्कनिर्णय वाद जल्प
वितण्डा हेत्वाभास छल जाति निग्रह-
स्थान इनका तत्त्व विचारेंगे क्योंकि
तत्त्वज्ञान परमपुरुषार्थ की प्राप्ति में
उपकारी है ॥ १ ॥

अब जो पूछो कि इस ग्रन्थ के पढ़ने का अधिकारी
आदि कौन कौन है तो सुनो । अधिकारी तो ज्ञाने-
षु और अमत्सर पुरुष है । जिनका वर्णन करेंगे सो
प्रमाणादि विषय है । इन विषयों से और इस ग्रन्थ
से प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावरूप सम्बन्ध है । और
इस ग्रन्थ के अध्ययन का प्रयोजन अर्थात् फल वही
तत्त्वज्ञान है जो इस ग्रन्थ से प्राप्त होगा ॥

अब जिस क्रम से परमपुरुषार्थ की प्राप्ति में तत्त्व-
ज्ञान उपकारक है सो द्वितीय सूत्र में कहते हैं ॥

परमपुरुषार्थकी प्राप्ति में तत्त्वज्ञान उप-
कारक है क्योंकि वह जिस विषय में होता

है तिस विषय का मिथ्याज्ञान नष्ट होता है। फिर उस मिथ्याज्ञान से जो जो अनुचित रागादि उत्पन्न होते हैं वे उस मिथ्याज्ञान के नाश के विना नष्ट नहीं होते हैं। फिर उन अनुचित रागादि से जो जो कुप्रवृत्ति उत्पन्न होती थी सो भी उन अनुचित रागादि के नाश के विना नष्ट नहीं होती है। फिर कुप्रवृत्ति से जो दुख उत्पन्न हो सो भी उस कुप्रवृत्ति के नाश के विना नष्ट नहीं हो जाता है ॥ २ ॥

ऐसा ज्ञात होता है कि जो जो दुख मिथ्याज्ञान से उत्पन्न हो तिसके दूर करने में तत्त्वज्ञान उपकारक है और दुख के दूर करने के विना परमपुरुषार्थ का सम्भव नहीं है। नहीं कहते हैं कि तत्त्वज्ञान ही के होने से सब दुख दूर हो जायगा और परमपुरुषार्थ प्राप्त होगा परन्तु यही कहते हैं कि जो जो दुख मिथ्याज्ञान से उत्पन्न हुआ करता है तिसके दूर करने में तत्त्वज्ञान उपकारक हो सकता है ॥

४

अब जिन पदार्थों का उद्देश्य पहिले सूच में किया गया था तिनका वर्णन प्रत्येकशः करते हैं । उन में से पहिला तो प्रमाण है ॥

प्रमाण दो प्रकार का है प्र-
त्यक्ष और अनुमान ॥ ३ ॥

प्रमा का करण प्रमाण कहलाता । और प्रमा सत्य-
ज्ञान का पर्याय है ॥

अब प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण उस यथार्थज्ञान का
करण है जो इन्द्रिय और अर्थ के स-
न्निकर्ष से उत्पन्न होता है ॥ ४ ॥

पाँच इन्द्रिय प्रसिद्ध हैं । वे ही प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण
कहलाते हैं । इन्द्रियों के अर्थ इन्द्रियों के विषय हैं
जैसे रूप आँख में रहनेवाले चक्षुष्यात्मक इन्द्रिय का
विषय है ॥

अब अनुमान प्रमाण का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

प्रत्यक्षपूर्वक अनुमान तीम प्र-
कार का है पूर्ववत् शेषवत् और
सामान्यतो दृष्ट ॥ ५ ॥

यदि धूम देखें तो अनुमान कर सकते हैं कि आग है परन्तु जहाँ कुछ प्रत्यक्षज्ञान नहीं है वहाँ किस रीत से कुछ अनुमान कर सकेंगे । इस लिये अनुमान प्रत्यक्षपूर्वक कहलाता ॥

अनुमान पूर्ववत् कहलाता जहाँ किसी कारण को प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण से ज्ञात करके तिसके कार्य की सम्भावना करते हैं । जैसा बादलों का समागम पानी बरसने का कारण है सो बादलों का समागम देखके पानी बरसने की सम्भावना करते हैं । ऐसा अनुमान पूर्ववत् अर्थात् कारणावत् कहलाता ॥

अनुमान शेषवत् कहलाता जहाँ किसी कार्य को प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण से ज्ञात करके तिसके कारण को निश्चय करते हैं । जैसा नदी का पूर्णत्व और उसके बहने की शीघ्रता देखके निश्चय करते हैं कि पानी बरसा है ॥

अनुमान सामान्यतो दृष्ट कहलाता है जहाँ कोई

६

मनुष्य किसी जगह में एक मौराते हुए आम के पेड़ को देखकर निश्चय करता है कि और आम के पेड़ भी और जगहों में अभी मौराते हैं क्योंकि वे पेड़ एक समान जात के हैं ॥

अब जाना चाहिये कि गौतम के न्यायशास्त्र में दो और प्रमाण उपमान और शब्द गिने जाते हैं । और वे दोनों सचमुच प्रमाण हैं । परन्तु कणाद कहता है कि अनुमान प्रमाण में वे अन्तर्गत हैं और यह हमारा भी मत है । इस लिये उनका विशेष उद्देश तीसरे सूत्र में नहीं किया । अब उनका वर्णन करते हैं और पहिले उपमान का ॥

किसी प्रसिद्ध वस्तु के साधर्म्य से सा-
ध्य का साधन उपमान ॥ ६ ॥

उदाहरण । कल्पना करो कि कोई मनुष्य है जो गाय को जानता है । वह किसी वनवासी के मुंह से सुनता कि गयाल गाय के सदृश है । इसके अनन्तर वह वन में जाके एक जन्तु को देखता जो गाय

के सदृश है । तब वह मनुष्य अनुमान करता कि य-
ही गयाल है ॥

अब शब्द प्रमाण का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

आप्त का उपदेश शब्द
प्रमाण है ॥ ७ ॥

आप्त वही है जो सच बात बोलता है । अब शब्द
का विभाग करते हैं ॥

शब्द दो प्रकार का है दृष्टार्थ
और अदृष्टार्थ ॥ ८ ॥

जिस पदार्थ की चरचा है जो वह पदार्थ संसार
में प्रस्तुत होवे तो उसकी अपेक्षा जो शब्द कहा
जाता है सो दृष्टार्थ कहलाता है । जो वह पदार्थ
संसार में प्रस्तुत न होवे तो उसकी अपेक्षा जो शब्द
कहा जाता है सो अदृष्टार्थ कहलाता है ॥

अब प्रमाणसाध्य प्रमेय का उद्देश करते हैं ॥

आत्मा शरीर इन्द्रिय अर्थ बुद्धि मन
 प्रवृत्ति रागादि सांसारिक जीवन फल
 दुखादि परमपुरुषार्थ ये तो प्रमेय
 कहलाते हैं ॥ ९ ॥

अब आत्मा का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

इच्छा द्वेष प्रयत्न सुख दुख ज्ञान
 ये सब आत्मा के लक्षण हैं ॥ १० ॥

अर्थात् आत्मा से अतिरिक्त ये किसी दूसरे पदार्थ
 में नहीं हैं ॥

अब शरीर का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

चेष्टा इन्द्रिय सुख और दुख का
 आश्रय शरीर है ॥ ११ ॥

चेष्टा एक व्यापार विशेष है जो प्रयत्न से उत्पन्न
 होता है। इन्द्रिय चक्षुष इत्यादि हैं। शरीर सुख
 और दुख का आश्रय कहलाता है क्योंकि आत्मा

शरीर में आश्रित होकर सुख और दुःख का भोग करता है ॥

अब इन्द्रियों का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

ग्राह्य रसन चक्षुष त्वक् श्रोत्र ये
इन्द्रिय हैं जो भौतिक द्रव्यों के गुणों
के ग्राहक हैं ॥ १२ ॥

भौतिक द्रव्य एव पाषाण इत्यादि हैं । जिन द्रव्यों से वे भौतिक द्रव्य उत्पन्न होते हैं सो भूत कहलाते हैं । प्राचीन मत में पांच भूत हैं परन्तु आधुनिक मत में भूत पचास से अधिक हैं ॥

अब जिन भूतों से भौतिक द्रव्य उत्पन्न होते हैं सो कहते हैं ॥

सुवर्ण इत्यादि भूत हैं ॥ १३ ॥

प्राचीन मत में पांच भूत हैं पृथिवी जल तेज वायु

प्रमाण प्रमेय संशय प्रयोजन दृष्टान्त
सिद्धान्त अवयव तर्कनिर्णय वाद जल्प
वितण्डा हेत्वाभास छल जाति निग्रह-
स्थान इनका तत्त्व विचारेंगे क्योंकि
तत्त्वज्ञान परमपुरुषार्थ की प्राप्ति में
उपकारी है ॥ १ ॥

अब जो पूछो कि इस ग्रन्थ के पढ़ने का अधिकारी
आदि कौन कौन है तो सुनो । अधिकारी तो ज्ञाने-
षु और अमत्सर पुरुष है । जिनका वर्णन करेंगे सो
प्रमाणादि विषय है । इन विषयों से और इस ग्रन्थ
से प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावरूप सम्बन्ध है । और
इस ग्रन्थ के अध्ययन का प्रयोजन अर्थात् फल वही
तत्त्वज्ञान है जो इस ग्रन्थ से प्राप्त होगा ॥

अब जिस क्रम से परमपुरुषार्थ की प्राप्ति में तत्त्व-
ज्ञान उपकारक है सो द्वितीय सूच में कहते हैं ॥

परमपुरुषार्थ की प्राप्ति में तत्त्वज्ञान उप-
कारक है क्योंकि वह जिस विषय में होता

है तिस विषय का मिथ्याज्ञान नष्ट होता है । फिर उस मिथ्याज्ञान से जो जो अनुचित रागादि उत्पन्न होते हैं वे उस मिथ्याज्ञान के नाश के विना नष्ट नहीं होते हैं । फिर उन अनुचित रागादि से जो जो कुप्रवृत्ति उत्पन्न होती थी सो भी उन अनुचित रागादि के नाश के विना नष्ट नहीं होती है । फिर कुप्रवृत्ति से जो दुख उत्पन्न हो सो भी उस कुप्रवृत्ति के नाश के विना नष्ट नहीं हो जाता है ॥ २ ॥

ऐसा ज्ञात होता है कि जो जो दुख मिथ्याज्ञान से उत्पन्न हो तिसके दूर करने में तत्त्वज्ञान उपकारक है और दुख के दूर करने के विना परमपुरुषार्थ का सम्भव नहीं है । नहीं कहते हैं कि तत्त्वज्ञान ही के होने से सब दुख दूर हो जायगा और परमपुरुषार्थ प्राप्त होगा परन्तु यही कहते हैं कि जो जो दुख मिथ्याज्ञान से उत्पन्न हुआ करता है तिसके दूर करने में तत्त्वज्ञान उपकारक हो सकता है ॥

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अब जिन पदार्थों का उद्देश्य पहिले सूच में किया गया था तिनका वर्णन प्रत्यक्षः करते हैं । उन में से पहिला तो प्रमाण है ॥

प्रमाण दो प्रकार का है प्र-
त्यक्ष और अनुमान ॥ ३ ॥

प्रमा का करण प्रमाण कहलाता । और प्रमा सत्य-
ज्ञान का पर्याय है ॥

अब प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण उस यथार्थज्ञान का
करण है जो इन्द्रिय और अर्थ के स-
न्निकर्ष से उत्पन्न होता है ॥ ४ ॥

पाँच इन्द्रिय प्रसिद्ध हैं । वे ही प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण
कहलाते हैं । इन्द्रियों के अर्थ इन्द्रियों के विषय हैं
जैसे रूप आँख में रहनेवाले चक्षुष्यात्मक इन्द्रिय का
विषय है ॥

अब अनुमान प्रमाण का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

प्रत्यक्षपूर्वक अनुमान तीम प्र-
कार का है पूर्ववत् शेषवत् और
सामान्यतो दृष्ट ॥ ५ ॥

यदि धूम देखें तो अनुमान कर सकते हैं कि आग है परन्तु जहाँ कुछ प्रत्यक्षज्ञान नहीं है वहाँ किस रीत से कुछ अनुमान कर सकेंगे । इस लिये अनुमान प्रत्यक्षपूर्वक कहलाता ॥

अनुमान पूर्ववत् कहलाता जहाँ किसी कारण को प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण से ज्ञात करके तिसके कार्य की सम्भावना करते हैं । जैसा बादलों का समागम पानी बरसने का कारण है सो बादलों का समागम देखके पानी बरसने की सम्भावना करते हैं । ऐसा अनुमान पूर्ववत् अर्थात् कारणवत् कहलाता ॥

अनुमान शेषवत् कहलाता जहाँ किसी कार्य को प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण से ज्ञात करके तिसके कारण को निश्चय करते हैं । जैसा नदी का पूर्णत्व और उसके बहने की शीघ्रता देखके निश्चय करते हैं कि पानी बरसा है ॥

अनुमान सामान्यतो दृष्ट कहलाता है जहाँ कोई

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मनुष्य किसी जगह में एक मौराते हुए आम के पेड़ को देखकर निश्चय करता है कि और आम के पेड़ भी और जगहों में अभी मौराते हैं क्योंकि वे पेड़ एक समान जात के हैं ॥

अब जाना चाहिये कि गौतम के न्यायशास्त्र में दो और प्रमाण उपमान और शब्द गिने जाते हैं । और वे दोनों सचमुच प्रमाण हैं । परन्तु कणाद कहता है कि अनुमान प्रमाण में वे अन्तर्गत हैं और यह हमारा भी मत है । इस लिये उनका विशेष उद्देश तीसरे सूत्र में नहीं किया । अब उनका वर्णन करते हैं और पहिले उपमान का ॥

किसी प्रसिद्ध वस्तु के साधर्म्य से सा-
ध्य का साधन उपमान ॥ ६ ॥

उदाहरण । कल्पना करो कि कोई मनुष्य है जो गाय को जानता है । वह किसी वनवासी के मुँह से सुनता कि गयाल गाय के सदृश है । इसके अनन्तर वह वन में जाके एक जन्तु को देखता जो गाय

के सदृश है । तब वह मनुष्य अनुमान करता कि य-
ही गयाल है ॥

अब शब्द प्रमाण का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

आप्त का उपदेश शब्द
प्रमाण है ॥ ७ ॥

आप्त वही है जो सच बात बोलता है । अब शब्द
का विभाग करते हैं ॥

शब्द दो प्रकार का है दृष्टार्थ
और अदृष्टार्थ ॥ ८ ॥

जिस पदार्थ की चरचा है जो वह पदार्थ संसार
में प्रस्तुत होवे तो उसकी अपेक्षा जो शब्द कहा
जाता है सो दृष्टार्थ कहलाता है । जो वह पदार्थ
संसार में प्रस्तुत न होवे तो उसकी अपेक्षा जो शब्द
कहा जाता है सो अदृष्टार्थ कहलाता है ॥

अब प्रमाणसाध्य प्रमेय का उद्देश करते हैं ॥

आत्मा शरीर इन्द्रिय अर्थ बुद्धि मन
प्रवृत्ति रागादि सांसारिक जीवन फल
दुखादि परमपुरुषार्थ ये तो प्रमेय
कहलाते हैं ॥ ९ ॥

अब आत्मा का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

इच्छा द्वेष प्रयत्न सुख दुख ज्ञान
ये सब आत्मा के लक्षण हैं ॥ १० ॥

अर्थात् आत्मा से अतिरिक्त ये किसी दूसरे पदार्थ
में नहीं हैं ॥

अब शरीर का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

चेष्टा इन्द्रिय सुख और दुख का
आश्रय शरीर है ॥ ११ ॥

चेष्टा एक व्यापार विशेष है जो प्रयत्न से उत्पन्न
होता है। इन्द्रिय चक्षुष इत्यादि हैं। शरीर सुख
और दुख का आश्रय कहलाता है क्योंकि आत्मा

शरीर में आश्रित होकर सुख और दुःख का भोग करता है ॥

अब इन्द्रियों का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

प्राण रसन चक्षुष त्वक् श्रोत्र ये
इन्द्रिय हैं जो भौतिक द्रव्यों के गुणों
के ग्राहक हैं ॥ १२ ॥

भौतिक द्रव्य दृक् पाषाण इत्यादि हैं। जिन द्रव्यों से वे भौतिक द्रव्य उत्पन्न होते हैं सो भूत कहलाते हैं। प्राचीन मत में पांच भूत हैं परन्तु आधुनिक मत में भूत पचास से अधिक हैं ॥

अब जिन भूतों से भौतिक द्रव्य उत्पन्न होते हैं सो कहते हैं ॥

सुवर्ण इत्यादि भूत हैं ॥ १३ ॥

प्राचीन मत में पांच भूत हैं पृथिवी जल तेज वायु

और आकाश अर्थात् मिट्टी पानी प्रकाश हवा और आकाश । आधुनिक व्यवहार में वही भूत कहलाता है जो अनेक द्रव्यों से नहीं उत्पन्न हुआ है । जैसा । सुवर्ण भूत कहलाता है क्योंकि सुवर्ण के टुकड़े में सुवर्ण से अतिरिक्त और कुछ नहीं ज्ञात होता है । परन्तु दूध भूत नहीं कहलाता है क्योंकि दूध में पानी और घी इत्यादि मिश्रित हैं ॥

अब इन्द्रियों के अर्थों को अर्थात् विषयों को कहते हैं ॥

गन्ध रस रूप स्पर्श शब्द भौतिक
द्रव्यों के गुण इन्द्रियों के अर्थ
कहलाते हैं ॥ १४ ॥

घ्राण इन्द्रिय गन्ध गुण का ग्राहक है । रसन इन्द्रिय रस गुण का ग्राहक है । चक्षुष इन्द्रिय रूप गुण का ग्राहक है । श्रोत्र इन्द्रिय शब्द गुण का ग्राहक है ॥

अब बुद्धि का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

बुद्धि और उपलब्धि और ज्ञान ये तीनों
एक ही अर्थ में व्यवहृत हैं ॥ १५ ॥

अब मन का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

युगपत् अनेक ज्ञान नहीं होते हैं
यह मन का लक्षण है ॥ १६ ॥

अर्थात् एक काल में एक आत्मा में अनेक ज्ञान
उत्पन्न न होने का कारण मन कहलाता है ॥

अब प्रवृत्ति का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

प्रवृत्ति वही है जिस से बुद्धि और शरीर
की चेष्टा का आरम्भ होता ॥ १७ ॥

वाक् की चेष्टा का आरम्भ भी प्रवृत्ति से होता है
परन्तु वाक् शरीर में अन्तर्गत है ॥

अब रागादि का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

रागादि का लक्षण प्रवर्तना है ॥ १८ ॥

प्रयत्न का हेतु होना यही प्रवर्तना कहलाती है। राग और द्वेष प्रयत्न के हेतु हैं। जिस विषय में राग है तिस की प्राप्ति के लिये यत्न किया जाता। जिस विषय में द्वेष है तिस के पास से बचने का यत्न किया जाता ॥

अब सांसारिक जीवन का लक्षण करते हैं ॥

ऐहिक देह से आत्मा का संयोग सां-
सारिक जीवन कहलाता है ॥ १९ ॥

अब फल का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

जो सुख वा दुःख प्रयत्न से प्राप्त होता
है सो फल कहलाता है ॥ २० ॥

प्रयत्न दो प्रकार की है उचित और अनुचित। उचित प्रयत्न का फल सुख है। अनुचित प्रयत्न का फल दुःख है ॥

अब दुःख का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

बाधना लक्षण है जिस का
सोई दुःख ॥ २१ ॥

यहां बाधना शब्द का अर्थ पीड़ा है ॥
अब परमपुरुषार्थ का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

परमेश्वर के प्रसाद से जो अत्यन्त सुख
आत्मा को हो सकता है सो परम-
पुरुषार्थ है ॥ २२ ॥

इस संसार में सुख दुःख से मिश्रित है परन्तु पर-
लोक में जो सुख परमेश्वर अपने सेवकों को देगा
तिस में दुःखका मिश्रण नहीं होगा और इस का
अन्त कबही नहीं होगा ॥

॥ प्रमेयप्रकरण समाप्त हुआ ॥

अब संशय का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

संशय वहाँ हो है जहाँ सामान्य का
प्रत्यक्ष है और विशेष का प्रत्यक्ष नहीं
है और विशेष की स्मृति है ॥ २३ ॥

उदाहरण । सन्ध्या काल में कोई मनुष्य एक द्रव्य
को देखता जो परिमाण में मनुष्य के समान और
स्थान के भी समान है । देखनेवाला स्मरण करता
कि मनुष्य और स्थान के विशेष तो हैं परन्तु जब तक
ऐसे किसी विशेष को नहीं पहचानता तब तक उस
के मन में यही संशय रहता कि यह द्रव्य स्थान है
या मनुष्य ॥

अब प्रयोजन का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

जिस अर्थ की प्राप्ति के लिये यत्न करते हैं
सोई प्रयोजन कहलाता है ॥ २४ ॥

अब दृष्टान्त का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

जिस अर्थ में लौकिकों की और

परीक्षकों की बुद्धि की साम्य है सो
दृष्टान्त कहलाता है ॥ २५ ॥

यहां लौकिक वे ही कहलाते हैं जो सीखनेवाले
हैं और परीक्षक वे जो सिखानेवाले हैं । यूं दृष्टान्त
वही है जो मतविरोध का विषय नहीं है । जैसा ।
महानसमें बह्नि है वा महाद्वाद में बह्नि नहीं है इस
बात को सीखनेवाला और सिखानेवाला दोनों स्वी-
कार करें तो वह दृष्टान्त है ।

॥ न्याय के पूर्वाङ्ग का प्रकरण समाप्त हुआ ॥
अब सिद्धान्त का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

सिद्धान्त वही है जिस की संस्थिति
शास्त्र में स्वीकृत है ॥ २६ ॥

जैसा । मीमांसा शास्त्र में शब्द नित्य कहलाता है
और न्याय शास्त्र में अनित्य कहलाता है सो मीमांसा
शास्त्र में शब्द का नित्यत्व सिद्धान्त है क्योंकि मीमांसा

शास्त्र में शब्द का नित्यत्व स्वीकृत है यद्यपि न्याय शास्त्र में नहीं स्वीकृत है ॥

अब सिद्धान्त का विभाग करते हैं ॥

सर्वतन्त्र सिद्धान्त प्रतितन्त्र सिद्धान्त अधिकरण सिद्धान्त और अभ्युपगम सिद्धान्त ये चार सिद्धान्त हैं ॥ २७ ॥

अब सर्वतन्त्र सिद्धान्त का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

सर्वतन्त्र सिद्धान्त वही कहलाता है जो किसी शास्त्र में स्वीकृत है और किसी शास्त्र से विरुद्ध नहीं है ॥ २८ ॥

जैसा । प्राण इन्द्रिय ही से गन्धगुण ग्राह्य है यह बात न्याय शास्त्र में प्रतिपन्न है और यह बात किसी शास्त्र से विरुद्ध नहीं है ॥

अब प्रतितन्त्र सिद्धान्त का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

प्रतितन्त्र सिद्धान्त वही कहलाता जो किसी न किसी शास्त्र में स्वीकृत है परन्तु और शास्त्रों में स्वीकृत नहीं है ॥ २९ ॥

जैसा । सूर्य का स्थैर्य और भूगोल का भ्रमण आधुनिक शास्त्र में यह स्वीकृत है परन्तु प्राचीन शास्त्र में स्वीकृत नहीं ॥

अब अधिकरण सिद्धान्त का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

अधिकरण सिद्धान्त वही कहलाता है जिस की सिद्धि से कोई और प्रकरण सिद्ध होता है ॥ ३० ॥

जैसा । संसार का जन्यत्व पक्ष अधिकरण सिद्धान्त है जिस से दूसरी बात अर्थात् ईश्वर की सर्वज्ञता सिद्ध होती है । यदि संसार जन्य न होता तो किस कारण से उस के कर्त्ता को सर्वज्ञ मानते ॥

अब अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्त का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

जो बात सूच में नहीं कही गई है और
स्वीकृत है कि सूचकार का मत वही है
सो अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्त कहलाता है ॥ ३१ ॥

जैसा । गौतम के सूत्रों में मन इन्द्रिय नहीं कहा
गया है परन्तु स्पष्ट है कि गौतम की समझमें मन एक
इन्द्रिय तो है ॥

॥ न्यायाश्रयसिद्धान्त प्रकरण समाप्त हुआ ॥
अब अवयवों का लक्षण और विभाग करते हैं ॥

प्रतिज्ञा हेतु उदाहरण उपनय निगमन
येई अवयव कहलाते हैं ॥ ३२ ॥

अब प्रतिज्ञा का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

साध्य का निर्देश प्रतिज्ञा
कहलाती है ॥ ३३ ॥

जैसा । यह पर्वत वहिमान है यह एक प्रतिज्ञा
है । यहां वहि साध्य है ॥

अब हेतु का लक्षण और विभाग करते हैं ॥

हेतु वही है जो साध्य का साधन हो-
ता है उदाहरण के साधर्म्य से वा उदा-
हरण के वैधर्म्य से ॥ ३४ ॥

साध्य का साधन यह तो हेतु का सामान्य लक्षण है । हेतु दो प्रकार का है उदाहरण के साधर्म्य से और उदाहरण के वैधर्म्य से । साधर्म्य अन्वय कहलाता है और वैधर्म्य व्यतिरेक कहलाता है । यदि पर्वत में वह्न साध्य है तो धूम जो देख पड़ता सो हेतु हो सकता । सो आगे कहेंगे । जाना चाहिये कि जिस अवयव में हेतु प्रदर्शित है वह अवयव भी हेतु कहलाता है ॥

अब उदाहरण का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

वह दृष्टान्त जो साध्य के साधर्म्य से साध्यरूप धर्म अताता सो उदाहरण कहलाता है ॥ ३५ ॥

यह तो अन्वयी उदाहरण है । व्यतिरेकी उदाहरण आगे कहेंगे ॥

यदि धूम हेतु से पर्वत में वह्नि साध्य होवे तो महानस उदाहरण होगा । यह कैसा है सो कहते हैं कोई मनुष्य एक अनवच्छिन्न रेखा धूम की देख कर जिस का आरम्भ महानस से होता तब निकट जाकर देखता कि वहां वह्नि है । फिर बहुधा जहां धूमरेखा का आरम्भ है तहां वह्नि को देखकर वह मनुष्य अपने मन में यह बात निश्चित करता कि जहां धूम है वहां वह्नि भी है जैसा महानस में । जो नियतसहचारी है जैसा वह्नि धूम का नियतसहचारी है सोई व्यापक कहलाता । जो नियतसहचरित है जैसा धूम सोई व्याप्य कहलाता । व्याप्य का भाव व्याप्ति कहलाती । व्याप्ति के ग्रहण का उपाय आगे व्याप्तिग्रहोपायप्रकरण में विस्तार से कहेंगे ॥

अब व्यतिरेकी उदाहरण का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

व्यतिरेकी उदाहरण अन्वयी उदा-
हरण का विपरीत है ॥ ३६ ॥

अर्थात् व्यतिरेकी उदाहरण वही है जो दिखाता है कि साध्य के अभाव में साधन का अभाव है। जैसा महाह्रद। महाह्रद में वह्नि नहीं है और वहां से धूम नहीं उठता है। सो जहां वह्नि नहीं है वहां धूम भी नहीं है जैसा महाह्रद में ॥

जिस अवयव में उदाहरण प्रदर्शित है वह अव-
यव भी उदाहरण कहलाता है ॥

अब उपनय का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

उदाहरण के अनुसार पक्ष का
उपन्यास जो है सो उपनय
कहलाता है ॥ ३७ ॥

पक्ष वही कहलाता है जिस में साध्य प्रतिज्ञात है।
जैसा। पर्वत वह्निमान है इस प्रतिज्ञा में पर्वत पक्ष है

क्योंकि साध्य जो बहि है सो पर्वत में प्रतिज्ञात है । जहां अन्वयी उदाहरण है तहां यह पर्वत भी वैसा है सो उपनय की आकृति है । जहां व्यतिरेकी उदाहरण तहां यह पर्वत वैसा नहीं है सो उपनय की आकृति है ॥

जिस अवयव में पक्ष का उपन्यास अर्थात् उपसंहार अर्थात् कथन उदाहरण की अपेक्षा में किया जाता है वह अवयव भी उपनय कहलाता है ॥

अब निगमन का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

हेतु के कहने के कारण से प्रतिज्ञा का पुनर्वचन निगमन कहलाता है ॥ ३८ ॥

अर्थात् जो पहिले प्रतिज्ञात था सो हेतु के कहने से सिद्ध होगया और जिस अवयव में प्रतिज्ञा सिद्ध स्वरूप में फिर कही जाती है वह अवयव निगमन कहलाता है । जैसा । इस लिये पर्वत बहिमान है ॥

॥ न्यायस्वरूप प्रकारण समाप्त हुआ ॥

अब तर्क का खचण कहते हैं ।

हेतु के उपपादन के द्वारा तत्त्व-
ज्ञान के लिये जो ऊह है सोई
तर्क कहलाता है ॥ ३८ ॥

व्यभिचार की शङ्का का निरसन हेतु का उपपादन है । व्यभिचार हेतु में व्याप्ति का अभाव है । जैसा । जो जो वह्निमान सो धूमवान् । यह द्रव्य वह्निमान है इस लिये धूमवान् है । यहाँ वह्नि हेतु है और उचित हेतु नहीं है क्योंकि तप्त लोहे के गोले में वह्नि है परन्तु धूम नहीं है । यूँ इस हेतु में व्यभिचार दोष है अर्थात् धूम जो साथ ही वह्नि हेतु का व्यापक नहीं है । जहाँ किसी उचित हेतु की अपेक्षा व्यभिचार की शङ्का है तिस शङ्का के निरास के लिये जो ऊह प्रयुक्त है सोई तर्क कहलाता है । जैसा धूम हेतु की अपेक्षा यदि व्यभिचार की शङ्का होवे तो तर्क यूँ करते हैं कि जो वह्निमान न होता तो धूमवान् न होता ॥

अब निर्णय का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

सन्देह के अनन्तर अर्थ का अवधारण करना वा पक्ष के स्थापन करने और प्रतिपक्ष के दूषण करने द्वारा जो ज्ञान सो निर्णय कहलाता है ॥ ४० ॥

अर्थात् अपने मत को स्थापन करने से और विकृष्ट मत के खण्डन करने से जो सन्देह का लोप होना है सो निर्णय कहलाता है ॥

॥ न्याय के उत्तराङ्ग का प्रकरण समाप्त हुआ ॥

अब तर्क के अनन्तर कदाचित् किसी साधु जिज्ञासु का सन्देह न गया और निर्णय न हुआ। तब वाद करना उचित है। उस वाद का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

वाद यही है कि दो मनुष्य जिन का कुछ सिद्धान्तों की अपेक्षा मतविरोध नहीं है पक्ष और प्रतिपक्ष स्वीकार करके पञ्चा-

व्ययी की रीत से प्रमाण और तर्क से अपने अपने मत का साधन और दूसरे मत का निषेध करते हैं ॥ ४१ ॥

जो साधु जिज्ञासु नहीं हैं वे जय की इच्छा से जल्पना करते हैं। उसी जल्पना का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

जहाँ साधन वा निषेध के लिये छल और जाति और निगूहस्थान का प्रयोग होता है वहाँ जो वाक्यप्रयोग है सो जल्पना कहलाती है ॥ ४२ ॥

छल और जाति और निगूहस्थान जो जो कहलाते हैं सो आगे कहेंगे ॥

जो साधु जिज्ञासु न होकर जल्प करने को भी समर्थ नहीं होता सो वितण्डा का प्रयोग करता है। इस हेतु अत्र वितण्डा का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

प्रतिपक्ष के स्थापन से हीन जो जय के लिये वाक्यप्रयोग किया जाता है सो वितण्डा कहलाती है ॥ ४३ ॥

प्रतिपक्ष दूसरा पक्ष है। पक्ष का विरोध जो कोई किया चाहता है सो चाहिये कि प्रतिपक्ष को स्थापन करे। जो मनुष्य पक्ष का दूषण तो करता है परन्तु प्रतिपक्ष के साधन के लिये कुछ यत्न नहीं करता तिस का वाक्यप्रयोग वितण्डा कहलाती है ॥

॥ कथा का प्रकरण समाप्त हुआ ॥

अथ जल्पक इत्यादि जब उन के मत के स्थापन के लिये हेतु प्राप्त नहीं होते हैं तब हेत्वाभासों का प्रयोग करते हैं। भ्रम से साधु जिज्ञासु भी हेत्वाभास का प्रयोग कदाचित्त करेगा। अब हेत्वाभास का लक्षण और विभाग करते हैं ॥

सत्यभिचार और विरुद्ध और प्रकरणसम

और साध्यसम और अतीतकाल ये पांच
हेत्वाभास कहलाते हैं ॥ ४४ ॥

हेत्वाभास एक दुष्ट हेतु है जिस का आभास हेतु के
सदृश है परन्तु सच मुच हेतु नहीं है ॥

अब सव्यभिचार हेत्वाभास का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

सव्यभिचार हेत्वाभास वही है
जो अनैकान्तिक है ॥ ४५ ॥

अनैकान्तिक होना यह है कि एक ही साध्य का
व्यापक अथवा उस साध्य के अभाव का व्यापक नहीं
होना परन्तु दोनों का व्यापक होना । जैसा । पर्वत
धूमवान है क्योंकि वहिमान है । यह धूम का हेतु
साधक नहीं है क्योंकि तप्त लोहे के गोले में भी
मिलता है जहां धूम का अभाव है ॥

व्यभिचार यही है कि वहां जाना जहां जाना उ-
चित नहीं है । अब उचित नहीं है कि हेतु वहां
जावे जहां साध्य नहीं है । जो यों दुष्ट हेतु करता

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है सो सब्बभिचार हेत्वाभास कहलाता है ॥

अब विरुद्ध हेत्वाभास का लक्षण कहति हैं ॥

साध्य के अभाव का जो साधक सो
विरुद्धहेत्वाभास कहलाता है ॥ ४६ ॥

जैसा यह द्रव्य वहिमान है क्योंकि महाद्वन्द्व है ।
अब महाद्वन्द्व होना वहि का हेतु नहीं है परन्तु वहि
के अभाव का हेतु है ॥

प्रकरणसम हेत्वाभास का लक्षण ॥

प्रकरणसम वह कहलाता है जिस के प्र-
योगसे निर्णय नहीं होता परन्तु यह
चिन्ता होती है कि क्या इस हेतु से साध्य
सिद्ध हुआ अथवा तुल्यबल हेतु से साध्य
का अभाव सिद्ध हुआ ॥ ४७ ॥

जैसा । शब्द नित्य है क्योंकि शब्द का धर्म नित्यत्व
है । इस बात को सुन कर यह चिन्ता हो कि शब्द

नित्य नहीं है क्योंकि क्रिया जाता है और जो
किया जाता है सो नित्य नहीं है ॥

साध्यसम हेत्वाभास का लक्षण ॥

जैसा साध्य साधनीय है यदि उस के स-
दृश हेतु भी साधनीय होवे तो वह दुष्ट
हेतु साध्यसम कहलाता है ॥ ४८ ॥

जो हेतु साधनीय सो असिद्ध कहलाता है ।
जैसा । आकाश के फूलों में सुगन्ध है क्योंकि फूल
हैं । अब वह सिद्ध नहीं है कि आकाश के फूल-
जो कहलाते हैं सो सच मुच फूल हैं ॥

कालातीत हेत्वाभास का लक्षण ॥

काल के अतीत भये जो हेतु प्रयुक्त
होता है सो कालातीत हेत्वाभास
कहलाता है ॥ ४९ ॥

जैसा । प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण से निर्णय हुआ है कि वहि
उष्ण है यदि कोई कहे कि वहि उष्ण नहीं है क्योंकि

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किया जाता है तो ऐसा हेतु नहीं सुना जाता है क्योंकि जब प्रबल प्रमाण से वहि की उष्णाता निर्णीत हुई तब ऐसे हेतु के सुनने का काल नहीं है ॥

॥ हेत्वाभास का प्रकरण समाप्त हुआ ॥

पीछे कहा गया है कि भ्रम से साधु जिज्ञासु भी हेत्वाभास का प्रयोग कर सके । अब जिन छलों का केवल धूर्त लोग प्रयोग करते हैं तिन का वर्णन करते हैं ॥

अर्थान्तर कल्पना के द्वारा वादी के वचन का दूषण करना यही छल कहलाता ॥ ५० ॥

अब छल का विभाग करते हैं ॥

छल तीन प्रकार का है वाक्छल सामान्यच्छल और उपचारच्छल ॥ ५१ ॥

वाक्छल का लक्षण ॥

जब वादी किसी अनेकार्थिक शब्द का प्रयोग करे तब उस के अभिप्रेत अर्थ का विरुद्ध कल्पना करना वाक्छल कहलाता है ॥ ५२ ॥

जैसा । संस्कृत में गौ शब्द के दो अर्थ गाय और हाथी हैं सो यदि कोई कहेगा कि गौ के सींग हैं तो धूर्त पूछेगा कि क्या तुम कहते हो कि हाथी के सींग हैं ॥

अब सामान्यच्छल का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

जब वादी किसी समभूत अर्थ की अपेक्षा में वचन कहे तब सामान्य के सम्बन्ध से किसी असमभूत अर्थ की अपेक्षा में उस वचन की कल्पना करना सामान्यच्छल कहलाता है ॥ ५३ ॥

जैसा । कोई कहता है कि यह एक ब्राह्मण है

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इस खिये पण्डित । तब धूर्त कहेगा कि क्या तुम कहते हो कि पण्डित है क्योंकि ब्राह्मण है तो यह बालक भी ब्राह्मण है इस खिये उस को भी पण्डित कहना होगा । ब्राह्मण में पाण्डित्य का सम्भव है परन्तु बालक में पाण्डित्य का सम्भव नहीं है यद्यपि ब्राह्मणत्वजाति का सम्बन्ध बालक में भी होवे । ऐसे विषय में वादी के अभिप्राय से विरुद्ध कल्पना करना सामान्यच्छल कहलाता है ॥

अब उपचारच्छल का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

जब किसी शब्द का वाच्य प्रयोग अथवा लाक्षणिक प्रयोग किया जाता है तब प्रयोगान्तर की कल्पना उपचारच्छल कहलाता है ॥ ५४ ॥

वाच्य प्रयोग यह है कि मचान शब्द मचान ही के अर्थ में प्रयुक्त होवे । लाक्षणिक प्रयोग यह है कि

मचान शब्द मचान पर बैठे हुए रखवाले के अर्थ में प्रयुक्त होवे । सो यदि कोई वादी लाक्षणिक प्रयोग से कहे मचान पुकारते हैं तब धूर्त कहेगा कि क्या मचान जो जड़ पदार्थ है सो पुकार सकता है ॥

अब छल के विषय में एक सन्देह को विचारते हैं ॥

कदाचित् कोई कहे कि उपचारच्छल वाक्-
छल ही है क्योंकि विशेष नहीं है ॥ ५५ ॥

अर्थात् कदाचित् कोई कहे कि छल तीन प्रकार का नहीं है परन्तु केवल दो प्रकार का है ॥
उस का समाधान करते हैं । अर्थात् उस सन्देह को दूर करते हैं ॥

ऐसा नहीं है क्योंकि उस
में विशेष है ॥ ५६ ॥

अर्थात् वाक्छल और उपचारच्छल सब मुच भिन्न
हैं यद्यपि कुछ सदृश हैं ॥

उस दूसरे मत के बाधन के लिये यह बात भी कहते हैं ॥

यदि जहां कुछ सादृश्य है वहां
विशेष न मानो तो छल एक ही
प्रकार का होगा ॥ ५७ ॥

तीन प्रकार के छल जो हैं तिन के कुछ कुछ सा-
दृश्यभाव से यह कहो कि छल दो ही हैं तो दो प्र-
कार के भी नहीं होंगे किन्तु एक ही प्रकार का
होगा ॥

॥ छल का प्रकरण समाप्त हुआ ॥
अब जाति का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

व्याप्ति की अपेक्षा के बिना जो दूषण किया
जाता है सो जाति कहलाती है ॥ ५८ ॥

जैसा । कोई कहे कि यह मनुष्य याचा करने के
योग्य नहीं है क्योंकि उस को ज्वर आया है ।

तब धूर्त कहता है कि यात्रा करने के योग्य तो है क्यों-
कि क्षत्रिय है । अब यात्रा करने की योग्यता क्षत्रिय
होने का व्यापक नहीं है । जो कहता है कि क्षत्रिय
है इस लिये यात्रा करने को समर्थ है सो व्याप्ति की
अपेक्षा नहीं करता है और उस का वाक्य व्यर्थ
और स्वव्याघातक है । अर्थात् वह वाक्य अपने
दुष्टत्व को आप ही दिखाता है ॥

अब निग्रहस्थान का लक्षण कहते हैं ॥

विप्रतिपत्ति और अप्रतिपत्ति ये दो-
नों निग्रहस्थान कहलाते हैं ॥ ५९ ॥

निग्रहस्थान शब्द में निग्रह शब्द का अर्थ छकाना
है और स्थान शब्द का अर्थ ज्ञापक है । इस से
निग्रहस्थान शब्द का अर्थ अयोग्यता का ज्ञापक है ।
एक मनुष्य की अयोग्यता के ज्ञापक विप्रतिपत्ति और
अप्रतिपत्ति हैं । विप्रतिपत्ति यह है कि प्रकृत अर्थ
का विरुद्ध वह मनुष्य सदा समझा करता है । अप्र-

३६

लिपिस्त यह है कि प्रकृत अर्थ को समझ ही नहीं
सकता है । ऐसे मनुष्य से विवाद निष्फल है ॥

कदाचित् लोग समझें कि जाति और निग्रहस्थान
का विभाग नहीं है । इस लिये उस को कहते हैं ॥

जाति और निग्रहस्थान के बहुत्व
से अनेक विभाग हैं ॥ ६० ॥

उन का वर्णन अब ही नहीं किया जायगा क्योंकि
और ऐसे विषय हैं जिनकी अपेक्षा में शिष्य की
जिज्ञासा इस बात के विचार की प्रतिबन्धक है ॥

॥ पहिला अध्याय समाप्त हुआ ॥

For Books 1 & 2 see 786^(11, 12)

41

THE APHORISMS
OF THE
NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

GAUTAMA,

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY BY
VIŚWANÁTHA.

BOOKS III & IV.

~~~~~  
**IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.**  
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
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THE
NYÁYA APHORISMS OF GAUTAMA.
BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

a. Without whose favour one is like a log, or the like; through a little of whose favour a person gets through the net of delusion; I continually worship, having placed her in the lotus of my heart, with a view to increase of eloquence, her the pre-eminent goddess Saraswatí.*

b. Now, as a fit occasion offers, the 'objects of right notion' (*prameya*) being to be examined, the set of six, beginning with Soul, which was first enunciated, [in the list at B. I. §9,] is to be examined in this Third [Book]; therefore the matter of the Book is just the Examination of the Set of Six beginning with Soul.†

* तद्रूपप्रवृत्तितुल्यता भवति यत्कृपामन्तरा यद्दीयकरुणा-
कृष्णात् तरति मोहजालं जनः । विधाय हृदयाम्बुजे रुचिर-
वाक्प्रचाराय तां नमामि परदेवतां सततमेव वाष्णीमहम् ॥

† अथाक्सरतः प्रमेयेषु परीक्षणीयेषु प्रथमोद्दिष्टमात्मा-

c. Of this, the examination of the quaternion, beginning with soul, is the matter of the First Diurnal Portion; and in this here are nine Sections. Among these there is, in the first place, the Section on the division of Sense.*

d. Here the doubt having arisen whether a Sense (*indriya*) be intelligent or not, there is an aphorism to set aside that which the assertor of the intelligence of Sense alleges, viz., let it be that the senses, which it is settled are the instruments [of perception], are intelligent,—as this is simplest;—and so, since the word Soul has various meanings, [and may possibly mean something material, as, e. g., the Senses,] or, since the Senses are not material, [and may therefore very well be that immaterial thing which is called the Soul,] there is no confusion† [of the material with the immaterial—says this mistaken person—in our hypothesis of the identity of Soul and Sense].

THE FIRST DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION I.

THAT THE SENSES ARE NOT THE SOUL.

दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात् ॥ १ ॥

Sense does not constitute Soul.

Aph. 1.—[A Sense is not Soul,] because, through both Sight and Touch, we apprehend a single object.

दिषङ्कं तृतीये परीक्षणीयं । तेनात्मादिषङ्कपरीक्षैवाध्या-
यार्थः ॥

* तत्रात्मादिचतुष्कपरीक्षा प्रथमाङ्गिकार्थः । तत्रच नव
प्रकरणानि । तत्रादाविन्द्रियभेदप्रकरणम् ।

† तत्रेन्द्रियं ज्ञानवन्नवेति संशये करणत्वेन सिद्धानामि-

a. .Because of the apprehension of only a single object through both Sight and Touch. Sight and Touch are different kinds of knowledge; and the 3d. [or instrumental case-affix attached to the words in the aphorism,] implies "sort,"—[the knowledge here referred to being, e. g., of the visual and tactual kind]; therefore the meaning is,—because there is an apprehension of a single subject with the possession of both visible and tangible properties;—and thus, from the consciousness that "I who saw the jar, I the same do touch it," Soul is single, and distinct from Sense.†

b. He ponders a doubt in regard to this.†

न विषयव्यवस्थानात् ॥ २ ॥

An objection. Aph. 2.—Nay [—that argument, says some one, will not do], because the objects are different.

a. Since the Sight, the Touch, &c., have, as their determinate [and exclusive] objects, what possesses Colour, Tangibility, &c., the visible, and so on, is indivisibly united with the Sight, and so on; and thus the cognition of non-distinction [—as if the

न्द्रियाणां चैतन्यमस्तु लाघवात् तथा चात्मशब्दस्य नानार्थत्वा-
द्विन्द्रियाणामभौतिकत्वाद्वा न साङ्कर्यमितीन्द्रियचैतन्यवा-
दिनस्तन्निराकरणाय सूत्रम् ॥

* एकस्यैव दर्शनस्यर्शनाभ्यामर्थस्य ग्रहणात् । दर्शनस्य-
र्शने ज्ञानविशेषौ । तृतीयाच्च प्रकारे । तेन चाक्षुषस्पर्शने-
भयवत्त्वेनैकस्य धर्मिणः प्रतिसम्भानादित्यर्थः । तथाच यो
ऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहं स्पृशामीत्यनुभवादात्मेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्त
एक इति ।

† अत्र शङ्कते ॥

seen, the touched, &c., constituted but one object—] is erroneous :—such is the import.*

b. He clears up this.†

तद्व्यवस्थानादेवात्मसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ ॥ . . .

The objection repelled. Aph. 3.—The objection will not do, because the real existence of the Soul [is inferred] from that very difference among these.

a. The above-stated objection is not proper,—because, from the very difference alleged among the objects, [it is inferred that] the soul really exists ;—that is to say, a Soul, distinct [from the Senses], is conjectured‡—[which confers a unity on the otherwise separate deliverances of the Senses].

b. Here ends the section on the differentness of Sense§ [from Soul].

c. But then, having pondered the following doubt, viz., let the Body be [what is called] the Soul, because we have such cognitions as “I, who am white [in body], do know,” &c.,—he condemns it.||

* चक्षुस्त्वगादीनां रूपस्पर्शादिविषयतविषयत्वाच्चक्षुरा-
देश्चाक्षुषादिसमवायित्वमित्यञ्चाभेदप्रत्ययो भ्रान्त इति
भावः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ उक्तप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः । उक्तविषयव्यवस्थानादेवात्म-
सद्भावादतिरिक्तात्मकल्पनादित्यर्थः ॥

§ समाप्तमिन्द्रियभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

॥ ननु गौरोऽहं जानामीत्यादिप्रतीतेरक्षु शरीरमात्मेत्या-
सञ्च दूषयति ॥

SECTION II.

THAT THE BODY IS NOT THE SOUL.

शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात् ॥ ४ ॥

How the Body is not the Soul.

Aph. 4.—Because of the non-existence of sin [which, on the supposition that the Body is the soul, would take place,] on the burning of the Body.

a. 'Because of the non-existence of sin,' i. e., because we should find that no sin &c. remains;—and so there should be no subsequent pain &c. Or, burning is destruction; and so, when the destruction of the body has been performed, the agent, viz., [by hypothesis,] the body, having been destroyed, there could be no sin, [—whereas, after a man's body has been burned, we find his sins pursuing him into subsequent states of existence]:—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders this doubt, that, "the same censure applies to thee."†

तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

A vain attempt to retort the argument.

Aph. 5.—There would be the non-existence thereof, [i. e., of sin,] even on the destruction of it, [the body,] if it had a soul, because that [viz., the soul,] is eternal.

a. Even on the destruction of a body, if it had a soul, a murderer would have no sin, because, since that, viz., the soul, is [as

* पातकाभावात् पातकादेरभावप्रसङ्गात् तथाचेत्तर-
कास्तिकं दुःखादिकं न स्यादिति । यद्वा दाहे नाशः तथाच
शरीरनाशे कृते कर्त्तरि शरीरे विनष्टे पातकं न स्यादिति-
त्यर्थः ॥

† तवापि तुल्यदोष इत्याशङ्कते ॥

you say,] eternal, none could be its destroyer,* [—and, the soul being the man, none could be killed].

b. He repels this.†

न कार्याश्रयकट्टेवधात् ॥ ६ ॥

The attempt repelled.

Aph. 6.—Not so, because murder is [not of the soul, but] of the active site of operations.

a. 'Of the site of operations,' i. e., of the site of gestures, 'active,' i. e., distinguished by energizing, viz., of the body alone, but not of the soul, is there destruction.‡

b. The import is, that, since Bráhmahood and the like belongs to the body, sin arises from the destruction of it,§ [i. e., of the body].

c. Here ends the section on the differentness of the body|| [from the soul].

d. As this is the proper place, he commences a section on the non-duality of the organ of vision.¶

* सात्मकशरीरनाशेऽपि हन्तुः पातकाभावः स्यात् तस्यात्मनो नित्यत्वेन तन्नाशकत्वाभावात् ॥

† परिहरति ॥

‡ कार्याश्रयस्य चेष्टाश्रयस्य कर्तुः कृत्यवच्छेदकस्य शरीरस्यैव नाशो न त्वात्मनः ॥

§ ब्राह्मणत्वादेः शरीरवृत्तित्वात् तन्नाशादेव पापोत्पत्तिरिति भावः ॥

॥ समाप्तं देहभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

¶ प्रसङ्गाच्चक्षुरद्वैतप्रकरणमारभते ॥

SECTION III.

ON THE NON-DUALITY OF THE ORGAN OF VISION.

सव्येन दृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥ ७ ॥

*An opinion regarding single vision.**Aph. 7.*—[Some say that there is a permanent Soul,] because what is seen by the left [eye] is recognised by the right.*a.* It is the opinion of some that a permanent Soul is demonstrated by the recognition, through the right eye, of what was seen by the left eye. He cites this in order to refute it.**b.* He [thus] censures it.†

नैकस्मिन् नासास्थिव्यवहिते द्वित्वाभिमानात् ॥ ८ ॥

*The preceding view corrected.**Aph. 8.*—Not so, because there is [only] a conceit of duality in that [organ of vision] which, being single, is divided by the bone of the nose.*a.* That is to say, as in the case of a piece of water with a bridge placed across the middle, so the notion that there is a duality [in the organ of vision], because of its belonging also to the other eye ball which is separated by the bridge of the nose, is a mistake.‡

* वामेन चक्षुषा दृष्टस्य दक्षिणेन चक्षुषा प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्
स्थिरात्मसिद्धिरिति केषाञ्चिन्मतं तन्निराकरणाथैतदुप-
न्यासः ॥

† एतदूषयति ॥

‡ मध्यस्थसेतुना तडागस्येवं नासास्थिव्यवहितगोलका-
न्तरावच्छिन्नतया द्वैतप्रत्ययो भ्रम इत्यर्थः ॥

b. Some one objects.*

एकनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशात् ॥ ९ ॥

Objection to the unity of the organ of vision.

Aph. 9.— [The two eyes, says some one, cannot be one single organ,] because, when the one is destroyed, the other does not perish.

a. If the organ of vision were single, then, on the destruction of one eye, there should be blindness :—such is the import. †

b. One partially informed rebuts this as follows : ‡—

अवयवनाशे ऽप्यवयव्यपक्षधरे हेतुः ॥ १० ॥

An imperfect reply to the objection.

Aph. 10.—This is no argument, for, though a part have perished, we still perceive that of which it was the part.

a. Since, even on the destruction of a part, as a branch, one recognises that of which it was the part, as the tree, there is no rule that the whole shall every where perish on the destruction of a part ; and so, even on the destruction of one [eye,] there is not blindness. §

b. In order to set to rights the opinion of the partially inform-

* आक्षिपति ॥

† चक्षुरेक्ये एकचक्षुर्नाशे ऽम्बुत्वं स्यादिति भावः ॥

‡ अत्रैकदेशी परिहरति ॥

§ अवयवस्य शाखादेर्नाशे ऽप्यवयविनो वृक्षस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नावयवनाशे सर्वत्रावयविनाशनियमस्तथाचैकनाशे ऽपि नाम्बुत्वमिति ॥

ed person, and the objection aforesaid, here is an aphorism of the author.*

दृष्टान्तविरोधादप्रतिषेधः । ११ ।

This matter cleared up. Aph. 11.—This is no reply, for the illustration is not in point.

a. The foregoing reply is not proper, because the illustration is 'not in point,' is not applicable. For, on the cutting off of the branches, *the tree* does not abide; for, if that were the case, we should find the tree to be indestructible:—therefore, since in that case a *mutilated* tree is constituted by the remaining parts, the opinion of the partially informed person is not correct. By the same argument is negatived also the attempt to establish a distinction [of the organ of vision into two,] on the ground that when one [eye] is destroyed the other does not perish;—for, even when one eye has been destroyed, there may remain a *mutilated* organ of vision in virtue of the parts that belong to the other eye-ball.†

b. He states another argument for a distinction between the Soul and the Senses.‡

* एकदेशिमत्स्य पूर्वाक्ताच्चेपस्यच समाधानाय सिद्धान्तिनः सचम् ।

† उक्तः प्रतिषेधो न युक्तो दृष्टान्तस्य विरोधादयुक्तत्वात् । न हि शाखाच्छेदे दृक्षस्तिष्ठति तथा सति दृक्षस्यानाशप्रसङ्गादतो ऽवस्थितावयवैस्तत्र खण्डदृक्षोत्पत्तेर्नैकदेशिमत्तं युक्तं । एतेनैकनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशाद्भेदसाधनमपि प्रयुक्तं चक्षुर्नाशेऽपि गोलकान्तरावच्छिन्नावयवैः खण्डचक्षुःसम्भवात् ।

‡ आत्मन इन्द्रियभेदे युक्त्यन्तरमाह ।

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात् । १२ ।

Another proof that the senses are not the soul.

Aph. 12.—Because there is a change [in an organ of sense,] through something other than the sense.

a. When an acid substance is seen, as the fruit of the *Gadepupa arborea*, since, from the remembrance of its taste, there is a change in the organ of taste, in the shape of an overflowing of the water of the teeth, it is settled that there is a Soul, other than the organ,* [in which Soul that remembrance resides].

b. Some one objects.†

न स्मृतेः स्मर्त्तव्यविषयत्वात् । १३ ।

An objection. *Aph. 13.*—Nay, because the remembrance is lodged in the thing remembered.

a. For it is a fixed thing that the remembrance is concerned about the thing remembered.‡

b. He clears up this.§

तदात्मगुणत्वसङ्गात्वादप्रतिषेधः । १४ ।

The reply. *Aph. 14.*—This is no objection, because it [—viz., remembrance—] is really a quality of the Soul.

* चिरबिस्वाद्यस्मद्द्रव्ये दृष्टे तद्रसस्मरणाद्गोदकसम्पु-
वरूपरसनेन्द्रियविकारादिन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा सिध्यति ।

† आक्षिपति ।

‡ स्मृतिर्हि स्मर्त्तव्यविषयिणीति नियमः ।

§ समाधत्ते ।

a. The aforesaid objection is not proper, because, by the evidence which acquaints us with the subject [viz., the Soul, the substratum of knowledge under all its forms], it is proved that memory is a quality of the Soul—exclusively a quality of the soul; and because we are conscious that it is *I* that remember, [and not my Sense of Taste or Smell that remembers]; and because, if the relation of cause and effect [in the case of memory and the thing remembered,] were lodged in the object, then, because Chaitra knew [this or that object], we should find Maitra recollecting it:—such is the import.*

b. Pondering the doubt whether memory be not intimately united with the objects remembered, he removes it.†

अपरिसंस्थानाच्च स्मृतिविषयस्य ॥ १५ ॥

A doubt in regard to memory cleared up.

Aph. 15.—And by reason of the innumerableness of the objects of memory, [it is simpler to suppose that it inheres in one separate subject].

a. Some say that this is not an aphorism but [a portion of] the *Bhāshya*.‡

* उक्तप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः । धर्मिग्राहकमानेन स्मृतेरात्मगुणत्वात्परिशेषेणात्मगुणत्वसिद्धेरहं स्मरामीत्यनुभवात् । विषयनिष्ठकार्यकारणभावे चैत्रस्य ज्ञानाच्चैत्रस्य स्मरणापत्तेरिति भावः ॥

† विषयाणां स्मर्तव्यानां स्मृतिसमवायित्वं स्यादित्याशङ्क्य समाधत्ते ॥

‡ इदं न सूत्रं किन्तु भाष्यमिति केचित् ॥

b. Here ends the section on the non-duality of the organ of vision.*

c. He ponders the doubt—but then, since the Mind (*manas*) is eternal, let it be [what is called] the Soul.†

SECTION IV.

HOW THE MIND IS NOT THE SOUL.

नात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात् ॥ १६ ॥

Whether the Mind be the Soul.

Aph. 16.—Nay [—says some one, there is no Soul other than the Mind—],

because the arguments that establish [what you choose to call] Soul are applicable to [what we all call] the Mind.

a. There is no other Soul [than Mind];—nothing else than Mind is meant in the arguments that establish [the existence of what is called] Soul:—such is the import.‡

b. He clears up this.§

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ १७ ॥

Soul and Mind not to be confounded.

Aph. 17.—Since there is a knower and an instrument of knowledge, it is merely a

difference of names [your calling these by one name or another].

* समाप्तं चक्षुरद्वैतप्रकरणम् ॥

† ननु मनसो नित्यत्वादात्मत्वमस्त्वित्याशङ्कते ॥

‡ नातिरिक्त आत्मा आत्मसाधकमानानां मनसार्थान्तरमिति भावः ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

a. If the Mind were the knower, then it would be necessary to mention some other instrument for the production of attention, &c., [in the Mind,—whereas the Mind, in this system, is regarded as the instrument for producing attention to one thing at a time in the Soul]. And thus it is fixed that there is one knower and one instrument;—but to say “let *Mind* be Soul,” is merely a matter of naming. Moreover, there is this unavoidable difference [between Mind and Soul], that the Mind, as it produces attention, is proved to be an Atom [—so that no more than one thing at one time can pass through it to the Soul]; and the Soul, as it conduces to perception, has magnitude, [—otherwise any perceptible impression on it were impossible];—such is the import.*

b. But then [some one may say],—let the perception of Colour, &c., require an instrument [as the eye, &c.], but not so the [non-sensuous] perception of Pleasure, &c. In like manner, though other Atoms transcend perception, the Mind may be perceptible [with its impressions];—to which he replies:—†

नियमश्च निरनुमानः ॥ १८ ॥

* यदि मनसो ज्ञातृत्वं तदा व्यासङ्गाद्युपपादनाय करणान्तरमवश्यं वाच्यं । तथाचैको ज्ञाता ज्ञानसाधनञ्चैकं सिद्धं । मन आत्मास्त्विति संज्ञामात्रं । किञ्च व्यासङ्गे-पपादकतया मनसो ऽणुत्वं सिद्धमात्मनश्च प्रत्यक्षोपपादकतया महत्त्वमिति भेद आवश्यक इति भावः ॥

† ननु रूपादिप्रत्यक्षं सकरणकमसु न तु सुखादिप्रत्यक्षं । एवं परमाण्वन्तरस्थातीन्द्रियत्वे ऽपि मनसः प्रत्यक्षं स्यादत्राह ॥

This reiterated. *Aph. 18.*—And such an arrangement is unsupported by argument.

a. The sort of arrangement, which you have alleged, is ‘unsupported by argument,’ i. e., it has no evidence;—because it is cumbrous [the argumentum ab inconvenienti], and because, if the contrary be asserted, there is nothing to decide the question.*

b. Here ends the section on the differentness of Mind‡ [from Soul].

c. Though Soul have thus been proved to be different from Body, &c.,—still, but for its being eternal, no one would strive as desirous of the next world. Therefore we have an aphorism to set forth the eternity of the Soul.‡

SECTION V.

ON THE SOUL'S HAVING NEITHER BEGINNING NOR END.

पूर्वाभ्यसामृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोक-
सम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥ १९ ॥

*Proof of the
soul's eternity.*

Aph. 19.—Because joy, fear, and grief, arise to him that is born, through relation to his memory of things previously experienced.

* उक्तो नियमविशेषो निरनुमानः निष्प्रमाणकः गौर-
वाद्द्वैपरीत्येच विनिगमकाभावाच्चेति भावः ॥

† समाप्तं मनोभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ एवं साधिते ऽपि देहादिभिन्न आत्मनि विना तन्नि-
त्यतां न परलोकार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिरत आत्मनित्यताप्रतिपा-
दनाय सूत्रम् ॥

a. To 'him that is born,' i. e., to a child,—the causes of joy, &c., in this birth, not even having as yet been experienced by him,—there 'arise,' i. e., there spring up, joy, &c. ;—[evidenced, e. g., by smiles,—and we conclude that the child must have existed in previous lives,] because this can only be through relation to memory dependent on successively antecedent cases of consciousness. And since thus the soul—of the time being—is proved to have existed during successively antecedent times, it can have had no beginning ; and of an entity that had no beginning there is no destruction ;—thus its eternity is demonstrated :—such is the import.*

b. How he ponders a doubt.†

पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसम्मीलनविकारवत्तद्विकारः ॥ २० ॥

*A conjecture
about infants.*

Aph. 20.—His [i. e., the child's] changes [of countenance, says some one,] are like the changes, of expanding and closing up again, in lotuses, &c.

a. The joy, &c., of the child, are inferred from the expanding, &c., of his countenance ; and this [—viz., that the inference should be altogether demonstrative,] is impossible, because this [expansion, &c.,] occurs just through the force of some peculiar

* जातस्य बालस्य एतज्जन्माननुभूतेष्वपि हर्षादिहेतुषु सत्सु हर्षादीनां सम्प्रतिपत्तिः । उत्पत्तिसस्याः पूर्वपूर्वानुभवाधीनस्मृतिसम्बन्धादेव सम्भवात् । इत्थञ्चेदानीन्तनस्यात्मनः पूर्वपूर्वसिद्धौ तस्यानादित्वमनादेश्च भावस्य न नाश इति नित्यत्वसिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

† अत्र शङ्कते ॥

unseen [influence], just as in the case of the expansion, &c., of lotuses, and the like:—such is the import.*

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.†

नेष्णशीतवर्षाकालनिमित्तत्वात् पञ्चात्मक-
विकाराणाम् ॥ २२ ॥

*Infants are not
vegetables.*

Aph. 21.—Nay, because the changes in things that consist [barely] of the five [elements], are caused by heat, cold, rain, and season.

a. What was alleged [in §20] is not proper; because those changes which take place 'in things that consist of the five,' i. e., in things that are made up of [nothing besides] the five elements, as lotuses and the like, are caused by warm weather, &c:—but the expansions of the face, &c., of men, &c., are caused by joy, &c.;—so that there is no similarity [between the two cases]:—such is the import.‡

b. He states another argument for the eternity of soul.§

* बालस्य हर्षादयो मुखविकासाद्यनुमेया न च तत्सम्भवः
पद्मादीनां प्रबोधादिवददृष्टविशेषाधीनक्रियावशादेव तदु-
पपत्तेरिति भावः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ उक्तं न युक्तं अतः पञ्चात्मकानां पाञ्चभौतिकानां
पद्मादीनां ये विकारास्तेषां उष्णकालादिनिमित्तत्वात् ।
मनुष्यादीनान्तु हर्षादिनिमित्तका मुखविकासादय इति न
तुल्यतेति भावः ॥

§ आत्मनित्यत्वे हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

प्रेयाहाराभ्यासकृतात् सन्याभिलाषात् ॥ २२ ॥

Another argument for the eternity of Soul.

Aph. 22.—Because of the desire for milk caused, by the practice of eating it, in one

that has [been born after having] died.

a. 'After having died,' i. e. of one who, having died, has just been born, the desire for milk is, in short, produced by the practice of eating it;—for the child applies itself to drinking the breast through the remembrance of there being the means of gratifying the desire,—this [remembrance] being dependent on the impression awakened by the soul's deserts, [and the impression being] generated by the knowledge, pertaining to eating in a previous life, of there being [e. g., in the breast] the means of supplying the thing desired. Therefore it [the soul] is eternal:* [because the same consideration which convinces us that the soul existed at least *once* before the present life, proves equally that it existed at least once before that antecedent life,—and so on without end].

b. He ponders a doubt.†

अयसो ऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत्तदुपसर्पणम् ॥ २३ ॥

Another conjecture about infants.

Aph. 23.—Like the approach of the iron to the loadstone [suggests some one,] is the approach of him, [i. e., of the new-born child to the breast].

* प्रेत्य मृत्वा जातमात्रस्य यः सन्याभिलाषः स तावदाहाराभ्यासजनितः जन्मान्तरीणाहारेष्टसाधनताधीनताधी-
जन्मजीवनादष्टेद्वेधितसंस्काराधीनेष्टसाधनतास्वरूपेन हि
बालः सनपाने प्रवर्त्तते इत्यनादित्वमिति ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

a. As the iron, in the vicinity of the loadstone, goes towards the loadstone, exactly so does the child also go towards the breast;—but this is no gesture resulting from an effort [of volition] dependent on the knowledge that this is the means of attaining what is wished :—such is the meaning.*

b. He clears up this.†

नान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात् । २४ ।

Difference between an infant and a piece of iron.

Aph. 24.—Nay, for there is no [voluntary] effort in the other.

a. For there is no effort 'in the other,' i. e., in the iron. For voluntary effort is inferred from gestures [obviously directed towards some desirable end], but the token [from which we may infer voluntary effort] is not mere motion :—therefore there is no undue extension [of the argument, from the case of the child to the case of the iron] :— such is the import.‡

b. He states another argument.§

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् । २५ ।

Another argument for the eternity of the soul.

Aph. 25.—Because we see nothing born devoid of desire.

* यथायस्कान्तसन्निहितस्यायसो ऽयस्कान्ताभिमुखतया गमनं तथैव ब्रह्मस्यापि स्तनोपसर्पणं न त्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानाधीनप्रवृत्तिजन्यचेष्टेयमित्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ अन्यत्र अयसि प्रवृत्त्यभावात् । प्रवृत्तिर्हि चेष्टानुमिता लिङ्गं न तु क्रियामात्रमतो न व्यभिचार इति भावः ॥

§ हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

a. One 'devoid of desire,' i. e., in short empty of desires, does not arise,—but on the contrary [every creature that is born is] possessed of desires; and therefore the reason [for the desire exhibited,] is remembrance dependent on the knowledge, belonging to a previous life, of the power of supplying the desire;—so, a little way back, the desire of *milk* was instanced, but now it is *desire* simply [that is spoken of—], common to the inclination for eating grain, &c., in the case of birds, &c.; so that this is not an instance of tautology.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ २६ ॥

A conjecture respecting the soul.

Aph. 26.—It arises [says some one,] just as a thing with qualities arises.

a. As a 'thing,' i. e., a jar, or the like, 'with qualities,' i. e., distinguished by colour, &c.,—as a jar, or the like, is just of itself coloured, &c.,—just so the soul also, of itself, is possessed of desires; so that there is no occasion for thy arguments [to prove how it comes to be possessed of desires]:—such is the import.‡

* वीतरागो रागशून्यस्त्वावमोत्पद्यते अपितु सरागस्तेन च जन्मान्तरीयेष्टसाधनताज्ञानाधीनस्मरणं हेतुरिति पूर्वं स्तन्याभिलाष उक्तः सम्प्रति तु पतगादीनां कणादिभक्षणाभिलाषसाधारणं रागमात्रमित्यपौनरुक्त्यम् ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ द्रव्यस्य घटादेर्वथा सगुणस्य रूपादिविशिष्टस्योत्पत्तिर्यथा घटादिः स्वत एव रूपादिमात्मवति तथैवात्मापि स्वत एव सरागो भवतीत्यप्रयोजकत्वं त्वदोयहेतूनामिति भावः ॥

b. He clears up this.*

न सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्वागादीनाम् ॥ २७ ॥

*How desires arise
in the soul.*

*Aph. 27.—Not so, because desire, &c., are
caused by judgment.*

a. 'Judgment,' i. e., knowledge ;—in short, the knowledge that something can effect what is desired. For desire, &c., are caused by this,† [—and knowledge, in a new-born child, implies its acquisition in a previous life].

b. Here ends the section on the [soul's] want of a beginning and of an end.‡

c. The examination of Body having presented itself in its turn, some say that the Body, of men, &c., is composed of the five Elements. In regard to that, here is an aphorism conveying our tenet.§

SECTION VI.

THE BODY CONSIDERED.

पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः ॥ २८ ॥

*The body proved to
be of earth.*

*Aph. 28.—It [the Body] is earthy, because
the special qualities [of earth] are found [in
the Body].*

* समाधत्ते ॥

† सङ्कल्पो ज्ञानमिष्टसाधनताज्ञानं इति यावत् । तन्निमित्तका हि रागादयः ॥

‡ समाप्तिनादिनिधनप्रकरणम् ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्ते शरीरपरीक्षणे मानुषादिशरीरं पाञ्चभौतिकमित्येके तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

a. The Body, of men and others, is 'earthy,' i. e., has Earth as its substantial cause, because there are found in it the 'special qualities,' as Smell, Black and other colour, Hardness, &c.*

b. Here is a set of three aphorisms, to set forth another view.†

पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः ॥ २९ ॥

निश्वासेच्छ्वासेोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम् ॥ ३० ॥

गन्धस्नेहपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्च-
भौतिकम् ॥ ३१ ॥

*Various opinions about
the Body.*

Aph. 29.—It is earthy, watery, and fiery, [says some one,] because the qualities of these are found [in the body].

Aph. 30.—It consists of four of the elements, [i. e., of air, in addition to the preceding three,] because [says another,] we find [in it] inspiration and expiration.

Aph. 31.—It consists of all the five elements, [says another,] because there is smell [which belongs to earth], moisture [which belongs to water], digestive warmth [which belongs to fire], breathing [which belongs to air], and the furnishing of room, [which belongs to space, or Ether].

a. These opinions, as being contemptible, are not [honoured by being] refuted by the author of the aphorisms.‡

* मानुषादिशरीरं पार्थिवं पृथिवीसमवाधिकारणकं
गुणान्तरस्य गन्धनीलादिरूपकादिनिश्वासेरुपलब्धेरिति ॥

† अतान्तराभिधानाय त्रिसूत्री ॥

‡ एतानि मतानि सूत्रकृता तुच्छत्वात्तु दूषितानि ॥

b. He states another argument for its consisting of earth.*

श्रुतिप्रामाण्याच्च ॥ ३२ ॥

According to scripture the body is of earth.

Aph. 32.—And [the body consists of earth,] because scripture is the authority.

a. Here ends the section on the examination of Body.†

b. Now Sense is to be examined. In regard to this, in order to examine what is stated in the aphorism of the definition [B. I, §12], that the senses are formed of the Elements, he mentions a doubt.‡

SECTION VII.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE SENSES.

लक्ष्यसारे सत्यपलम्भाद्भ्रुतिरिच्य चोपल-

म्भात्संशयः ॥ ३३ ॥

Question as to what is to be called the sense.

Aph. 33.—There is a doubt [as to what is to get the name of the Sense], because, when there is the pupil of the eye, there is the perception [of the object], and because there is the perception separately [from the pupil of the eye].

a. When there is the 'pupil,' i. e., the ball of the eye, since a jar, &c., is perceived, the *eye-ball* is the sense,—says the Bauddha. Others say that they [the senses] are other than the eye-ball, because 'there is perception,' i. e., because perception is produced,

* पार्थिवत्वे युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

† समाप्तं शरीरपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ अथेन्द्रियं परीक्षणीयं तत्र लक्षणसूत्रोक्तभौतिकत्व-
मिन्द्रियाणां परीक्षितुं संशयमाह ॥

'separately,'—i. e., [the sense,—but certainly not the *eye-ball*,—] having reached [or come into contact with] the object. In regard to this point there is the doubt whether the senses be other than the eye-balls [&c.] or not. The Naiyáyikas, &c., hold that they *are* other than the eye-balls [&c.]. In regard to this point, also, the Sánkhyas [—see *Tattwa-Samása*, §54—] hold that they consist not of the Elements, but of Consciousness (*ahankára*): and others that they consist of the Elements.*

b. In regard to this, combating the Bauddha opinion by means of the Sánkhyas opinion, he says.†—

महदणुग्रहणात् ॥ ३४ ॥

How the eye-ball is not the sense.

Aph. 34.—By reason of the apprehension of the great and the small.

a. The eye-ball is not the sense, for then it [—viz., the character of a sense—] would unduly extend to the [impossible] case of something that acts where it is not present. And thus [what some say, viz.,] “we must say that it [the sense] is something other than the eye-ball, and formed of some Element,”—that also is incongruous,—because, by the eye, what has little bulk and what has great bulk is apprehended, and what is large cannot be embraced by what is small [like the eye itself, or like the visual

* कृष्णसारे चक्षुर्गोलके सति घटाद्युपलम्भाद्गोलकस्येन्द्रियत्वमिति बौद्धः । व्यतिरिच्य विषयं प्राप्य उपलम्भात् उपलम्भजननाद्गोलकातिरिक्तानीत्यपरे । तत्र इन्द्रियाणि गोलकातिरिक्तानि नवेति संशयः । गोलकातिरिक्तानीति नैयायिकादयः । तत्राप्यभौतिकान्याहङ्कारिकाणीति सांख्याः । भौतिकानीत्यपरे ॥

† तत्र सांख्यमतेन बौद्धमतमुदस्यन्नाह ॥

ray which some allege as the sense of sight], nor, without being embraced [in its full extent,] can any thing be apprehended; therefore [concludes the Sánkhya,] the Senses, not consisting of the Elements, consist of Consciousness.*

b. He refutes the Sánkhya.†

रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षान्तद्गृहणम् । ३५ ।

*The Nyāya theory
of Vision.*

*Aph. 35.—It is by the contact of the ray
and the object that it is apprehended.*

a. The [visual] 'ray' is light contained in the eye-ball. From the peculiar 'contact,' i. e., a kind of conjunction, which takes place between this light and the 'object,' as a jar, or the like, the apprehension of the great and of the small is produced. We see that the power of manifesting both what is great and what is small belongs to something formed of the Elements, as a lamp, or the like; but if it [the sense] were *not* formed of the Elements [it would not be obstructed by the Elements, and] we should perceive *all* things, whether placed in front or behind.‡

* गोलकं नेन्द्रियं अप्राप्यकारित्वे ऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । इत्यञ्च गोलकातिरिक्तं भौतिकमिति वाच्यं तदप्यसङ्गतं चक्षुषा हि न्यूनपरिमाणं महत्परिमाणञ्च गृह्यते नच न्यूनेन महतो व्यापनं सम्भवति नवाव्याप्यग्रहणमतो ऽभौतिकानीन्द्रियाण्याहङ्कारिकाणीति ॥

† सांख्यं निरस्यति ॥

‡ रश्मिर्गोलकावच्छिन्नं तेजः । तेजो ऽर्थस्य घटादेर्यः सन्निकर्षविशेषः संयोगविशेषस्तस्मात् महद्दृष्यवोर्यग्रहणमुपपद्यते । भौतिके ऽपि प्रदीपादौ महद्दृष्यप्रकाशकत्वं इष्टं । अभौतिकत्वे तु पुरःपश्चाद्दर्शनां सर्वेषामेव ग्रहः स्यात् ॥

b. The Bauddha suspects that this luminous organ of vision is disproved by its not being perceived.*

तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ३६ ॥

The theory questioned.

Aph. 36.—This is not the cause, [says the Bauddha,] because we perceive no such thing.

a. Contact of a ray with the object is not the cause [of vision], because we perceive no ray in addition to the eye-ball.†

b. He clears up this.‡

नानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिर-
भावहेतुः ॥ ३७ ॥

Reply to this.

Aph. 37.—That we do not apprehend it perceptively, is no proof of the non-existence of what we infer.

a. That is to say, our not apprehending it perceptively does not ascertain the non-existence of what we infer from such a consideration as this, that the perception of Colour implies some instrument§ [by which the eye establishes a communication with the object].

* तैजसे चक्षुष्यनुपलब्धिबाधं बोद्धुः शक्यते ॥

† रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षो न हेतुर्गोलाकातिरिक्तस्य रश्मेरनु-
पलब्धेः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ रूपोपलब्धेः सकरणकत्वादिनानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतो
ऽनुपलब्धेर्नाभावनिर्णायिकेत्यर्थः ॥

b. How then is it [the visual ray] not perceived? To this he replies.*

द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदाच्चोपलब्धिनियमः । ३८ ।

Conditions of visibility. Aph. 38.—And perception depends upon the sort of character of the subject and of its qualities.

a. By the sort of character of the subject is meant magnitude, &c.; the sort of character of the quality is obviousness:—since perception is dependent on this, there is no rule that a substance, simply as such, shall be perceived. That in which there is obvious colour, and magnitude, &c., is perceived;—from the absence thereof, the organ of sight, &c., are not perceived.†

b. Whence is there really not obvious colour in the organ of sight, &c.? With reference to this doubt the *Bhāshya* says.—‡

कर्मकारितश्चेन्द्रियाणां व्यूहः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः । ३९ ।

No need that the senses should have been visible. Aph. 39.—And the arrangement of the senses, occasioned by [man's] works, is subservient to the purposes of man.

a. The 'arrangement,' i. e., the peculiar structure, of the senses, dependent on certain deserts [in the person who is perfectly or imperfectly furnished with them], is a means of enjoyment [and

* कथं तर्हि नोपलम्भा इत्यत आह ।

† द्रव्यस्य धर्मभेदो महत्त्वादिगुणस्य धर्मभेद उद्भूतत्वं । तदधीनत्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्य द्रव्यमात्रे उपलब्धेर्न नियमः । यत्रोद्भूतरूपमहत्त्वादिकं तस्य प्रत्यक्षं तदभावाच्चक्षुरादेर-प्रत्यक्षम् ।

‡ चक्षुरादावुद्भूतरूपमेव न कुत इत्याशङ्कायां भाष्यम् ।

not an object of observation]. Some say that this is really an aphorism,* [while others hold that it is a clause of the *Bhāṣya*].

b. He states an instance of [even] a large coloured object's being imperceptible.†

मध्यन्दिनेष्वाप्रकाशानुपलब्धिवत्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४० ॥

Not wonderful that the organ of vision should be imperceptible.

Aph. 40.—It is not perceived, just as the light of a firebrand at mid-day is not perceived.

a. As the light of a large firebrand, [though] possessing colour, by being overpowered by the light of the sun, is not perceived at midday, [much more] the organ of vision also, since it is not possessed of obvious colour, may not be perceived:—such is the import.‡

b. But then, that way, [some one may say,] a jar, or the like, also may have a ray, which, again, is not perceived in consequence of its being overpowered by the light of the sun. To this he replies.§—

न रात्रावप्यनुपलब्धेः ॥ ४१ ॥

* अद्भुतविशेषाधीन इन्द्रियाणां व्यूहो रचनाविशेष उपभोगसाधनमिति । सत्रमेवेदमिति केचित् ॥

† महतो रूपवतो ऽनुपलब्धो दृष्टान्तमाह ॥

‡ महतो रूपवत्सोष्वाप्रकाशस्य शैवालोकेनभिभवात् मध्यन्दिने ऽनुपलब्धिवत्तदनुपलब्धिरूपवत्तदनुपलब्धो ऽप्यनुपलब्धः सम्भवतीति भावः ॥

§ नन्वेवं घटादेरपि रश्मिः स्वाद्यैरालोकेनभिभवात्पुनरद्भुत इत्यमाह ॥

An objection to the visual ray disposed of.

Aph. 41.—Nay, because even in the night this is not perceived. [See §44.]

a. After 'nay,' supply "[nor] is there any ray in a jar, or the like."*

b. But then what is the proof of this, that it is from its want of obvious colour that the organ of vision is not perceived, and not from its being overpowered—[like the firebrand at §40]? To this doubt of some indifferent person he replies.—†

ब्राह्मप्रकाशानुग्रहाद्विषयोपलब्धेरनभिव्यक्तितो
ऽनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४२ ॥

Invisibility of the visual ray whence.

Aph. 42.—It is not perceived in consequence of its unobviousness, because an object is perceived through the aid of external light.

a. In consequence of 'unobviousness,' i. e., in consequence of the non-possession of obvious colour, the organ of vision is not perceived :—why?—because an object is perceived 'through the aid of external light,' i. e., with the aid of the light of the sun, or the like. If it possessed obvious colour, it would need no external light, [being itself of the nature of light ;] and if it were overpowered, then even therewith there would be no perception produced, because what is overpowered can effect nothing :—such is the import. ‡

b. But then [some one may say], it is not the organ of sight, but the colour thereof, that is overpowered,—and there is no

* नेत्यस्य घटादौ रश्मिरिति शेषः ॥

† मन्वनुद्धतरूपत्वाच्चक्षुषो ऽनुपलब्धिर्नत्वभिभवादित्यत्र किं विनिगमकमिति तटस्थशङ्कायामाह ॥

‡ अनभिव्यक्तितो ऽनुद्धतरूपवत्त्वाच्चक्षुषो ऽनुपलब्धिः । कृतः । ब्राह्मप्रकाशानुग्रहा । शैरालोकादिसाहित्यादि-

proof that it is this [colour] that generates perception. Moreover, this itself is not perceived, through its being overpowered, and there is nothing contradictory in the perception of other things' taking place :—to which doubt he replies.*—

अभिव्यक्तौ चाभिभवात् ॥ ४३ ॥

Only the manifest can become hidden.

Aph. 43.—And [it is not through its being overpowered that the organ of sight is not perceived,] because there is overpowering [only] where there is [—in the absence of the overpowering cause—] manifestation.

a. Where, of colour, there is 'manifestation,' i. e., perception,—obviousness, in short. For, where something that possesses obvious colour is not perceived, we conjecture that it is overpowered; but this is not the case in the present instance.†

b. He states another proof of [there being such] an organ of sight.‡

नक्तञ्चररश्मिदर्शनाच्च ॥ ४४ ॥

The visual ray where discernible.

Aph. 44.—And because we see the [visual] ray of nocturnal animals.

a. Of 'nocturnal animals,' cats, and the like, since we see the

षयोपलब्धेः । तस्योद्भूतरूपत्वे बाह्यप्रकाशापेक्षा न स्यात् ।
अभिभूतत्वे च तन्नाहित्येनापि प्रत्यक्षजननं न स्यादभिभूतस्य
कार्याक्षमत्वादिति भावः ॥

* ननु चक्षुषो नाभिभवः किन्तु तद्रूपस्य तस्य च प्रत्यक्ष-
जनकत्वे मानाभावः । किञ्चाभिभवात् तस्य न प्रत्यक्षमि-
तरप्रत्यक्षजनने च विरोधाभाव इत्याशङ्कयामाह ॥

† रूपस्य अभिव्यक्तौ प्रत्यक्षे उद्भूतत्व इति यावत् । उद्भू-
तरूपस्य प्रत्यक्षाभावे ह्याभिभवकल्पना न त्वेवं प्रकृते ॥

‡ चक्षुषि प्रमाणान्तरमाह ॥

ray in the eye-ball,—by this example we infer the ray in the case of others also ; such is the import :—otherwise, in the dark, *this* could not be seen :—such is the heart* [or force of the argument].

b. He ponders the doubt whether the [supposed] organ of sight must not act where it is not present.†

अप्राप्यग्रहणं काचाधपटलस्कृतिकान्तरितौ-

पलम्बेः ॥ ४५ ॥

Whether the sight apprehends what it cannot reach.

Aph. 45.—There is apprehension [—says some one—] of what is not reached [by the supposed visual organ], because we perceive that which is divided from us by glass, talc, a film, or crystal.

a. He clears up this.‡

कृद्धान्तरितानुपलम्बेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४६ ॥

Sight is interrupted by opaque bodies.

Aph. 46.—This is no objection [to our theory of vision], because we do not perceive what is divided from us by a wall.

a. The luminous nature [of the organ of vision] is established by the example of the lamp, inasmuch as it reveals what is divided from us by glass, and the like. But then how should it not be something that acts where it is not?—To this he replies ' by a wall,' &c. You cannot disprove the alleged luminous nature [of the visual organ,] by arguing that it consists of the eye-ball, be-

* नक्तञ्चरस्यं दृषदंशादीनां गोलके रश्मिदर्शनात् तद्दृष्टान्तेन प्ररेषामपि रश्मिनुमानमिति भावः । अथयथा तमसि तस्य प्रत्यक्षं न स्यादिति हृदयम् ।

† अप्राप्यकारित्वं चक्षुषः स्यादित्याशङ्कते ।

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

cause it does not perceive what is divided off by a wall,* [—and neither does a lamp reveal this,—though the lamp be unquestionably luminous].

b. But then, as it cannot be in contact with what is divided from it by a wall, so also [neither can it be in contact] with what is divided from it by a glass;—so how can it be said [in the latter case] to be acting upon what it has reached? In regard to this doubt he says.†—

अप्रतिघातात्मन्निकर्षोत्पत्तिः ॥ ४७ ॥

Sight not interrupted by transparent bodies.

Aph. 47.—Contact takes place because there is no obstruction.

a. That is to say, contact does take place, because, by the glass, or the like, which is a clear substance, there is no 'obstruction,' i. e., no hindrance.‡

b. He states an example of this.§

आदित्यरश्मेः स्फटिकान्तरिते ऽपि दाह्ये
ऽविघातात् ॥ ४८ ॥

* प्रदीपदृष्टान्तेन काचाद्यन्तरितप्रकाशकत्वेन तैजसत्वं सिद्ध्यतीति । नन्वप्राप्यकारित्वं किं न स्यादत्राह कुड्येति । उक्तस्य तैजसत्वस्य प्रतिषेधो गोलकात्मकत्वं न सम्भवति कुड्यान्तरितस्यानुपलब्धेरिति ॥

† ननु कुड्यान्तरित इव काचान्तरिते ऽपि सन्निकर्षो न सम्भवतीति कथं प्राप्यकारित्वमित्याशङ्क्यामाह ॥

‡ काचादिमा सच्छब्दव्येणाप्रतिघातादप्रतिबन्धात्मन्निकर्ष उपपद्यत इति भावः ॥

§ तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह ॥

*The sun's rays where
uninterrupted.*

Aph. 48.—Because a ray of the sun is not prevented from reaching something that is to be burned, though crystal be interposed.

a. 'Something that is to be burned' stands further for anything in general. But others say that this refers to the non-prevention of fire, &c., from reaching the bowl-shaped half, which is to be baked, of a jar, or the like,* [even through opaque substances].

b. Some one objects.†—

नेतरेतरधर्मप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ४९ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 49.—Nay [says some one,]—because the property of the one presents itself in the other.

a. It is not right to say that there is no prevention; because in the one, i. e., in the crystal, or the like, there presents itself the property, viz, prevention 'which is that of the other,' i. e., of the wall, &c. That is to say, crystal, and the like, must obstruct just as a wall does.‡

b. He clears up this.§

आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादस्वभाव्याद्रूपोपलब्धि-
वत्तद्रूपलब्धिः ॥ ५० ॥

* दाह्य इति वस्तुमात्रोपलक्षणं । परे तु दाह्ये कपालादौ बह्यादेरविघातपरं तदित्याहुः ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

‡ अप्रतिघातो न युक्त इतरस्य स्फटिकादेरितरस्य कुचा-
देर्यो धर्मः प्रतिघातकत्वं तत्प्रसङ्गात् । स्फटिकादिकमपि
कुचादिवत्प्रतिबन्धकं भवेदित्यर्थः ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

Reply to the objection.

Aph. 50.—The perception thereof is as the perception of a form, in a mirror, or in water, through the possession of the nature of clearness.

a. In a mirror, and in water, 'through the possession of the nature of clearness,' i. e., through the being possessed of a clear nature, the form of the face, or the like, is perceived,—but not in a wall, or the like;—in like manner, what has crystal, or the like, interposed, is perceived; but not what has a wall, or the like, interposed;—and there is no fault to find here, because it is from the nature of things. By this we debar the objection, that, as fire, &c., is not stopped by a jar, or the like, the sight also ought not to be stopped [by the same]; because, though a thing may not stop fire [or heat], it is [by the nature of things,] possible it may intercept it [sight,] as it does the light of a lamp, or the like:—such is the import.*

b. What proof is there in support of the hypothesis that the organ of vision is such [as has been here set forth]? To this he replies.†—

दृष्टानुमितानां हि नियोगप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ ५१ ॥

Hypotheses must accommodate themselves to facts.

Aph. 51.—For neither injunctions nor prohibitions can be imposed on ob-

* आदर्शे उदके च प्रसादस्वाभाव्यात्स्वच्छस्वभावत्वात् मुखादिरूपोपलब्धिर्न तु भित्त्यादावेवं स्फटिकाद्यन्तरितस्योपलब्धिर्न तु कुवाद्यन्तरितस्येति स्वाभाव्यान् दोषः। एतेन वद्द्यादर्शेष्टादिनाप्रतिघातवच्चक्षुषो ऽपि प्रतिघातो न स्यादिति प्रत्युक्तं वद्द्याद्यप्रतिबन्धे ऽपि दीपालोकादेः प्रतिबन्धवत्तत्सम्भवादिति भावः ॥

† चक्षुषस्तादृशत्वकल्पने किं मानमित्यत्राह।

served facts, or on inferences [legitimately derived from rightly observed facts].

a. 'For,' i. e., because :—of things seen and inferred,—or the meaning is—of things inferred from what has been seen :—in the case of these, the injunction "It shall be thus," or the prohibition "It shall not be thus," is nothing to the purpose ;—for conjecture must defer to facts :—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the examination of the senses.†

c. The expressions [as at §1] "through both Sight and Touch," &c., are to the purpose, if the senses be several ; so, to supply a basis for this, the plurality of the senses has to be examined :—in regard to this he states a doubt.‡

SECTION VIII.

THAT THERE ARE MORE SENSES THAN ONE.

स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादवयविनानास्थानत्वाच्च

संशयः । ५२ ।

Whether the senses be more than one.

Aph. 52.—Since there is plurality where there is a diversity of place, and since what

* हि यस्मात् । दृष्टानामनुमितानां वा पदार्थानां दृष्टे-
नानुमितानामिति वार्थः । तेषामेवं भवितेति नियोग एव
मा भवितेति प्रतिषेधो वा नोपपद्यते । युक्त्यनुसारिणी
हि कल्पनेति भावः ।

† समाप्तमिन्द्रियपदोच्चाप्रकरणम् ।

‡ दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामित्यादिकमिन्द्रियनानात्वे युज्यते
इत्युपोद्घातेनेन्द्रियनानात्वं परीक्षणीयं तत्र संशयमाह ।

is made up of parts has several places, there is a doubt, [suggests some one, whether Sense be one or many].

a. 'Where there is a diversity of place,' i. e., where there are different places, as in the case of jars, webs, &c., since we observe a plurality; and since we see the unity of a whole which consists of many parts; there is a doubt whether plurality belongs to the senses, or unity.*

b. An aphorism conveying a *prima facie* view.†

त्वगव्यतिरेकात् । ५३ ।

Whether all the senses be modifications of Touch.

Aph. 53.—The Touch,—because nowhere absent.

a. Let the Touch be the sole sense; 'because nowhere absent,' i. e., because of its really existing in all the situations of the senses.‡ [Compare Sir Wm. Hamilton's allusion, Reid's Works p. 104, to the shrewd conjecture of Democritus, that all the senses are only modifications of touch.]

b. He replies.§

न युगपदर्थानुपलब्धेः । ५४ ।

* स्थानान्यत्वे स्थानभेदे घटपटादीनां नानात्वदर्शनाद्वा-
नावयवस्थितस्यावयविन एकत्वदर्शनाच्च इन्द्रियाणां नाना-
त्वमेकत्वं वेति संशयः ।

† पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ।

‡ सर्वेन्द्रियप्रदेशेष्वव्यतिरेकात् सत्त्वात्त्वगेवैकमिन्द्रि-
यमस्तु ।

§ उत्तरयति ।

Why they cannot be so. Aph. 54.—Not so, because objects are not apprehended simultaneously.

a. Since 'objects,' i. e., Odours, Colours, &c., are not apprehended 'simultaneously,' i. e., at one and the same time, the Touch is not the sole organ of sense; otherwise, since it pervades [the whole body], at the time of visual perception, or the like, there must also be olfactory, &c. : such is the import.*

b. He states the diversity of their effects as a proof of the plurality of the senses.†

इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् । ५५ ।

The senses must be five. Aph. 55.—Since the objects of the senses are five.

a. Since the 'objects of the senses,' i. e., Colour, &c., which are apprehended by the senses, 'are five,' i. e., are of five sorts. For Colour, &c., are heterogeneous, because they are apprehended only by the senses, sight, &c., severally; and this could not be the case, on the supposition of there being but one sense:—and we should find blind men, &c., [were that the case—] apprehending Colour, &c. :—such is the import.‡

* युगपत् एकदा अर्थानां गन्धरूपादीनां अनुपलब्धेर्न त्वगेवैकमिन्द्रियं । अन्यथा तस्य व्यापकत्वाच्चाक्षुषादिकाले घ्राणजादिकमपि स्यादिति भावः ॥

† इन्द्रियाणां नानात्वे कार्यभेदमानमाह ॥

‡ इन्द्रियार्थानामिन्द्रियग्राह्याणां रूपादीनां पञ्चत्वात् पञ्चविधत्वात् । रूपादीनां हि चक्षुराद्येकैकेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यत्वाद्द्वैलक्षण्यं तच्चैकेन्द्रियपञ्चे न सम्भवति । अन्वादीनां रूपाद्युपलब्धिप्रसङ्गश्चेति भावः ॥

b. He ponders a doubt.*

न तदर्थबहुत्वात् ॥ ५६ ॥

This view questioned.

Aph. 56.—Not so, [says some one,] because their objects are multitudinous.

a. The division of the senses [into five], on the ground that the objects of the senses are five, is not proper; because, since the 'objects' of the senses, viz., blue, yellow, &c., are multitudinous, we should find [—according to your argument—] that the senses are many more† [than five].

b. He clears up this.‡

गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकाद्गन्धादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५७ ॥

The objection removed.

Aph. 57.—This is no objection, because Odours, &c., are never without the nature of Odour, &c.

a. The aforesaid objection will not do, because 'Odour, &c.,' i. e., fragrance, &c., are 'never without the nature of Odour, &c.,' i. e., they always have the nature of Odour, &c. And so, what we mean [—when we talk, e. g., of what constitutes the sense of Smell—] is the 'fact of its being an apprehender, with distinctive reference to what separates it [from the other senses, viz.], the general nature of Odour,—but not its being an apprehender with distinctive reference to subordinate natures [—such

* शक्यते ॥

† इन्द्रियार्थानां नीलपीतादीनां बहुत्वादिन्द्रियाणां बहुतरत्वप्रसङ्गादिन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वादिन्द्रियभेदो न युक्तः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

as the smell of this, that, and the other thing] :’ such is the import.*

b. He ponders the doubt that, if things fragrant, &c., be one, on the ground that they have in common, e. g., the nature of Odour, then, since Odours, and Flavours, &c., also are one, in respect of their having in common the nature of Objects, there must be only one sense.†

विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वम् ॥ ५८ ॥

Further objection. Aph. 58.—Since the character of Object is never absent [from the objects of sense], oneness [of the senses, suggests some one, should follow].

a. ‘Since the character of Object is never absent,’ i. e. since there is unity [in all the multitude of things perceived], in as far as they are [all alike] objects.‡

b. He replies.§—

न बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजाति- पञ्चत्वेभ्यः ॥ ५९ ॥

* उक्तप्रतिषेधो न गन्धादीनां सौरभादीनां गन्धत्वाद्य-
व्यतिरेकाद्गन्धत्वादिसत्त्वात् । तथाच विभाजकगन्धत्वाव-
च्छिन्नग्राहकत्वमभिप्रेतं नत्ववान्तरधर्मावच्छिन्नग्राहकत्वमि-
ति भावः ॥

† यदि गन्धत्वादिना सुरभ्यादीनामैक्यं तदा विषयत्वेन
गन्धरसादीनामप्यैक्यादिद्वियैक्यं स्यादिति ॥

‡ विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकाद्विषयत्वेनैक्यात् ॥

§ उत्तरयति ॥

He replies. *Aph.* 59.—Not so, because, of the characters of knowledge, the provinces, the procedures, the forms, and the genera, there is severally a five-fold nature.

a. The senses are not one. He states his reason, saying 'of understanding,' &c. Since visibility, and the rest, which are the 'characters' of knowledge, visual or otherwise, are of five descriptions,—the instruments appropriated thereto are five. In like manner, their 'provinces,' i. e., the object, Colour, &c., because this is of five sorts. 'Procedure' is a going to a distance, &c. This is with reference to the Sight. Or 'procedure' is a way; and so it means, because of the five-fold character of their ways, because they differ in their ways,—for the Sight apprehends after having gone [to the object], the Touch [apprehends] in association with the body, the Hearing in association with the ear, and so on. 'Form' is some peculiar collocation, e. g., of the eye-balls. 'Genus' means the nature of Earth, &c., [the Smell being held to be earthy, the Taste watery, &c.,] but, really, Genus here means habit, [and not that which—see *Bhāshā-parichchheda* §vi., c,—would exclude Ether,] so that the nature of Hearing [—the hearing being said to be ethereal—] is included.*

* इन्द्रियाणामैक्यं न । हेतुमाह । बुद्धीत्यादि । बुद्धे-
श्चाक्षुषादेर्यञ्चक्षणं चाक्षुषत्वादि तत्पञ्चत्वेन तदवच्छिन्नकर-
णानां पञ्चत्वं । एवमधिष्ठानं रूपादिविषयस्तत्पञ्चत्वात् ।
गतिः दूरादौ गमनं । इदं चक्षुरधिकृत्य । यद्वा गतिः प्रका-
रस्तथाच प्रकाराणां पञ्चत्वात् । चक्षुर्हि गत्वा गृह्णाति त्वग्दे-
हावच्छेदेन ओन्नं कर्णावच्छेदेनेत्यादिप्रकारभेदात् । आ-
ह्वतिर्गोलकानां संस्थानविशेषः । जातिः पृथिवीत्वादि ।
वस्तुतो जातिः धर्मत्वेन ओन्नत्वसंग्रहः ॥

b. He states a proof that the Smell &c., are really of the nature of Earth, &c.*

भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेसादात्म्यम् ॥ ६० ॥

Why Smell is held to be Earthy, &c.

Aph. 60.—Since they apprehend the peculiar qualities of the Elements, they are of the same nature, [severally, as the Elements to which these qualities are peculiar].

a. 'Of the Elements,' i. e., of Earth, &c., which are the 'peculiar qualities,' i. e., Odour, &c.;—since they apprehend these. The import is, that they are proved to have the nature of Earth, &c., by such examples as butter's bringing out the odour of saffron† [to which it is akin in respect of its earthy constitution; and so the Smell, which brings out the odours of things, must be earthy also. Compare the lines of Empedocles, quoted by Prof. H. H. Wilson at p. 122 of his *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*].

b. Here ends the section on the plurality of the senses.‡

c. For the examination of the Objects [of sense], whose turn next arrives, we have an aphorism conveying a tenet.§

* घ्राणादेः पृथिवीत्वादिसत्त्वे मानमाह ॥

† भूतानां पृथिव्यादीनां ये गुणविशेषा गन्धादयस्तदुपलम्भकत्वात् कुङ्कुमगन्धाभिव्यञ्जकघृतादिदृष्टान्तेन पृथिवीत्वादिसाधनमिति भावः ॥

‡ समाप्तमिन्द्रियनानात्वप्रकरणम् ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्तार्थपरीक्षणाय सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

SECTION IX.

EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECTS OF THE SENSES.

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्या अप्रेजो-
वायूनां पूर्वपूर्वमपोह्याकाशस्योत्तरः ॥ ६१ ॥

*The Qualities of the
Elements.*

Aph. 61.—Of Odour, Savour, Colour, Tangibility, and Sound, those ending with Tangibility belong to Earth ; rejecting each preceding one in succession, they belong to Water, Light, and Air ; the last belongs to Ether.

a. Among those, as far as Tangibility, having left out successively each preceding one, are to be recognised the qualities of Water, Light, and Air. The 'last,' viz., Sound, is the quality of Ether. And so those among which Tangibility is the last, belong to Earth ; Savour, Colour, and Tangibility, to Water ; Colour and Tangibility to Light ; Tangibility to Air ; Sound to Ether.*

b. Some one objects.†

न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः ॥ ६२ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 62.—Not so, [says some one,] because the whole of the qualities [of each alleged Element] are not apprehended [by the single appropriate sense].

* स्पर्शपर्यन्तेषु मध्ये पूर्वपूर्वं त्यक्त्वा अप्रेजोवायूनां गुणा ज्ञातव्याः । उत्तरः शब्द आकाशस्य गुणः । तथाच स्पर्शान्ताः पृथिव्या रसरूपस्पर्शा जलस्य रूपस्पर्शा तेजसः स्पर्शा वायोः शब्द आकाशस्य ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

a. The above-mentioned assignment of qualities is not proper. Since all that are conceived to be qualities, e. g., of Earth, are not apprehended, e. g., by Smell, there is no such genus as earthiness, &c., for the Savour, &c., of Earth is not apprehended by Smell, [—whereas, according to §60, the earthy sense is what apprehends the earthy Element]. The import is, that such a distribution ought to be observed, that the external senses should apprehend the *whole* of the qualities that are capable of belonging to [the several Elements which are alleged to be] their several material;* [—that only being entitled, e. g., to be reckoned a quality of the earthy element, which is apprehended by the sense that is formed out of elemental earth; and so of the rest].

b. And so what is the state of the case as regards the Savour, &c., that are perceived in Earth, &c.? In regard to this he [the objector,] states his own opinion.†

एकैकस्यैवोत्तरोत्तरगुणसङ्गादादुत्तरोत्तराणां
तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ६३ ॥

The objection pursued. Aph. 63.—Since the severally subsequent qualities [says the objector,] belong to those severally subsequent, just each to each, these are not perceived [by the organ of any preceding one].

* उक्तो गुणनियमो न युक्तः । पृथिव्यादेगेणत्वाभि-
मतानां सर्वेषां घ्राणादिग्राह्यत्वाभावान्न पार्थिवत्वादिकं
घ्राणेन पृथिव्या रसाद्यग्रहणात् । बहिरिन्द्रियाणां स्वप्रकृ-
तिवृत्तियोग्याशेषगुणग्राहकत्वनियमो भज्येतेति भावः ॥

† इत्थञ्च पृथिव्यादावुपलभ्यमानानां रसादीनां का
गतिरित्यत्र स्वमतमाह ॥

a. 'Those severally subsequent,' viz., Water, &c,—'just each to each,' i. e., in their respective order;—'since the qualities severally subsequent thereto belong,' i. e., since Savour and the other qualities belong;—'these are not perceived,' i. e., these, Savour, &c., are not perceived by Smell, &c.:—such is the meaning.*

b. Then how are Savour, &c., apprehended in Earth, &c? In regard to this he says :†—

संसर्गाच्चानेकगुणग्रहणं विष्टं ह्यपरम्परेण । ई ४ ।

Alleged commixture of the senses.

Aph. 64.—And it is through their commixture [says some one,] that there is the apprehension of more than one, for the one is interpenetrated by the other.

a. 'The one,' i. e., Earth, &c;—'by the other,' i. e., by Water, &c.;—'for,' i. e., because;—'interpenetrated,' i. e., combined:—and so Savour, &c., is perceived through the conjunction of the sense of Taste [with that of Smell], through the Water [—the element of Taste,—] &c., that is in the same place with the Earth [—the element of Smell,—] &c.:—such is the import.‡ [Compare *Vedānta Sāra*, No. 68.]

* उत्तरोत्तराणां आबदीनां एकैकस्यैव एकैकक्रमेण तदुत्तरोत्तरगुणसङ्गावात् रसादिगुणसङ्गावात् तदनुपलब्धिष्वेषां रसादीनां घ्राणादिनानुपलब्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† तर्हि कथं पृथिव्यादौ रसादिग्रहणं तत्राह ॥

‡ अपरं पृथिव्यादि । परेण जलादिना । हि यस्मात् । विष्टं सम्बद्धं । तथाच पृथिव्याद्यवच्छिन्नजलादिना रसना-संयोगाद्रसादिग्रह इति भावः ॥

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet.*

न पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ॥ ६५ ॥

*The Nyāya view
of the matter.*

Aph. 65.—Not so, because, of the Earthy and the Watery, there is immediate knowledge.

a. The aforesaid assignment of the qualities [in §64.] is not proper ;—why?—because earthy and watery substance is directly perceived, i. e., they really have Colour and Tangibility. Were they devoid of Colour and Tangibility, they would not be apprehended by Sight and Touch ; and it is cumbrous to suppose that Colour, &c., is caused, in some [of the elements], by direct connection [of colour with the element], and, in others, mediately :—such is the import.†

b. If Savour, e. g., be a quality, e. g., of Earth, then [says some one,] we should find it apprehended, e. g., by the [earthy organ, viz.,] Smell. He states what determines this point.‡

पूर्वपूर्वगुणोत्कर्षात्तत्प्रधानम् ॥ ६६ ॥

*Each sense has its own
appropriate object.*

Aph. 66.—In each, in order, as the [respective] quality is intense, it is principally characterised by this or that.

* सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† उक्तो गुणनियमो न युक्तः । कुतः । पार्थिवस्याप्यस्य च द्रव्यस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वादूपस्पर्शसिद्धेस्तस्य रूपस्पर्शगून्यत्वे चक्षुषा त्वचा च ग्रहणं न स्याद्रूपदेस्य कचित्साक्षात्सम्बन्धेन कश्चिच्च परस्परत्वाद्देतुत्वे गौरवमिति भावः ॥

‡ रसादेः पृथिव्यादिगुणत्वे घ्राणादिनापि तद्ग्रहणप्रसङ्ग इत्यत्र नियामकमाह ॥

a. 'Each in order,' viz., Smell and the rest [of the senses];— 'principally characterised by Odour, &c.,—he states the source of this principalness, viz., 'as the quality is intense,' i. e., as the quality, Odour, &c., is intense, is distinctive of this or that. And so, among Odour and the rest, the Smell and the rest apprehend only their own distinctive quality* [severally].

b. But then, [some one may say,] since Odour may predominate in other things than Earth, *which* is the Sense, and which is not the Sense [in respect of this or any other sense-object,] In regard to this he says.†

तद्भवस्थानन्तु भूयस्त्वात् ॥ ६७ ॥

The Senses need not be confounded. Aph. 67.—But this is determined by the excessiveness.

a. 'By the excessiveness,' i. e., by its originating, e. g., from Earth that is not peculiarised by [any noticeable proportion of] Water, &c.;—'this is determined,' i. e., it is determined whether the Sense is the Smell, or the like.‡

b. He states a proof that the Smell, &c., do possess the quality of Odour, &c.§

* पूर्वपूर्वं घ्राणादि । तत्तत्प्रधानं गन्धादिप्रधानं । प्राधान्ये बीजमाह गुणात्कर्षाद्गुणस्य गन्धादेरुत्कर्षात्तद्भवस्थापकत्वात् । तथाच गन्धादिषु मध्ये स्वव्यवस्थापकगुणस्यैव ग्राहकत्वं घ्राणादीनामिति ॥

† ननु पृथिव्यन्तरस्यापि गन्धप्राधान्यात्किमिन्द्रियं किमिन्द्रियमित्यत्राह ॥

‡ भूयस्त्वात् जलाद्यविशिष्टपृथिव्यादारब्धत्वात्तद्भवस्थानं घ्राणादीन्द्रियत्वव्यवस्थितिः ॥

§ घ्राणादीनां गन्धादिगुणवत्त्वे मानमाह ॥

सगुणानामिन्द्रियभावात् । ६८ ।

How the five senses must have the five qualities.

Aph. 68.—Because only what have the qualities can be the Organs [perceptive of the qualities].

a. 'Because [only] what have the qualities,' i. e., what are peculiarised by Odour, &c., viz., the Smell, &c., 'can be the organs,' i. e., can be the causes of the perception of Odour, &c.;—because we see the same thing in such examples as butter's bringing out the odour of saffron,* [—see §60].

b. And their Odour, &c., being thus established, it is conjectured, from the fact of its not being perceived, that it is not developed, [see §38;] adverting to which, he says :†—

तेनैव तस्याग्रहणाच्च । ६९ ।

Imperceptibility of the qualities of the Senses.

Aph. 69.—And because it is not apprehended by that same.

a. Since 'by that,' i. e., by the Sense, 'it,' i. e., the Sense which has a quality, is not apprehended, the undeveloped character [of the quality] is conjectured.‡

* सगुणानां गन्धादिविशिष्टानां घ्राणादीनामिन्द्रिय-
भावात् गन्धादिसाक्षात्कारकारणत्वात् कुङ्कुमगन्धाभिव्यञ्ज-
कघृतादौ तथैव दर्शनात् ।

† इत्थञ्च गन्धादिसिद्धावप्रत्यक्षत्वादनुद्भूतत्वकल्पनमि-
त्याशयेनाह ।

‡ तेन इन्द्रियेण तस्य सगुणस्येन्द्रियस्याग्रहणादनुद्भूत-
त्वकल्पनमिति ।

b. He ponders the doubt—but then it is not necessary that the qualities in the Senses be imperceptible.*

न शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः ॥ ७० ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 70.—Not so, because the quality Sound is perceived [as pertaining to the organ of Hearing].

a. The aforesaid rule is not correct, because Sound is perceived as the quality of the organ of Hearing.†

b. He clears up this.‡

तदुपलब्धिरितरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ७१ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 71.—The perception of it is in consequence of the difference of the qualities of substances, one from another.

a. In consequence of the difference mutually between 'the qualities of substances,' viz., Colour, Sound, &c., there is perception of Sound [as belonging to the organ of Hearing], and not of Colour in the organ of vision, and the like :—because, for simplicity, it is settled that the substratum of Sound [viz., the Ether,] is but one, [so that the organ of Hearing, being ethereal, is one with it :] such is the import.§

* नन्विन्द्रियगुणानामप्रत्यक्षत्वानियमो नेत्याशङ्कते ॥

† उक्तो नियमो न युक्तः शब्दस्य श्रोत्रगुणस्योपलब्धेः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ द्रव्यगुणानां रूपशब्दादीनां परस्परं वैधर्म्याच्छब्दस्योपलब्धिर्न चक्षुरूपादीनां । शब्दाश्रयस्य लाघवेनैक्यसिद्धेरिति भावः ॥

b. Here ends the section on the examination of the Objects* [of the senses].

c. So much for the First Diurnal Portion of the Third Book, viz., the Examination of the set of four, among the objects of right knowledge, beginning with Soul.†

d. Now, since its turn has arrived, there is the examination of Understanding and Mind. Simply the examination thereof, in seven sections, is the matter of this Diurnal Portion. But others say that the matter of this Diurnal Portion is really the examination of whatever, being an object of right knowledge, exists within the Body,—an examination of whatever has any relation adapted to the experience to which this is common that it pertains to the body. But this is not right, for it would unduly extend to an examination of the Senses [—which reside in the Body, but which have been examined, already, in the preceding Diurnal Portion]. And, among these, the examination of Understanding (*buddhi*) is in five sections. Among these, in the first place, there is the section on the fact that Understanding is not eternal. In order to set forth a doubt in regard to this point, we have an aphorism.‡

* समाप्तमर्थपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

† इति तृतीयाध्यायस्याद्यमाङ्गिकं आत्मादिप्रमेयचतुष्क-
परीक्षणं नाम ॥

‡ अथ क्रमप्राप्तया बुद्धेर्मेनसश्च परीक्षा सप्तभिः प्रकर-
णैस्तपरीक्षैव चाङ्गिकार्थः । परे तु शरीरावच्छेदव्याप्यभो-
गानुकूलसम्बन्धवत्परीक्षा शरीरान्तर्वर्तिप्रमेयपरीक्षैवाङ्गि-
कार्थ इति तदसत् इन्द्रियपरीक्षायामतिव्याप्तेः । तत्र च
बुद्धिपरीक्षा पञ्चभिः प्रकरणैः । तत्रादौ बुद्धानित्यताप्रकरणं ।
तत्र संशयदर्शनाय सूत्रम् ॥

SECOND DIURNAL PORTION.

ON THE EXAMINATION OF UNDERSTANDING, AND MIND.

SECTION X.

ON THE NON-ETERNITY OF KNOWLEDGE.

कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यात्संशयः ॥ ७२ ॥

Whether knowledge be eternal. *Aph. 72.*—Since it resembles Action, and the Ether, there is a doubt [whether it be transitory like the one, or eternal like the other].

a. 'Since it resembles Action and the Ether,' viz., in being intangible, there is a doubt whether what is meant by the word Understanding be eternal,—which amounts to the question whether the word, 'Understanding' mean something eternal or not.*

b. In regard to this, the Sāṅkhya establishes the eternity of Understanding.†

विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥ ७३ ॥

Sāṅkhya argument for the eternity of the understanding. *Aph. 73.*—Since objects are recognised.

a. Supply—therefore the Understanding is eternal. The recognition "I who saw the jar, the same I do touch the jar" supposes, as its sphere, some one thing liable to modifications; and the Soul is not so, for this, no subject of emergent habitudes, is

* कर्मण आकाशस्य च साधर्म्याद्भिः स्पर्शत्वाद्बुद्धिपदार्थ-
नित्यत्वसंशयः । बुद्धिपदं नित्यशक्तं न वेति संशयपर्य-
वसन्नः ॥

† तत्र बुद्धिनित्यत्वं सांख्यः साधयति ॥

unalterable; therefore [argues the Sāṅkhya,] there really is an understanding which is liable to modifications; but its modification is [not a production, but] an affection;—for Understanding, too, is only revealed or concealed, but not produced or destroyed.*

b. He refutes this.†

साध्यसमत्वाद् हेतुः । ७४ ।

Its refutation. Aph. 74.—This is no reason, because it is in the same condition with what is to be proved.

a. The fact of there being one that recognises, is no reason [for supposing, in man, an eternal understanding other than Soul,] ‘because this is in the same condition with what is to be proved,’ i. e., because this [alleged reason, like the question in dispute,] is not established [and admitted by both parties]; for, in consequence of such expressions as “I know,” it is the Soul only that is regarded as a recogniser. Its “unalterableness” is merely its having neither beginning nor end; but it is not proved that it is anything else :—such is the import.‡

b. He rejects the Sāṅkhya opinion, that just from the under-

* बुद्धिर्नित्येति शेषः । यो ऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सो ऽहं घटं स्पृशामीतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानमेकं वृत्तिमन्तं विषयीकरोति । न चात्मा तथा तस्य अन्यधर्मानधिकरणस्य कूटस्थत्वात् । तस्माद्बुद्धिमती बुद्धिरेव वृत्तिस्तु तस्याः परिणामः बुद्धेराद्याविर्भावतिरोभावावेव न तूत्पादविनाशाविति ॥

† परिहरति ॥

‡ साध्यसमत्वात् असिद्धत्वात् प्रतिसम्भाष्टत्वं न हेतुः । अहं जानामीत्यादिना आत्मन एव प्रतिसम्भाष्टप्रत्ययात् ॥

standing, which is permanent, there issue, like sparks from fire, modifications, not different from the thing modified, one to each object, consisting of knowledge.*

न युगपदग्रहणात् । ७५ ।

A Sāṅkhya opinion opposed. Aph. 75.—Not so, for apprehension [of various things] is not simultaneous.

a. If there were no distinction between the modification and that to which the modification belongs, then, since that which is modified is permanent, it must be granted that the modification also is permanent; and so the apprehension of all things should be simultaneously; and this is not the case; so that it is not the case that there is no distinction,†

b. Now the transitoriness of the modifications is asserted [by the Sāṅkhya]; in regard to which he says.‡

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानेन विनाशप्रसङ्गः । ७६ ।

अनादिनिधनत्वमेव तस्य क्रीटस्थं अन्यादृशं त्वसिद्धमिति भावः ।

* बुद्धेरेव स्थाविन्वा यथाविषयं ज्ञानात्मिका वृत्तयो वृत्तिमदभिज्ञा वद्भूरेव स्फुलिङ्गा निःसरन्तीति सांख्यमतं निरस्यति ।

† वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोरभेदे वृत्तिमदवस्थित्या वृत्तेरप्यवस्थितिर्वाद्या तथाच सर्वपदार्थग्रहणं युगपत्स्यात् नचैवं तस्मात्प्रभेदे इति ।

‡ अथ वृत्तीनामनवस्थायित्वमुच्यते तत्राह ।

*Further argument
against the opinion.*

Aph. 76.—And when there was not the recognition, we should find the destruction [of the recogniser].

a. 'When there was not the recognition,' i. e., when there was the non-existence, the destruction, of the recognition, 'there would be the destruction also of the modified, [if the modified and its modification were the same;] therefore the two are not one.*

b. He explains, on his own theory, how things are not apprehended simultaneously.†

क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपद्गृहणम् । ७७ ।

*Why apprehensions are
not simultaneous.*

Aph. 77.—The non-simultaneousness of apprehensions is in consequence of the successiveness of modifications.

a. Supply "of the mind." In consequence of the atomic character of the mind, as its conjunction with the senses is successive, cognitions are successive; and so the *Bhāshya* introductory [to the aphorism,] says: "The Mind, unextended and one, combines with all the senses in succession:"—when the conjunction of the mind with this or that sense takes place, knowledge is possible.‡

* अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य अभावे विनाशे वृत्ति-
मतो ऽपि विनाशः स्यादतो न द्वयोरैक्यम् ।

† अयुगपद्गृहणं स्वमते व्युत्पादयति ।

‡ मनस इत्यादिः । मनसो ऽणुत्वादिन्द्रियैः सह क्रमेण
सम्बन्धात् ज्ञानानां क्रमिकत्वं । तथाच अविभु चैकं मनः
पर्यायेण सर्वेन्द्रियैः सम्बन्धत इत्यवतारभाव्यं । तत्तदिन्द्रि-
यमनसंयोगे सति ज्ञानमुपपद्यते ।

b. He explains how knowledge ceases in the absence of this.*

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानञ्च विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात् । ७८ ।

How apprehensions cease.

Aph. 78.—And there is cessation of the perception, when it [the Mind,] applies itself to another object.

a. 'Cessation of the perception,' i. e. non-existence of the knowledge produced by this or that sense; through the conjunction of the mind with 'another object,' i. e., with another Sense:—such is the meaning.†

b. And this could not be the case, on thy theory, as he states.‡—

न गत्यभावात् । ७९ ।

The mind not infinitely extended.

Aph. 79.—Nay, because there could be no going of the mind, [from one to another].

a. On thy theory, the mind could not be conjoined with the senses successively, because, as being all-pervading, the mind could not go§ [from one point to another].

b. He ponders a doubt, with the view of setting forth that, even granting that there were really no distinction between the

* तद्गतिरेके ज्ञानाभावमुपपादयति ॥

† अप्रत्यभिज्ञानं तत्तद्दिन्द्रियजज्ञानाभावः । विषयान्तरेण इन्द्रियान्तरेण मनसः सम्बन्धादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ त्वम्भते चेदज्ञोपपद्यते इत्याह ॥

§ त्वम्भते मनसः क्रमेणेन्द्रियसम्बन्धो न मनसो विभुत्वेन गत्यभावात् ॥

modified and its modification, there is the belief of a distinction.*

स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत्वाभिमानः । ८० ।

A sceptical suggestion. Aph. 80.—As crystal is fancied to be different, so is this fancied to be different.

a. As, from the proximity of the Hibiscus flower and other things, a crystal, though one and the same, is fancied to have the colour of this or that, so the [mental] modification, [says some one,] though not different from the modified, through the influence of the contact with this or that object, appears as if various.†

b. He censures

न हेत्वभावात् । ८१ ।

This repelled. Aph. 81.—Not so, for there is no proof.

a. That is to say, what is asserted [in §80,] is not right, because there is no proof that such a mistake [in the general belief respecting mind and its operations,] takes place.‡

* वृत्तिवृत्तिमतेर्बसुतो ऽभेदे ऽपि भेदप्रत्ययप्रतिपादनाय शक्यते ।

† यथा जवाकुसुमादिसन्निधानादेकस्यापि स्फटिकस्य तत्तद्रूपाभिमानस्तथा वृत्तिमदभिज्ञापि वृत्तिस्तद्विषयसन्नि-
कर्षवशाद्गानेव प्रतिभासत इति ।

‡ दूषयति ।

§ भ्रमत्वे साधकाभावाच्चेत्तं युक्तमित्यर्थः ।

b Here ends the section on the non-eternity of understanding.*

c. A Buddhist, not tolerating the illustration, [in § 80,] that, "There is a mistaken notion of diversity, as in the case of crystal," states his doubt.†

SECTION XI.

DISPROVING THE MOMENTARY DURATION OF THINGS.

स्फटिके ऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद्ब्रह्मीना-
महेतुः ॥ ८२ ॥

The sceptic argues from the momentary duration of things.

Aph. 82.—That is no argument, because, [says the Buddhist,] since individuals are momentary in duration, even in the case of the crystal there is the arising of another and another.

a. It is no argument to say "like the fancy that the crystal is different:"—why?—'because, even in the case of the crystal, there is the arising of another and another,' i. e., there is the arising of a different and a different crystal. He states his proof of this,—'since individuals,' i. e., entities, 'are momentary.‡

b. In support of this there is the *Bhāshya*, "From beholding,

* समाप्तं बुद्ध्यनित्यताप्रकरणम् ॥

† स्फटिके इव नानात्वक्षम इत्यसहमानः सौगतः शङ्कते ॥

‡ स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवदित्यहेतुः । कुतः । स्फटिके ऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः विलक्षणविलक्षणस्फटिकोत्पत्तेः । तत्र मानमाह व्यक्तीनां भावानां क्षणिकत्वात् ॥

in bodies, the course of increase and decrease;”—from seeing, in bodies, from moment to moment, increase and decrease, the diversity [of the body, at one moment, from itself at the next moment, is inferred]:—for two magnitudes cannot belong to one and the same mass;—such is the import. Some say that this [passage of the *Bhāshya*] is really an aphorism.*

c. An aphorism conveying the tenet.†

नियमहेत्वभावाद्यथा दर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा ॥ ८३ ॥

Proof of this needed. Aph. 83.—Since there is no proof of any such absolute rule, we will acknowledge it [only] where we see reason.

a. Since there is no proof of its being an absolute rule that things are distinguished by an apparatus for their destruction, [—so that they must needs perish momentarily], yet, supposing it to be so, he says—‘where we see reason:’—if there be a proof that anything is distinguished by an apparatus for its destruction, then the momentary duration of that shall indeed be acknowledged,—as, e. g., the last sound‡ [in any series, which is held to be self-destructive].

* तत्साधनाय भाष्यं उपचयापचयप्रबन्धदर्शनाच्छरीरेषु।
प्रतिक्षणं शरीरेषूपचयापचयदर्शनाज्ञानात्वं। नह्येकस्मिन्नव-
यविनि परिमाणद्वयसमावेश इति भावः। इदं सूत्रमेवेति
केचित् ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ पदार्थानां विनाशसामग्रीवैशिष्ट्यनियमे मानाभावात्।
अभ्युपेत्याह यथा दर्शनमिति। यदि कस्यचिद्विनाशसामग्री-

b. He states another argument.*

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ८४ ॥

*Production and destruction
result from what.*

Aph. 84.—Not so, because the causes of production and destruction are apprehended.

a. There does not belong, to crystal, &c., a momentary duration; because the causes of production and destruction [in general] have been ascertained by perception, viz., addition and abstraction of parts, &c.; and in the case of the crystal no cause of destruction is discerned, by which there should be destruction of the previous [crystal] and production of a subsequent one:—such is the import.†

b. Some one objects.‡—

क्षीरविनाशकारणानुपलब्धिकदृश्युत्पत्तिवच्च

तदुपपत्तिः ॥ ८५ ॥

An inadmissible suggestion.

Aph. 85.—And this may be accounted for, [suggests some one,]

वैशिष्ट्ये मानं स्यात्तदा क्षणिकत्वं तस्याभ्यनुज्ञायत एव
यथान्यशब्द इति ॥

* युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

† न स्फटिकादेः क्षणिकत्वं यत उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणा-
नुपलब्ध्या निर्णीतान्यवयवोपचयापचयादीनि । नच स्फ-
टिके विनाशकारणमुपलभ्यते येन पूर्वविनाशोऽपरोत्पत्तिश्च
स्यादिति भावः ॥

‡ आक्षिपति ॥

just as the production of curd, where no cause of the destruction of the milk is discerned.

a. 'As the production of curd,' i. e., as the cause of the production of curd is not discerned; 'this may be accounted for,' i. e., the non-apprehension of a cause of the destruction of the previous crystal, and the non-apprehension of a cause of the production of a subsequent crystal, may consistently be:—such is the import.*

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet.†

लिकृतो ग्रहणानुपलब्धिः । ८६ ।

Its rejection. Aph. 86.—This is *not* unapprehended, because it is apprehended inferentially.

a. And since the destruction of the milk [that went to the making] of the curd is demonstrated by perception, a cause of this [destruction] is conjectured; but not in this way are destruction and production of the crystal apprehended, so as that any cause thereof need be conjectured.‡

b. In regard to the Buddhistic doctrine he cites an objection of the Sāṅkhya.§

* दध्युत्पत्तिवद्दध्युत्पत्तिकारणानुपलब्धिवत् तदुपपत्तिः
पूर्वस्फटिकविनाशकारणानुपलब्धेरुत्तरस्फटिकोत्पत्तिकारणा-
नुपलब्धेश्चोपपत्तिः स्यादिति भावः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ दध्नः क्षीरविनाशस्य च प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्तत्कारणं कल्प्यते
नत्वेवं स्फटिकविनाशोत्पादावुपलब्धेते येन तत्कारणक-
ल्पनम् ॥

§ सौगतमते सांख्यदूषणमुपन्यस्यति ॥

न पयसः परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात् ॥ ८७ ॥

The Sāṅkhya doctrine of transformation.

Aph. 87.—Not so [says the Sāṅkhya], because there is a transformation, a manifestation of other qualities, in the case of the milk.

a. There is not a destruction of the milk and a production of curd, but there is a 'transformation' of the milk;—the meaning of the word 'transformation' is 'manifestation of other qualities.' The meaning is, that there is a disappearance of the previous flavour of the still existent milk through the manifestation of another quality, in the shape of an acid flavour.*

b. The author of the aphorisms rejects this.†

व्यूहान्तराद्द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं पूर्वद्रव्यनिवृत्तेर-
नुमानम् ॥ ८८ ॥

The Nyāya view on this point.

Aph. 88.—The seeing arise, from a different arrangement, a different substance, is an argument for the surcease of the previous one.

a. From 'a different arrangement,' i. e., from a different composition; the destruction of the previous combination of parts, and the production of another substance, is recognised; such is the import.‡

* न क्षीरस्य नाशो दध्नश्चेत्पत्तिः किन्तु क्षीरस्य परिणामः । परिणामशब्दार्थो गुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावः । विद्यमानस्य क्षीरस्य पूर्ववसतिरोभावो ऽस्वरसात्मकगुणान्तरस्याविर्भावद्वित्यर्थः ॥

† एतन्निराकरोति सूत्रकारः ॥

‡ व्यूहान्तराद्द्रव्यान्तरात् पूर्वावयवसंयोगनाशो द्रव्यान्तरोत्पादश्चानुभविक इति भावः ॥

b. In order to mention another fault [in the argument at §85], there is an aphorism of the author.*

क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः । ८६ ।

An erroneous view objected to. Aph. 89.—Since in some cases the cause of destruction is not perceived.

a. [For this reason,] and because in some cases [see §84] it is perceived, this [viz., the illustration made use of at §85] is ambiguous :—it is not proper, on the strength of the example of milk and curd, to say that destruction and production have no causes, —because this is invalidated by our perceiving the presence of a cause thereof in the case of a jar, or the like. In reality, since the cause of the destruction of milk is the contact of a sour substance, and since curd originates from the sour-tasted particles [thence resulting], the destruction of milk and the generation of curd are *not* without a cause.†

b. Here ends the section regarding momentary destruction‡ [and reproduction of things].

c. Although the fact that understanding is a quality of Soul was pretty well established by the examination of Soul [at the commencement of the present Book], yet, in order to set this

* दोषान्तराभिधानाय सिद्धान्तिनः सूत्रम् ।

† क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेरनैकान्तः । क्षीरदधिदृष्टान्तेन विनाशोत्पादावकारणकावेवेति न युक्तं घटादौ सकारणकत्वोपलब्धेर्व्यभिचारात् । वस्तुतः क्षीरविनाशे ऽसद्द्रव्यसंयोगस्य हेतुत्वादस्वरसवत्परमाणुभिश्च दध्ना चारम्भाद्वाकारणकौ क्षीरविनाशदध्युत्पादाविति ॥

‡ समाप्तं क्षणभङ्गप्रकरणम् ॥

forth explicitly, we have a section on Understanding's being a quality of Soul. And here a *primâ facie* view presenting itself, viz., since it [understanding] depends on the conjunction of a sense with its object, suppose that it is just located in the sense, &c., as Sound, which depends on the conjunction of the musical instrument and the Ether, is lodged in the Ether;—we have an aphorism conveying the tenet.*

SECTION XII.

HOW KNOWLEDGE IS A QUALITY OF SOUL.

नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशे ऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात् ॥ ९० ॥

Knowledge not a quality of Sense.

Aph. 90.—It [knowledge] belongs neither to the Sense nor to the Object, because, even on the destruction thereof, knowledge abides.

a. Understanding is not a quality of the Sense nor of the Object, because, even when that perishes, knowledge, i. e., memory, abides, i. e., exists:—for memory is impossible in the absence of the one who was [previously] cognizant [of the thing remembered], for this would be beyond the rule [that he only who has experienced can remember];—such is the import.†

* बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वं यद्यप्यात्मपरीक्षात एव सिद्धप्रायं तथापि विशिष्य व्युत्पादनाय बुद्ध्यात्मगुणत्वप्रकरणं । तत्रचेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाधीनत्वादिन्द्रियादिनिष्ठत्वमेवास्तु भेर्याकाशसंयोगाधीनशब्दस्याकाशनिष्ठत्ववदिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† बुद्धिर्नेन्द्रियस्य न वार्थस्य गुणस्तन्नाशे ऽपि ज्ञानस्य स्मरणस्यावस्थानात् उत्पत्तेः । नच्चनुभवितुरभावे स्मरणमुपपद्यते ऽतिप्रसङ्गादिति भावः ॥

b. He denies that it [knowledge] is a quality of the Mind.*

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च न मनसः । ९१ ।

Nor of the Mind.

Aph. 91.—Nor to the Mind [the existence of which is inferred] from the non-simultaneous apprehension of what things are knowable.

a. The character of agent [—and knowledge is the quality of the agent—] does not belong to the Mind, which is proved to exist [—see §77—] by this argument that what things are knowable are not apprehended simultaneously; for it [the Mind] is proved to be only an instrument [in the hands of Soul], by the argument that there must be a subject, [of whatever qualities, properties, &c., may be proved to exist]. In reality, by the fact that what things are knowable are not apprehended simultaneously, we are made aware that the Mind is an Atom, and thus pleasure, &c., if lodged in it [instead of in the Soul], would be imperceptible. So too when there is a set of bodies [tenanted by one Yogí] there would be no knowledge, &c., in this or that body,† [—since the mental atom could be present in no more than one at one time].

b. He ponders a doubt.‡

* मनोगणत्वं निरस्यति ।

† युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्चेतोः सिद्धस्य मनसो न कर्तृत्वं धमिग्राहकमानेन करणत्वेनैव सिद्धेः । वस्तुतो युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेरित्यनेन मनसो ऽणुत्वं सूचितं तथाच तद्गतसुखाद्यप्रत्यक्षता स्यात् । एवं कायव्यूहे तज्जदेहावच्छेदेन ज्ञानादिकं न स्यादिति ।

‡ शक्यते ।

तदात्मगुणत्वे ऽपि तुल्यम् । ९२ ।

An objection. *Aph.* 92.—It were the same [suggests some one], even were it [knowledge] a quality of Soul.

a. Even were it, viz., knowledge, a quality of the Soul, there ought equally to be simultaneousness of cognitions, because the Soul [—being all-pervading—] is in conjunction with all the organs of Sense.*

b. He replies.†—

सन्निकर्षाभावात्तदनुपपत्तिः । ९३ ।

The reply. *Aph.* 93.—This cannot be, because of the absence of the conjunction [of the Mind].

a Because of the absence of the conjunction of the Mind with several senses simultaneously, there is not the simultaneous apprehension of several objects, [—the soul, even where present, operating only through its instrument the Mind];—such is the import.‡

b. Some one objects.§—

नेत्यत्तिकारणानपदेशात् । ९४ ।

An objection. *Aph.* 94.—Not so [—says some one—], because you do not state the cause of its existence.

* तस्या बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वे ऽपि ज्ञानयोगपदं तुल्यं आत्मनः सर्वेन्द्रियसंयोगात् ।

† उत्तरयति ।

‡ युगपद्भानेन्द्रियैः सह मनसः सन्निकर्षाभावात्तदनुपपत्तिरिति भावः ।

§ आक्षिपति ।

a. Since you do not state, i. e., since you do not mention, any cause of the existence of knowledge, we deny that knowledge is a quality of Soul:—if its cause be [—as you seem to insinuate—] the conjunction of Soul and Mind, then [since these are always in conjunction] it appears that knowledge must be eternal, [contrary to what has been made out]:—such is the import.*

b. Some one alleges the following objection also to the notion that knowledge is a quality of Soul.†

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्व-

प्रसङ्गः । ९५ ।

The objection further. Aph 95.—And if it abide there, we should find it to be eternal, because of there being no cause discernible for its destruction.

a. If knowledge were located in the soul, since no cause of destruction, i. e., of the destruction, &c., of that in which it resides, is discernible, we should find that it, viz., knowledge, is eternal,‡ [contrary to what has been made out].

b. He replies.§

* बुद्ध्युत्पत्तौ कारणस्थानपदेशात् अकथनात् नात्मगुणो बुद्धिः । आत्ममनसंयोगस्य कारणत्वे सार्वदिकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति भावः ।

† बुद्धेरात्मागुणत्वे दोषमप्याह ।

‡ बुद्धेरात्मन्यवस्थाने विनाशकारणस्याश्रयनाशादेरनुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने बुद्धेर्नित्यताप्रसङ्गः ।

§ उत्तरयति ।

अनित्यत्वग्रहणाद्बुद्धेरुत्पत्त्यादनाशः शब्दवत् । ९६ ।

The reply. Aph. 96.—Since we perceive that it is *not* eternal, [we may conjecture that] one cognition is put an end to by another cognition, just like Sound.

a. Since we perceive that knowledge is not eternal, i. e., since we are conscious of its production and its destruction, a cause thereof being to be conjectured, it is conjectured that its producer is the conjunction of the Soul and the Mind, &c., and that its destroyer is subsequently emergent knowledge, or mnemonic impression, &c.:—but of the last knowledge [to which none succeeds, so as to account for its supersession,] the destruction results from the cessation of desert, [—whereupon the soul attains a blissful freedom from ideas,—] or from time. As regards the destruction of one cognition by another cognition, he mentions a parallel instance, saying ‘just like Sound.’ As a sound is put a stop to by another sound, and the last sound ceases on the cessation of its cause, so is it also in the case of the thing in question :—such is the import.*

b. Here he ponders the objection of a partially informed person, viz., but then, if knowledge be a quality of the Soul, since the mnemonic impression and the conjunction of Soul and Mind actually are [at all times], acts of memory must be simultaneous.†

* बुद्धेरनित्यत्वस्य ग्रहणात् उत्पादनाशयोरनुभविकत्वात्कारणे कल्पनीये आत्ममनोयोगादेरुत्पादकत्वमनन्तरोत्पन्नबुद्धेः संस्कारादेर्वा नाशकत्वं कल्प्यते । चरमबुद्धेस्तु अदृष्टनाशात्कालाद्वा नाशः । बुद्धेरुत्पत्त्यादनाशत्वे ऽनुरूपं दृष्टान्तमाह शब्दवदिति । शब्दस्य यथा शब्दान्तराग्राह्यमचरमशब्दस्य निमित्तनाशनाश्यत्वं तथा प्रकृते ऽपीति भावः ॥

† ननु बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्वे संस्कारात्ममनोयोगयोः सत्त्वात् स्मृतीनां योगपदं स्यादत्रैकदेशिनः परिहारमाशङ्कते ॥

ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षात्मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न
युगपदुत्पत्तिः । ६७ ।

An imperfect suggestion. *Aph. 97.*—Since memory is produced [—suggests some one—] by the conjunction of the Mind with some portion of the Soul in which knowledge inheres, there is no simultaneous production [of many acts of recollection].

a. 'Knowledge,'—here the cause of a mnemonic impression,—in what portion it 'inheres,'—since the conjunction of the Mind with that portion is what produces memory,—and since this is successive,—there is no simultaneousness of recollections :—such is the meaning.*

b. Others say that the word [here translated] 'knowledge' (*jnāna*), according to the etymology which explains it as "that by means of which something is known," means here the mnemonic impression.†

c. He condemns this opinion‡ [conveyed in §97].

नान्तः शरीरवृत्तित्वात्मनसः । ६८ ।

He condemns this. *Aph. 98.*—Not so, because it is within the body that the Mind has its function.

a. What is alleged [in §97] is not proper, because the Mind 'has its function within the body,' i. e., it is that of which the

* ज्ञानं संस्कारकारणं समवेतं यदवच्छेदेन तदवच्छेदेन
मनस्सन्निकर्षस्य स्मृत्युत्पादकत्वान्नस्य च क्रमिकत्वान्न स्मृति-
यौगपद्यमित्यर्थः ॥

† ज्ञायते अनेनेति व्युत्पत्त्या ज्ञानपदं संस्कारपरमित्यन्ये ॥

‡ तन्मतं दूषयति ॥

function, viz., the operation which consists in producing knowledge, is within the body.*

b. That is to say, this [notion, implied in §97, that memory may result from the conjunction of Mind with Soul even beyond the body,] is entirely a mistake, because the conjunction of Soul and Mind in any place apart from the body is no cause of knowledge, that only being such cause which is within the limits of the body:—such is the import.†

c. A partially informed person ponders a doubt.‡

साध्यत्वादहेतुः । ९९ ।

A demur. *Aph.* 99.—This, [says some one] is no reason, because it requires to be proved.

a. The conjunction, within the limits of the body, of Soul and Mind, is not [to be admitted as] the cause [of knowledge], because this ‘requires to be proved,’ i. e., it is not an established fact,—there is no proof:—such is the import.§

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet.||

* उक्तं न युक्तं मनसः अन्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वात् अन्तः-
शरीरे वृत्तिज्ञानजनकीभूतो व्यापारो यस्य तत्त्वात् ॥

† शरीरातिरिक्तावच्छेदेनात्ममनेयोगस्य ज्ञानाहेतुत्वा-
च्छरीरावच्छिन्नस्य हेतुत्वे तद्दोषतादवस्थमिति भावः ॥

‡ एकदेशी शङ्कते ॥

§ शरीरावच्छिन्नात्ममनेयोगो न हेतुः साध्यत्वात् अवि-
द्वत्त्वात् मानाभावादिति भावः ॥

॥ सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

स्मरतः शरीरधारणोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ १०० ॥

The reply. Aph. 100.—This is no objection, because the proof is that we find the supporting of the body during reminiscence.

a. The objection mentioned [at §99] is not proper, because there is a 'proof,' i. e., an argument [for the fact] that the Mind, in Memory, does not quit the body], in the shape of 'the supporting of the body during reminiscence;' otherwise, when the Mind was without, the body would not be supported, in the absence of effort, through there being [then] no conjunction of the Mind with the Soul *within* the limits of the body :—such is the import.*

b. Again some one ponders a doubt.†

न तदाशुगतित्वान्मनसः ॥ १०१ ॥

Another demur. Aph. 101.—Not that [proves that the Mind does not leave the body, suggests some one], because the Mind moves swiftly.

a. The sustaining of the body is not [a proof that the Mind has not quitted it], because 'the Mind moves swiftly,' i. e., it returns quite quickly into the body.‡

b. He blames this.§

* उक्तप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः स्मरतः शरीरधारणरूपाया उपपत्तेर्युक्तेरन्यथा मनसो बहिर्भावे शरीरावच्छिन्नात्मनो-योगाभावेन प्रयत्नाभावे शरीरधारणं न स्यादिति भावः ॥

† पुनः शङ्कते ॥

‡ शरीराधारणं न मनसः आशुगतित्वाच्छीघ्रमेव शरीरे परावृत्तेः ॥

§ दूषयति ॥

न स्मरणकालानियमात् ॥ १०२ ॥

The reply.

Aph. 102.—Not so, because there is no rule as regards the duration of reminiscence.

a. The quick returning of the mind is not to the purpose, because in reminiscence there is no rule as regards the time ; sometimes a thing is recollected quickly, sometimes moreover, through attention, with delay.*

b. And you must not say that the attention belongs altogether to the Mind while abiding within the body, but that the out-going takes place immediately antecedently to the re-collecting ;—because the body would not be supported for so long as the space of time for the several actions adapted to its out-going and re-entering, &c. :—such is the import.†

c. Another partially informed person blames the opinion of the partially informed person‡ [in §97].

आत्मप्रेरणयदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च न संयोगवि- शेषः ॥ १०३ ॥

An imperfect view.

Aph. 103.—There is no such peculiar conjunction [—says some one—as that alleged in §97], whether

*. मनसः शीघ्रमागमनं न युक्तं स्मरणे कालनियमाभावात् कदाचिच्छीघ्रं स्मर्यते कदाचित्प्रणिधानाद्विलम्बेनापीति ॥

† नच प्रणिधानं शरीरान्तः स्थितमनस एव बहिर्निगमस्तु स्मरणव्यवहितपूर्वमेवेति वाच्यं । बहिर्निगमान्तःप्रवेशानुकूलक्रियाविभागादिकालकलापं यावच्छरीरधारणं न स्यादिति भावः ॥

‡ एकदेशमतमन्य एकदेशी दूषयति ॥

through the Soul's sending [the Mind in search of what it wishes to recollect], or arbitrarily, or through its [the Mind's] being cognizant.

a. It is impossible there should be any peculiar conjunction of the Mind with any particular external locality,—for this could not take place through the Soul's sending it for the sake of recollecting, for, as this presupposes a knowledge of what is to be remembered [—compare Plato—], it would be a case of recollecting even before [sending the Mind in search]; nor again [could this alleged conjunction of the Mind take place] 'arbitrarily,' i. e., without a reason why; for it is denied that anything happens without a reason why; nor again through the Mind's being 'cognizant,' i. e., through its being that which knows,—because it is not held that the Mind [—but the Soul—] is the knower.*

b. Some one says that [the words which we have rendered] "through sending, or arbitrarily, or through its being cognizant," mean "through effort, and desire, and knowledge;" but this is not the case, because [—since effort presupposes desire, and desire knowledge—] it would turn out that all the meaning is conveyed by the term 'effort' alone,† [and that the other words are superfluous and tautological].

* वहिः प्रदेशविशेषे मनःसंयोगविशेषो न सम्भवति ।
स हि न स्मृत्यर्थमात्मप्रेरणेन तस्य स्मरणीयज्ञानपूर्वकतया
प्रागेव स्मृत्यापत्तेः । नापि यद्वच्छया अकस्मात् आकस्मि-
कत्वस्य निषेधात् । नापि मनसो ज्ञतया ज्ञाततया मनसो
ज्ञातत्वानभ्युपगमात् ॥

† प्रेरणयद्वच्छाज्ञताभिः प्रयत्नेच्छाज्ञानैरित्यर्थ इति कश्चि-
त्तन्न प्रयत्नेनैव चरितार्थत्वापत्तेः ॥

c. He disallows this* [that is alleged in §103].

व्यासक्तमनसः पादव्यथनेन संयोगविशेषेण
समानम् ॥ १०४ ॥

*The foregoing view
disallowed.*

Aph. 104.—It is the same as the particular conjunction, in the case of him that is rapt in mind, when he hurts his foot.

a. In the case of one looking [intently] at dancing, or the like, when he hurts his foot with a thorn, or the like, as there takes place a conjunction of the Mind with that locality; just so is this also:—such is the import. Otherwise the alleged objections [in §103] would apply also to the conjunction of the Mind here [—within the limits of the body as well as without]. If you say that, that [conjunction of the Mind, or direction of the attention to the injured limb] is through the force of Action dependent on some particular desert, then it is just the same with the case in question also;—such is the import.†

b. He himself accounts for the non-simultaneousness of recollections.‡

प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानामयुगपद्भावाद्युगप-
दस्मरणम् ॥ १०५ ॥

* एतन्निराकरोति ॥

† चृत्यादिकं पश्यतः कण्टकादिना पादव्यथनेन तदव-
च्छेदेन मनस्संयोगो यथा जायते तथैव तदपीति भावः ।
इतरथा तत्र मनस्संयोगे ऽप्युक्तदोषाः स्युः । अदृष्टविशेषा-
धीनकर्मवशादसाविति चेत्तुल्यं प्रकृते ऽपीति भावः ॥

‡ स्मरणायौगपद्यं स्वयमुपपादयति ॥

Why acts of memory are not simultaneous.

Aph. 105.—Recollections are not simultaneous, because [efforts of] attention, and the knowledge of signs, &c., are not simultaneous.

a. 'Attention' (*pranidhāna*) means the direction of the mind to one point,—in short the desire to recollect. The 'knowledge of a sign' means an awakener [of memory]. The expression, "&c.", immediately after these awakers, is to be joined on after the "knowledge." Since this is successive, recollection is successive. And if awakers are simultaneous [—e. g., when the recollection is of a complex fact—], it is to be understood that we quite agree that then the recollection embraces as many objects [as are simultaneously suggested],—as in the case of the knowledge of words, &c.,* [where several words simultaneously concur in calling up the complex import of a sentence].

b. But then [some one may say], since Desire, &c., are qualities of the Mind, since [again] they are products of knowledge, and since it is through their having the same substratum [as knowledge] that they [viz., Desire and knowledge] stand in the relation of product and cause, how is knowledge a quality of the *Soul* [and not of the Mind] ? In regard to this doubt, there is an aphorism conveying a tenet.†

* प्रणिधानं चित्तैकाग्रं सुस्मूर्धेति यावत् । लिङ्गज्ञानं उद्बोधकं । उद्बोधकानामानन्त्यादादिपदं ज्ञानात्परतो योजनीयं । तस्य क्रमात् स्मरणक्रमः । यदि च युगपद्बोधकानि तदा तावद्विषयकस्मरणमिष्यत एव यथा पदज्ञानादाविति मन्तव्यम् ॥

† नन्विच्छादीनां मनोधर्मत्वात्तेषां ज्ञानजन्यत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्येन च तत्र कार्यकारणभावात्कथं ज्ञानस्यात्मगुणत्वमित्याशङ्कायां सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादारम्भनिवृत्त्योः ॥ १०६ ॥

*Desire, &c., are qualities
of the Soul.*

Aph. 106.—They belong to the knower,
because commencing and leaving off are

caused by Desire and Aversion.

a. Desire, &c., belong to 'the knower,' i. e., the possessor of knowledge, viz., Soul. He states the reason, viz., 'because commencing and leaving off are caused by Desire and Aversion,' i. e., because doing and forbearing are products of Desire and Aversion, and knowledge, as having the same receptacle with them [—for else were this impossible—], is the cause of these, [viz., of Desire and Aversion]:—such is the import.*

b. Or the meaning is,—because they are caused by Desire and Aversion, which belong to the knower, i. e., to that to which knowledge belongs. And so the fact that knowledge, desire, and effort, have the same receptacle, is not un-established,† [—though this was charged against our theory at §105, *b*].

c. But then, grant that they have the same receptacle,—ponders the *Chárváka*,—yet their receptacle is only the form of the body,—an aggregate of earthy or other atoms.‡

* ज्ञस्य ज्ञानवत आत्मन इच्छादयः । हेतुमाह । आ-
रम्भनिवृत्त्योरिच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादिति । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यो-
रिच्छाद्वेषजन्यत्वान्नत्रच सामानाधिकरण्येन ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्व-
मिति भावः ॥

† यद्वा ज्ञस्य ज्ञानवतो याविच्छाद्वेषौ तन्निमित्तत्वा-
दित्यर्थः । तथाच ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नानां सामानाधिकरण्यं
नासिद्धम् ॥

‡ नन्वस्तु तेषां सामानाधिकरण्यं परन्तु तेषामधिकरण्यं
कायाकारः पार्थिवादिपरमाणुपुञ्ज एवेति चार्वाकः शङ्कते ॥

तद्विज्ञत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्व-
प्रतिषेधः । १०७ ।

Opinion of the materialist.

Aph. 107.—It is not to be denied [—says the materialist—] that these exist in what consist of earth, or the like, because Desire and Aversion are indicated by those same [commencings and leavings off].

a. It is not to be denied that knowledge, &c., exist in 'what consist of earth, or the like,' i. e., in bodies [—earthy, watery, aerial, or fiery—];—why?—'because desire and aversion are indicated by those,' i. e., are indicated by commencing and leaving off—[see §106],—and these two [species of voluntary effort] are indicated by particular gestures,—and gesture is proved by immediate evidence to belong to the body :—such is the import.*

b. Seeking to clear up this, he states an objection† [to the view taken in §107].

परश्चादिष्वारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् । १०८ ।

An objection to the materialistic view.

Aph. 108.—[This cannot be allowed,] because we see commencements and leavings off in axes and the like.

a. We should find it established [—were we to accept the reasoning in §107—] that there is knowledge, &c., in axes, and the like,—because [in the case of these] we see particular actions

* पार्थिवाद्येषु देहेषु ज्ञानादेर्न प्रतिषेधः । कुतः । इच्छा-
द्वेषयोस्तद्विज्ञत्वादारम्भनिवृत्तिलिङ्गकत्वान्तयोः चेष्टाविशेष-
लिङ्गकत्वाच्चेष्टायाश्च शरीरे प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादिति भावः ।

† समाधिसुः प्रतिबन्धिमाह ।

which might lead us to infer [voluntary effort directed towards] commencement and leaving off:—therefore, that particular movements are the result of voluntary effort must be through some other relation than that of inherence,—because of the straying away [of movement unaccompanied by any voluntary effort, inhering in or originating in the axe]:—such is the import.*

b. He explains the matter according to his own view.†

नियमानियमौ तु तद्विशेषकौ ॥ १०६ ॥

Distinction between Spirit and Matter. Aph. 109.—But the rule and the reverse of the rule are what distinguish these two.

a. ‘What distinguish the two,’ i. e., what distinguish, or difference from one another, the two, viz., Soul and Not-soul,—are ‘the rule and the reverse of the rule,’ i. e., the rule that the production takes place through intimate [and not some mediate] relation, and the reverse of this. It is through intimate relation that knowledge and desire, &c., are properties of Soul; and it is through [the mediate relation of] its being their *circumscriber* that within the Body these have the relation of product and producer; and in an axe, or the like, motion is through its [the axe’s] being the *object* [not the originator] of effort. But in reality it is merely *gesture* that is the generator of motion in an axe, or the like; there is no proof that its cause is *effort*,‡ [—for the arm that wielded it may have been involuntarily convulsed].

* आरम्भनिवृत्त्यनुमापकक्रियाविशेषदर्शनात् परशवादिषु ज्ञानादिसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात्क्रियाविशेषाणां प्रयत्नाद्विजन्त्यत्वं सम्बन्धान्तरेण नतु समवायेन व्यभिचारादिति भावः ।

† स्वमते व्युत्पादयति ॥

‡ तद्विशेषकौ तयोश्चेतनाचेतनयोर्विशेषकौ इतरव्यावर्त्त-

b. He states another reason why Desire, &c., are not qualities of the Mind.*

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् पारतन्यात् खट्वताभ्यागमाच्च न
मनसः । ११० ।

Distinction between Mind and Soul dwelt upon. Aph. 110. They do not belong to the Mind, because they are caused as aforesaid, because it is subject to another, and because it is from one's own deeds that one has fruition.

a. Supply "Desire, and the rest." 'Because they are caused as aforesaid,' i. e., because knowledge and desire, &c., stand in the relation of cause and effect through their having the same substratum, [which has been shown, in Section III, to be the Soul]. 'Because it is subject to another ;'—since the Mind is an assistant of Soul, Desire and the rest are not qualities of this [subordinate]. 'From one's own deeds,' i. e., from the actions done by oneself. 'Fruition,' i. e., experience. And this [experience], if Effort, &c., belonged to the Mind, could not take place,—because experience [in the shape of reward or punishment] does not come from the deeds done by *another*, nor can experience, moreover, belong to the *Mind* [—which we have supposed, for the sake of argument, to be the agent—], because it is just the experiencer,—the partaker of bondage or liberation,—that is meant

कौ नियमानियमौ समवायेन जन्यतानियमतदभावौ ।
समवायेन ज्ञानेच्छादीनां चेतनधर्मत्वादवच्छेदकतयाच शरीरे
तेषां जन्यजनकभावः परश्चादौ यत्प्रविषयतया क्रिया ।
वस्तुतस्तु चेष्टैव परश्चादिक्रियाजनिका यत्नादेस्तद्हेतुत्वे मा-
नाभावः ॥

* इच्छादीनां मनोगुणत्वाभावे युक्त्यन्तरमाह ।

by the word Soul,—there being no proof that there is any other Soul than this [which we mean when we speak of the experiencer of bondage and liberation]. Moreover these [—viz., Mind and Soul—] are not one and the same ;—the Soul has magnitude, because it is adapted to the perception of pleasure, &c. ; and the Mind is atomic, as is proved by the argument which proved its own existence* [as the subject to which this atomic character belonged ;—see B. I. §16].

b. He winds up in regard to their being qualities of Soul.†

परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्च ॥ १११ ॥

Recapitulation. Aph. 111.—And since the aforesaid arguments are established exclusively.

a. Supply—Desire and the rest are qualities of Soul. He states the reason, since ‘exclusively,’ i. e., to the exclusion of the arguments for its being the Body, or the like,—‘the aforesaid arguments,’ viz., such as “Because through both Sight and

* इच्छादय इति शेषः । यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् ज्ञानेच्छादीनां सामानाधिकरण्येन कार्यकारणभावात् । पारतन्त्र्यात् मनसश्चेतनसहकारित्वादिच्छादयो न तद्गूणाः । स्वकृतात्स्वयंकृतात्कर्मणः । अभ्यागमो भोगः । स मनसो यत्नादिसत्त्वे न स्यान्नह्यन्यकृतात्कर्मणो भोगः । न वा भोगो ऽपि मनसः भोक्तुर्बन्धमोक्षादिभागिन एवात्मत्वात्तद्भिन्न आत्मनि मानाभावात् । आत्मनः सुखादिसाक्षात्कारानुरोधाम्यहत्त्वं मनसश्च धर्मिग्राहकमानादणुत्वमतो ऽपि नैक्यम् ॥

† आत्मगुणत्वमुपसंहरति ॥

Touch, we apprehend a single object," [§1,] and the like,—‘are established,’ i. e., are congruous.*

b. That *memory* is a quality of Soul, though established by the meaning of the term [when properly looked into], he sets forth separately, with a view to the clearness of the pupil's understanding.†

स्मरणं त्वात्मनो ज्ञखाभाव्यात् ॥ ११२ ॥

Aph. 112.—But memory belongs to the Soul, because it is of the essence of that which knows.
Memory belongs to Soul.

a. The “but” means “moreover.” ‘Because it is of the essence of that which knows,’ i. e., it is of the essence of that which is the possessor of knowledge. For, the essence of the Soul is its being the possessor of what is constituted by the genus of knowledge, and as Memory is constituted [what it is] by the genus of knowledge, [i. e., by being a kind of knowledge], it is settled by the sense of the terms that it [Memory] is a property thereof, † [i. e., of Soul].

b. In order to clear away [the mistaken notion of] the simultaneousness of recollections, the argument assigned [at §105]

* इच्छादिकमात्मगुण इत्यादिः । हेतुमाह परिशेषात् शरीरादिहेतुनिरासात् यथोक्तहेतूनां दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादित्यादीनां उपपत्तेः उपपन्नत्वात् ॥

† स्मृतेरात्मगुणत्वमर्थसिद्धमपि शिष्यबुद्धिवैशद्याय पृथग्व्युत्पादयति ॥

‡ तुरप्यर्थे । ज्ञखाभाव्यात् ज्ञानवत्खाभाव्यात् । ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नवत्त्वं ज्ञात्मनः खभावः स्मृतेश्च ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नत्वात्तद्ब्रह्मत्वमर्थात्सिद्धम् ॥

was the successiveness of its awakers, Attention and the rest. With reference to this he exhibits Attention and the rest.*

प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्च-
 याश्चित्तसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्यविरोधातिशय-
 प्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभयार्थित्वक्रिया-
 रागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः ॥ ११३ ॥

Awakeners of Memory. Aph. 113.—[Memory is awakened] by the following causes, viz., Attention, Concatenation, Study, Signs, Marks, Likeness, Possession, Refuge and Refugee, Relation, immediate Subsequency, Absence, Similarly employed, Opposition, Frequency, Receiving, Covering, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, Fear, Wealthiness, Motion, Affection, Merit and Demerit.

a The word "Memory" is borrowed [from §105]. The word "cause" which [in this aphorism] is heard following the aggregative compound, is indifferently in construction with each term, severally.†

b. 'Attention' (*pranidhāna*) is the hindering the mind's moving away to some other object.‡

c. 'Concatenation,' (*nibandha*) means the association of context in the same composition:—for example, by the word "Proof"

* स्मृत्यागपद्यसमाधानाय प्रणिधानादीनामुद्बोधकानां क्रमो हेतुरुक्तस्तत्र प्रणिधानादीनि दर्शयति ॥

† स्मरणमित्यनुवर्त्तते । निमित्तशब्दस्य इन्द्रात्परं श्रुतस्य प्रत्येकमभेदेनान्वयः ॥

‡ प्रणिधानं मनसो विषयान्तरसञ्चारवारणम् ॥

[the first word in Book I, §1], one remembers "Thing proved," [which is the next word in the aphorism,] and so on.*

d. 'Study' (*abhyása*) means a multiplicity of impressions† [confirming the first impression by force of repetition].

e. A 'Sign' (*linga*), that which is constantly accompanied, reminds us of what constantly accompanies it.‡

f. A 'Mark' (*lakshana*), as the monkey-standard, or the like, [reminds us] of Arjuna, or the like.§

g. 'Likeness,'—of person, or the like.||

h. 'Possession' (*parigraha*) means making one's own:—it means here the relation of property and owner:—by either of these we are reminded of the other.¶

i. The 'Refuge and Refugee' (*śraya* and *śrita*), as a king and his attendants, reciprocally call one another to mind.**

j. 'Relation' (*sambandha*), as the relation of preceptor and disciple, and the like. This is mentioned separately [—though there are various instances of relation in the present list—], on

* निबन्ध एकग्रन्थोपनिबन्धनं यथा प्रमाथेन प्रमेया-
दिस्ररणम् ।

† अभ्यासः संस्कारबाहुल्यम् ।

‡ लिङ्गं व्याप्यं व्यापकस्य स्मारकम् ॥

§ लक्षणं यथा कपिध्वजादि अर्जुनादेः ॥

॥ सादृश्यं देहादेः ॥

¶ परिग्रहः स्त्रीकारस्य स्वामिभावो ऽर्थः तदेकतरे-
णान्यतरस्मरणम् ॥

** आश्रयाश्रितौ राजादितत्परिजनौ परस्परस्मारकौ ॥

the same principle as "Kine and bulls,"* [where the bulls, though comprised under the cow-kind, are mentioned, *honoris causa*, separately].

k. 'Immediate Subsequency' (*ánantarya*), as of sprinkling [the rice to be employed in some sacrificial operation], and pounding [the rice, immediately afterwards, in a wooden mortar, to free it from the husk], and the like.†

l. 'Absence,' as of a wife, &c.,‡ [which makes one think of her].

m. Those 'similarly employed,' as [fellow] disciples, &c., reciprocally call to mind one another.§

n. From 'Opposition,' the snake and ichneumon, and the like, call to mind one another.||

o. 'Distinction,'—an influence [of some ceremony], as the investiture with the sacrificial string, calls to mind, e. g., the preceptor [who officiates on such occasions].¶

p. 'Receiving,' of wealth, &c., reminds us of the giver.**

q. A 'Covering,' is what hides;—thus a sheath, or the like, [reminds us] of a sword, or the like.††

* सम्बन्धो गुरुशिष्यभावादिः । गोवृषन्यायात् पृथगुक्तः ॥

† आनन्तर्यं प्रोक्षणावघातादेः ॥

‡ वियोगो यथा दारादेः ॥

§ एककार्या अग्नेवासिप्रभृतयः परस्परस्मारकाः ॥

॥ विरोधाद्द्विनकुलादेरन्यतरेणापरस्मरणम् ॥

¶ अतिशयः संस्कार उपनयनादिराचार्यादिस्मारकः ॥

** प्राप्तिर्धनादेर्देतारं स्मारयति ॥

†† व्यवधानमावरणं यथा खड्गादेः कोषादि ॥

r. By one or other of the two, Pleasure and Pain, the other is called to mind ; or by these two the occasioner thereof* [is called to mind].

s. ' Desire and Aversion' remind us of that in respect of which they are entertained. †

t. ' Fear' reminds us of death, and the like, or of some reason for fear. ‡

u. ' Want,' [reminds us] of a bestower, § [who can supply our wants].

v. ' Motion,' of a branch or the like, [reminds us] of the wind, or the like [which occasions the action]. ||

w. From ' Affection,' or fondness, there is recollection of a son, &c. ¶

x. Through ' Merit and Demerit,' finally, there is recollection of causes of joy and sorrow experienced in another birth, and of the joy, &c., previously experienced.**

y. And among the things mentioned [in the aphorism], some

* सुखदुःखयोरन्यतरेणापरस्य ताभ्यां तत्प्रयोजकस्य वा स्मरणम् ।

† इच्छाद्वेषौ यद्विषयकतया गृहीतौ तस्य स्मारकौ ।

‡ भयं मरणादेर्भयहेतोर्वा स्मारकम् ।

§ अर्थित्वं दातुः ।

¶ शाखादेः क्रिया वाप्यादेः ।

¶ रागात्प्रीतेः पुत्रादेः स्मरणम् ।

** धर्माधर्माभ्यां जन्मान्तरानुभूतसुखदुःखसाधनयोः प्रागनुभूतसुखादेश्च स्मरणमिति ।

are really of themselves awakeners [of memory], and some are awakeners if imagined,—[just as a fire burns, without reference to our thoughts, while, on the other hand, the notion that there is a tiger, even when there is none, raises alarm]; and this detail [—which is unusual in an aphorism—] is for the edification of the disciple.*

z. Here ends the section on understanding's being a quality of Soul.†

aa. It was stated [under §96] that [one act of] understanding is put an end to by [another act of] understanding; and this may be the case provided that it be proved that it [viz., understanding or knowledge,] is the counter-entity to a destruction which takes place at the third instant [of the existence of the thing destroyed,—one instant being allotted to its production, and at least a second instant to its continuance—]; therefore what has to be made out is that understanding [thus] perishes as soon as produced. In regard to this we have an aphorism conveying a tenet.‡

SECTION XIII.

HOW KNOWLEDGE PERISHES AS PRODUCED.

कर्मानवस्थायिग्रहणात् । ११४ ।

*The transitoriness
of knowledge.*

*Aph. 114.—Because we apprehend it to be
transitory like Action.*

* उक्तेषुच किञ्चित्स्वरूपसक्तिञ्चिच्च ज्ञातमुद्बोधकं शि-
ष्यव्युत्पादनायचार्यं प्रपञ्चः ॥

† समाप्तं बुद्ध्यात्मगुणत्वप्रकरणम् ॥

‡ बुद्धेर्बुद्धान्तरादिनाश उक्तः । सच तृतीयक्षणवर्तिध्वंस-

a. That is to say, because we apprehend [through consciousness] the transitoriness of knowledge like that of Action.*

b. Some one doubts†:—

अव्यक्तग्रहणमनवस्थायित्वाद्विद्युत्संघाते रूपाव्यक्त-
ग्रहणवत् ॥ ११५ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 115.—From its transitoriness [—if we were to grant it—says some one], there should be indistinct apprehension [in the case of every cognition], just as there is indistinct apprehension of colour [or of coloured from] during a flash of lightning.

a. If knowledge were instantly perishable, it could not apprehend any object peculiarized by an indefinite number of cognizable distinctive properties,—just as in the case of the apprehending of anything during a flash of lightning;—and this is not the case [—because such things *are* apprehended];—therefore it is not so [—that knowledge is transitory as a flash of lightning—]; such is the meaning.‡

b. He replies§:—

प्रतियोगित्वासिद्धौ स्यादतो बुद्धेरुत्पन्नापवर्गित्वं व्युत्पाद-
नीयं । तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

* कर्मवद्बुद्धेरनवस्थायित्वग्रहणादिति ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ बुद्धिर्यद्याशुविनाशिनी स्याद्योन्याशेषविशेषधर्मविशि-
ष्टधर्मिग्राहिणी न स्याद्विद्युत्संघातकालीनवस्तुग्रहणवत् ।
न च वं । तस्मान्न तथेत्यर्थः ॥

§ उत्तरयति ॥

हेतुपादानात्प्रतिषेधव्याभ्यनुज्ञा ॥ ११६ ॥

The reply. Aph. 116.—By taking this argument, you acknowledge that which you had undertaken to disprove.

a. An acknowledgment of 'what thou hadst undertaken to disprove,' viz., that knowledge is momentarily perishable, has been made by thee,—by taking, as what was to prove the point, an argument in the shape of the example of the [knowledge during a] flash of lightning [—see B. V. §26];—and thus thou dost, in respect of that part, contradict thyself,—such is the import.*

b. Assuming, then, that, according to that example [of the flash of lightning] other cognitions are un-permanent, he says, in regard to this†:—

न प्रदीपार्चिःसन्तत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्तद्ग्रहणमनवस्था-
यित्वे ऽपि ॥ ११७ ॥

An objection anticipated. Aph. 117.—Nay [—say not that clear knowledge is therefore impossible, for]—even though it [knowledge] be un-permanent, through it there is [clear] apprehension, as there is distinct apprehension through the constant succession of the [momentarily perishing] rays of a lamp.

a. As there is distinct apprehension through the continuously

* प्रतिषेधव्यस्य बुद्धेराशुविनाशित्वस्याभ्यनुज्ञा त्वया कृता
विद्युत्सम्पातदृष्टान्तरूपस्य हेतोः साधकस्योपादानात् ।
तथाचांशतो बाध इति भावः ॥

† अथु तर्हि तद्दृष्टान्तेनान्यासां बुद्धीनामनवस्थायित्वमि-
त्यबाह ॥

streaming rays of a lamp, though these be not permanent, so may it be in the other instance also. The knowledge which is produced in the case of a flash of lightning [—§115, a.—], is distinct in respect of its own object [—or so far as it goes];—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the perishing of knowledge as soon as produced.†

c. Now there is a section on understanding's not being a quality of the *body*. And you are not to say that, because this has been proved already [in section 3d. of the present Book], it ought not to be entered upon here; because, through such cognitions as "I, who am fair [in complexion of body], do know," &c., a doubt is thrown on our arguments in regard to this; therefore, with a view to setting forth this matter explicitly, he states the source of the doubt.‡

SECTION XIV.

HOW KNOWLEDGE IS NO QUALITY OF THE BODY.

द्रव्ये स्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः । ११८ ।

*Whether knowledge be a quality
of the body.*

Aph. 118,—From our perceiving,
in a substance, the qualities of itself

* यथा प्रदीपार्चिषां सन्तन्म्यमानानामनवस्थायित्वे ऽप्य-
भिव्यक्तग्रहणं तथास्यजापि स्यात् । विद्युत्सम्पातस्थले वा
बुद्धिरत्यन्ना सा स्वविषये व्यक्तैवेति भावः ।

† समाप्तं बुद्धेरत्यन्नापवर्गित्वप्रकरणम् ।

‡ अथ बुद्धेः शरीरगुणत्वाभावप्रकरणां । नच प्रागेव
तत्सिद्धेरनारम्भाणीयमेतत् गौरो ऽहं जानामीत्याद्यनुभवेन

and of others, there arises a doubt [whether this or that quality belong to it or not].

a. From our perceiving, 'in a substance,' e. g., in sandal-wood,—a 'quality of itself,' e. g., colour,—and a 'quality of another,' e. g., cold—[which is held to be proper to water but adscititious in the case of other substances],—so likewise, from our perceiving, in the Body, colour, &c. [which are proper to it], and warmth [which is held to be peculiar to fire], the doubt arises whether knowledge, or the like, be a quality of the Body or not.*

b. The aphorism of the tenet in regard to this point.†

यावच्छरीरभावित्वादूपादीनाम् ॥ ११६ ॥

Knowledge how not a quality of the Body.

Aph. 119.—Because Colour, &c. [—the proper qualities of the Body], exist

as long as the Body.

a. At the commencement, the clause, "Intellect is not a quality of the Body," is supplied by the author of the *Bhāshya*,—meaning that it is not a distinctive quality of the Body.‡

b. The form of the confutation is as follows:—"Were knowledge, or the like, a distinctive quality of the Body, it would re-

तन्माधकानामाभासीकरणादतो विशिष्य तद्भुत्पादनाय संशयबीजमाह ॥

* द्रव्ये चन्दनादौ खगुणस्य रूपादेः परगुणस्य शैत्यादेश्च ग्रहादेवं शरीरे रूपादेरौष्ण्यस्य च ग्रहाद्बुद्धादिः शरीरगुणो न वेति संशयः ॥

† तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ न शरीरगुणश्चेतनेति आदौ भाव्यकृतः पूरणं । न शरीरविशेषगुण इत्यर्थः ॥

main as long as the Body,—as Colour, or the like does.” And the argument elaborated out of this is,—“knowledge, or the like, is not a distinctive quality of the Body, because it does not remain as long as the Body,—as Sound, or the like, [does not remain];”—or, contrariwise, as colour, or the like,* [does remain].

c. And “not to remain as long as the substance,” is [—in the case of any quality—] to be the counter-entity to a non-existence, [or, in other words, to be that of which there is an emergent non-existence] contemporaneous with what is held to be the substratum† [of the quality in question].

d. He considers the doubt whether this argument would prove too much, according to the opinion that it is the aggregate [and not the atoms] that undergoes maturation.‡

न पाकजगुषान्तरोत्पत्तेः ॥ १२० ॥

The argument objected to. Aph. 120.—Nay—[says the objector], because other qualities, produced by maturation, arise.

a. That is to say,—the alleged reason is not proper, because it proves too much, since there are, in the case of the Body,

* अयं तर्काकारः । बुद्ध्यादिकं शरीरविशेषगुणः स्याद्या-
वच्छरीरभावि स्यात् रूपादिवत् । तत्परिव्कार्यञ्चानुमानं ।
बुद्ध्यादिकं न शरीरविशेषगुणः । अथावद्द्रव्यभावित्वात् ।
शब्दवत् । व्यतिरेके । रूपवद्वा ।

† अथावद्द्रव्यभावित्वञ्च आश्रयत्वाभिमतकालीननाश-
प्रतियोगित्वम् ।

‡ पिठरपाकमते व्यभिचारमाशङ्कते ।

Colour, &c., dependent on maturation,* [—so that Colour, not existing co-extensively with the Body, should be no distinctive property of the Body, according to the reasoning in §119].

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet,†

प्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धेः पाकजानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ १२१ ॥

The reply. Aph. 121.—This is no objection, because what result from maturation exist in some opposite.

a. Though colour produced by maturation be possible in a jar, or the like, because those [colours, &c.,] that are produced by maturation take place 'in some opposite,' i. e., in another body corresponding to the former body [—the baked jar being another body than the unbaked jar—],—yet it is not possible in respect of the [human] Body, because the parts of the Body, the skin, &c., are necessarily destroyed by any instance of contact with fire‡ [—such as brings out the red colour in a jar].

b. But others say, that, he is stating another reason why it [knowledge] is not a quality of Body,—when he says 'in relation to some opposite,' &c. Of what [colours, &c.,] result from maturation, the 'opposite' is some different previous colour, or the like, —because there is no difference of colour whilst the one colour

* शरीरे पाकाधीनरूपादिना व्यभिचारात्प्रोक्तं साधनं युक्तमित्यर्थः ॥

† सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ पाकजानां प्रतिद्वन्द्विनि पूर्वशरीरप्रतिरूपके शरीरान्तरे सिद्धेः घटादौ पाकजरूपसम्भवे ऽपि शरीरे न तत्सम्भवः शरीरावयवानाच्चर्मादीनामग्निसंयोगविशेषेण नाशावश्यकत्वात् ॥

continues ; but in the present case, since, even whilst the cognition is but one, at the second instant [—in consequence of the momentariness of knowledge—§114—] it is another cognition that arises, knowledge, or the like [—thus differing from colour, &c.,—] is no distinctive quality of the Body :—such is the meaning.*

b. He mentions another reason.†

शरीरव्यापित्वात् । १२२ ॥

Another reason. Aph. 122.—Because they pervade the body.

a. Supply—the distinctive qualities of the Body. But knowledge, pleasure, &c., do not pervade the body, because it is within the limits of the heart, &c., that these affect us.‡

b. Some one doubts.§—

न केशनखादिव्वनुपलब्धेः । १२३ ॥

A doubt. Aph. 123.—Not so, because these are not found in the hair and nails, &c.

* अन्ये तु शरीरगुणत्वाभावे हेत्वन्तरमाह प्रतिद्वन्द्वीति । पाकजानां पूर्वरूपादिकं प्रतिद्वन्द्वि विरोधि एकस्मिन् रूपे विद्यमाने रूपान्तराभावात् प्रकृते त्वेकस्मिन् ज्ञाने सत्यपि द्वितीयक्षणे ज्ञानान्तरोत्पत्तेर्ज्ञानादिकं न शरीरविशेषगुण इत्यर्थः ।

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ शरीरविशेषगुणानामिति शेषः । ज्ञानसुखादिकन्तु न शरीरव्यापकं हृदयावच्छेदेन तदानुभविकत्वादिति भावः ॥

§ देशयति ।

a. The colour, &c., of the Body [—says the objector—] do not pervade their receptacle,—because the bodily fair colour, touch, &c., are not found in the hair, the nails, &c.:—such is the meaning.*

b. He censures this.†

त्वक्पर्यन्तत्वाच्चरीरस्य केशनखादिव्वप्रसङ्गः ॥ १२४ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 124.—These [qualities of the Body] are not met with in the hair, and the nails, &c., because what belongs [distinctively] to the Body is only as far as the cuticle.

a. This is plain.‡

b. He mentions another reason.§

शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात् ॥ १२५ ॥

Another reason. *Aph.* 125.—Because it is of another character than the qualities of the Body.

a. Knowledge is not a quality of the Body, 'because it is of another character than the qualities of the Body,' i. e., because, whilst it is unrecognizable by the external senses, it is yet *recognizable*.||

* शरीररूपादेराश्रयव्यापकत्वं न शरीरस्य गौररूपस्य-
शादेः केशनखादावनुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ स्पष्टम् ॥

§ हेत्वनन्तरमाह ॥

॥ बुद्धिर्न शरीरगुणः शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात् । वहिरिन्द्रि-
यावेद्यत्वे सति वेद्यत्वात् ॥

b. Some one objects.*

न रूपादीनामितरेतरवैधर्म्यात् ॥ १२६ ॥

An objection. Aph. 126.—Not so,—because colours, &c., are heterogeneous in respect of one another.

a. What you have alleged [—says the objector—] is not proper, 'because colours, &c., are heterogeneous in respect of one another,'—and so, at that rate, Touch, &c., should not be qualities of the Body, because they are not visible;—and so what you have alleged is useless :—such is the import.†

b. He clears up this.‡—

ऐन्द्रियकत्वादरूपादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ १२७ ॥

The reply. Aph. 127.—There is no objection to colour, &c., [as being qualities of the Body], because these are sensible.

a. There is no objection that colour, &c., should be qualities of the Body :—why?—'because these are sensible';—i. e., because, though this or that quality differ from another in so far as it is not apprehensible by this or that sense-organ, they do not possess that distinction from bodily quality simply, which Knowledge does possess, viz., of being cognizable though not cognizable by any external sense :—such is the import.§

* आक्षिपति ॥

† नोक्तं बुक्तं रूपादीनां परस्परवैधर्म्यात् । तथाच तद्वीत्या स्पर्शादीनां शरीरगुणत्वं न स्यादचाक्षुषत्वान्तथा-
चोक्तमप्रयोजकमिति भवः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ रूपादीनां न शरीरगुणत्वप्रतिषेधः । कृतः । ऐन्द्रि-

b. Here ends the section on understanding's being other than a quality of the Body.*

c. Now for the examination of Mind (*manas*), the turn of which has arrived. In regard to this, there being the doubt whether the Mind be one to each Body, or whether there be a pentad of minds, inasmuch as it is a fellow-worker with the Sight, &c.,—the primâ faciê view being this that a pentad of Minds is what is proper, and that thus, from the conjunction of all the [five] minds in each instance, separate continuance and simultaneousness [of conceptions] would be explicable,—we have [in regard to this point] an aphorism conveying the tenet.†

SECTION XV.

ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE MIND.

ज्ञानायौगपद्यादेकं मनः ॥ १२८ ॥

The unity of the Mind.

Aph. 128.—The Mind (*manas*) is one,
—because cognitions are not simultaneous.

यकत्वात् । तत्तद्विन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वलक्षणतत्तद्गुणवैधर्म्ये ऽपि
शरीरगुणत्वावच्छिन्नवैधर्म्यस्य वहिरिन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वे सति
ग्राह्यत्वस्याभावात् । बुद्धौ च तत्सत्त्वादिति भावः ॥

* समाप्तं बुद्धेः शरीरगुणभेदप्रकरणम् ॥

† अथ क्रमप्राप्ता मनःपरीक्षा । तत्र प्रतिशरीरमेकं
मनश्चक्षुरादिसहकारितया मनः पञ्चकं वेति संशये पञ्च-
कमेवोचितं तेन च प्रत्येकं सकलमनः सम्बन्धाद्भ्रमसङ्गयौगपद्ये
उपपद्येते इति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

a. If there were a plurality of Minds to each Body, then even in the case of separate attention there would be simultaneousness [of cognitions]; therefore the Mind is not plural;—such is the import.*

b. He ponders the doubt whether there should not be a plurality [in Mind] from the simultaneousness of cognitions in the eating of a cake [with many flavours in it], or the like.†

न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः ॥ १२९ ॥

The plurality of the Mind wrongly asserted.

Aph. 129.—Not so—[says some one], because we perceive simultaneously several acts [of cognition].

a. The mind is not one, because we perceive 'several acts,' i. e., more than one cognition [simultaneously]; such is the meaning.‡

b. He clears up this.§

अलातचक्रदर्शनवत्तदुपलब्धिराशुसञ्चारात् ॥ १३० ॥

This misconception cleared up.

Aph. 130.—The apprehension thereof is in consequence of the rapid succession, as in seeing a circle in the case of a firebrand.

* प्रतिशरीरं मनोनानात्वे व्यासङ्गस्थले ऽपि यौगपद्यं स्यादतो न मनोनानात्वमिति भावः ॥

† दीर्घशक्कुलीभक्षणादौ ज्ञानयौगपद्याज्ञानात्वं स्यादित्याशङ्कते ॥

‡ न एकं मनः अनेकक्रियाणां अनेकज्ञानानामुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

a. Even in the case of what is successive, 'the apprehension thereof,' i. e. the apprehension of simultaneousness, is 'in consequence of the rapid succession,' i. e., in consequence of the delusion that consists in its rapid succession; just as when a firebrand is whirling in a circle with an excess of rapidity, we do not perceive the succession of actions as involving any difference* [in the continuous and unbroken circular image].

b. But then [—some one may object—], since it brings about a simultaneousness [among things different], the Mind must be [not atomic, but rather, on the contrary,] all-pervading. In regard to this he says.†

यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चाणुः ॥ १३१ ॥

The Mind an atom. Aph. 131.—It [the Mind] is an atom, because what has been aforesaid is proof.

a. Supply—the Mind. 'What has been aforesaid,' i. e., the non-simultaneousness of cognitions;—because it is 'proof,' i. e., because it establishes the atomic nature of the Mind:—such is the meaning.‡

b. Here ends the section on the examination of the Mind.§

* क्रमिके ऽपि तदुपलब्धियौगपद्योपलब्धिराशुञ्चारात् शीघ्रसञ्चारात्कदोषात् । यथा अलातचक्रे वेगातिशयेन भ्राम्यमाणे क्रियासन्तानस्य भेदेनानुपलब्धिरिति ॥

† ननु यौगपद्योपपादकतया मनसो वैभुत्वं स्यादत्राह ॥

‡ मन इति शेषः । यथोक्तस्य ज्ञानायौगपद्यस्य हेतुत्वाच्चनोऽणुत्वसाधकत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

§ समाप्तं मनः परीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

c. Now, as it presents itself, there is a section on the fact that the Body is caused by this or that person's deserts. In regard to this, there being a difference of opinion as to whether or not the Body be caused by the desert inhering in each person, the negative alternative is of three kinds—(1) because there is no such thing as desert, or (2) because this is not the cause of the Body, or (3) because desert does not inhere in Soul. Of these he rejects the first view* [—as follows].

SECTION XVI.

HOW THE BODY IS THE RESULT OF ONE'S DESERTS.

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ १३२ ॥

The body whence. Aph. 132.—It is produced through the connection of the fruit of former deeds.

a. 'Of former deeds,' such as sacrifice, gifts, injuries, &c.;—'the fruit'—in the shape of merit or demerit;—'through the connection,' i. e., through the co-operation;—'it,' i. e., the body, is produced.†

* अथ प्रसङ्गाच्छरीरस्य तत्तत्पुरुषाद्वृष्टनिष्पाद्यताप्रकरणं । तत्र शरीरं तत्तत्पुरुषसमवेताद्वृष्टनिमित्तकं नवेति विप्रतिपत्तौ निषेधकोटिस्त्रेधा अद्वष्टाभावात् तस्य शरीरहेतुत्वाभावात् अद्वष्टस्य पुरुषसमवायाद्वा । तत्राद्यं पक्षं निरस्यति ॥

† पूर्वकृतस्य यागदानहिंसादेः फलस्य धर्माधर्मरूपस्य अनुबन्धात्सहकारिभावात्तस्य शरीरस्योत्पत्तिः ॥

b. Some one objects.*

भूतेभ्यो मूर्त्त्युपादानवत्तदुपादानम् ॥ १३३ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 133.—It [—says some one—] is formed of the elements, just as a statue is formed.

a. The expression 'of the elements' is for precision, [—for it might have been *inferred* that the Body was formed of the *elements* if it was formed as a statue is—]. And so, as a 'statue,' of clay, or the like, is 'formed,' or has its origin, from 'the elements,' i. e., from atoms, which have no reference to desert,—just so 'it,' viz., the Body, is 'formed,' i. e., has its origin,—viz., from atoms which have no reference to desert:—such is the meaning.†

b. He clears up this.‡

न साध्यसमत्वात् ॥ १३४ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 134.—Not so,—because this [example of yours] is in the same predicament with what you have to prove.

a. What you have alleged is not proper, because the example is 'in the same predicament with what is to be proved,' i. e., in the same predicament with the subject [of your proposition, viz., the Body]; for, since we hold that clay, &c., also are produced from atoms which *have* a reference to desert [—the atoms of the

* आक्षिपति ॥

† भूतेभ्य इति सावधारणं । तथाचादृष्टनिरपेक्षेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः परमाणुभ्यो मूर्त्तेर्मृदादेरुपादानमारम्भो यथा तथैव तस्य शरीरस्य उपादानमारम्भः परमाणुभ्यो ऽदृष्ट-निरपेक्षेभ्य इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

material world so comporting themselves as to work out the designs of retributive justice—, it is not established [—nor are you at liberty to take for granted—] that there [—i. e., in the case of the clay of the image], the origination is not therefrom [—i. e., not from desert]:—such is the import.*

b. In a couple of aphorisms he states that it is not the same case [with the Body] as with clay, &c.,† [formed into images].

नोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वान्मातापित्रोः ॥ १२५ ॥

Further reasons. *Aph.* 135.—Not so,—because father and mother are the cause of its production.

तथाहारस्य ॥ १३६ ॥

Aph. 136.—So too eating [food offered to the manes].

a. The Body is not the same as clay, &c., because the Body results from the desert of the parents;—for the means of [obtaining] a son, &c., is the merit, resulting from worship, &c., of the gods, which [merit] leads to the experiencing the delight produced by the beholding, &c., of a son.‡

b. Likewise [the Body differs, as regards its production, from an earthen image,] because what conduces to the birth of a son,

* नोक्तं युक्तं दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यसमत्वात् पक्षसमत्वात् ।
मृदादेरप्यदृष्टसापेक्षपरमाणुभ्य एवोत्पत्तेरुपगमात्तदजन्म-
त्वस्य तत्रासिद्धेरिति भावः ॥

† न मृदादिसाम्यमित्याह सूत्राभ्याम् ।

‡ शरीरे न मृदादिसाम्यं मातापित्रोः कर्मणः शरीरो-
त्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वात् पुत्रदर्शनजन्मसुखानुभावकादृष्टस्य देवा-
राधनादिजन्मस्य पुत्रादिनिमित्तत्वात् ॥

&c., is, through desert, the 'eating' or partaking of the cakes offered to ancestors, &c. : such is the meaning* [according to some.]

c. He states what debars the opinion opposed to the fact that the eating [of the sacrificial cakes] co-operates with desert† [in bringing about the birth of a son].

प्राप्तौचानियमात् । १३७ ।

A further reason.

Aph. 137.—And because there is no certainty though there be present [the other requisites].

a. Though there be present both husband and wife, yet since, on their taking steps, there is no certainty of impregnation, therefore it is indispensable that this [eating of the sacrificial cakes] should co-operate with desert :—such is the import.‡

b. But then [some one may say], let the Body be [held to be] produced by certain Elements which are quite irrespective of desert, through some particular self-determining nature [—such as neither requires nor admits of any analysis or explanation—]; and if you do not admit such a self-determining nature, then, since a Body is conjoined with every Soul, we should find a state of community,—[there being nothing to determine which Soul should tenant which Body]. Therefore he replies.§—

* एवं आहारस्य पितामहपिण्डभोजनादेरदृष्टद्वारा पुत्रजनकत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† आहारस्यादृष्टसहकारित्वे विपक्षे बाधकमाह ।

‡ प्राप्तौ दम्पत्योः सम्प्रयोगे तु गर्भधारणस्य यतो न नियमस्ततो ऽदृष्टस्य सहकारित्वमावश्यकमिति भावः ॥

§ मन्वदृष्टनिरपेक्षैरेव भूतैः क्वैश्चित् स्वभावविशेषाच्छरीरं

शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत्संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म ॥ १३८ ॥

Bodies assigned on what principle.

Aph. 138.—Desert, as it is the cause of the production of the Body, so is it the cause of the taking place of conjunction [between a Soul and this or that Body].

a. Now he rejects the second view [§131, c], held by the *Sāṅkhyas*, viz.,—that the Body is not produced by desert; for it is accounted for just by its being the nature of the Primal Agency to originate; but that what is dependent on desert is the departure of the previous Body which obstructs [the coming into existence of a subsequent one], just as the nature of water to follow a slope is dependent on the departure of what confines it.*

एतेनामियमः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ १३९ ॥

The assignment not fortuitous.

Aph. 139.—By this [theory of ours] the absence of rule is denied [—which would have to be admitted on the *Sāṅkhya* view].

a. 'By this,' i. e., by this decision that desert is the cause [§138]. But 'absence of rule,' means the Soul's connection sometimes with a human body, and sometimes another sort [of connection];—and one body having all its members, and another one being irregular as regards its members,—and so on. But

जन्यतां । स्वभावानभ्युपगमे च शरीरस्य सर्वात्मसंयुक्तत्वात्
साधारण्यापत्तिरत आह ॥

* अथ शरीरं नादृष्टजन्यं प्रकृतेरारम्भस्वभावत्वादेव
तदुपपत्तेः प्रतिबन्धकपूर्वशरीरापगमत्वदृष्टाधीनः जलस्य
निम्नानुसरणस्वभावस्येव बन्धापगमाधीनत्वमिति द्वितीयपक्षं
सांख्यसम्मतं निरस्यति ॥

there would be absence of rule [in such a state of things] if it were not agreed that desert is the cause,—but not on our theory,* [which teaches that all these varieties of condition are retributive].

. b. Moreover if it [—the Body—] were originated merely by Nature, without reference to desert, the [same kind of] Body would be common to all Souls :—such is the import.†

c. But the followers of Arhat [—viz., the *Jainas*—] hold that desert is a quality [—not of Soul,—see §131, c—but] of the Mind (*manas*) and of atoms. That is to say,—the earthy atoms in concert, by force of desert attached to them, originate the Body; and the Mind, impelled by its own desert, enters the Body; and that desert, just through its own nature, brings about the joy or suffering of the Soul (*puḍgala*). To this he replies.‡—

पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गो ऽपवर्गे ॥ १४० ॥

*Objection to the
Jaina view.*

Aph. 140.—This [assignment of a Body] would present itself again, even when there had been emancipation.

* एतेन अदृष्टहेतुकत्वव्यवस्थापनेन । अनियमस्तु आ-
त्मनः कदाचिन्मानुषशरीरसम्बन्धः कदाचिदग्न्यादृशः कि-
ञ्चिच्च शरीरं सकलावयवं किञ्चिच्च विकलावयवमित्यादि ।
अदृष्टहेतुत्वानभ्युपगमे त्वयमनियमो न त्वस्मन्मते ॥

† किञ्चादृष्टनिरपेक्षप्रकृतिमात्रारब्धत्वे सर्वात्मसाधार-
ण्यं शरीरस्य स्यादिति भावः ॥

‡ आर्हतास्तु मनःपरमाणुगुणमदृष्टं मन्यन्ते । तथाहि ।
पार्थिवाः परमाणवः सद्दिताः स्वादृष्टवशाच्छरीरमारभन्ते ।

a. If the atoms originated a Body, for this or that Soul to have experience, quite without account taken of the desert of this or that Soul, then even when some Soul had been emancipated, they would originate a Body, with a view to its having experience*—[which it was entitled to be utterly rid of].

b. He blames also the opinion that desert is a quality of the Mind† [and not of the Soul].

मनःकर्मनिमित्तत्वाच्च संयोगाद्यनुच्छेदः । १४१ ।

Further objection.

Aph. 141.—And there would [in that case] be no putting an end to the conjunction [of Soul with Body], &c., because of its being caused by the desert of the Mind.

a. There would be no putting an end to 'the conjunction' [§138] which originates the Body and gives rise to knowledge, &c.;—why? Because the 'desert,' merit or demerit, which [by the hypothesis] belongs to the *Mind*, is the cause thereof:—such a continuance of conjunction could not be put a stop to, because this [desert of the Mind] must be eternal,—[there being no assignable reason why it should cease]:—and even if it were not eternal, it would be out of the question that what should put an end to it should be experience belonging to a different receptacle: [—in other words, desert chargeable against the

मनश्च खादृष्टप्रयुक्तं शरीरमाविशति तच्चादृष्टं स्वभावादेव पुद्गलस्य सुखदुःखे साधयतीति तत्रोत्तरमाह ।

* तत्तदात्मादृष्टोपग्रहं विनैव तत्तदात्मापभोगाय परमाणवश्चेच्छरीरमारभन्ते मुक्ते ऽपि तदात्मनि तद्भोगाय शरीरमारभेरन् ।

† अदृष्टस्य मनोगुणत्वमपि दूषयति ।

Mind could not be wiped out by experience undergone by the *Soul*;] such is the import.*

b. What is the harm if there be no end to the conjunction [of *Soul* and *Body*]? To this he replies.†

. . नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गश्च प्रापणानुपपत्तेः ॥ १४२ ॥

Force of the objection. *Aph.* 142.—And we should find it [viz., mundane life] eternal, because there could be no reaching [the end of it].

a. Were it so [as alleged at §139, c.], since there would be no possibility of ‘reaching,’ i. e., no possibility of death,—we should find the *Body*, &c., to be ‘eternal,’ i. e., indestructible.‡

b. Some one objects.§

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववत् स्यात् ॥ १४३ ॥

An inadmissible conjecture. *Aph.* 143.—This [says some one] may be just like the eternity of the blackness of an atom.

a. As the blackness of an atom, though eternal [in so far as it is without beginning], surceases,—so also the *Body*, &c., surceases. ||

* संयोगस्य शरीरारम्भकस्य ज्ञानादिजनकस्य च उच्छेदे न स्यात् । कुतः । मनसो यत्कर्म अदृष्टं तन्निमित्तत्वात् तस्य नित्यत्वान्नादृशसंयोगधारा नोच्छेद्येत । तस्यानित्यत्वेऽपि व्यधिकरणभोगस्य तन्नाशकत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्ग इति भावः ॥

† संयोगानुच्छेदे का क्षतिरत आह ॥

‡ तथा सति प्रापणस्य मरणस्यानुपपत्तेः शरीरादेर्नित्यत्वस्याविनाशित्वस्य प्रसङ्गः ॥

§ आक्षिपति ॥

॥ यथा परमाणोः श्यामता नित्यापि निवर्त्तते तथा शरीरादिकमपि निवर्त्तते ॥

b. An aphorism conveying the tenet.*

नाहताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ॥ १४४ ॥

This point settled.

Aph. 144.—Not so,—because it would turn out that we were accepting what is undemonstrable.

a. 'What is undemonstrable,' i. e., what is not susceptible of proof;—it would turn out that we were 'accepting,' i. e., were admitting, this. For, whilst the cause [of mundane existence], viz., [by hypothesis,] the desert lodged in the atoms [§141, a], exists, there could be no putting an end to the body:—moreover thus [—i. e., according to your argument—] we should have to admit the eternity of the blackness of atoms, which cannot be submitted to evidence;—and so the example is not a real one, † [and goes for nothing].

b. Here ends the section on the Body's resulting from desert. ‡

c. And so ends the Second Diurnal Portion of the Third Book. §

d. Thus is completed, in the commentary on the Nyāya Aphorisms composed by the venerable Viśwanātha Bhaṭṭāchārya, the comment on the Third Book. ||

* सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

† अहतास्य प्रमाणाविषयस्य अभ्यागमः स्वीकारस्तत्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः । नहि परमाणुनिष्ठस्यादृष्टस्य कारणस्य सत्त्वे शरीरोच्छेदः स्यादेवमणुश्यामतानित्यत्वस्यापि प्रमाणागोचरस्य स्वीकारस्यानथाच दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः ॥

‡ समाप्तं शरीरस्यादृष्टनिष्पाद्यताप्रकरणम् ॥

§ समाप्तञ्च तृतीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥

॥ इति श्रीविश्वनाथभट्टाचार्यकृतायां न्यायसूत्रवृत्तौ तृतीयाध्यायवृत्तिः समाप्ता ॥

THE
NYÁYA APHORISMS OF GAUTAMA.
BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

a. I take refuge with that pre-eminent Light, filled with splendour that surpasses hundreds of thousands of suns, who haunts the minds of the devout,—that undescrivable black Light [—meaning Krishna—], the giver of our desires, lovely as a hundred thousand Cupids.*

b. In the Third [Book] was examined just the set of six of the Objects [B. I. §9] beginning with Soul, which [set] is in the shape of causes, [—Soul being the substantial cause of knowledge, and so on]. Now the [remaining] set of six, beginning with Effort (*pravritti*), which [set] consists of effects, is to be examined, since the occasion offers, and because of their relation as effects [to the foregoing].†

* सूरकोटिविजयिप्रभाभरं योगिमानसचरं परं महः ।
श्यामलं किमपि धाम कामदं कामकोटिकमनीयमाश्रये ॥

† तृतीये तावदात्मादिप्रमेयषट्कं कारणरूपं परोक्षितमथ
कार्यरूपं प्रवृत्त्यादिप्रमेयषट्कमवसरतो हेतुमङ्गावेनच परी-
क्षणीयम् ॥

c. Although the set of six is to be examined in the First Diurnal Portion, but knowledge of the truth [—which is not one of the set—] in the Second Diurnal Portion, yet the matter of this Book is just the examination of the set of six, because that [viz., true knowledge] is the cause of Liberation [which is one of the six,] and because this falls within the examination of Liberation, inasmuch as it requires to be examined as supplementary* [to the determination thereof].

d. And, among these things, the matter of the First Diurnal Portion is the examination of the set of six as regards their possessing the characters enunciated [in the First Book]. In this First Diurnal Portion there are fourteen Sections; and, of those, the matter of the first section is the examination of Effort and of the Faults, as to whether they possess the natures ascribed to them. And there is no subdivision of the section [which you may imagine ought to be made] because of the difference of the topics [embraced in it]; for, by the two mutually respective portions, viz., the expression “As” [in the first aphorism,] and “So” [in the second and last,] he informs us that it embraces but one topic, in the shape, viz., of whether the things possess the natures ascribed to them.†

* यद्यपि प्रथमाङ्गिके षड् परीक्षणीयं द्वितीयाङ्गिके तु तत्त्वज्ञानं तथापि तस्यापवर्गहेतुत्वादुपोङ्गातेनच परीक्षणीयत्वादपवर्गपरीक्षान्तःपातितया षड्परीक्षैवाध्यायार्थः ॥

† तत्रचोद्दिष्टधर्मवन्तया षड्परीक्षा प्रथमाङ्गिकार्थः । तत्र प्रथमाङ्गिके चतुर्दश प्रकरणानि तत्रचोक्त रूपवन्तया प्रवृत्तिदोषयोः परीक्षा प्रथमप्रकरणार्थः । नचार्थभेदात् प्रकरणभेदः यथा तथेति परस्परसाकांक्षाभ्यामवयवाभ्यामुक्तरूपवत्त्वलक्षणीकार्थवत्त्वकथनात् ॥

e. The examination of 'Effort' being looked for, we have an aphorism as follows :*

THE FIRST DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION I.

GENERAL EXAMINATION OF EFFORT AND OF THE FAULTS.

प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्ता । १ ।

Effort. *Aph.* 1.—As Effort is as has been said,—[so are the Faults].

a. Some here fill up the ellipsis with the expression "just so," [—making the aphorism to mean "Effort is just so as has been asserted" at B. I, §17]. This is not right. If it were so, then the 'expectancy' of the word "as," [—which always looks out for "so"—] being satisfied in this very place, there would be, by our having to supply another "as," for the word "So," too, which stands in the next aphorism, a splitting of the section [—or, in other words, a distinction of topics,—see Introduction, d]. Therefore the construction [of the "As"] with the word "So," which stands in the next aphorism, is the right one.†

b. The meaning, in combination with the next aphorism, is, that, as 'Effort' possesses the character ascribed to it, so the 'Faults' also possess the character ascribed to them. The defi-

* प्रवृत्तिपरीक्षायामाकांक्षितायां सूत्रम् ।

† अत्र तथैवेति शेषं पूरयन्ति । तदयुक्तं । तथा सत्यत्रय यथाशब्दस्याकांक्षाशान्तावग्रिमसूत्रस्थतथाशब्दे ऽपि यथा-शब्दान्तरस्य पूरणीयतया प्रकरणभेदापत्तेस्तस्मादग्रिमसूत्र-स्थतथाशब्देनान्वयो युक्तः ।

nition is established, because the definition stated [at B. I, 17], viz., "Effort is what originates the voice, the intellect, and the body," is true :—such is the import.*

c. The examination of the 'Faults' having offered itself, he says.†

तथा दोषाः ॥ २ ॥

Faults. Aph. 2.—So are the Faults.

a. So also are the Faults [rightly defined, as is Effort, §1]:—they really possess the character assigned [at B. I. §18], viz., "Whose character is to stimulate :"—so that there is nothing here unestablished ;—such is the import.‡

b. Here ends the section on the examination in general of Effort and of the Faults.§

c. Now, with the view of examining the Faults in respect of what is peculiar to them, viz., their being of three sets, there is a section on their being of three sets. In regard to this there is an aphorism conveying the tenet as follows :||

* प्रवृत्तिर्यथा उक्तलक्षणवती तथा दोषा अप्युक्तलक्षणवन्त इत्यग्रिमसूत्रसंबलितो ऽर्थः । प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भ इत्युक्तलक्षणसत्त्वात् सिद्धं लक्षणमिति भावः ॥

† दोषपरीक्षायां प्राप्तायामाह ॥

‡ तथा दोषा अपि । प्रवर्तनालक्षणा इत्युक्तलक्षणवन्त एवेति नासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

§ समाप्तं प्रवृत्तिदोषसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

॥ अथ त्रैराशयेन विशेषेण दोषपरीक्षायामतन्त्रैराशय-प्रकरणं । तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

SECTION II.

EXAMINATION OF THE FAULTS.

तत्रैराशुं रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात् । ३ ।

The Faults what.

Aph. 3.—There are three sets thereof, because of the subdivision of Desire, Aversion, and Misconception.

a. 'Thereof,' i. e., of Faults, there are three 'sets,' or parties; but it is not the case that Desire and Aversion and Delusion are severally single,—because of their 'subdivision,' i. e., because of their possessing subordinate divisions; and so, since fear, and grief, and disdain, &c., are really included among these, [—the division is exhaustive—] there is no deficiency of division,—nor, since they possess heterogeneous characters, in the shape of the nature of Desire, and of Aversion, and of Misconception, is there any superfluity of division,* [—the members of the division do not include one another].

b. But the character of Desire, e. g., is proved, by consciousness, to exist in Love—and so of the others—[Aversion in Anger, and so on]. Among these [three sets of feelings], the set of Desires is Love, Spite, Censoriousness, Acquisitiveness, Covetousness, Deceitfulness, and Hypocrisy.†

* तेषां दोषाणां त्रयो राशयः त्रयः यच्चा जतु रागद्वेष-
मोहानामेकैकत्वं तेषामर्थान्तरभावात् अवात्तरभेदवत्त्वात् ।
तथा च भयशोकमानादीनामेवैकान्तभावात् त्रिभागन्यूनत्वं
इच्छात्वद्वेषत्वमिथ्याज्ञानत्वरूपविरुद्धधर्मवत्त्वात् त्रिभागा-
धिक्यम् ॥

† इच्छात्वादिकन्तु रागादावनुभवसिद्धं । तत्र रागपक्षः
कामो मत्सरः स्पृहा दृष्ट्या लोभो माया इत्येव इति ॥

c. 'Love' (*kāma*) is a desire of enjoyment.*

d. 'Spite' (*matsara*) is the desire of obstructing another's wishes, without aiming at benefit to oneself:—e. g., that nobody is to drink water out of the king's well, [though he cannot drink it all himself], &c.†

e. In like manner 'Censoriousness' (*sprīhā*) is also a Desire [—the desire, viz.,] of obscuring the merits of another.‡

f. 'Acquisitiveness' (*trishnā*) is the desire of acquisition not in opposition to justice. 'Miserliness' (*kārpanya*) also,—the desire that this of mine should not be lost,—in the shape of the desire of preserving one's wealth even by omitting to make a proper expenditure,—is just a species of Acquisitiveness.§

g. 'Covetousness' (*lobha*) is the desire of another's wealth in opposition to justice.||

h. 'Deceitfulness' (*māyā*) is the desire of cheating another.¶

i. 'Hypocrisy' (*dambha*) is the desire of celebrating one's own superiority, in virtuousness, or the like, falsely.**

* कामो रिरंसा ॥

† मत्सरः स्वप्रयोजनप्रतिसम्भानं विना पराभिमतनिवारणेच्छा । यथा राजकीयादुदपानान्नेदकं पेयं इत्यादि ॥

‡ एवं परगुणनिवारणेच्छापि स्पृहा ॥

§ धर्माविरोधेन प्राप्तीच्छा तृष्णा । इदं मे न क्षीयतामितिच्छा उचितव्ययाकरणेनापि धनरक्षणेच्छारूपं कापय्यमपि तृष्णाभेद एव ॥

॥ धर्मविरोधेन परद्रव्येच्छा लोभः ॥

¶ परवञ्चनेच्छा माया ॥

** कपटेन धार्मिकत्वादिना स्वोत्कषस्थापनेच्छा दम्भः ॥

j. The set of Aversions is Anger, Envy, Malignity, Hatred, Implacability, and Disdain.*

k. 'Anger' (*krodha*) is a particular kind of Fault which is the cause of redness of the eyes, &c.†

l. 'Envy' (*irshyá*), is, in respect of something common to both, since it belongs to another, an Aversion to the possession thereof,—as the endless [envy] of co-heirs.‡

m. 'Malignity' (*asúyá*) is Aversion to the merits &c. of another.§

n. 'Hatred' (*droha*) is Aversion [stimulating] to destruction. But deadly injury (*hinsá*) is a result of hatred; but others hold it to be [what is meant by] hatred.||

o. 'Implacability' (*amarsha*) is, towards him who has committed an offence, the Aversion of him who cannot bear it.¶

p. 'Disdain' (*abhimána*) is, towards an injurer, the Aversion in the soul of him who *does* nothing.**

* द्वेषपक्षः क्रोध ईर्ष्या ऽहत्या द्रोहो ऽमर्षो ऽभिमान इति ॥

† क्रोधो नेत्रलौहित्यादिहेतुर्दोषविशेषः ॥

‡ ईर्ष्या साधारणे वस्तुनि परस्वत्वात् तद्गृहीतरि द्वेषः ।
यथा दुरन्ता दायादानाम् ॥

§ अहत्या परगुणादौ द्वेषः ॥

॥ द्रोहो नाशाय द्वेषः । हिंसा तु द्रोहजन्या । परे तु तां द्रोहं मन्यन्ते ॥

¶ अमर्षः कृतापराधे असमर्थस्य द्वेषः ॥

** अभिमानो ऽपकारिण्यकिञ्चित्करस्यात्मनि द्वेषः ॥

g. The set of Misconceptions is Error, Doubt, Confutation, Pride, Infatuation, Fear, and Sorrow.*

r. 'Error' (*viparyaya*) is another synonyme for false knowledge,—the being sure of something that is not true.†

s. 'Doubt' (*sansaya*) is the conceiving that a contradictory existence and non-existence belong to one and the same subject. This same is also expressed by the term 'Dubiety' (*vichikitsa*).‡

t. 'Confutation' (*tarka*) consists in the coming upon a Major [confessedly inadmissible], on our admitting [for the sake of argument,] a Minor§ [which is untrue, but which the opponent insists upon. For example,—our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill, if there be no fire, while we see the smoke, is the Confutation of there being no fire in the hill].

u. 'Pride' (*mana*) is a fancy of superiority, through the imputation to oneself of some merit that does not belong to one. 'Contempt' (*smaya*) also,—in the shape of the fancy that there is no merit in some meritorious person,—is included under 'Pride'.||

v. 'Infatuation' (*pramada*) is the fancy that something can-

* मोहपक्षः विपर्ययसंशयतर्कमानप्रमादभयशोकाः ॥

† विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानापरपर्यायो ऽवयार्थनिश्चयः ॥

‡ एकधर्मिकविरुद्धभावाभावज्ञानं संशयः । स एव वि-
चिकित्सेत्युच्यते ॥

§ व्याप्यारोपाज्ञापकप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः ॥

॥ आत्मन्यविद्यमानगुणारोपेणोत्कर्षधीर्मानः । गुणवति
निर्गुणत्वधीरूपस्योऽपि मानेऽन्तर्भवति ॥

not be done, even when it has already been ascertained that it can be done ; and so too conversely.*

w. 'Fear' (*bhaya*) is, on the befalling of some cause of distress, the not knowing any possibility of getting rid of it.†

x. 'Sorrow' (*soka*) is, when something loved is absent, the not knowing any possibility of attaining it.‡

y. He ponders a doubt.§

नैकप्रत्यनीकभावात् ॥ ४ ॥

An objection. Aph. 4.—Not so,—because they are the opposites of one single thing.

a. There is no difference [—says some one—] between Desire and the rest [§3], 'because they are the opposites of one single thing'. That is so [i. e., has no difference,] which is the opposite, or contrary, of one single thing,—that is to say, because destructible by that one thing :—for knowledge of the truth is the one contrary of these|| [alleged different Faults].

b. He clears up this.¶

* प्रमादः पूर्वकर्त्तव्यतया निश्चितेष्यकर्त्तव्यताधीः । एवं वैपरीत्येऽपि ॥

† भवमनिष्टहेतूपनिपाते तत्परित्यागानर्हताज्ञानम् ॥

‡ शोक इष्टवियोगे तद्भाभानर्हताज्ञानम् ॥

§ शङ्कते ॥

॥ रागादीनां भेदे न एकप्रत्यनीकभावात् । एकस्मिन् प्रत्यनीकभावो विरोधित्वं यस्य तत्तथा तेनैकनाश्रयत्वादि-
त्यर्थः । एकं हि तस्वज्ञानमेषां विरोधि ॥

¶ समाधत्ते ॥

व्यभिचाराद्देतुः ॥ ५ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 5.—This is no argument, because it wanders away [and so would prove too much].

a. The fact of having one and the same opposite [or destroyer] is no reason for denying a distinction,—‘because it wanders away’ [to cases where the thing to be proved is not present] ;—because colours differ, although destructible by the conjunction of one and the same fire.*

b. Moreover, these [different ‘Faults’] are *not* removable by one [and the same remedy], because it is true knowledge that is the remover of ‘Misconception,’ and it is through the removal thereof that ‘Desire,’ &c., are removed ;—so, to this purpose, he says.†—

तेषां मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

The worst of the ‘Faults’. *Aph.* 6.—Of these, ‘Misconception’ is the worse ; because, in the case of him who is not under misconception, neither of the others comes into existence.

a. Although the expression “the worst” (*pāpatama* or *pāpishtha*) would have been proper, according to the rule directing “-est” or “most” (*ishthan* or *tamap*) in the case of the comparison of many [—i. e., of more than two],—still he compares them by taking them two by two,—for “-er” (*iyasun*) is enjoined when the comparison is of two ;—so, of ‘Desire’ and ‘Misconception’, or [again] of ‘Aversion’ and ‘Misconception’, ‘Miscon-

* एकविरोधित्वं भेदनिषेधे न हेतुर्व्यभिचारात् एकाग्नि-
संयोगनाश्रयत्वे ऽपि रूपादीनां भेदात् ॥

† किञ्च नैतेषामेकनिवर्त्यत्वं तत्त्वज्ञानस्य मोहनिवर्त्त-
कत्वात्तन्निवृत्त्या रागादिनिवृत्तेरित्याशयेनाह ॥

ception' is 'the *worser*', i. e., the root of evil,—in short, the more earnestly to be shunned. He states the reason;—because, in the case 'of him who is not under misconception', i. e., who is void of misconception,—there is neither 'Desire' nor 'Aversion':—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

प्राप्तस्तर्हि निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावादर्थान्तरभावो-
दोषेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 7.—Then we have here [—says some one—] a difference [of 'Misconception'] from the [other] 'Faults', through their relation of cause and effect.

a. Since 'Misconception' is the *cause* of the 'Faults', it must be something other than a 'Fault', because, where there is no distinction, there cannot be the relation of cause and effect.‡

b. 'From the faults',—here the sign of the plural is employed on the strength of the included subdivisions,§ [—see §3,—'Desire' and 'Aversion' making, otherwise, only a case of duality].

* यद्यपि बहूनां निद्वारणे इष्टनस्तमपो वा विधानात्
पापतमः पापिष्ठ इति वा युक्तं तथापि द्वौ द्वावधिकृत्य नि-
र्धारणं द्वयोर्निर्धारणे ईयसुनो विधानात्तेन रागमोहयोर्द्वेष-
मोहयोर्वा मोहः पापोयाननर्थमूलं बलवद्देव्य इति यावत् ।
हेतुमाह नामूढस्य मोहशून्यस्य रागद्वेषयोरभावादित्यर्थः ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ दोषनिमित्तत्वान्मोहस्य दोषभिन्नत्वं स्यादभेदेन कार्य-
कारणभावाभावात् ॥

§ दोषेभ्य इत्यान्तर्गणिकभेदाद्बहुवचनं ॥

c. He repels* [the objection in §7].

न दोषलक्षणादरोधान्मोहस्य । ८ ।

The reply. Aph. 8.—Not so,—because 'Misconception' does involve the character of 'Fault'.

a. 'Misconception' is a 'Fault', because it really has the character of a 'Fault';—and the relation of cause and effect is not excluded, because it differs individually,†—[though not generically, from the two others].

b. Having shown that there was no occasion [for the argument advanced under §7], he states further that it would prove too much.‡

निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेश्च तुल्यजातीयावामप्रति-
षेधः । ९ ।

Further reply. Aph. 9.—And since homogeneous things may consistently be [mutually] cause and effect, this is no objection.

a. Since two things, though they have the same genus, as two substances or two qualities, 'may consistently be cause and effect', i. e., are admitted to be cause and consequent, it is not proper to deny [—on that ground—] the homogeneousness§ [of 'Misconception' with the other 'Faults'].

* निराकरोति ।

† मोहस्य दोषलक्षणसत्त्वाद्दोषत्वं व्यक्तिभेदाच्च हेतुहेतुमङ्गावो न विरुध्यत इति भावः ।

‡ अप्रयोजकत्वमुक्त्वाऽनैकान्तिकत्वमप्याह ।

§ एकजातीययोरपि द्रव्ययोर्गुणयोश्च निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेर्हेतुहेतुमङ्गावखीकारान्तुल्यजातीयत्वप्रतिषेधो न युक्त इति ।

b. Here ends the section on the investigation of the 'Faults.'*

c. As its turn has arrived, since 'Transmigration' has to be investigated,—there being a doubt whether transmigration pertain to the Body, or the Understanding, or the Soul, we have an aphorism conveying the tenet.†

SECTION III.

TRANSMIGRATION EXAMINED.

आत्मनित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥

Transmigration why belonging to the Soul.

Aph. 10.—Since the Soul is eternal, [it is to it that] Transmigration is proved

[to belong].

a. The Soul, for reasons aforesaid, being eternal, it is to it that Transmigration is proved to belong;‡ [and it could not belong to the Body, which is different in successive births].

b. But then [some one may say—], Transmigration must be described by means of its *production* [—i. e. by telling us how and whence it originates];—and this [—viz., production, of anything whatsoever,—] cannot take place either from what is homogeneous [with the alleged product], or from what is heterogeneous, because [if there were *any such thing* as production,] it would extend unduly to *primal* earth, &c.,—for there is no proof that this is eternal;—therefore Transmigration [—having never been produced—] is not a real thing:—so [—to obviate this

* समाप्तं दोषपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

† क्रमप्राप्ततया प्रेत्यभावे परीक्षणीये प्रेत्यभावः शरीरस्य बुद्धेरात्मनो वेति संशये सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ॥

‡ आत्मनः पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या नित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावस्य सिद्धिः ॥

objection—], either as it is a prerequisite [to the establishment of Transmigration], or because it presents itself, he shows the way in which production *does* take place.*

व्यक्ताद्यक्तानां प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

*Production
how.*

Aph. 11.—Of the distinct from the distinct,—because there is the evidence of sense [that such is the case].

a. Supply—"there is the production" of the distinct. 'From the distinct,' i. e., from what has some [given] distinct genus,—e. g., from earth,—there is the production of 'of the distinct,' i. e., of things having that distinct genus,—e. g., derivative earth† [in the shape of jars, &c].

b. Not having understood this, some one doubts.‡

न घटाद्घटानिष्पत्तेः ॥ १२ ॥

An objection.

Aph. 12.—Nay [—says some one—], for a jar is not produced from a jar.

* ननु प्रेत्यभाव उत्पत्तिनिरूप्यः सा च न सजातीयाद्विजातीयाद्वा सम्भवति आद्यपृथिव्यादौ व्यभिचारात्तन्नित्यत्वे मानाभावादतः प्रेत्यभावोऽसिद्ध इत्युपोद्धातात् प्रसङ्गाद्देत्यत्तिप्रकारं दर्शयति ॥

† व्यक्तानामुत्पत्तिरिति शेषः व्यक्ताद्यक्तजातीयात् पृथिव्यादितः व्यक्तानां व्यक्तजातीयानां जन्यपृथिव्यादीनामुत्पत्तिः ॥

‡ अबुद्धा शङ्कते ॥

a. The import [of the objection] is, that if there be not such relation of cause and effect in the case of special objects [—so that a jar shall result from a jar—], then it cannot be so in the general case* [of the alleged production of earthy things from earth].

b. He clears up this point,—resting on the fact that the exception in the particular case [where a jar is undeniably not the product of a jar,] is no negative, since such is not at all the case generically.†

व्यक्ताद्घटनिष्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ १३ ॥

The reply. *Aph.* 13.—This is no objection, for the jar is produced from what [—though not a *jar*—] is distinct [in its generic character].

a. This [that is alleged in §12,] is no objection to the production of like from like,—because, e. g., the jar is produced, e. g., from the [constitutive] bowl-shaped halves, which have the nature of earth [that exists in the resulting product]:—and the alleged assertion has nothing to support it;—such is the import.‡

b. Here ends the section on the examination of Transmigration.§

* विशेषकार्यकारणभावाभावे सामान्यतोऽपि न तथेति-
भावः ॥

† विशेषतो व्यभिचारो न विरोधी सामान्यतस्तु नास्त्येवे-
त्याशयवान् समाधत्ते ॥

‡ सजातीयात्मजातीयोत्पत्तेर्न प्रतिषेधः पृथिवीजाती-
यात् कपालादितो घटादिनिष्पत्तेः उक्तापादनं चाप्रयोज-
कमितिभावः ॥

§ समाप्तं प्रेत्यभावपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

c. Now there here follow eight sections, because they present themselves, or because they are illustrations serving to substantiate the proposition [asserted in §11,]—"Of the distinct," &c. among these there is first a section on the void's being the aterial [of all things]. In regard to this, here is an aphorism conveying a *primâ facie* view.*

SECTION IV.

THAT NON-ENTITY IS NOT THE MATERIAL OF THINGS.

अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपसृद्य प्रादुर्भावात् । २४ ।

Whether entity come from non-entity. Aph. 14.—It is from non-entity that entity arises [—suggests some one—], for manifestation is not—unless there have been destruction.

a. Because there is no manifestation of effects, in the shape of entities, e. g., as a plant, without destruction, e. g., of the seed ; —and so the *destruction* [or emergent non-existence] of the seed, or the like, is the matter from which comes the plant or the like.†

b. The reply to this.‡

* अथात्राद्यौ प्रकरणानि प्रसङ्गाद्यत्नानामित्येतत्सिद्ध्यर्थ-
मुपोद्घाताद्वा तच्चाद्यौ शून्यतोपादानप्रकरणं तच्च पूर्वेष्व-
हृत्त्वं ।

† काथेषां भावानामुत्पत्तिर्यतोऽङ्कुरादेर्वीजादिकमनुप-
सृद्य प्रादुर्भावाभावात् तथाच बीजादिविनायोऽङ्कुराद्युपा-
दानमिति ।

‡ अत्रोत्तरं ।

न व्याघातादप्रयोगः ॥ १५ ॥

This denied. Aph. 15.—Not so,—this is not a correct expression, because it is suicidal.

a. It is not proper to say that a thing becomes manifest through destruction, because the expression is inconsistent; for if that which [as you say,] destroys [and takes the place of what is destroyed,] was not previously existent, then it cannot be a destroyer,—and if it *did* previously exist, then it could not subsequently *come into* existence.*

b. The supporter of the *primâ facie* view censures this.†

नातीतानागतयोः कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् ॥ १६ ॥

A defence attempted. Aph. 16.—Nay [—remonstrates the objector—I make use of no suicidal expression—], because terms relating to action are [allowably] applied both to what has departed and to what has not yet come [into existence].

a. My expression [—the objector contends—] is not improper, because, in the case of what has departed and in the case of what has not come, terms in construction with a verb [see *Laghu Kâumudî*, No. 945,] are employed,—that is, terms are employed which designate agent and patient, &c.;—as, for example, “A son [now non-existent,] *will be* born,”—“He congratulates himself on the son that *is to be* born,”—“There *was* [once upon a

* उपसृद्य प्रादुर्भवतीति न युक्तः प्रयोगव्याघातात् उपमर्दकस्य पूर्वमसत्त्वे उपमर्दकत्वायोगात् पूर्वमसत्त्वे च परतः प्रादुर्भावायोगात् ॥

† पूर्वपक्षी दूषयति ॥

time,] a jar [now no longer extant],”—"He mourns his broken jar* [now a jar no more].”

b. But then [—we remark—], grant that your employment of language is figurative [and admissible], still, pray, do you hold that it is the destroyed seed, &c., that is the material, or the *destruction* of the seed, &c? If the latter, is this, moreover, [in your opinion,] the *material* cause or is it the *concomitant*? If the first of these [three]—here is the reply.†

न विनष्टेष्योऽनिष्यन्ते । १७ ।

The defence repelled in two of its aspects.

Aph. 17.—Nay,—because nothing is produced from things annihilated.

a. Because it is impossible that things annihilated, seeds, or the like, should serve as material [for the formation of anything else]. For the same reason the second [alternative,—viz., that the *destruction* is the *material*,] is not true:—in this case the word “annihilated” [in the aphorism,] stands for “annihilation”,—and nothing arises therefrom, because it is substantiality [and not the being a privation,] that constitutes the nature of the material cause of a positive product.‡

* मायुक्तः प्रयोगः अतीतेऽनागते च कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् कर्तृकर्मादिबोधकशब्दप्रयोगात् यथा जनिष्यते पुत्रः जनिष्य मायं पुत्रमभिनन्दति अभूत् कुम्भो भिन्नं कुम्भमनुशोचति ।

† नन्वास्मान्मौपचारिकः प्रयोगस्तथापि किं बीजादेर्विनष्ट-स्योपादानत्वं मन्यसे बीजादिविनाशस्य वा अन्येऽपि तस्योपादानत्वं निमित्तत्वं वा तत्रादौ उत्तरं ।

‡ विनष्टानां बीजादीनामुपादानत्वायोगादतएव न द्वि-तीयस्तत्र विनष्टं विनाशस्ततो नोत्पत्तिर्द्रव्यत्वस्य भाषकार्यस-मवाधिकारणतावच्छेदकत्वात् ।

- b. But in regard to the third [alternative,—viz., that the destruction of the seed is the *contomitant* cause of the plant,] he says.*—

क्रमनिर्देशादप्रतिषेधः । १८ ।

The defence, in its third aspect, repelled.

Aph. 18.—Since there is [merely] the pointing out of a sequence, this is no objection.

ii. Since [it may be contended that] non-existence cannot be denied to be a cause, seeing that it is an admitted doctrine [—admitted without formal mention—] that the absence of obstacles is a *cause*, he therefore says 'Since,' &c. From perceiving that when the seed is destroyed the plant springs up, the destruction of the seed—the obstruc^ter—is [indeed, assumed to be] a cause [of the plant, which could not come into being unless the seed gave place to it];—for, when the seed is destroyed, the plant originates from the parts thereof, combined with the parts of the irrigated earth [in which the seed was planted]. But if non-existence by itself could be a cause, then a plant might arise even from a seed when [its non-existence has resulted from its being] reduced to powder,—for there is no difference between the non-entity [in the one case and in the other; i. e., whether the seed be destroyed by one process or another process]:—such is the import.†

* तृतीयेत्याह ।

† अभावस्य कारणत्वं न प्रतिषिध्यते प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य हेतुत्वोपगमादित्याह क्रमेति । बीजे विनष्टेऽङ्कुरो जायत इति प्रत्ययाद्बीजस्य प्रतिबन्धकस्याभावः कारणं बीजे विनष्टे तदवयवैर्जलाभिषिक्तभूम्यवयवसहितैरङ्कुर आरभ्यते ।

b. Here ends the section denying that emptiness can be a material cause.*

c. He states another opinion.†

SECTION V.

WHETHER GOD BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE.

ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् । १९ ।

Whether God be the sole cause.

Aph. 19.—God [—suggests some one—] is the [sole] cause, because we see that the acts of men are [occasionally] unattended by their fruits.

a. He clears up this.‡

न पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः । २० ।

This denied.

Aph. 20.—Not so; because, in the absence of men's acts, the fruit is not produced.

u. But then, were it thus, would not the agency of man unduly involve [the attainment of] fruit [without God's co-operation]? If this be said, he declares in regard to this :§—

अभावमात्रस्य कारणत्वे चूर्णीकृतादपि बीजादङ्कुरोत्पत्तिः
स्यादभावस्य निर्विशेषत्वादिति भावः ॥

* समाप्तं शून्यतोपादाननिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

† मतान्तरमाह ॥

‡ समाधत्ते ॥

§ नन्वेवं पुरुषव्यापारस्य फले व्यभिचारो न स्यादिति चेदत्राह ॥

तत्कारितत्वाद्हेतुः ॥ २१ ॥

An objection met. *Aph.* 21.—It [viz., man's agency,] is not the [sole] cause, because that [absence of fruit, spoken of in the preceding aphorism] is caused by that [absence of man's agency spoken of at the same place,—but not conversely].

a. Because [all that we assert is that] the absence of fruit is the result of the absence of man's works,* [—but it does not follow that the works by themselves can produce fruit].

b. Here ends the section as to whether God be the material cause.†

c. And if effects were fortuitous, then neither could atoms, or anything else, be the material cause [of things], nor could God be the concomitant Cause;—therefore he begins a section in disproof of fortuitousness. In regard to this matter there is an aphorism conveying a *prima facie* view.‡

SECTION VI.

DISPROVING THAT EFFECTS ARE FORTUITOUS.

अनिमित्तेषां भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैश्चयथा-
दिदर्शनात् ॥ २२ ॥

* फलाभावस्य पुरुषकर्माभावकारितत्वात् ॥

† समाप्रमीश्वरोपादानताप्रकरणं ॥

‡ यदि च कार्याणामाकस्मिकत्वं तदा न परमाणवादीनामुपादानत्वं ब्रह्मेश्वरस्य निमित्तत्वमत आकस्मिकत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणमारभते तत्र पूर्वपक्षसूत्रं ॥

Whether things can occur uncaused.

Aph. 22.—There is an origination of entities [—contends some one—] from no cause, for we see the sharpness of a thorn, &c.

a. 'From no cause';—the affix [viz., *tasil*, in the expression thus rendered,] has the force of a nominative,—the meaning being the causeless coming into existence of entities. The expression 'entities' [—which might seem superfluous—] is for the sake of clearness. The origination of a jar, or the like, [—contends this reasoner—] is not determined by causes, because it is a case of [simple] origination [or coming into existence], like the coming into existence of the sharpness of a thorn, &c.*

b. By the " &c., he includes the variegated hues of the peacock, &c.;—the import being that these have no cause whatever.†

c. A partially [orthodox] mistaken person blames this.‡

अनिमित्तनिमित्ततो नानिमित्ततः ॥ २३ ॥

A defective reply.

Aph. 23.—It is not from no cause, because it is from a cause [in the shape of what you call] "no-cause."

ã. That is to say,—how can it be from no cause, when the cause is precisely that "no-cause" [mentioned by yourself in the preceding aphorism], seeing that you exhibit, in the ex-

* अनिमित्तत इति प्रथमान्तात्तसिल् अनिमित्ता भावोत्पत्तिरित्यर्थः । भावेति स्पष्टार्थं । घटाद्युत्पत्तिर्न कारणनियम्या उत्पत्तित्वात् कण्टकैश्चघ्नाद्युत्पत्तिवत् ॥

† आदिपदाभयूरचिन्नादिपरिग्रहः तदकारणकमेवेत्योशयः ॥

‡ एकदेशी भान्तो दूषयति ॥

pression "from no cause," a 5th case-affix which marks a reason*?

b. He [the author] blames† [this argument of a well-meaning follower, who did not discern that the affix,—see §22, a,—was employed with the force of the 1st case, and not of the 5th].

निमित्तानिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावादप्रतिषेधः । २४ ।

The defective reply set aside.

Aph. 24.—This is no objection, because a cause and no cause are two [entirely] different things.

a. The alleged objection is not proper, because no cause and a cause are 'different things,' i. e., are heterogeneous,—because what is no cause cannot be a cause. And that [error, to which the reply in question is no answer,] has been sufficiently refuted just by the refutation of the opinion that works are no cause of [man's being born into the world in] the body,—therefore it is not refuted [over again] here‡.

b. Here ends the section respecting fortuitousness.§

* अनिमित्तत इति हेतुपञ्चमीनिर्देशादनिमित्तस्यैव निमित्तत्वात् कथमनिमित्तत इति ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ अनिमित्तस्य निमित्तस्य च अर्थान्तरभावात् भेदात् उक्तः प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः अनिमित्तस्य निमित्तत्वासम्भवात् । शरीरस्याकर्म्मनिमित्तत्वदूषणेनैव च तद्दूषितप्रायमित्याशयेन नात्र दूषितमिति ॥

§ समाप्रमाकस्मिकत्वप्रकरणं ॥

c. Were everything uneternal, then not even Soul would be eternal; therefore there is a section repelling the notion that everything is uneternal. Here the doubt arising, whether whatever is cognizable be eternal, or not, we have an aphorism conveying a *primâ facie* view.*

SECTION VII.

HOW NOT ALL THINGS ARE UNETERNAL.

सर्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

*Whether everything
be uneternal.*

Aph. 25.—Everything is uneternal [—con- tends some one—], because it is what has a habit of coming into existence and perishing.

a. What is not from eternity is destructible [—says this rea- soner—], because whatever has an origin has the character of decay.†

b. He censures this.‡

नानित्यतानित्यत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

This denied.

Aph. 26.—It is not uneternal, because it [—in some instances—] is eternal.

a. The fact of having an origin does not establish a thing's destructibility,—because *destruction* is 'eternal,' i. e., is inde-

* सर्वस्यैवानित्यत्वे नात्मादेरपि नित्यत्वं स्यादतः सर्वानित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणं । तत्र प्रमेयत्वं नित्यत्वव्याप्यं नवेति संशये पूर्वपक्षद्वयं ॥

† अनित्यं विनाशि उत्पत्तिमतेो विनाशधर्मकत्वात् ॥

‡ ह्यप्रयति ॥

structible;—so that, in that instance, there is a wandering away* [of the alleged mark unattended by what it is alleged as a mark of].

b. Some one objects.†

तदनित्यत्वमग्नेर्दाह्यविनाशानुविनाशवत् ॥ २७ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 27.—That [—objects some one—] is un-
eternal, just as fire perishes on the perishing of the
combustible.

a. That also, viz., destruction, is not eternal;—as fire, imme-
diately on the perishing of ‘the combustible,’ i. e., of the fuel, or
the like, perishes also itself, and does not *emerge* from the com-
bustible; so also the destruction of a jar, or the like, perishes,
and does not emerge from the jar, or the like.‡

b. He clears up this.§

नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानं यथोपलब्धिव्यवस्थानात् ॥ २८ ॥

This repelled. *Aph.* 28.—The eternal is undeniable, because
it is laid down as it is apprehended.

a. The full meaning is, that, there is no denying ‘the eternal,’

* उत्पत्तिमत्त्वं न विनाशित्वसाधकं ध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वाद्-
विनाशित्वात् तत्र व्यभिचारात् ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

‡ तस्या अनित्यताया अप्यनित्यत्वं यथाग्निर्दाह्यस्येभ्वना-
देर्विनाशानन्तरं स्वयमपि नश्यति नतु दाह्योन्मज्जनं तथा
घटादेरपि नाशो नश्यति न घटाद्युन्मज्जनं ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

i. e., the eternity of that which is distinguished by eternality. 'As it is apprehended,' i. e., without going beyond [cases where there is] perception [of an eternal character]. And so [the fact that eternity belongs at least to some things, is settled] by its being determined that eternity belongs to [the ethereal] Space, and the like, on the strength of the argument which leads us to admit a subject of [admitted] qualities, corroborated by the simplicity* [which belongs to no other theory of the matter in question].

b. Here ends the section disproving the allegation that all things are uneternal.†

c. If [on the other hand,] all things were eternal, then Transmigration, &c., could not take place at all;—therefore there is a section for the refutation of this [eternity of all things]. On this point there is an aphorism of objection.‡

SECTION VIII.

HOW NOT ALL THINGS ARE ETERNAL.

सर्वे नित्यं प्रच्यभूतनित्यत्वात् ॥ २९ ॥

*Whether everything
be eternal.*

*Aph. 29.—Everything [—says some one—]
is eternal, because the five elements are
eternal.*

* नित्यस्य नित्यत्वविशिष्टस्य नित्यत्वस्य न अत्योत्साह-
मिति फलितं । यथापलब्धि उपलब्धनतिक्रमेण । तथाच
अभिर्यापकमानेन लाघवसहकृतेनाकाशादेर्नित्यत्वव्यवस्था-
प्रमादिति ॥

† समाप्तं सर्वानित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

‡ सर्वनित्यत्वे न प्रेत्यभावादिसिद्धिरंतसंश्रित्यनिराकरणप्रक-
रणं । तत्राक्षेपसूत्रं ॥

a. He clears up this.*

नेत्यत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः । ३० ।

This denied. Aph. 30.—Not so,—because we apprehend causes of production and of destruction.

a. It is not proper to say that everything is eternal; because we apprehend, [in the case] of jars, and the like, causes of production and of destruction, viz., the conjunction of the bowl-shaped halves [in the production of a jar], and the blow of a mallet [in the destruction of it], and the like;—and ~~the~~ production and destruction are inevitable [as regards the necessity of conceding their existence].

b. Again a Sāṅkhya says. †—

तद्वक्षणावरोधादप्रतिषेधः । ३१ ।

A Sāṅkhya objection, Aph. 31.—This is no refutation [—says the Sāṅkhya, of the objection];—because the character thereof is [merely] obscured.

a. The alleged refutation [of the objection, advanced in §29,] will not do; because [—argues the Sāṅkhya—] that which is the character of something eternal, an atom, or the like, viz., [the character of] elementariness, or the like, is, in a jar, or the like, [merely] ‘obscured,’ i. e., it really exists;—and therefore the

* समाधत्ते ।

† सर्वानित्यत्वं न बुक्तं घटादीनां उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणां कपालसंयोगसुद्धरपातादीनां उपलब्धेस्तथाचेत्यादिविनाशभावप्रकाशिते ।

‡ पुनः साह्यं चाह ।

notion of production, &c., is a mistaken one:—such is the import.*

b. He blames this.†

नैत्यत्तित्कारणोपलब्धेः । ३२ ।

This repelled.

Aph. 32.—Not so,—because we perceive production,—which causes [us to know] that [uneternality].

a. The denial that anything is uneternal is not proper, because we perceive production, which ‘causes’ that, i. e., which causes us to know it for certain. And so, since the notion of production and destruction is a just one, the theory [that everything is eternal,] is set aside; for otherwise there could be no such thing as the cognition of occasionalness;—and this could not be accounted for by [the Sāṅkhya hypothesis of] manifestation [—see Sāṅkhya Aph. B. 1. §151—], because, since this [manifestation] itself is not an eternal thing, it upsets the theory that *all* is eternal. And this will be discussed more clearly in the sequel.‡

* उक्तप्रतिषेधो न नित्यस्य परमाण्वादेर्यच्चक्षणं भूतत्वादि घटादौ तदवरोधात् तत्त्वत्तथाचोत्पादादिप्रत्ययो भ्रान्त इति भावः ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ अनित्यत्वनिषेधो न युक्त उत्पत्तेस्तत्कारणान्तरमापकादुपलब्धेः । तथाचोत्पादविनाशप्रतीतेः प्रामाणिकत्वात्मनिषेध इतरथा कादाचित्कत्वप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः न चाविर्भावान्तदुपपत्तिस्तस्यैवानित्यत्वे सर्वनित्यत्वव्याघातात् । विवेचयिष्यते चेदं स्पष्टतरमुपरिष्ठात् ॥

b. Pondering the doubt whether the notion of production and destruction may be a mistaken one, he says.*—

न व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः ॥ ३३ ॥

A doubt disposed of.

Aph. 33.—Not so,—because [in that case] there could be no such thing as settling anything.

a. That is to say,—if we were to entertain a doubt whether even that be an error which has been settled by all mankind to be a matter of fact, then we should have to give up using the terms truth and error.†

b. Here ends the section confuting the opinion that all things are eternal.‡

c. Now, as the subject presents itself, there is a section on the question whether all things be separate things. In regard to this there is an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.§

SECTION IX.

HOW ALL THINGS ARE NOT EACH SEVERAL THINGS.

सर्वं पृथग्भावलक्षणापृथक्त्वात् ॥ ३४ ॥

Whether everything be several things.

Aph. 34.—Everything is several [—says some one—], because the marks of an entity are several.

* उत्पादविनाशप्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तत्वं स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह ॥

† सार्वलौकिकप्रमात्वेन सिद्धस्यापि भ्रमत्वशङ्कायां प्रमा-
भ्रमव्यवहारविलोपः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ समाप्तं सर्वमित्यत्वनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

§ अथ प्रसङ्गात्सर्वपृथक्त्वप्रकरणं । तत्र पूर्वपक्षसङ्गं ॥

a. Every thing is 'several,' i. e., plural. A 'mark' is that whereby anything is recognised,—something notorious in itself. This [mark] is 'several,' i. e., it consists of several things. And so the application [of the argument is as follows]:—

(1.) A jar, or the like, is in the shape of an aggregate:—

(2.) Because it is nameable:—

(3.) [Everything that is nameable is in the shape of an aggregate,] as an army, a forest, &c.

[And, continues this reasoner,] there is no wandering away [of nameableness unaccompanied by the character of an aggregate], because [—to anticipate the instances that may seem to contradict this—] there is no proof of [there being any such thing as] an imperceptible Ether, &c., and because the Soul is nothing other than the Body, and Quality and Action are nothing distinct from their substratum, and there is no proof of [there being any such thing as] either Ultimate Difference or Co-inhesion, and Non-existence is nothing at all.*

b. He clears up this.†

नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिरूप्यते: । ३५ ।

This denied. Aph. 35.—Not so,—because by more marks than one a single entity is constituted.

a. Because, 'by more marks than one,' i. e., by more natures

* सर्व्ववस्तु पृथक् नाना लक्ष्यतेऽनेनेति लक्षणं समाख्या तस्याः पृथक्त्वं पृथग्मर्थकत्वं तथाच प्रयोगे घटादिः समूहरूपो वाच्यत्वात् सेनावनादिवत् अतीन्द्रिये नगनादौ मानाभावादात्मनः शरीरानतिरेकान्नुषकर्मषोराश्रयामेकादिरेक-समवाययोर्मानाभावादभावस्य नुष्कत्याङ्ग व्यभिचारः ।

† समाधत्ते ।

than one, e. g., by Colour, Savour, and so on,—and by this that and the other [constituent] portion,—there is 'constituted,' i. e., there is produced, just a single distinct entity;—such is the meaning.*

b. He states the reason,† [on which the foregoing argument is based].

लक्षणव्यवस्थानादेवाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३६ ॥

The denial reinforced. Aph. 36.—There is no setting aside [this our argument], just because it is settled that there are marks.

a. 'There is no setting aside,' i. e., there is no establishing that every thing is several,—just because 'it is settled,' i. e., it is an established point, that there are 'marks,'—viz., [marks] of entities, such as jars, webs, &c.,‡ [which entities possess a unity, else how could the mark of any one be a mark of that one] ?

b. Here ends the section refuting the notion that everything is several things.§

c. Were all a void, there could be no such relation as that of cause and effect; therefore he commences a section in order to refute this [notion]. Here the doubt presenting itself—whether the fact of being an object of knowledge be, or be not, invari-

* अनेकलक्षणैरनेकरूपै रूपरसादिभिस्तत्तदवयवैश्च
विशिष्टस्यैकस्यैव भावस्य निष्पत्तेरुत्पत्तेरित्यर्थः ॥

† श्लेषवाद् ॥

‡ लक्षणस्य अर्थाङ्गानां घटपटादीनां व्यवस्थानाद्भव-
स्थितत्वादेवाप्रतिषेधः ॥

§ समाप्तं सर्व्वपृथक्निराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

ably attended by the fact of being a non-entity—, there is an aphorism conveying a *prima facie* view.*

SECTION X.

HOW ALL IS NOT NON-EXISTENT.

सर्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः । ३७ ।

Whether all be non-entity. *Aph. 37.*—Everything is a non-entity [—says some one—], because it is a settled point that in entities there are mutual non-existences.

a. Everything is matter of dispute—non-entity—trash. He alleges a direct proof of this, saying, ‘because in entities,’ &c.,—i.e., because, in what are fancied to be entities, e. g., in jars, &c. it is settled that there is the nature of non-entity;—for, that all things have the nature of non-existence, is settled by such cognitions as “A jar is not a web,” [—so that there is non-existence of a jar in the web, and of a web in the jar,] &c.†

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.‡

न स्वभावासिद्धेर्भावानां । ३८ ।

* सर्वशून्यत्वेन कार्यकारणभावासम्भव इति तन्निराकरणप्रकरणमारभते । तत्र ज्ञानविषयत्वमभावत्वव्याप्यं नवेति संशये पूर्वपक्षसूत्रं ।

† सर्वं विवादपदमभावस्तुक्त्वं तत्र प्रत्यक्षं माममाह भावेष्विति । भावत्वाभिमतेषु घटादिषु अभावत्वसिद्धेर्घटः पटो नेत्यादिप्रतीत्या सर्वेषामभावत्वसिद्धेः ।

‡ सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ।

This denied. Aph. 38.—Not so,—because, of entities, the nature is real.

a. 'Of entities,' i. e., of Earth, &c., the 'nature,' viz., Odour, &c., and Existence, &c., is real:—for it is impossible that of a *nothing* the Odour, Colour, or the like, should appear really existent.*

b. Again some one doubts:†—

न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् ॥ ३९ ॥

A doubt. Aph. 39.—There is no reality [—says some one—] in the nature [of things], because they are relative.

a. Because they have relation one to another,—for we observe that "In relation to that—this is bluer,"—"It is short in comparison with that," &c. And what is relative is not real, just like the redness of crystal which has relation to the Hibiscus flower‡ [reflected in it, or seen through it].

b. He clears up this.§

आहतत्वादयुक्तं ॥ ४० ॥

This cleared up. Aph. 40.—This is improper, because asserted falsely.

* भावानां पृथिव्यादीनां स्वभावस्य गम्भादेः सत्त्वादेश्च सिद्धेः
नहि तुच्छस्य गम्भरूपादिकं सत्त्वेन प्रतीतिर्वा सम्भवति ॥

† पुनः शङ्कते ॥

‡ इतरसापेक्षत्वात् एतदपेक्षयाऽयं नीलतर एतदपेक्षया
दुख इति प्रतीतेः यच्च सापेक्षन्तदवस्तु यथा जवासापेक्षं
स्फटिकारूप्यं ॥

§ समाधत्ते ॥

a. Since it is 'asserted falsely,' i. e., since it is not the case, that non-entity is predicable wherever there is relativity. Nor can a jar, or the like, be a relative thing. Further, is *relativity* relative, or not? If the first, then, since [on your hypothesis,] it is a non-entity, it proves nothing. If the latter, then, since it itself is something real, how can *all* be *unreal*? Such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section refuting the opinion that all is nothing.†

c. Next there is a section in refutation of the doctrine that all is numerically one.‡

d. An aphorism conveying a tenet§ [follows].

SECTION XI.

HOW ALL IS NOT NUMERICALLY ONE, AND, FURTHER,
REGARDING FRUIT.

सङ्ख्यैकान्तसिद्धिः कारणानुपपत्त्युपप-
त्तिभ्याम् । ४१ ।

*Argument against all
being numerically one.*

Aph. 41.—Through there being a reason, or by there not being one, it is not true that all is numerically one.

* सापेक्षत्वस्य तुच्छत्वव्याप्तेर्व्याहृतत्वादसिद्धत्वात् न वा घटादेः सापेक्षत्वं सम्भवति किञ्च सापेक्षत्वं सापेक्षं न वा आद्येतस्य तुच्छत्वान्न साधकत्वं अन्ये तस्यैव सत्यत्वात् कुतः सर्वशून्यत्वमिति भावः ॥

† समाप्तं सर्वशून्यतानिराकरणप्रकरणं ।

‡ अथ संख्यैकान्तवादनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

§ सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ॥

a. All things are not really numerically one, because there is no 'reason,' i. e., no proof of this; or, if there be, then all is *not* numerically one, because it is looked for that the proof be something other than the thing proved.*

b. Some one objects :†—

न कारणावयवभावात् ॥ ४२ ॥

An objection. *Aph.* 42.—Not so [—says some one—], because the reason is a part.

a. That all is numerically one is not untrue, because the 'reason,' i. e., the proof, is a 'part,' i. e., is a portion, of the aforesaid [numerically single total]; and there is no difference between part and whole,‡ [such as might justify our regarding a part and the whole as *two*].

b. He blames this.§

निरवयवत्वाद्देतुः ॥ ४३ ॥

This repelled. *Aph.* 43.—This is no reason, because there is no part [available for the purpose].

a. The alleged reason is not proper, because, since everything whatever is the subject of the proposition, there is nothing left

* सङ्गैकान्ता न सिध्यन्ति कारणस्य प्रमाणस्यानुपपत्तेः
उपपत्तौ वा न सङ्गैकान्तः साधनस्य साध्यातिरिक्तस्या-
पेक्षितत्वात् ॥

† आक्षिपति ॥

‡ न सङ्गैकान्तस्यासिद्धिः कारणस्य प्रमाणस्यावयवभावात्
उक्तस्यैकदेशत्वाद्दवयवावयविनेश्व भेदाभावः ॥

§ दूषयति ॥

over,—and a portion of the *subject* cannot supply the *argument* :—such is the import.*

b. Now, since the opportunity offers, 'Fruit' being to be examined, he states a doubt.†

सद्यः कालान्तरे च फलनिष्पत्तेः संशयः ॥ ४४ ॥

A doubt regarding 'Fruit.' Aph. 44.—Since 'Fruit,' is produced instantly, and at another time, there arises a doubt.

a. Since we see that such an action as *cooking* has its fruit immediately, while *ploughing*, or the like, has its fruit at a subsequent time, there arises a doubt whether the fruit of maintaining the sacred fire, of oblations, of injuries, and so on, be immediate, or belong to another time.‡

b. In regard to this point, the *primâ facie* view being this, that, since worldly credit or discredit may themselves be the fruit, we are not to imagine merit, &c., [as accruing to the agent]; the aphorism conveying the tenet§ [follows] :—

न सद्यः फलं कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वात् ॥ ४५ ॥

* उक्तो हेतुर्न युक्तः सर्वस्यैव पक्षत्वेनावशिष्टस्याभावात्पक्षैकदेशस्य हेतुत्वासम्भवादिति भावः ॥

† अथावसरतः फले परीक्षणीये संशयमाह ॥

‡ पाकादिक्रियायाः सद्यःफलकत्वस्य कृष्यादेः कालान्तर-फलकत्वस्य दर्शनादग्निहोत्रहवनादेर्द्विसादेर्वा फलं साद्यत्वं कालान्तरीयं वेति संशयः ॥

§ तत्रैहिककीर्त्यकीर्त्यादीनामेव फलत्वसम्भवे नादृष्टादिकल्पनमिति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ॥

The doubt solved.

Aph. 45.—The 'Fruit' is not immediate, because it has to be experienced at a future date.

a. That is to say, because it is declared as having to be experienced at a future date. For heaven is mentioned in scripture as 'Fruit,' and *that* is joy unmixed with pain, and worldly joys are not so. In like manner the experiencing of this or that hell is mentioned in scripture as the 'Fruit,' of doing injury, &c.; and that cannot be here [on earth] :—such is the import.*

b. Some one doubts.†

कालान्तरेणानिष्पत्तिर्हेतुविनाशात् ॥ ४६ ॥

A doubt.

Aph. 46.—It cannot be produced at a subsequent time [—says some one—], because the cause has ceased to be.

a. The fruit of this or that act cannot be at a future time, because the 'cause,' viz., the act, has ceased to be.‡

b. He clears up this.§

प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्दृक्षफलवत्तस्यात् ॥ ४७ ॥

This cleared up.

Aph. 47.—Before the production, that may be like a tree and its fruit.

* कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वेन प्रतिपादनादित्यर्थः स्वर्गादि फलं श्रूयते सच दुःखासम्भिन्नसुखं न चैदिकं सुखं तथा एवं हिंसादे-
सत्तन्मरकोपभोगः फलं श्रूयते नचेद् न तत्सम्भव इति भावः ।

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ कालान्तरेण तत्तत्कर्मणः फलं न सम्भवति हेतोरात्कर्म-
णो विनाशात् ॥

§ समाधत्ते ।

a. Before the production of [one's fruition of] heaven, &c., that may be the medium. He states an example: 'like a tree and its fruit.' As, even when the watering of the root, and so on, has ceased, fruit may be produced by virtue of the medium, viz, the consequent growth, &c., of the parts, so, in the matter before us, though the sacrificial acts, &c., have ceased to be, there is no inconsistency in the resulting of [the fruition of] heaven, &c., because a medium really exists in the shape of the *merit* thereby generated.*

b. But then [—says some one—] the very relation of cause and effect will not bear examination;—so he ponders this doubt.†

नासन्न सन्न सदसत् सदसतोर्वैधर्म्यात् । ४८ ।

Whether the relation of cause and effect be possible.

Aph. 48.—[The Fruit, says some one, before its production, is] neither non-entity, nor entity, nor yet [at once,] entity and non-entity, because entity and non-entity are incongruous.

a. 'Before production' is borrowed [from the preceding aphorism]. 'The Fruit' has to be supplied. And so, antecedently to its production, the fruit is not a non-entity, because, if what is a non-entity could come into existence, then hares' horns, and the like, might also come into existence, and we might find oil even in sand, and the like;—neither is it [—the fruit—] an entity, because it is a contradiction that what *is* should *come into*

* खर्गादिनिष्पत्तेः प्राक्तद्द्वारं स्यात् इष्टान्तमाह दृश्यफल-
वत् यथा मूलसेकादिनाशेऽपि तदधीनावयवोपचयादिद्वार-
बलेन फलोत्पत्तिस्तथा प्रकृतेऽपि यागादिनाशेऽपि तन्न्या-
दृष्टरूपद्वारसत्त्वान्न खर्गाद्युत्पत्तिविरोधः ।

† ननु कार्यकारणभाव एव न विचारसह इत्याशङ्कते ।

existence ;—for the same reason it is not [at once] an entity and non-entity, because an entity and a non-entity have inter-repugnant characters, in the shape of being and *not* being.*

b. He clears up this.†

प्रागुत्पत्तेरुत्पत्तिधर्मकमसदित्यद्वा उत्पादव्यय- दर्शनात् ॥ ४९ ॥

This point cleared up. Aph. 49.—Previously to its production, that which has the character of coming into existence, is, verily, not an entity, because we witness both production and destruction.

a. 'That which has the character of coming into existence', i. e., that which is viewed under the aspect of what has the character of coming into existence, e. g., a web, or the like, is, antecedently to its production, not an entity :—'verily,' i. e., this is the truth,—because production and destruction are established facts ;—for we understand that " Now the jar has been produced," and " Now the jar has been destroyed ;"—but what really *exists* cannot be *produced*, because then we should have a case of what has been produced being produced over again.‡

* प्राङ्घ्रियत्तेरित्यनुवर्त्तते फलमित्यध्याहर्त्तव्यं तथा
चोत्पत्तेः प्राक् फलं नासत् असत् उत्पत्तौ शशष्टङ्गादेर-
प्युत्पत्तिः स्यात् स्याच्च सिकतादावपि तैलं न वा सत् सत्
उत्पत्तिविरोधात् अतएव न सदसत् सदसतोः सत्त्वासत्त्व-
लक्षणवैधर्म्यात् ।

† समाधत्ते ।

‡ उत्पत्तिधर्मकं उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वेनोपलभ्यमानं पटादिक-
मुत्पत्तेः प्रागसदिति अद्वा तत्त्वं उत्पादनाशयोः प्रमितत्वात्

b. To the remark, that, if what is no entity could come into existence, there would be no law, [but utter confusion would prevail,] he says.*

बुद्धिसिद्धन्तु तदसत् । ५० ।

An objection met. Aph. 50.—But that, [though] no entity, is determined by the understanding.

a. 'That,' i. e., the product;—[though] 'no entity,' i. e., being that whereof antecedent non-existence was predicable;—'is determined by the understanding,' i. e., is made to itself an object, by the understanding. To explain,—the weaver sets himself to work, having considered, that, "In these threads [—i. e., constituted by these threads—] there *will be* a web,"—but not with the understanding, that, "there *is* a web;" for, if *that* were the case, then, the product being supposed extant, there would be no setting one's self to work, because desire [precluded by possession,] would be absent.†

b. Well, be it so, that 'Fruit' results from a *cause*, yet, since the example [in §47], viz., 'like a tree and its fruit,' is not a parallel one, it is not proved that there is such a thing as *merit*:—so some one, on the strength of this, doubts as follows.‡—

इदानीं घट उत्पन्न इदानीं घटो विनष्ट इति प्रत्ययात् सतस्तु
नोत्पत्तिसम्भव उत्पन्नपुनस्त्यादप्रसङ्गात् ।

* असत् उत्पत्तौ नियमो न स्यादित्यत्राह ।

† तत्कार्यं असत् प्रागभावप्रतियोगिबुद्धिसिद्धं बुद्ध्या-
विषयीकृतं तथाहि इह तन्तुषु पटो भविष्यतीति ज्ञात्वा
कविन्दः प्रवर्त्तते नतु पटोऽस्तीति ज्ञात्वा तथा सति सिद्धत्वेन
ज्ञात इच्छाऽभावात् प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः ।

‡ नन्वस्तु हेतुफलभावस्तथापि दृष्टफलवदिति दृष्टान्तवैष-
म्यान्नादृष्टसिद्धिरित्याशयेन शङ्कते ।

आश्रयव्यतिरेकात् वृक्षफलवदित्यहेतुः ॥ ५१ ॥

Another objection. *Aph.* 51.—[The example, in §47,] “like a tree and its fruit” is no argument, [says some one,] because a receptacle is wanting.

a. It is no argument to say, that, before production [of the fruit of acts], the case is like that of a tree and its fruit;—why?—‘because a receptacle is wanting,’ i. e., because that body by which the act was done has perished:—but, in the case of the tree, its improvement, by watering, &c., is suitable, because the tree really exists [and furnishes a continuant receptacle for the results of the acts]:—such is the fancy* [of this objector].

b. He clears up this.†

प्रीतेरात्माश्रयत्वादहेतुः ॥ ५२ ॥

The point cleared up. *Aph.* 52.—This [that is urged in §51,] is no argument, because the Soul is the receptacle of the happiness.

a. The argument, ‘because a receptacle is wanting,’ is not proper,—because ‘the happiness,’ i. e., the joy that is to take place, on being lodged in a celestial body, resides in the *Soul*;—that is to say, because it has the same receptacle as [the merit of] the sacrifices, &c.,‡ [of which it is the fruit].

* प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्वृक्षफलवदित्यहेतुः कुतः आश्रयव्यतिरेकात् येन कायेन कर्म कृतं तस्य नाशात् वृक्षस्थले तु तस्य वृक्षस्य सत्त्वात् सलिलसेकादिकं परिकर्मापयुज्यत इत्यभिमानः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

‡ आश्रयव्यतिरेकादितिहेतुर्न युक्तः प्रीतेः सुखस्य स्वर्गि-

b. He ponders the doubt whether, even though it be possible that, in *some* cases, they [—the merit and the fruit—] have the same receptacle, it may not be so in every case.*

न पुत्रस्त्रीपशुपरिच्छदहिरण्याग्नादिफलनिर्दे-
शात् । ५३ ॥

The objection modified. Aph. 53.—Not so [—says some one,— the fruit cannot be lodged always in the *Soul*], because such fruits are mentioned as a son, a wife, cattle, attendants, gold, food, &c.

a. Since sons, &c., are mentioned as fruits, it is impossible that they should have the same receptacle [as the merit of which they are the fruits]:—such is the import.†

b. Although, since sons, &c., are fruits belonging to the present life, there is no [room for] doubt at all, seeing that, in this case, there is no such *absence of a receptacle* [as the doubt, in §51, is founded upon, and we might therefore have spared ourselves the trouble of replying];—still, having regard to the consideration that where the fruit may be in the shape of wealth, &c., belonging to a *subsequent* birth, even *then* our theory does not fail,—he says‡ [as follows].

शरीरावच्छेदेन जायमानस्यात्मवृत्तित्वाद्यागादिसामानाधिकरण्यादित्यर्थः ॥

* क्वचित्त्वामानाधिकरण्यसम्भवेऽपि सर्वत्र न तथेति शङ्कते ॥

† पुत्रादीनां फलनिर्देशात् सामानाधिकरण्यं न सम्भवतीति भावः ॥

‡ यद्यपि पुत्रादीनामैहिकफलत्वान्त्राश्रयव्यतिरेका-

तत्सम्बन्धात्फलनिष्पत्तेस्तेषु फलवदुपचारः ॥ ५४ ॥

The objection removed. *Aph.* 54.—In the case of these there is a figurative employment of speech, as if they were 'Fruit,' because 'Fruit' is produced by the conjunction thereof.

a. 'By the conjunction thereof,' i. e., by the possession of a son, &c. ;—'because fruit is produced,' i. e., because [—see §45, *a*—] joy is produced ;—'in the case of these,' i. e., in the case of a son, or the like ;—'there is a figurative employment of speech, as if they were fruit,' i. e., they are figuratively called fruit,—just as in such an expression as "Food, verily, is the life of the living,"—[whereas, literally, it is only by the *conjunction* of food that life is continued to the living].*

b. Here ends the section on the examination of 'Fruit.'†

c. Now 'Pain,' which [—see the enunciation in B. I. §9—] presents itself next in order, is to be examined ; and, in regard to this, it has been stated [at B. I. §21,] that Pain is that whose mark is distress :—and it was stated that what is meant by it is the being whatever has the nature [or genus] which is the nature of *pain* :—and this, in such [so called] pains as the Body [—see B. I. §21, *a*—] is *not* invariably accompanied [by the al-

भावात् शक्यैव न तथापि यत्र जन्मान्तरीयधनादिकमपि
फलं स्यात्तत्रापि नानुपपत्तिरित्याशयेनाह ॥

* तत्सम्बन्धात्पुत्रादिसम्बन्धात्फलनिष्पत्तेः प्रीत्युत्पत्तेः तेषु
पुत्रादिषु फलवदुपचारः फलत्वेन व्यपदेशः यथाऽत्र वै
प्राणिनां प्राणा इति ॥

† समाप्तं फलपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

leged mark of *distress*] ;—so, pondering this doubt, he says* [as follows].

SECTION XII.

THE EXAMINATION OF PAIN.

विविधबाधनायोगाद्दुःखं जन्मोत्पत्तिः ॥ ५५ ॥

The definition of Pain justified.

Aph. 55.—The occurrence of birth is a grief, because it is joined with various distresses.

a. The Body, &c., is [called] a ‘birth,’ because of its association with the fact of being born. ‘The occurrence thereof’ means conjunction therewith. ‘Because it is joined with various distresses,’ the expression *pain* is applied to it [—viz., to the Body, —] figuratively,—but it is not an actual pain ;—and so it is directed to be *regarded* as ‘Pain,’ with a view to its being avoided in consideration of its being *connected* with various pains.†

b. But then, by considering it [the Body,] as a pain, pray, is

* अथ क्रमप्राप्तं दुःखं परीक्षणीयं तत्र च बाधनाखक्षयं दुःखमित्युक्तं तदर्थस्तु दुःखत्वजातिमत्त्वमित्युक्तं तच्च शरीरादौ दुःखेऽव्याप्तमित्याशङ्क्याह ॥

† जननयोगाज्जन्म शरीरादिकं तदुत्पत्तिसत्त्वस्वभावः विविधबाधनायोगात् दुःखमिति व्यपदिश्यते न तु वास्तवमेव तत् दुःखं तथाच विविधदुःखानुषक्ततया हेतुत्वार्थं दुःखमिति भावनीयमुपदिश्यते ॥

- pleasure denied [to have any existence] ? —this is impossible ;—
 • therefore he says* [as follows].

सुखस्याप्यन्तरालनिष्यत्तेः ॥ ५६ ॥

Pleasure admitted to exist. *Aph.* 56.—[Pleasure is not denied to exist,] because pleasure also is produced in the midst [of the pains which constitute the actual stuff of human life].

a. [This we grant,] because, since pleasure also does arise amidst pains, it is impossible to deny its existence.†

b. But then, since there is no difference between the connection of pleasure [with the Soul,] and that of pain, why do you not prefer that we should regard them [both] as *pleasure* [—instead of regarding both of them as *pain*] ? To this he replies :‡—

बाधनानिवृत्तेर्वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषाद्प्रति- षेधः ॥ ५७ ॥

Pleasure a trifle in comparison with pain. *Aph.* 57.—Since there is the cessation of pain [—which is the one great end], and since he who adopts your view has the fault of seeking after [en-

* ननु दुःखभावेन किं सुखं प्रत्याख्यायते न चैतच्छक्य-
मत आह ।

† दुःखानां मध्ये सुखस्याप्यन्तरेण प्रत्याख्यानस्याशक्य-
त्वात् ।

‡ ननु सुखदुःखसम्बन्धाविशेषात् सुखभावनमेव किं
नेष्यत इत्यत्राह ।

joyable objects], this is no objection [to the injunction that all that is mundane should be regarded as pain].

a. This is no objection to regarding [everything mundane] as pain,—because 'he who adopts your view,' i. e., he who considers that it [the body,] is an instrument of enjoyment, 'has the fault of seeking after,' i. e., has the fault of seeking after, or of exerting himself about, the objects of enjoyment. For, he who exerts himself for the the sake of joy, is tormented, in the acquiring and the keeping, &c., with various distresses;—therefore, since this may serve as a cause of the abandoning of desire, it is directed that it [viz., the Body, and mundane existence altogether,] shall be regarded as a *pain*.*

b. But then, [some one may say,] since it [mundane life,] can cease, quite spontaneously, in the case of him who *feels* it to be pain, the instruction to *consider* it as such is useless;—so to this he replies :†—

दुःखविकल्पे सुखाभिमानाच्च । ५८ ॥

The direction to regard the Body as an evil not needless.

Aph. 58.—And [the injunction is advisable,] because, whilst there is a

doubt whether it be pain, something may be fancied a pleasure, [though it be really an evil].

a. In respect of what thing there is a various [and undecided]

* दुःखभावनस्य न प्रतिषेधः वेदयतः सुखसाधनत्वं जानतः पर्येषणदोषात् पर्येषणे सुखार्थप्रवर्त्तने दोषात् सुखार्थं प्रवर्त्तमानो हि अर्जनपालनादौ विविधाभिर्बाधनाभिरुपतप्यतेऽतो दुःखभावनं वैराग्यहेतुतयोपदिश्यते ।

† ननु दुःखमनुभवतः स्वत एव निवृत्तिसम्भवात् दुःखभावनोपदेशो व्यर्थ इत्यत आह ।

opinion whether it be a pain, this injunction is in order that there may be no engaging in such a thing, e. g., in forbidden injury, or eating, or embraces, &c., :—such is the import.*

b. Here ends the section on the examination of 'Pain'.†

c. Now, since it has presented itself in turn, 'Emancipation' [B. I. §9,] is to be examined; and in regard to this he states a primâ facie view that there is no such thing, because there is no [sufficient] opportunity for exerting oneself with a view thereto.‡

SECTION XIII.

EMANCIPATION EXAMINED.

ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावः ॥ ५९ ॥

The possibility of Emancipation questioned.

Aph. 59.—There is no Emancipation [says some one], because of the [continual] association of one's debts and troubles and exertions.

a. There can be no Emancipation, because, by reason of the clinging to us of our 'debts,' &c., there is no opportunity for working out our salvation :—and so it is stated in scripture "when born, verily, a Brâhman is born triply indebted;—from the Rishis, by his course of student-life; from the gods, by sacrifice; from the progenitors, by progeny;"—that is to say, one is freed 'from the

* दुःखस्य विविधः कल्पो यत्र तादृशे प्रतिषिद्धिंसाभोजन मैथुनादौ प्रवृत्तिर्माभूदित्ययमुद्देश इति भावः ॥

† समाप्तं दुःखपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

‡ अथ क्रमप्राप्तयाऽपवर्गः परीक्षणीयः तत्र च तदर्थक-प्रवृत्तिकालाभावात्तदभाव इति पूर्वपक्षयति ॥

Rishis,' i. e., from his debts to the Rishis, by his course of student-life; he is freed 'from the gods,' i. e., from his debts to the gods, by sacrifice; he is freed 'from the progenitors,' i. e., from his debts to the progenitors, 'by progeny,' i. e., by [his begetting] offspring:—and life passes away in the mere clearing off of these debts: *—[and so of the 'troubles' and 'exertions'].

b. He clears up this.†

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्देनानुवादेो निन्दा-
प्रशंसोपपत्तेः । ६० ॥

This doubt cleared up.

Aph. 60.—Since the literal expressions would be inadmissible, the recital is with figurative expressions, [and this has an additional advantage] because [it acquaints us that] blame and praise are rendered suitable.

a. For the recital "when born," &c. [§59, a.] does not consist of literal expressions, for a person is not competent to acts as soon as born. In the same way, the word 'debt', too, is not meant literally, for, in this instance, no one gives something that is to be received back again;—but it is enounced in such terms

* ऋणाद्यनुबन्धादपवर्गानुष्ठानकालाभावादपवर्गाभावः
स्यात् तथाच श्रूयते जायमानो हवै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिः ऋण-
वान् जायते ब्रह्मचर्येण ऋषिभ्यः यज्ञेन देवेभ्यः प्रजया
पितृभ्य इति ऋषिभ्यः ऋष्युणेभ्यो ब्रह्मचर्येण मुच्यते देवेभ्यः
देवर्षेभ्यः यज्ञेन मुच्यते प्रजया अपत्येन पितृभ्यः पितृषुभ्यो
मुच्यते ऋणापाकरणेनैव च जीवनापगमः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

in order to acquaint us that the thing is as obligatory as the discharging of a debt.*

b. He mentions the reason for the employment of figurative language, saying, 'because blame and praise are rendered suitable.' Just as by the discharging of a debt and by the not discharging it, so by the performance of sacrifice, &c., and by its non-performance, blame and praise are rendered suitable.†

c. And it is not the case that there is no season for engaging in the work [of one's Emancipation], because it is said "By old age is he emancipated," &c.‡

d. But then, though it be possible to get rid of things desirable by abandoning the desire of them, how can constant duties [—see the *Īśānta-sūtra*§ —] be got rid of?—for it is stated in scripture "He should offer burnt sacrifice *as long as he lives.*" To this he replies§.—

* जायमानइत्याद्यनुवादोहि न प्रधानशब्दः नहि जायमानः कर्मण्यधिक्रियते । एवमृणशब्दोऽपि न मुख्यः नच्च प्रत्यादेयं कश्चन ददाति परन्तु ऋणापाकरणवदावश्यकत्वस्थापनाय तथोक्तं ॥

† लाक्षणिकशब्दप्रयोगे बीजमाह निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः ऋणानपाकरणतदपाकरणाभ्यामिवाग्निहोत्राद्यकरणतत्करणाभ्यां निन्दाप्रशंसे उपपद्यते ॥

‡ नचानुष्ठानकालाभावः जरया विमुच्यत इत्युक्तेः ॥

§ ननु काम्यानां कामनाविरहेण त्यागसम्भवेऽपि नित्यानां कथं त्यागः श्रूयते हि यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयादिति तत्राह ॥

समारोपादात्मन्यप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६१ ॥

How the eternal duties do not exclude Emancipation.

Aph. 61.—This is no objection [to Emancipation], because it is imputed to the soul.

a. The objection to Emancipation is not proper, because we are instructed to attribute these fires to the soul :*—[in short,—when a Bráhmaṇ, having reached the age at which he ought to retire from the world, is no longer competent to perform the regular daily duties, he must *imagine* himself performing them ;—and this will free him from the bad consequences of *neglecting* them ; while, on the other hand, the defect of actual fulfilment will free him from the necessity of having to undergo *reward* for the same].

b. But then, even if burnt sacrifice were not an obstacle [to Emancipation], the very fruit of it, viz., Paradise, must [—says some one—] be an obstacle to Emancipation [from pleasure and pain alike]. To this he replies.†

पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेश्च फलाभावः ॥ ६२ ॥

How sacrifice does not debar Emancipation.

Aph. 62.—Because the [required] collection of vessels cannot be had, and [so of other cases], there is not the fruit.

a. In the case of him that possesses knowledge, the 'fruit,' i. e., Paradise, does not take place :—for burnt sacrifice implies a

* अपवर्गप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः अग्नीनामात्मनि समारोप-
विधानात् ॥

† नन्वग्निहोत्रस्याप्रतिबन्धकत्वेऽपि तत्फलस्वर्ग एवापवर्ग-
प्रतिबन्धकः स्यादत्राह ॥

'collection of vessels,'—vessels, i. e., vessels for burnt sacrifice,—
 • a collection of such,—an arrangement of them with respect to
 the members of the victim, the thing sacrificed,—according to
 the direction "In the mouth a ladle filled with butter," and so
 in order. Since these cannot be provided by a *beggar* [—which
 every Bráhmaṇ, when he becomes aged, is bound to be—], and
 since, therefore, the fruit of the burnt sacrifice, from the want of
 these things, does not take place, still the fruits of the *Jyotish-*
toma sacrifice, and of bathing in the Ganges, &c., and [on the
 other hand] of injuries, &c., might be [supposed to be] obstacles
 [to Emancipation], therefore, in order to include other reasons
 [why Emancipation should not be eternally impossible], an "and"
 [—equivalent to an "&c."—] is inserted [in the aphorism].
 And thus the import is, that actions, other than those done in a
 former state of existence, are obliterated by *knowledge* simply; *—
 [for it is he "that possesses knowledge" who can both perform
 the 'constant duties,' so as to avoid the guilt of their neglect,
 and at the same time escape the opposite Charybdis of having to
suffer the reward of them in Paradise].

b. He censures [the notion—see §59—that Emancipation is
 rendered impossible by] the constant attendance of distress.†

* ज्ञानिनः फलस्य स्वर्गस्याभावः अग्निहोत्रं हि पात्रव-
 यान्तं पात्राण्यग्निहोत्रपात्राणि तेषाञ्चयः यजमानस्याङ्गेषु
 विन्यासः मुखे हृतपूर्णां स्रुवमिति क्रमेण भिक्षोस्तदनुपपत्तेः
 तेन तत्परित्यागात् अग्निहोत्रफलाभावेऽपि ज्योतिष्टोमगङ्गा
 स्नानादिहिंसादिफलानां प्रतिबन्धकत्वं स्यादतो हेत्वन्तर-
 समुच्चयाय चकार उपन्यस्तस्यैव प्रारब्धातिरिक्तकर्मणां
 ज्ञानादेव क्षय इत्याशयः ॥

† क्लेशानुबन्धं दूषयति ॥

सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभाववदपवर्गः ॥ ६३ ॥

In Emancipation distress cannot be.

Aph. 63.—As he who is sound asleep, when he sees no dream, has no distress,—so is it in the case of Emancipation.

a. In the case of one sound asleep, at the time of seeing no dream, as, from the absence of any cause, there is the absence of pain, so also in Emancipation, from the absence of Desire, &c., there must be the absence of pain.*

b. He censures [the notion of] the impossibility of Emancipation, because of the constant attendance [—alleged at §59—] of exertion.†

न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसम्भानापहीनक्लेशस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

Exertion does not render Emancipation impossible.

Aph. 64.—The Exertion of him that has got rid of the Distresses does not tend to obstruct.

a. The 'Distresses, are Desire, &c., because people are distressed through these. The Exertion of him who is freed therefrom 'does not tend to obstruct,' i. e., it is no obstacle [to his Emancipation]; that is to say it generates neither merit nor demerit,‡ [the reward or punishment of which would require his continuance in the body].

* स्वप्नादर्शनकाले सुषुप्तस्य यथा हेत्वभावेन दुःखाभावस्तथाऽपवर्गेऽपि रागाद्यभावेन दुःखाभावः स्यात् ॥

† प्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावं दूषयति ॥

‡ क्लिश्यन्तेऽनेनेति क्लेशोरागादिः तद्विरहिण्यायाप्रवृत्तिः सा प्रतिसम्भानाय प्ररिबन्धाय न भवति धर्माधर्मौ न जनयतीत्यर्थः ॥

b. Some one, not able to endure [this view of] the non-existence of the Distresses [§64, a], doubts as follows.*

न क्लेशसन्ततेः स्वाभाविकत्वात् ॥ ६५ ॥

Whether distress can cease. Aph. 65.—Not so [—says some one—is there a cessation] of the continuance of Distress, because it is essential.

a. A termination of the continuance of distress is not proper [to be asserted], because it exists through its own nature,† [and is not dependent on any arrangement of causes, the absence of which could involve its cessation].

b. A partially informed person clears [—or attempts to clear up—] this as follows.‡

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत् स्वाभाविकेऽनित्यत्वं
अणुश्यामताऽनित्यत्ववद्वा ॥ ६६ ॥

An imperfect reply. Aph. 66.—Even though essential [—suggests some one—], it is uneternal, just as the non-existence that was antecedent to production is not eternal, —or as the blackness of an atom is not eternal.

a. It may perish, 'just as the non-existence that was antecedent to production is not an eternal thing,' i. e., just as antecedent non-existence [e. g., of a jar before it was made,] is not eternal, [though it was *from* eternity up to the time of the making of the jar],—or as the blackness of an atom [—say of Earth—],

* क्लेशभावमसहमानः शङ्कते ॥

† क्लेशसन्ततेरुच्छेदो न युक्तः स्वाभाविकत्वात् ॥

‡ एकदेशी समाधत्ते ॥

which was from eternity, perishes* [when the jar, of which it is a constituent, is baked *red* in the kiln].

b. Rejecting both of these views, he states the tenet.†

न सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्वागादीनां ॥ ६७ ॥

The point settled. Aph. 67.—Not so,—because Desire, &c., are caused by the fancying [something] to be good.

a. What has been asserted is not proper;—why?—because Desire, &c., [see §64, a] are [not self-existent, but] ‘caused by the fancying to be good,’—they are things the cause of which is a ‘fancying to be good,’ i. e., a false notion;—and so, since false notions are put an end to by knowledge of the truth, it is quite fitting that Desire, &c., should have an end:—such is the import.‡

b. Here ends the section on the examination of Emancipation.§

c. The First Diurnal Portion of the Fourth Book is completed.∥

* प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत्प्रागभावानित्यत्ववत् अनादेः
परमाणुश्यामताया विनाशवद्वा विनाशः ॥

† मतद्वयमुपेक्ष्य सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

‡ नोक्तं युक्तं कुतो रागादीनां सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वात् संक-
ल्पो मिथ्याज्ञानं निमित्तं येषां तथाच तत्वज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञान-
निवृत्तौ रागादिनिवृत्तिर्युज्यत एवेति भावः ॥

§ समाप्तमपवर्गपरीक्षाप्रकरणं ॥

∥ समाप्तं चतुर्थोऽध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकं ॥

THE SECOND DIURNAL PORTION.

d. Now the pre-eminent motive for this Institute is Emancipation ; and this, though it has been enounced [in B. I. §], and defined [at B. I. §22], and examined [in the section preceding this one], does no good, because its *cause* has not been displayed. But then [—some one may say—], in the aphorism [B. I. §2] beginning “ Pain,” &c., in the order of the removal of causes, Emancipation is the absence of *pain* ;—[well] if [any one says this], it is the truth ;—but the *cause* of the departure of error is not explained. If you say that the cause thereof is the ‘ knowledge of truth,’ then it ought to be mentioned of *what* the truth requires to be known ;—so, regard being had to this, it is just the examination of the ‘ knowledge of truth’ that is the matter of the [present] Diurnal Portion. And in this there are six sections. First there is the section regarding the *production* of the knowledge of truth ; and the others will be mentioned as they present themselves. In regard to this matter there is an aphorism conveying a tenet.*

SECTION XIV.

CONCERNING THE PRODUCTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH.

दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः ॥ ६८ ॥

The notion of one's personality to be got rid of.

Aph. 68.—Through the knowledge of the truth in respect of the causes of the ‘ Faults’ [B. I. §18], there is cessation of the notion of one's personality.

* अथ शास्त्रस्य परमं प्रयोजनमपवर्गः सचोद्दिष्टो लक्षितः परीक्षितोऽप्यकिञ्चित्करः कारणानिरूपणात् मन्वभिहितमेव दुःखादिदृष्टे कारणमाशक्रमेण दुःखाभावोऽपवर्गः

a. 'The notion of one's personality' (*ahankāra*) is the fancy which reveals itself in the expression "I"; and what is so called is an error, the object of which is the Body, and other things; and this [error] is put an end to by a knowledge, in regard to 'the causes of the Faults,' viz., the Body, &c., of 'the truth,' viz., that these are not the Soul:—for, fancying the Body, &c., to be the Soul, one is attracted by things pleasing [to the Body], and irritated by things offensive.*

b. But then [some one may ask],—what, in short, are those attractive matters, whereby being attracted one remains mundane?—so, to discriminate these, he exhibits them.†

दोषनिमित्तं रूपादयो विषयाः सङ्कल्पकृताः ॥ ६९ ॥

Desire, &c., whence. Aph. 69.—The cause of the 'Faults' [B. I. § 18] is Colour, and other objects regarded as good.

इतीति चेत्तत्त्वं मिथ्याज्ञानापगमहेतुर्नाभिहितः तत्त्वज्ञानं तत्रहेतुरिति चेत्कस्य तत्त्वं ज्ञातव्यमित्यभिधानीयमित्याशयेन तत्त्वज्ञानपरीक्षा सैव चाङ्गिकार्थः तत्र च घट प्रकरणानि आदौ तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रकरणं अन्यानि च यथायथं वक्ष्यन्ते तत्र सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ॥

* अहङ्कारोऽहमित्यभिमानः तत्र शरीरादिविषयको मिथ्याज्ञानमुच्यते तच्च दोषनिमित्तानां शरीरादीनां तत्त्वस्य अनात्मत्वस्य ज्ञानान्निवर्त्तते आत्मत्वेन हि शरीरादौ मुह्यन् रञ्जनीयेषु रज्यति कोपनीयेषु कुप्यति ॥

† ननु के यावदनुरञ्जनीयाविषयाः येषु रज्यन्त्सरतीत्यतो विवेकाय तानुपदिशति ॥

a. 'Regarding as good' (*sankalpa*) means regarding as a good thing. Colour, &c., made the objects of this [fancy that they are good], are the cause of 'Fault,' i. e., of Desire, &c. Perceiving that "This woman is beautiful," one feels Desire;—and [again] that "This is an enemy," one feels Aversion. These, Colours, &c., are in the first place to be regarded as what is to be shunned. Thence comes the discrimination between Body and Soul.*

b. But then [some one may say], Desire, &c., is hard to get rid of even by Brahma when he looks on beauty, &c. This is stated in the following verse,—“For the mind, O Krishna, is unstable, violent, energetic, powerful,” &c. Therefore, showing a method for the removal of Desire, &c., he says.†—

तन्निमित्तत्ववयव्यभिमानः ॥ ७० ॥

Suggestions for the removal of Desire, &c.

Aph. 70.—But the cause thereof is a conceit in respect of something made up of parts.

a. 'In respect of something made up of parts,' e. g., the body of a maiden,—a 'conceit,' i. e., a notion of beautiful,—is 'the cause thereof,' i. e., the cause of Desire, &c.:—and so this notion

* सङ्कल्पः समीचीनत्वेन भावनं तद्विषयीकृता रूपादयः
दोषस्य रागादेर्निमित्तं सुन्दरीयमिति जानन् रज्यति शब्द
रयमिति द्वेष्टि ते रूपादयो हेयत्वेन भावनीयाः प्रथमं ततः
शरीरात्मविवेकः ॥

† ननु सौन्दर्यादिकं पश्यतो रागादिर्ब्रह्मणोऽपि दुष्परि-
हरः तदुक्तं चञ्चलं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाथि बलवद्बुद्धमित्यतो
रागादिनिवृत्त्युपायं दर्शयिष्येति ॥

is to be got rid of * [by means of dwelling on repulsive aspects of the body, after the manner of Dean Swift].

b. Here ends the section on the production of the knowledge of truth.†

c. Now, since the matter presents itself [—though already in some measure discussed in B. II.—], there is a section on [wholes, or] ‘what is made up of parts.’ There is an aphorism for the purpose of displaying a doubt in regard to this.‡

SECTION XV.

CONCERNING PARTS AND WHOLES.

विद्याविद्याद्वैविध्यात्मंशयः । ७१ ।

Whether there be wholes. *Aph. 71.*—There is a doubt [whether there be such things as wholes], because there are two sorts of [knowledge, viz.,] knowing and mistaking.

a. In connection with ‘doubt,’ supply “whether there be such things as wholes.” Since [the existence of] a whole is established by sense-evidence, the evasion of it is hardly possible, therefore he says ‘knowing,’ &c;—that is to say, because, through the distinction of right notion and wrong notion, knowledge is of two sorts. The meaning is, that, there is a doubt whether there be such things as wholes, because there is a doubt whether *know-*

* अवयविनि तरुण्यादिशरीरे अभिमानः सपरिष्कार-
बुद्धिस्तन्निमित्तं रागादिनिमित्तं तथाच सा बुद्धिर्हेया ॥

† समाप्तं तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रकरणं ॥

‡ अथ प्रसङ्गाद् अवयविप्रकरणं । तत्र संशयप्रदर्शनाय सूत्रम् ॥

ledge be correctly instructive, since we see that the character of *being knowledge* is a character common* [both to right notion and wrong notion].

b. He clears up this point.†

तदसंशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात् । ७२ ।

The doubt repelled.

Aph. 72.—There is no doubt in regard to this, because the preceding arguments are quite established.

a. 'In regard to this,' i. e., in regard to [the existence of] wholes,—'because the preceding arguments are quite established,' i. e., because wholes were emphatically proved [to exist] by the arguments stated in the Second Book.‡

b. He entertains a doubt as to whether there be not something self-contradictory in [the notion of] a whole.§

वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तर्हि संशयानुपपत्तिः । ७३ ।

Possibility of a whole questioned.

Aph. 73.—Since it is strictly impossible for it [the whole] to reside [anywhere—says

* संशयइत्यस्य अवयविनीत्यादिः अवयविनः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्तदपलापो दुःशक्य इत्यत उक्तं विद्येति प्रमाक्षमभेदेन ज्ञानद्वैविध्यात् ज्ञानत्वसंज्ञासाधारणधर्मदर्शनात् ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यसंशयादवयविनि संशयइत्यर्थः ।

† समधत्ते ।

‡ तत्रावयविनि न संशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात् द्वितीयाध्यायोक्तयुक्तिभिरवयविनः प्रकर्षेण सिद्धत्वात् ।

§ अवयविनि बाधकं शङ्कते ।

some one—], therefore there is no room for a doubt [as to whether there be wholes].

a. 'Strictly' [—as we here render *api*—] gives the force of precision [to the statement]. Then there is no room for *doubt*, because there is strictly no such thing as a whole, since it is impossible for it to reside [anywhere]. The author of the *Bhāshya* explains this impossibility of its having any residence, thus:—
 "Parts constitute no whole, because this must reside either wholly or partially. For, is the whole, in each separate part, *wholly* or *partially*? Not the first, because their dimensions are unequal. On the latter alternative, again, is it in the shape of that same part or another one [that the whole resides in the part]? Not the first, for it is contradictory that a thing should reside in *itself*; nor is it the latter, because one part cannot reside in another part."*

b. Still, how is it that there is no whole? In regard to this the *Bhāshya* says—"And since it does not reside in those, there is no whole;" that is, since, for the foregoing reasons [§73, a], it is not present 'in those,' i. e., in the parts, there is no such thing as a whole;—for you cannot assume that which shall have *no residence*;—such is the import. Others again say that this [last quotation from the *Bhāshya*] is really an aphorism† [of Gautama's].

* अपिरवधारणे तर्हि संशयानुपपत्तिर्दृश्यनुपपत्तितो
 ऽवयव्यभावादेव स्यादित्यर्थः । दृश्यनुपपत्तिं विदृष्योति भाष्य-
 कारः कृत्स्नैकदेशवृत्तित्वादवयवानामवयव्यभावः अवयवीहि
 एकैकावयवे कात्स्न्येन एकदेशेन वा नाद्यः विषमपरिमाण-
 त्वात् अन्येऽपि तेनैवावयवेनान्येन वा नाद्यः स्वस्मिन्वृत्तिवि-
 रोधात् नान्यः अवयवान्तरस्थावयवान्तरावृत्तेः ।

† तथापि कथमवयव्यभाव इत्यत्र भाष्यं तेषु चावृत्तेरव-

c. With reference to the doubt, viz., but then, grant that the whole really have no residence,—there is an aphorism of one who adopts a *primâ facie* view.*

पृथक्कावयवेभ्योऽदृत्तेः । ७४ ।

Granting the possibility, its existence questioned.

Aph. 74.—And [there is no whole] different from the parts, because it has no residence.

a. Complete thus,—‘there is no whole different from the parts.’ If the passage [§73, b] “And since it does not reside in those,” &c., be an *aphorism*, then it is from this that the expression “there is no whole” is borrowed. Why [do we say that there is no whole]?—‘because it has no residence.’ If it have no residence, then we should find that this whole [—if it existed at all—] is something *eternal*;—and no eternal whole is perceived,—therefore there is no whole at all;—such is the import.†

b. But then [some one may say], let the relation between

यव्यभावः तेषु अवयवेषु पूर्वाक्तयुक्त्या अभावादवयवी नास्ति
नह्यसावदृत्तित्वयाऽभ्युपेयतइति भावः । सूत्रमेवेदमित्यपि
वदन्ति ॥

* नन्वास्तामदृत्तिरेवावयवीति शङ्कायां पूर्वपक्षिसूत्रं ।

† अवयवभ्यः पृथक् अवयवी नास्तीति शेषः । तेषुचादृत्तेरित्यस्य सूत्रत्वे अवयव्यभावइत्यनुवर्तते । कुतः । अदृत्तेः दृत्त्यभावेऽवयविनो नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः नच नित्योऽवयव्युपसभ्यते ततो वा-
ल्येवा वयवीति भावः ।

parts and the whole be just that of *identity*. To this he replies.*—

न चावयव्यवयवाः । ७५ ।

*Parts and the whole
not identical.*

Aph. 75.—And the parts are not the whole.

a. For no one considers that the thread is the web, or that the pillar is the house ; nor is it reasonable that the relation of lodging and lodger should be without any distinction† [between the two].

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.‡

एकस्मिन् भेदाभावाद्भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेर-
प्रश्नः । ७६ ।

The tenet. *Aph. 76.*—Since the employment of the term difference, where there exists no difference, is unjustifiable,—there is no [room for the] question.

a. The question [mooted under § 73], viz., “does the whole abide totally or partially [in each part]?”—is not proper ;—because, ‘in respect of what is *one*,’ i. e., in respect of a whole,—the employment of language regulated by [consideration of] *difference* is improper, inasmuch as there is *no* difference [in what is *one*]. For ‘totality’ means there being, in the case of several, none left out ; and ‘partialness’ means there being, out of what

* नन्ववयवावयविनोस्तादात्म्यमेव सम्बन्धः स्यादत्राह ।

† नहि तन्तुः पटस्तम्भो गृहमिति कश्चित्प्रत्येति नवाऽभेदे-
नाधाराधेयभाव उपपद्यते ।

‡ सिद्धान्तसूत्रं ।

constitute an aggregate, some;—and this is inapplicable to what is *one* [and indivisible]; such is the import.*

b. And for the following reason the [pretended] dilemma as to the residence [of the whole] is not proper,—so he says.†—

अवयवान्तरभावेऽप्यवृत्तेरहेतुः । ७७ ।

The opponent's dilemma shown to be wide of the mark.

Aph. 77.—It is no argument [that pretended dilemma of our opponent's], because, even if another part could be [in a given part], there would be no residence [for the *whole*,—the question of which, therefore, this dilemma does not touch].

a. The argument of our opponents [§73, a], that a whole does not reside in its own parts partially, because there cannot be [in any part] another part,—is not a proper one. Why?—‘because, even if another part could be there, there would be no residence,’—that is to say, because, even if another part could be actually existent [in some given part], it is only of that same [*part*] that the residence would offer itself,—but not also of the *whole*.‡

* अवयवी कात्स्न्येन एकदेशेन वा वर्त्ततइति प्रश्नो न युक्तः एकस्मिन्नवयविनि भेदाभावाद्भेदनियतशब्दप्रयोगस्यायुक्तत्वात् अनेकस्याशेषता हि कात्स्न्ये समुदायिनां किञ्चित्त्वमेकदेशत्वं नचैकस्य तत्त्वम्भवइति भावः ।

† इतश्च वृत्तिविकल्पो न युक्तइत्याह ।

‡ अवयवी स्वावयवेषु नैकदेशेन वर्त्तते अवयवान्तराभावादिति यः परेषां हेतुः स न युक्तः । कृतः । अवयवान्तरभावेऽप्यवृत्तेः अवयवान्तरसत्त्वेऽपि तस्यैव परं वृत्तिरायाति नत्ववयविनोऽपीति ॥

b. By this [§72], viz., "There is no doubt in regard to this, because the preceding arguments are quite established," an argument previously mentioned [at B. II. §34] is brought to mind,— viz., "Everything would be imperceptible, were there no wholes." One holding a *prima facie* view proceeds to censure this.*

केशसमूहे तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः । ७८ ।

Whether things imperceptible in detail may be perceptible in the mass.

Aph. 78.—It is perceived [says some one], just as a collection of hairs [to him separately imperceptible] is perceived by the purblind.

a. As a single hair is not perceived 'by the purblind,' i. e., by one whose organ of vision is affected by gutta serena, but a collection thereof is,—so a single atom is imperceptible,—but a jar, or the like, consisting of a collection thereof, may be perceptible.†

b, He replies.‡

खविषयानतिक्रमेणैन्द्रियस्य पटुमन्दभावात् विषयग्रहणस्य
तथाभावो नाविषये वृत्तिः । ७९ ।

The senses are powerless except in reference to their proper objects.

Aph. 79.—Since a sense is acute or dull without [however] trans-

* तदसंशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वादित्यनेन सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेरिति पूर्वोक्तयुक्तिः स्मारिता तूर्ध्वपक्षी । तां दूषयितुमुपक्रमते ।

† यथा तैमिरिकस्य तिमिरग्रस्तचक्षुषेणैकः केशः प्रत्यक्ष-
किन्तु तत्समूहः एवमेकः परमाणुरप्रत्यक्षः तत्समूहरूपाद्य
टादिः प्रत्यक्षः स्यात् ।

‡ उत्तरयति ।

ending its own sphere, such is their case in respect of their apprehending objects;—there is no functioning [of any sense] in reference to what is not the object [of the sense].

a. If the senses be acute, there is acuteness, vivacity, in the apprehending of the object;—if the senses be dull, there is dullness, deficiency, in the apprehending thereof;—but it is not the case that a more acute Sight apprehends a Sound;—this is declared in the expression ‘without transcending its own sphere.’ He states the meaning in full, when he says ‘there is no functioning in reference to what is not the object;’—and so, how can the Sight apprehend an *atom*, which is *not* its object [—an atom being invisible—], even though this exist in the state of a collection? Such is the import.*

b. Here is an aphorism in order to declare another censure.†

अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गश्चैवमाप्रलयात् ॥ ८० ॥

How the opponent's dilemma would lead to nihilism.

Aph. 80.—And in that way we should find both parts and wholes [obnoxious to your dilemma], up to the annihilation [of everything whatever].

a. ‘In that way,’ i. e., in the way alleged [at §73, *a*], the fault of [being obnoxious to] the dilemma, as to where the thing resides, presents itself in the whole and in the part alike;—‘up to

* इन्द्रियाणां पाटवे विषयग्रहणस्य पाटवं प्रकर्षः इन्द्रियाणां मान्द्ये तद्ग्रहणस्य मान्द्यमपकर्षः नतु पटुतरं चक्षुःशब्दं गृह्णाति तदिदमुक्तं स्वविषयानतिक्रमेणेति । फलितार्थमाह नाविषये वृत्तिरिति । तथाच स्वाविषयं परमाणुं समूहत्वापन्नमपि कथं चक्षुर्गृहीयादिति भावः ॥

† दोषान्तराभिधानाय सूत्रं ॥

annihilation':—annihilation means non-existence,—and so *everything* would be non-existent,—nothing whatever would be perceived;—therefore it was properly said [at B. II. §34] “Everything would be imperceptible, were there no wholes.”*

b. Let everything be non-existent [—says some one],—to which he replies.†

न प्रलयोऽणुसङ्गावात् । ८१ ।

Whatever perishes, the atoms must survive.

Aph. 81.—There cannot be annihilation [of all], because the atoms have a real existence.

a. What is an atom? To this he replies.‡

परन्वा चुटेः । ८२ ।

An atom what.

Aph. 82.—What is absolutely beyond being cut [or destroyed].

a. An atom is that which, being excessively minute, is beyond cutting. The word [वा, here rendered] ‘absolutely,’ is for the sake of precision.§

b. Here ends the section regarding parts and wholes.||

* एवमुक्तप्रकारेण वृत्तिविकल्पदोषोऽवयवविन्यवधवे च प्रसक्तः आप्रलयात् प्रलयोऽभावस्तथाच सर्वाभावएव स्यात् कस्यापि ग्रहणमिति साधूक्तं सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेरिति ।

† अस्तु सर्वाभावइत्यत्राह ।

‡ परमाणुरेव कइत्यत्राह ।

§ चुटेः परं यदतिस्वल्पं तत्परमाणुः । वागन्दोऽवधारणे ।

॥ समाप्तमवयवावयविप्रकरणं ॥

- c. Now, in order to confute the opinion that, since all is void, where is the possibility of atoms?—there is a section regarding what has no parts. In regard to this there is an aphorism conveying a primâ facie view.*

SECTION XVI.

RESPECTING THE INDIVISIBLE.

आकाशव्यतिभेदानुपपत्तिः ॥ ८३ ॥

The possibility of atoms questioned. Aph. 83.—Such a thing cannot be, because it must be divided throughout by [the Ether or] Space.

a. 'Such a thing,' as an atom devoid of parts, cannot be. Why?—'because it must be divided throughout by Space,' i. e., it must be enveloped by [Ether] or Space within and without,—and so it must have parts, and therefore it cannot be eternal.†

b. Now if it were *not* pervaded by [Ether or] Space, then Space would not be all-pervading;—so he [the objector] says.‡—

* अथ विश्वस्य शून्यत्वात् क परमाणुसम्भावनेति मत-
निराकरणाय निरवयवप्रकरणं । तत्र पूर्वपक्षद्वयं ॥

† तस्य निरवयवस्वाणोरनुपपत्तिः । कुतः । आकाशव्यतिभे-
दात् अन्तर्वह्निश्चाकाशसमावेशात् । तथाच सावयवस्य तन्वा-
मित्य इति ॥

‡ अथ नाकाशव्यतिभेदस्यैव आकाशसर्वगतं स्यादि-
त्याह ॥

आकाशासर्वगतत्वं । ८४ ।

Ground of the doubt.

Aph. 84.—Else Space [would be] not all-pervading.

a. Supply “would be.”*

b. He clears up this point.†

अन्तर्वहिरिति कार्यद्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनादकार्ये
तदभावः । ८५ ।

Atoms have no within and without.

Aph. 85.—The expressions “within and without” apply to a thing that is a *product*; they do not apply to that which is no product, because they speak of something else than *causes*.

a. The word ‘within,’ and the word ‘without,’ express certain *parts* of something that is a product; and it is impossible that what is no product should have parts;—such is the meaning.‡

b. Let it be [—says some one—with allusion to §84—] that the Ether is *not* omnipresent. To this he replies.§

शब्दसंयोगविभवाच्च सर्वगतं । ८६ ।

How the Ether must be omnipresent.

Aph. 86.—And it is omnipresent, because of the omnipresence of the conjunction [which is the cause] of Sound.

* स्यादिति शेषः ।

† समाधत्ते ।

‡ अन्तःशब्दो वहिःशब्दश्च कार्यद्रव्यस्यावयवविशेषवाची न चाकार्येऽवयवसम्भवइत्यर्थः ।

§ आकाशस्यासर्वगतत्वं स्यादित्यत्राह ।

a. The omnipresence of Sound, and of Conjunction,—or [to construe it another way] the 'omnipresence,' i. e., the being everywhere, of that Conjunction which generates Sound,—from this, again, that the Ether is all-pervading [is inferred],—so much is to be supplied [to complete the aphorism]. Since, from the production of Sound in every place, the Conjunction of the producer thereof is inferred, it is settled that this [producer of Sound, viz., the Ether,] has an omnipresence in the shape of its being something in conjunction with everything finite.*

b. If the Ether were in conjunction with everything [says some one], then there must be repulsion and obstruction [to which it must be subject];—therefore he says.†—

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि आकाशधर्माः ॥ ८७ ॥

Properties of the Ether. Aph. 87.—That it is un-repelled, unobstructed, and all-pervading, are properties of the Ether.

a. 'Repulsion' is the turning back of that which is repelled. 'Obstruction' is the hindering of motion towards another place. Neither of these belongs to the Ether, because it is intangible.‡

* शब्दस्य संयोगस्य च यो विभवः अथवा शब्दजनकसंयोगस्य यो विभवः सार्वत्रिकत्वं तस्मात्पुनः सर्वगतं आकाशमिति शेषः । सर्वदेशे शब्देत्यच्या तज्जनकसंयोगानुमानात् सर्वमूर्त्तिसंयोगित्वरूपसर्वगतत्वं तस्य सिद्धं ॥

† आकाशस्य सर्वसंयोगित्वे व्यूहनविष्टम्भो स्यातामत आह ॥

‡ व्यूहः प्रतिहतस्य परावर्त्तनं विष्टम्भोत्तरदेशगतिप्रतिबन्धः आकाशे तद्योरभावः निःसर्गत्वात् ॥

b. The holder of the *primâ facie* view ventures another argument.*

मूर्त्तिमताञ्च संख्यानोपपत्तेरवयवसङ्गावः । ८८ ।

Whether an atom can be without parts.

Aph. 88.—And there really are parts [of an atom,—contends some one—], because things that have form must have a collocation [of parts].

a. Supply “of an atom.”†

b. He mentions another argument.‡

संयोगोपपत्तेश्च । ८९ ।

This doubt reinforced.

Aph. 89.—And [—insists some one,— atoms really have parts,] because this is consistent with the conjunction [of atoms].

a. That “atoms have parts” is borrowed [from the preceding aphorism]. The meaning of the argument is, because they are capable of being in conjunction. If you ask how it is that their being possessed of parts is inferred from their being capable of being in conjunction, it is thus, viz., because conjunction is a state other than being co-extensively present; and a state other than that of being co-extensively present cannot exist without some sort of barrier, and the barrier [to co-existent presence] is a *part*,§ [—the atoms being conjoined only in the parts next to one another].

* पूर्वपक्षी युक्त्यन्तरमाशङ्कते ।

† परमाद्येति शेषः ।

‡ युक्त्यन्तरमाह ।

§ अवयवसङ्गावद्वत्यनुवर्त्तते । संयोगवत्त्वादिति हेत्वर्थः । संयोगवत्त्वात् कथं सावयवत्वमिति चेत् इत्थं संयोगस्याव्या-

b. He clears up the point.*

अनवस्थाकारित्वादनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चाप्रति-
षेधः । ६० ।

This point cleared up. *Aph.* 90.—This [indivisibility of atoms] is not to be refuted, because this would occasion a regressus in infinitum, and because a regressus in infinitum is not proper.

a. It is not proper to set aside, by the arguments aforesaid, the fact that atoms have not parts ;—why?—‘because this would occasion a regressus in infinitum.’ Let the regressus in infinitum [says some one] be legitimate ;—therefore he adds ‘and because a regressus in infinitum is not proper.’ Were all things indefinitely divisible, we should find Mount Meru and a mustard-seed [—as containing an equally infinite number of parts—] to be equal in dimension.†

b. Here ends the section respecting what has no parts.‡

c. But then [some one may say], since nothing external exists, how should there be the arrangement of parts and whole? To remove this opinion, he enters upon a refutation of the denial of

प्यष्टत्तित्वादव्याप्यष्टत्तित्वञ्चावच्छेदकभेदं विना नोपपद्यते
अवच्छेदकश्चावयवइति ॥

* समाधत्ते ॥

† पूर्वाक्तयुक्त्या परमाणोर्निरवयवत्वप्रतिषेधो न युक्तः
कुत अनवस्थाकारित्वात् प्रामाणिकीयमनवस्था स्यादत
आह अनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चेति सर्वोषामनवस्थितावयवत्वे
मेरुसर्षपयोस्तुस्थपरिमाणत्वापत्तिः ॥

‡ समाप्तं निरवयवप्रकरणं ॥

external things. The doubt presents itself, viz., is the fact of being an *object* of right knowledge invariably attended by the fact of being *knowledge*?—[or, to put the question in the language of the successors of Locke, is every *thing* an *idea*?] In regard to this there is an aphorism conveying a *prima facie* view.*

SECTION XVII.

CONFUTING THE DENIAL OF THE EXTERNAL.

बुद्ध्या विवेचमान्तु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धि सन्त्वप-
कर्षणे पटसङ्गावानुपलब्धिवत् ॥ ९१ ॥

Whether things are other than ideas.

Aph. 91.—But, in consequence of their being undistinguishable from thought, there is no apprehension of any possession of a separate self in entities,—just as there is no apprehension of the actual existence of a web when the threads have been removed.

a. The 'but' is for the sake of dividing the section† [from that which went before].

b. Since things are 'undistinguishable from thought,' i. e., since they are expressed indifferently [by the terms which denote ideas], 'there is no apprehension of,' i. e., there cannot be, 'any possession of a separate self,' viz., in the shape of being different from an idea. For, there is such a case of consciousness as [may be represented in the expression] "The knowledge—a *jar*—has

* ननु वाद्धार्याभावात् कुतोऽवयवावयविव्यवच्छेति मत-
मपाकर्षणं वाद्धार्यभङ्गनिराकरणमारभते । प्रमेयत्वं ज्ञानत्व-
व्याप्यं नवेति संशयः । तत्र पूर्वपक्षसङ्गं ॥

† तुः प्रकरणविच्छेदार्थः ॥

occured to me :”—in this instance, by the expressions [placed in opposition, viz.,] “a jar” and “the knowledge,” the indifference of the knowledge and the jar is expressed ;—therefore a thing is not other than the idea ; just as, when a web is discerned, if the threads themselves be removed, or the like, no separate thing [called “web”] remains ;—so moreover the thread is nothing other than its [own constituent] fibres :—but what constitutes a jar, or the like, is just a certain form of knowledge [or modification of thought] :—such is the import,*

c. He clears up this.†

व्याहृतत्वादहेतुः । ९२ ।

This denied. Aph. 92.—This is no argument because of the falsehood [of the assertion.]

a. The alleged argument is not proper, ‘because of the falsehood of the assertion ;’—for a web, in our mental conception of it, is *not* something in the shape of threads ;—for, what is cognized is, that, “Of threads there is a web,” but not, that, “The threads are a web.” In like manner the garment is [formed] by the web, but not by the threads. Moreover, by the very discrimination between the threads and the web it is proved that there

* भावानां बुद्ध्या विवेचनादभेदोऽज्ञेयात् याथात्म्यस्य
ज्ञानभेदलक्षणस्यानुपलब्धिरनुपपत्तिः घटइति ज्ञानं मन
जातमिति ह्यनुभूयते तत्र घटइतिज्ञानमित्यनेन ज्ञानघट-
योरभेद उल्लिख्यते ततो न ज्ञानातिरिक्तो विषयः यथा पटे
विविच्यमाने तन्तूनामेवापकर्षणादावतिरिक्तं न वस्तु एवं
तन्तुरपि नांशुव्यतिरिक्तइति घटत्वादिस्तु ज्ञानस्यैवाकार-
विशेषइति भावः ।

† समाधत्ते ।

are external things. But it is not declared by the idea that there is no distinction between itself and the web, because it [the idea] is not its own object; but, by reflection, it is declared that, when there is an effort of attention, it is the web [—or other external thing—] that is the object.*

b. But then [some one may say], if the threads and the web were different things, they might be perceived separately [—e. g., the web without the threads—], so to this he replies.†

तदाश्रयत्वादपृथग्रहणं ॥ ६३ ॥

An objection met. *Aph.* 93.—It is not perceived separately, because it consists thereof.

a. If you mean by 'perception separately' that the web should be the object of a perception whereof the threads were *not* the object, then to this he replies 'because it consists thereof,' &c: for the web consists of the threads; therefore, as the totality [of the causes of the perception of the threads] is present, the perception of the web *has* the threads as its object. And if you mean [by 'perception separately'] the conviction of a difference, then [we grant you] there really *is* one:—such is the import.‡

* उक्तो हेतुर्न युक्तः व्याहृतत्वात् नहि बुद्ध्या विवेचने पटस्य तन्तुरूपता सिध्यति तन्तुतः पटइति हि प्रतीयते न तु तन्तुः पटइति । एवं पटेन प्रावरणं न तु तन्तुभिः । किञ्च तन्तुपट-विवेचनादेव बाह्यार्थसिद्धिः ज्ञानेन तु स्वस्मिन् पटाभेदे नोऽस्मिन्नस्ति स्वाविषयकत्वादानुव्यवसायेन तु पटविषयकत्वं व्यवसाये समुच्चिद्यते ॥

† ननु तन्तुपटयोर्भेदे पार्थक्येन ग्रहणं स्यादित्यत्राह ।

‡ पृथग्रहणं यदि तन्त्वविषयकप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं पटस्यापा-द्यते तन्नोत्तरं तदाश्रयत्वादिति पटो हि तन्त्वाश्रितः तेन

b. But then [some one may say], since both parties have settled that there are ideas; and since it is simpler to suppose that this [the idea] alone is the *thing*, it should be settled that there is no "thing" other than that [viz., other than an idea];—so to this he replies.*

प्रमाणतश्चार्थप्रतिपत्तेः । ६४ ।

A false simplification rejected.

Aph. 94.—And since things are established by proofs, [the argument from simplicity is not in point.]

a. The "and" connects the preceding argument† [with the present one].

b. Since 'things,' i. e., jars, and the like, 'are established,' i. e., are due to proofs [or "causes of *right* notion"]. And so, in the case of a thing that is established by [irrefragable] evidence, cumbrousness does not exclude: such is the import. Otherwise even *knowledge* would not be proved to exist, because [forsooth] of the cumbrousness [of the hypothesis]; so that we should come [for simplicity] to there being *nothing at all*.‡

सामग्रीसत्त्वात्पटप्रत्यक्षस्य तन्तुविषयकत्वं । घटि च भेद-
प्रत्यय आपाद्यते तदा भवत्येवेति भावः ॥

• ननु ज्ञानस्योभयवादि सिद्धत्वात्तन्मात्रपदार्थकल्पने लाघ-
वात्तदतिरिक्तपदार्थाभावसिद्धिः स्यादित्यत आह ॥

† पूर्वोक्तहेतुं समुच्चिनोति चकारः ॥

‡ अर्थस्य घटादेः प्रतिपत्तेः प्रमाणाधीनत्वात् । तथाच
प्रामाणिकेऽर्थे गौरवं न बाधकमिति भावः अन्यथा ज्ञानमपि
न सिध्येद्गौरवादिति शून्यतापत्तिः ॥

c. Nor is it possible to prove that external things do *not* exist, —so he says.*

प्रमाणोपपत्त्यनुपपत्तिभ्यां ॥ ९५ ॥

That the external does not exist cannot be proved.

Aph. 95.—By there being, or not being, a proof, [the non-existence of external things is incapable of being demonstrated].

a. Supply—the non-existence of the external cannot be proved, because there is an inconsistency. In regard to the proposition “The external is not,” if there be any proof of it, then, since the proof, which is something external, exists, it is not true that the external does not exist. Again, if there is not [any proof], then it [the proposition] is not established, because it is destitute of evidence. Moreover, if there is any proof that there is a jar, or the like, then by *that* it is established that there is something external :—now if there be no such proof, then how dost thou suppose, when speaking of “a jar,” that the knowledge has the form of a jar ?—for mere knowledge does not spring up [—without being the knowledge of something or other].

b. But then [some one may say], this talk about proof and object of proof does not go to the bottom of the question, but cognitions of this or that form, just in virtue of the ripening of

* नवा वाह्यार्थाभावसाधनं सम्भवतीत्याह ॥

† व्याघातात् न वाह्याभावइति शेषः । वाह्यं नास्तीत्यत्र यदि प्रमाणमस्ति तदा प्रमाणस्य वाह्यस्य सत्त्वान्न वाह्याभावः । अथ नास्ति तदा निष्प्रमाणकत्वान्न तत्सिद्धिरित्यर्थः । किञ्च घटादौ यदि प्रमाणमस्ति तदा ततएव वाह्यार्थसिद्धिः । अथाप्रमाणं तदा कथं घटइति ज्ञानस्य घटाकारत्वं मग्यवे ज्ञानस्यैवानुत्पत्तेरिति ॥

mental impressions [—see Yoga Aphorisms B. II. §13, b,—], display themselves, just like cognitions in a dream, or like perceptions produced by magic:—so, with reference to this, he dubitates through two aphorisms.*

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः ॥ ९६ ॥

Whether external appearances are delusive. *Aph. 96.*—Like the conceit of things in a dream [—says some one—], is this conceit of proofs and objects of proof.

मायागम्बर्वनगरमृगतृष्णावद्वा ॥ ९७ ॥

Aph. 97.—Or like jugglery, or the city of the celestial quirs-ters, or the mirage.

a. [The meaning of this is] plain.†

b. He clears up the point.‡

हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः ॥ ९८ ॥

This denied. *Aph. 98.*—This is not proved, because of the absence of any proof.

a. It is not proved that the external does not exist, 'because of the absence of any proof,' i. e., because there is no evidence [that such is the fact]. Or the meaning is, if you do not admit the existence of 'proofs,' such as Sight, &c., you can have no such notions as "This is a jar," &c. And you are not to say that

* ननु प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारो न पारमार्थिकः परन्तु विज्ञानानि तत्तदाकारकाणि वासनापरिपाकवशादेव स्वाप्नप्रत्ययवदैन्द्रजालिकप्रतीतिवच्चाविर्भवन्तीत्याशयेन शङ्कते सूत्राभ्यां ॥

† स्पष्टं ।

‡ समाधत्ते ।

this [possession of notions of things, without there being anything external,] may be through the power of mental impressions; because, if these mental impressions are something other [than knowledge], then it seems that you do admit something external. We may hint, too, that since these mental impressions are continuous, we should [—if vision, &c., depended thereon—] find the visible, &c., to be continuous, [whereas, on the contrary, we find that we see only so long as what we call the object remains in view].*

b. But then [some one may say], like cognitions in a dream, or like imaginary cognitions, other cognitions also may be devoid of real objects, and also destitute of a cause;—therefore he says.†

स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवच्च स्वप्नविषयाभिमानः ॥ ९९ ॥

*The stuff of
dreams what.*

Aph. 99.—The conceit of objects in a dream is as in the case of remembrance and imagination.

a. Supply,—it has for its objects what had been previously perceived.‡

* वाह्याभावस्यासिद्धिः हेत्वभावात् प्रमाणाभावात् अथवा हेतोश्चक्षुरादेरनभ्युपगमे घटोऽयमित्यादिज्ञानानामसिद्धिरित्यर्थः । नच वासनावशात्स्यादिति वाच्यं वासनाया अतिरिक्तत्वे वाह्योपगमप्रसङ्गात् वासनायाः सन्तन्यमानतया चाक्षुषादेरपि सन्तानापत्तिरिति दिक् ।

† नन्वसद्विषया अहेतुका अपि स्वाप्नप्रत्यया इव भावनाप्रत्यया इव परेऽपि प्रत्यया भवेयुरित्यत आह ॥

‡ पूर्वोपलब्धविषयइति शेषः ।

b. But then, if even error has its real objects, how is it to be averted? Pondering this doubt, he says.*—

मित्योपलब्धिविनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात् स्वप्नविषयाभिमान-
प्रणाशवत् प्रतिबोधे ॥ १०० ॥

How false notions may cease. Aph. 100.—False apprehension is put an end to by knowledge of the truth, just as the conceit of [the existence of] the objects in a dream comes to an end on awaking.

a. But he who is called a Mádhyamika, having come to the conclusion of the non-existence of the external;—in conformity with that example, makes out the non-existence of knowledge also. It is in opposition to this person that he says.†—

बुद्धैश्चैवं निमित्तसङ्गावोपलम्भात् ॥ १०१ ॥

Knowledge really is. Aph. 101.—And in the same way [there is no reasonable denial of the existence] of knowledge, because we are conscious of the reality of its cause.

a. 'In the same way,' i. e., as in the case of the external, knowledge also is not to be denied [to exist], 'because we are conscious of the reality of its cause,'—for that which has a cause is a real thing,‡ [—and the cause of knowledge is the

* ननु भ्रमस्यापि सद्विषयकत्वे तत्प्रतिरोधः कथं स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह ॥

† माध्यमिकस्तु बाह्यासत्त्वं प्रसाध्यते तद्दृष्टान्तेन बुद्धेरप्यसत्त्वं साधयति तं प्रत्याह ॥

‡ एवं बाह्यवद्बुद्धेरपि न प्रतिषेधः निमित्तसङ्गावोपलम्भात् सहेतुकत्वस्य प्रमितत्वात् ॥

object,—the non-existence of which we refuse to concede to the Mádhyamika,—and the conjunction of the sense-organ there-with—].

b. Nor, by [instancing] the example of false notion, can it be [proved] that knowledge in general has an absolutely unreal object, or has not any real object ;—so he says.*—

तत्त्वप्रधानभेदाच्च मिथ्याबुद्धिविधोपपत्तिः ॥ १०२ ॥

The precise nature of a mistake. Aph. 102.—And we find that there is a two-fold character [even] in a false cognition, because of the distinction between the reality and the principal [appearance—such as offers itself.]

a. 'The reality,' i. e., the nature of the thing ;—'the principal [appearance,'] i. e., what is imputed, [as when the imputation of silver is cast on mother o'pearl, or that of a snake is cast upon a rope seen in the twilight,—see *Vedānta-Sāra* §20 :]—and so, in the case of a mistake, there is the fact of being right knowledge in one part, viz., in the thing [—for, when one, mistakingly, thinks "This is silver,"—it being actually mother o'pearl,—he is right in thinking "This is"—], and there is the nature of error in one part, viz., in the imputed character of silver ;—so that the example [by which the opponent thought to prove his case] is not a fact :—such is the import. †

* नवा मिथ्याबुद्धिदृष्टान्तेन ज्ञानमात्रस्यासम्भवाच्च विषयकत्वं सद्विषयकत्वाभावो वा सम्भवतीत्याह ।

† तत्त्वं धर्मिस्वरूपं प्रधानं आरोप्यं तथाच धमे धर्म्ये प्रमात्वमारोप्यरजतत्वाद्यं च धमत्वमिति दृष्टान्तासिद्धिरिति भावः । केचित्तु प्रमात्वाप्रमात्वयोर्विरोधात्प्रैकत्र समावेश इत्यत आह तत्त्वेति । तथाच विषयभेदाच्च विरोध इति भाव इत्याहुः ।

b. Here ends the section confuting the denial of external things.*

c. But then the knowledge of the truth, due to the Institute, is momentary;—therefore, on its perishing, there must be just false notions; for no knowledge whatever is such as to be adequate to the uprooting of false notions firmly founded and habitual; therefore he commences a section on the augmentation of the knowledge of truth. The augmentation [or re-inforcement] of the knowledge of truth means the *habit* of thinking the truth; and it is therefrom that there is the complete annihilation of false notions. Here he states the means of the augmentation of the knowledge of truth.†

SECTION XVIII.

HOW THE KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH IS TO BE RE-INFORCED.

समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात् ॥ १०३ ॥

The habit of right knowledge how acquired.

Aph. 103.—[Knowledge of the truth is rendered habitual] by the practice of special meditation.

a. 'Meditation' is fixedness of thought upon some chosen object [—see Yoga Aphorisms B. I. §17 and 51—]; its perfection consists in abstractedness from all other objects; by the 'prac-

* समाप्तं वाच्यार्थभङ्गनिराकरणप्रकरणं ॥

† ननु शास्त्राधीनं तत्त्वज्ञानं क्षणिकमतस्तस्मात् मिथ्याज्ञानं स्यादेव नहि तादृशं किञ्चिदेव ज्ञानं इदमभूमिसवासनमिथ्याज्ञानसमुत्पूलनक्षममतस्तत्त्वज्ञानविट्टिप्रकरणमारभते । तत्त्वज्ञानविट्टिस्तत्त्वज्ञानवासना । ततश्चात्यन्तिको मिथ्याज्ञाननाशः तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानविट्टौ हेतुमाह ॥

tion,' or re-iteration, thereof, there is augmentation of the knowledge of truth.*

b. But then, objects some one in a couple of aphorisms, Meditation positively does not commence, by reason of obstruction through Desire, &c †

नार्थविशेषप्रावल्यात् । १०४ ।

दुधादिभिः प्रवर्तनाच्च । १०५ ।

Whether Meditation be possible.

Aph. 104.—Not so [—objects some one—], by reason of the predominance of some particular object.

Aph. 105.—And by reason of one's being impelled to action by hunger, &c.

a. By reason of the 'predominance of,' i. e., the inveterate association, of affection for 'some particular object,' e. g., a son, a wife, or the like, it is impossible to leave off one's attention thereto; so that it [Meditation] cannot take place:—and it may be prevented by one's perceiving the thundering of a cloud, and so on. Likewise, being obstructed by hunger, thirst, fear, &c., one must exert one's self for the removal of these, ‡ [and this is incompatible with Meditation.]

* समाधिः चित्तस्याभिमतविषयनिष्ठत्वं तस्य प्रकर्षो विषयान्तरानभिष्वङ्गलक्षणसस्याभ्यासात् पौनःपुन्यात् तत्त्वज्ञानविट्टिः ॥

† ननु रागादिभिः प्रतिबन्धात् समाधिरेव नोदेतीत्याक्षिपति सूत्राभ्यां ॥

‡ अर्थविशेषस्य तनयविनतादिरागस्य प्रावल्याच्चिरकालानुबन्धात्तदनुसन्धानमवच्छेनीयमिति तदभावः स्वाच्च

b. He refutes this.*

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ १०६ ॥

How Meditation is possible.

Aph. 106.—It may arise through the possession of the fruits of former works.

a. That is to say, Meditation [may be effected] through the force of the habit generated by meditation practised in a previous life.†

b. He informs us of the places [suitable] for the practice of Meditation.‡

अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु योगाभ्यासोपदेशात् ॥ १०७ ॥

Places suitable for Meditation.

Aph. 107.—For we are instructed to practice Meditation in a forest, a cave, an alluvial island, or the like.

a. That is to say, steadiness of thought is possible in such places. Some say that this is not an aphorism, but [a passage of the] *Bhāshya*.§

घनगजितादिज्ञानेन प्रतिबन्धः । एवं क्षुत्तृष्णाभयादिभिः
प्रतिबन्धस्तदुपशमाय प्रयतेत ॥

* परिहरति ॥

† जन्मान्तरकृतसमाधिजन्यसंस्कारवशात् समाधिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ योगाभ्यासस्थानमुपदिशति ॥

§ तत्र स्थिरचिन्ता स्यादिति भावः । इदं न सूत्रं किन्तु भाष्यमिति केचित् ॥

b. An indifferent person throws out a doubt.*

अपवर्गेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्गः । १०८ ।

A doubt. *Aph.* 108.—At that rate, it [viz., attachment to loved objects,] would present itself even in Emancipation.

a. 'At that rate [—referring to §104—] it would present itself,'—i. e., by reason of the predominance of some particular object, the conception of the object would present itself.†

b. He clears up this.‡

न निष्पन्नावश्यन्भावित्वात् । १०९ ।

This disposed of. *Aph.* 109.—Not so,—because that which he has gone out of is what must necessarily be, [—otherwise the thoughts which you refer to cannot occur—].

a. 'That which he has gone out of,' i. e., the body, &c. Because this is 'what must necessarily be,' i. e., because this is what is the cause,—supply—in respect of notions, &c.,§ [which, therefore do not belong to the disembodied].

b. But then, what has that to do with the case?—so he tells us.||

तदभावश्चापवर्गे । ११० ।

* तटस्थः शङ्कते ।

† एवं प्रसङ्गः अर्थविशेषप्रावल्याद्विषयावभासप्रसङ्गः ।

‡ समाधत्ते ।

§ निष्पन्नस्य शरीरादेः अवश्यन्भावित्वात् कारवत्त्वात् ज्ञानादिष्विति शेषः ।

|| ननु किमेतावतेत्यत आह ।

*The emancipated
are disembodied.*

Aph. 110.—And in Emancipation there is the non-existence of that.

a. There is the non existence 'of that,' i. e., of the body, &c:—because of the having got rid of the merit and demerit which originate it [—see B. III. §132—]: such is the import.*

b. He mentions the means of accomplishing Meditation.†

तदर्थं यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारो योगाच्चात्मविध्यु-
पायैः । १११ ।

*Practical
rules.*

Aph. 111.—With a view thereto, let there be a purifying of the soul by abstinence [from evil] and observance [of duties], and by the means of those rules regarding the soul [which are to be learned] from the Yoga Institute.

a. 'With a view thereto,' i. e., with a view to Emancipation. Or, as in the *Bhāshya*, &c., 'with a view thereto' means with a view to Meditation.‡ [Regarding the terms in this aphorism, see the Yoga Aphorisms B. II. §29].

b. But then at that rate [—i. e., if the chief End of Man be attainable through the rules of the Yoga—] what is the use of [the present Institute of] Logic. To this he replies.§

ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासस्तद्विद्यैः सह सम्वादः । ११२ ।

* तस्य शरीरादेरभावः तदारम्भकधर्माधर्माविरहादिति भावः ।

† समाधिसाधनान्याह ।

‡ तदर्थमपवर्गार्थमिति भाष्यादौ तदर्थं समाधर्थमिति

वा ।

§ नन्वेवं किमान्वीक्षित्येत्यत आह ।

*Use of the present
Institute.*

Aph. 112.—The practice of perusing this Institute, and communication with those learned in it, [are advisable with a view to Emancipation].

a. 'With a view thereto' is borrowed [from §111]. The 'institute,' i. e., that whereby something is understood,—meaning the present Institute.*

b. With a view to showing the method of communication, he says.†

तं शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोऽर्थिभिरनसह-
युभिरभ्युपेयात् । ११३ ।

*With whom we should
communicate.*

Aph. 113.—He should approach him, [and he should also communicate] with disciples, preceptors attended by disciples, eminent persons, desirous of Emancipation,—they being unenvious.

a. 'Him,' i. e., him who understands it [viz., the Nyáya Institute]. 'Attended by disciples,' i. e., having readers with them. 'Eminent,' i. e., pre-eminently intelligent. 'Desirous of emancipation,' i. e., wishing for salvation. Some one says that the word (*viśiṣṭa*) which we have translated 'eminent,' means 'other than those mentioned earlier in the list.' He says 'unenvious' in order to exclude those who desire [not truth but] victory.‡

b. He states the manner of communication.§

* तदर्थमित्यनुवर्त्तते ज्ञायतेऽनेनेति ज्ञानं शास्त्रं प्रकृतं ॥

† संवादप्रकारं दर्शयितुमाह ॥

‡ तं तद्विद्यं । सब्रह्मचारी सहाध्यायी । विशिष्टः प्रकृत-
ज्ञानवान् । श्रेयोऽर्थी मुमुक्षुः । विशिष्टः पूर्वोक्तभिन्न इत्यर्थे
इति कश्चित् । विजिगीषुव्यावृत्त्यर्थं अनसहयुभिरिति ॥

§ संवादप्रकारमाह ॥

प्रतिपक्षहीनमपि वा प्रयोजनार्थमर्थित्वे । ११४ ॥

How we should communicate.

Aph. 114.—Moreover, verily, for the sake of the motive [viz., certainty], so as that there be no opposite opinion, [one should communicate with those learned in the Institute,]—provided all desire the object [truth].

a. The word 'verily' [—as we have here rendered the particle *vā*—] is intended for precision. 'Provided all desire the object,' i. e., there being a desire to know the truth. 'For the sake of the motive,' i. e., for the sake of ascertaining the truth. 'So as that there be no opposite side,' i. e., so as that there may be no adverse side,—so should he enter upon [this communication with the unenvious learned]. And to this effect the *Bhāshya* says—"Not having established any side of his own, he should clear his own view;"—the import being, that, through desire of ascertaining the truth, one should take up no side.*

b. Here ends the section regarding the augmentation of the knowledge of truth.†

c. In order that there may not be the mistake of supposing that, when we say [§112] "communication with those learned in it," &c., communication is to be made with those who are

* वाशब्दे निश्चयार्थः । अर्थित्वे तत्त्वबुभुक्षायां सत्यां ।
प्रयोजनार्थं तत्त्वनिर्णयार्थं । प्रतिपक्षहीनं प्रतिकूलपक्षहीनं
यथा स्यात्तथाऽभ्युपेयात् । तथाच भाष्यं स्वपक्षमनवस्थाप्य
स्वदर्शनं परिशोधयेदिति । तत्त्वनिर्णीषुतया न पक्षपात
इति भावः ॥

† समाप्तं तत्त्वज्ञानविट्टिप्रकरणं ॥

outside the pale of the triad [of Vedas], he commences a section on the preservation of the knowledge of truth.*

SECTION XIX.

ON THE GUARDING THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRUTH.

तत्त्वाथवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे वीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत् ॥ ११५ ॥

The function of wrangling, &c. Aph. 115.—For the sake of guarding the knowledge of the truth, there are wranglings and cavils, just as, for the sake of guarding the growth of the seed, there is the clothing of the branches with thorns.

a. 'The knowledge of the truth,' i. e., certainty as to the truth. 'Guarding' means the dispelling of doubts as to one's correctness by destroying the objections alleged by others. For this purpose are the wranglings and cavils already mentioned [at B. I. §§42 and 43]:—so much is to be supplied.†

b. But then, what is to be done with these two [—viz., wrangling and cavilling—]? To this replied.‡

* तद्विद्वैः सह संवाद इत्यत्र त्रयीवाह्यैः सह संवादः कर्त्तव्य इति भ्रमो मा भूदिति तत्त्वज्ञानपरिपालनप्रकरणमारभते ॥

† तत्त्वाथवसायस्य तत्त्वनिर्णयस्य संरक्षणं परोक्तदूषणास्तन्दनेनाप्रामाण्यशङ्काविघटनं तदर्थं जल्पवितण्डे पूर्वमूक्ते इति शेषः ॥

‡ ननु ताभ्यां किङ्कार्थमित्यत आह ॥

ताभ्यां विगृह्य कथनं ॥ ११ ई ॥

The occasion for this.

Aph. 116.—Discourse [is to be made] with these [appliances], when *contending*, [i. e., when arguing against *heretics*].

a. The meaning is this, that, if his view is called in question by those [heretics] who are outside the pale of the triad [of Vedas], wrongly thinking persons who are ill-disposed towards the study of this Institute, or others, then [he is to discourse] 'with these two,' i. e., with wranglings and cavillings. And this is [enjoined] with strict limitation [to the case of heretics]; but when those [orthodox] who fall within the pale of the triad make objections, he may discourse either with honest discussion [B. I. §41], or with wrangling, or with cavilling, accordingly as he pleases :—such is the import.*

b. But in reality he who is desirous of Emancipation holds no communication with such, because he is devoid of desire; nor, moreover, is it any aim of his to defend the Institute; nor does he go to the Institute with any positive contempt for this [business of defending it,—which he nevertheless neglects]; but he should habitually study the Institute,—such is the fact.†

* अयमर्थः त्रयीवाह्यैः तद्दर्शनाभ्यासाहितकुञ्जनैरपरै-
र्ष्वी यदि स्वपक्ष आक्षिप्यते तदा ताभ्यां जल्पवितण्डाभ्यां ।
सावधारणं चेतत् । त्रय्यन्तःपातिनामाक्षेपे तु वादजल्पवित-
ण्डाभिर्यथेच्छकथयेदिति भावः ॥

† वस्तुतस्तु मुमुक्षोर्न तादृशैः सह संवादो वीतराग-
त्वान्नहि शास्त्रपरिपालनमपि तदुद्देश्यं नवा तदुपेक्षयैव
शास्त्रं गच्छति किन्तु शास्त्रमभ्यस्येतेति तत्त्वमिति ॥

c. Here ends the section on the guarding of the knowledge of the truth.*

d. Here ends the Second Diurnal Portion of the Fourth Book.†

e. So much for the Fourth Book of the Commentary on the Aphorisms of the Nyáya, the work of the venerable Viswanátha Siddhántapanchánana Bhaṭṭáchárya, the son of the great teacher the venerable Vidyánivása Bhaṭṭáchárya.‡

* समाप्तं तत्त्वज्ञानपरिपालनप्रकरणं ॥

† समाप्तं चतुर्थाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकं ॥

‡ इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीमद्विद्यानिवासभट्टाचार्यात्मज-
श्रीविश्वनाथसिद्धान्तपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्यकृतावां न्यायसूत्रवृ-
त्तौ चतुर्थोऽध्यायः ॥

END OF BOOK IV.

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28.	Tarka Sangraha,	8 do.	Sansk., Hindí, Eng.
29.	Synopsis of Science, Vols. I. & II., R. 1, & 14 as.		Sanskrit & English.
30.	Ditto Ditto, Book 1,	8 annas	Hindí & English.
31.	Bacon's Novum Organum, Part 1,	12 do.	Sanskrit & English.
32.	Lectures on the Nyāya Philosophy, 2d Ed. revised,	10½ annas,	Ditto Ditto.
33.	Elements of Logic,	1: 2: 0	English.
34.	Aphorisms of the Nyāya, Part II,	15 annas	Sanskrit & English.
35.	Aphorisms of the Nyāya, Part III & IV, 1: 6: 0		Ditto Ditto.
36.	Metaphysics and Mental Philosophy, No. 4, 2: 0: 0		English.

मौल्य सहित पुस्तकों के नाम जो श्रीयुत बेलगटाइन
साहिब से बनी हैं पाठशाला के उपकारार्थ ।

पुस्तकनाम	रूपया	आना	पाई	भाषानाम	
१ इङ्गलिष ग्रामर	:	१	:	अङ्गरेज़ी	
२ इण्ट्राडक्शन् टु लाजिक :		८	:	तथा	
३ लेक्चर्ज़ आन किमिस्त्री :		१२	:	तथा	
४ चौटलाइन्ज़ आफ़ मेटेफिज़िक्स	}	८	:	तथा	
५ पेरेफ्रेज़ आफ़ मक्- बेठ [शेक्सपीयर्ज़]	}	१	८	:	तथा
६ भाषापरिच्छेद और सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली पहला भाग	}	:	७	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेज़ी
७ एलिमेण्टस् आफ़ इङ्ग- लिश ग्रामर	}	:	१२	:	तथा
८ लघुकौमुदी पहला भाग १ :		८	:	तथा	
९ भाग २ :		८	:	तथा	
१० भाग ३ :		८	:	तथा	
११ तथा भाग १ :		८	:	संस्कृत और हिन्दी	
१२ लेक्चर्ज़ आन दि सब- डिविज़न्ज़ आफ़ नालेज वा विद्याचक्र भाग १ २ ३ ४ प्रत्येक	}	:	४	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेज़ी

पुस्तकनाम	रूपया	आना	पाई	भाषानाम	
१३ षोडशाईंज आक्र संस्कृत ग्रामर वा बालबोध	}	:	८	:	संस्कृत और हिन्दी
१४ रीप्रिण्ट्स् फार दि पण्डित् भाग १					
१५ भाग २	:	:	८	:	तथा
१६ भाग ३	:	:	१२	:	तथा
१७ भाग ४	:	:	८	:	तथा
१८ भाग ५	:	:	८	:	तथा
१९ लेक्चर्ज आन दि न्याय फिलासोफी वा तर्कसंग्रह	}	:	८	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेजी
२० लेक्चर्ज आन दि सांख्य फ़िलासोफ़ी वा तत्त्वसमास					
२१ तथा वेदान्त	:	:	८	:	तथा
२२ फर्स्ट लेसंज् इन् संस्कृत ग्रामर	}	:	४	:	तथा
२३ हितोपदेश भाग १					
२४ स्क्रेच आक्र आपरे- यंज् इन् दि बनारस कालिज	}	:	४	:	अङ्गरेजी
२५ न्यायसूत्र					

पुस्तकनाम	रुपया	आना	पाई	भाषानाम
२६ वैशेषिकसूत्र	:	७	:	तथा
२७ मीमांसासूत्र	:	७	:	तथा
२८ साङ्ख्यसूत्र	:	१२	:	तथा
२९ योगसूत्र भाग १ } और २ प्रत्येक }	:	८	:	तथा
३० वेदान्तसूत्र	:	७	:	तथा
३१ तर्कसंग्रह	:	८	:	संस्कृत अङ्ग- रेजी हिन्दी
३२ सिनाप्सिस् आफ़ सैअं न } न्यायकौमुदी भाग १ } १	:	:	:	संस्कृत अङ्ग- रेजी
३३ भाग २	:	१४	:	तथा
३४ तथा भाग १	:	८	:	हिन्दी और अङ्गरेजी
३५ बेकन्ज़ नेवम् आर- गनम् बेकनीयसूत्र- व्याख्यान }	:	१२	:	संस्कृत और अङ्गरेजी
३६ पुनः शोधित और } मद्वित तर्कसंग्रह }	:	१०	:	तथा
३७ एलिमेण्टस् आफ़ लाजिक }	१	२	:	अङ्गरेजी
३८ न्यायसूत्र भाग ३ } और ४ प्रत्येक }	१	६	:	संस्कृत अङ्गरेजी
३९ मेटेफिजिक्स एण्ड मैटल फिलासोफी }	२	:	:	अङ्गरेजी